storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

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UNCRO, UN AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
Early in 1992 the internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis brought the UN
peacekeeping forces to Croatia. Th ey were a compromise, and the Republic of
Croatia was not satisfi ed with their performance; neither were the rebel Serbs.
Th e Croats expected the full reintegration of the occupied areas, the demilitarization of
Serbian forces, the return of displaced persons and the establishment of the constitutional
order throughout the territory of the Republic of Croatia. On the other side, the rebel
Serbs experienced the plan as a recognition of their sovereignty over the territory in
which they revolted and which the JNA had conquered for them. In their view the
international forces were to play the role of the JNA, of an armed force separating them
from the Croatian armed forces.
Nothing signifi cant happened even aft er the redefi nition of the role of the peacekeeping
forces in the spring of 1995. UNCRO was as ineffi cient as UNPROFOR had been. In the
second half of July 1995 the Serbs expected a Croatian attack every day, and the view
prevailed among them that UNCRO was pro-Croatian and against the RSK. 488 Some
commanders, e.g., the commander of the 11 th Infantry Brigade of the SVK Kordun Corps,
even ordered, as a precaution, on 1 August the blockade of UN forces: their crossing
into the Republic of Croatia was to be prevented, and the troops disarmed and held as
hostages. Th ey were not to be insulted or mistreated. 489 It can be assumed that the order
was not an isolated event but rather a response to a circular memo.
On the Croatian side, e.g., in the case of the Karlovac Corps District, offi cers in
charge of liaison with UN forces transmitted to the UN personnel the “recommendation
concerning risk of movement in the zone of responsibility of the Corps”. Aft er this notice
“UNCRO, UNMO and ECMM activities ceased and the personnel withdrew to their
bases”. 490 Th e concentration of Croatian forces for Storm did not go unnoticed. On 4
August, at 0200 hours, Hrvoje Šarinić, Chief of Staff of the Republic of Croatia, personally
called the UNCRO commander, the French General Bernard Janvier, and informed him
about the impending action. 491 Furthermore, one hour before the start of the operation
liaison offi cers informed the commanders of the UNCRO sectors about the impending
488 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao uBeogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 44.
489 Command of the 11th Inf. Brig., str. conf. no 230/1, 1 August 1995; Order.
490 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl.81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95.558 of 3 August 1995; Daily operational
report.
491 H. Šarinić, “Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem 1993-95(98)” (All My Secret Negotiations
with Slobodan Milošević 1993-95/98), 262.