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148
RESPONSE OF THE SVK SLAVONIA-BARANJA CORPS,
THE VRS AND THE VJ
Although the SVK commitment plan clearly regulated the mission and
commitments of the Slavonia - Baranja Corps, it failed to produce any impact on
developments in the theatre. Th e Corps was fully mobilized, but did not pursue
its war plan mission for political reasons. Th e position of the Corps was specifi c. It was
physically separated from the other parts of the SVK and leaned directly on the Yugoslav
Army, i.e., on its Novi Sad Corps. According to the war plan they were supposed to act
together. Th at did not take place because the Yugoslav leadership, S. Milošević, did not
approve off ensive action. Because of this the Slavonia - Baranja Corps focused on decisive
defence and occasional provocative artillery and infantry fi re against Croatian positions.
Th e Intelligence Directorate of the HV General Staff was fully right in its assessment that
“there was no major commitment of the 11 th Corps because of the lack of any decision
by the SRJ leadership” and that “the artillery attacks and minor assaults along the front
were geared to providing ‘moral support’ rather than being actual endeavours to carry
out off ensive operations”. 480
Until 1700 hours on 5 August two civilians were killed, 12 persons were wounded
(out of whom 5 civilians), and one soldier went missing between Nuštar and Marinci,
because of the fi re from the 11 th Corps. Serbian artillery caused great material damage
because it did not attack only HV positions but settlements as well. Th e HV responded
with artillery fi re. 481 On 5 August a plane out of Vukovar rocketed Nuštar on three
occasions. 482 On the same day an attempt was made to mount an infantry and armour
assault towards Cerić - Nuštar and Jankovac - Hendrikovac. 483 Th ere were no further
attacks. As M. Sekulić noted bitterly, the Slavonia-Baranja Corps “behaved as if it were
part of the Yugoslav Army rather than of the Serbian Army of the Krajina. 484
Th e agreed action of the Army of Republika Srpska also failed to materialize. During
Storm it was undergoing a serious internal crisis due to the confl ict between Radovan
Karadžić, RS President and VRS Commander-in-Chief, and General Ratko Mladić, Chief
480 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Intelligence Directorate, cl. 804-08/95-172/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/1-95-1953 of 5
August 1995; Intelligence information.
481 MORH, GSHV: ZO Osijek Command, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-527 od 5 August 1995;
Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-528 of 5 August 1995; Daily
operational report.
482 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-525 of 5 August 1995; Report.
483 MORH, GSHV: IZM GSHV Đakovo, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/119, reg. no. 512-06-04-95-09 of 5 August
1995; Daily operational report.
484 M. Sekulić, ”Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade).