storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

in the night of 6/7 August and ordered Croatian forces to establish a cease-fi re at 0600
hours in the area of Vojnić - Vrginmost - Glina - Kostajnica - Dvor na Uni. On the
basis of contacts with UNCRO representatives, it was felt that the surrender of Serbian
forces in the Banovina region was a matter of course. According to sources, the Zagreb
Corps District was ordered to prepare a brigade-strong unit, to seize Dvor na Uni
by 0700 accompanied by UNCRO, and to allow only unarmed persons - offi cers and
non-commissioned offi cers would be allowed handguns - to cross into Bosnia and
Herzegovina. All other weapons and materiel were to be handed over to the HV in the
presence of UNCRO. 411
Soon it transpired that this ‘scenario’ would not get off the ground. Th e Serbian side
did not “respect the agreed conditions related to the cease-fi re in the region of Banovina
and the surrender of weapons and military equipment”, and on 7 August in the morning
the Chief of the HV General Staff revoked the cease-fi re order and ordered continuation
of action “in order to eliminate the enemy in Banovina and push on to the state border
of the Republic of Croatian in accordance with earlier orders”. Th e order called attention
to the observance and respect of the Geneva Convention in the treatment of POWs and
civilians. Th e commanders of the Karlovac and Bjelovar Corps Districts, and General
Stipetić, were to be responsible for the execution of the mission. 412 Croatian forces were
prepared to negotiate only in the case of unconditional surrender. 413 However, on the
basis of the order of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman, combat
actions by the Croatian forces were halted in the aft ernoon of 8 August. 414 Soon thereaft er
the news was received that the Kordun Corps had agreed to unconditional surrender
and that General Stipetić was “engaged in technical preparations for the surrender”. 415
Negotiations on the surrender of the Corps started at 1320 hours in the command of the
Ukrainian battalion in Glina, in the presence of UNCRO representatives. Surrender was
signed at about 1400 hours in the Brijuni hotel near Topusko. Croatia was represented by
General Petar Stipetić, and the Serbian side by Colonel Čedo Bulat and Tošo Pajić, RSK
minister of the interior. 416 On the same day in the evening a second meeting was held
411 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-420 of 7 August 1995; Order. General
Stipetić noted that he had never received such an order and that the surrender of all weapons of the
defeated adversary was insisted upon in the negotiations. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić
on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.
412 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-421 of 7 August 1995; Order. Contrary
to the source, General Stipetić stated that he had not been informed about the order and that it could
have been received by General Basarac. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about
the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.
413 MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 347 of 8 August 1995. Just as in the case of the previous
order, General Stipetić claimed that he had never received such an order. HMDCDR: Comments of
General Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.
414 MORH, GSHV: OS RH War diary, note 350 of 8 August 1995.
415 MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 353 of 8 August 1995.
416 MORH, GSHV: Minutes of the surrender of the 21st Kordun Corps, 8 August 1995.
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