storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

On 10 August the Chief of the HV General Staff presented to the President of the
Republic a summary report on the execution and course of the operation. Th e report
also referred to certain conduct and command problems. 508 During the operation major
problems were observed in the organization and security of communications systems
and equipment. Th e insuffi cient availability of communications facilities in the units,
particularly in the mobilized brigades and regiments, complicated and hampered the
organization of communications, which directly infl uenced the possibility of having a
timely insight into the situation on the battleground and slowed down decision-making
and command.
On the Serbian side the command system was disrupted by force division into two
groups, one comprising the Lika and North Dalmatian Corps under the command of the
SVK General Staff , and the second the remaining forces under the command of General
Mile Novaković. 509 Th e real threat strategy turned out to be a complete failure, apart
from the fact that the SVK did not have the capability for its implementation. Th e same
applied to the SVK trusted Special Unit Corps, the worst of all SVK corps committed in
Storm.
In the initial part of the operation the main task of the HV was the disruption of the
Serbian communications system and pushing back Serbian artillery and rocket systems
within range of Croatian towns and industrial plants. Th e next step involved control over
the approaches to Knin, the passes on Mount Velebit and at Ljubovo, the penetration of
the 1 st Guards Brigade from Lika towards the Bihać area and of the 2 nd Guards Brigade
across the Banovina region. Th e fi rst day of the operation was not so effi cient, perhaps, in
terms of advance on the ground, but the concurrent pressure along the entire front line
had a bearing on the decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on front “reduction”.
One of the rare accessible SVK documents on events on that particular day states that
the HV attack on the SVK started at 0500 hours “by the shelling of the towns of Knin,
Drniš, Udbina, Benkovac, Karin, Obrovac, Gračac, Korenica, the Udbina airstrip,
Vojnić, Vrginmost and Petrinja ... At about 0600 the ustashi mounted an infantry attack
from Sunja towards Kostajnica involving tank commitment, but the 39 th Corps repulsed
successfully the assault. Th e infantry attack started from Brlog - Drenov Klanac - village
of Glavace, but it was beaten off ”. 510
Th e situation did not change substantially by the end of the day. Th e HV score some
tactical successes, the major one being the forced crossing of the river Sava in Banovina.
At that point it turned out that the weakest link of the RSK (and the SVK) was its
President and Commander-in-chief M. Martić. In the night of 4/5 August he literally
broke down the SVK by his decision to cut down the front in Northern Dalmatia, even
if the SVK had already been dented by the HV operations on Mount Dinara and was not
508 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-456 of 10 August 1995; Summary
report.
509 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 175-176.
510 Command of the 11th Infantry Brigade, str. conf. 23972-95 of 4 August 1995; unit briefi ng.
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