storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

1995). However, his statement about the provision of shelter for the population only in
the “surrounding villages” is denied by the letter of Milivoj Vojnović, “foreign minister of
RSK”, of 5 August, sent to the UNPROFOR spokesman Yury Miyahotnik, informing him
that “the Government of the RSK and the SVK General Staff had decided to immediately
evacuate children, women and old people from the territory of the so-called RSK to
Yugoslavia, and asked for UNPROFOR help”. (Radovan Kovačević, “Ko je doneo odluku
o evakuaciji?”/Who Decided to Evacuate?/; Politika, 27 Aug. 1995).
But all ambiguities about who ordered evacuation, when and to which points were
eliminated at the press conference in Belgrade on 22 August 1995; aft er the fall of the
RSK, that was the fi rst public appearance of the members of its government and assembly,
who actually confi rmed that the political and military leadership of the Serbs in the
Republic of Croatia was responsible for the departure of the Serbs from Croatia. Th at is,
the journalists were shown the “Decision on the evacuation of the population from the
municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac”, issued by the “Supreme
Defence Cuncil” and signed by Milan Martić. In their report of the conference Večernje
novosti and Politika published a facsimile of the “Decision” according to which persons
unfi t for combat duty were supposed to pull out via Otrić towards Srb and Lapac. Th e
full text of the “Decision” was published in Radovan Pavlović’s article “Th e people were
led from Knin by the Supreme Defence Council of RSK” Politika, 23 Aug. 1995): Because
of the new situation caused by the outright general aggression of Croatia against the
RSK, and aft er the fi rst initial defence successes, a substantial part of northern Dalmatia
and part of Lika became endangered, and we have therefore decided as follows: planned
evacuation of all combat-unfi t persons must be carried out from the municipalities of Knin,
Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac. Th e evacuation shall be carried out in accordance
with prepared plans along routes towards Knin and further on via Otrić towards Srb and
Lapac. For evacuation purposes request the help of the UNPROFOR Command for Sector
South headquartered in Knin.
Th e statements of RSK offi cials issued aft er that were attempts to disclaim their
responsibility. Th e “President of the RSK Assembly” Rajko Ležajić stated that he did not
know about the decision, but thought that the population should have been evacuated
only to the neighbouring villages because “the RSK did not even have a professional
army, the people were the army, and it was therefore logical that fathers, husbands,
brothers and sons should follow the weak and the infi rm”. Milan Ivanić, adviser to
Milan Martić, declared the decision to be unlawful because there was no quorum at
the meeting of the VSO (Supreme Defence Council) and all the decisions were made
by Milan Martić and Mile Mrkšić as the other VSO members were not even in Knin.
(Milan Babić was in Belgrade, the “minister of the interior” Tošo Pajić in Kordun, and
the “minister of defence” Milan Šuput in Korenica). In his assessment of the “Decision”
the “foreign minister” Milivoj Vojnović claimed that its goal was to draw the SRJ into war
and confi rmed the existence of a split between two groups, “the negotiation-prone and
the war-mongering one”, in the leadership of the so-called RSK. Although those present
did not give an accurate answer to the question concerning the person who ordered
the retreat of the army (M. Bošnjak, D. Dimitrovska, “Bežaniju naredio Martić”/Martić
14