storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

As a whole, all its initial problems notwithstanding, ZP Zagreb accomplished its
mission. During Storm it was probably the weakest operational unit of the HV. 406 Poor
and uncoordinated command also distinguished the other side, the SVK Banija Corps.
Because of Croatian oversights in the fi ghting around Petrinja the general impression
of the worth of the Banija Corps and its 31 st Motorized Brigade is higher than its actual
performance. 407 During the operation the casualties of the Zagreb Corps District totalled
80 dead, 380 wounded and 16 missing men. 408
Th e Encirclement and Surrender of the Kordun Corps
On 5 August in the early evening the main body of the Kordun Corps along with part of
the population of the Kordun region was semi-encircled by the Croatian forces. Th e road
towards Lika was cut, and the communication leading via Glina to Dvor na Uni could
be easily threatened. General Mile Novaković, commander of the Serbian forces in the
regions of Kordun and Banovina, ordered the command of the Kordun Corps to reduce
its defence lines and set up positions on the right bank of the river Koran from Skrad to
Tržić. Th e Kordun Coordinating Committee, which sat in session since 4 August as the
government authority, decided to evacuate the population towards Vojnić - Vrginmost -
Glina - Dvor, fearing that Croatian forces could enter Glina and cut the road. As planned,
Glina would be protected by deploying the 2 nd Armoured Brigade of the Special Units
Corps and one company of the 19 th Infantry Brigade at Viduševac. Only the company
executed the order, while the armoured brigade proceeded towards Dvor na Uni. During
the day Croatian and Bosniak forces split the SVK Kordun and Lika Corps entirely at
Rakovica and the Plitvice Lakes. Late on 6 August the Croatian forces entered Glina, and
the main body of the Kordun Corps with about 35,000 civilians remained encircled in
the greater area of Topusko. Th e Corps command applied to UNCRO for protection. 409
Th e HV General Staff intended to commit the 1 st Guards Brigade against the Kordun
Corps. On 6 August in the aft ernoon the brigade was ordered to prepare for the assault
along the Cetingrad - Johovo - Vojnić axis in order to crush Serbian forces, liberate
Vojnić and push on to Topusko, and set up active defence there. 410 Th e Chief of the HV
General Staff halted all off ensive operations against the Serbian forces aft er midnight
406 General Stipetić does not agree with this assessment before thorough research required for it is carried
out. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZPZ in the military-police operation
Storm. In evaluating the action of ZPZ in Storm, believes General Tus, due account should be taken of
the fact that the mistakes committed on the fi rst day were corrected the next day and had no eff ect on the
course of the operation or on its outcome, because by the end of the second day the situation proceeded as
planned in the region of Banovina as well. HMDCDR: General Tus’s review of the text on the military-police
operation Storm.
407 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 239-240.
408 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/3, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213/1 of 13 September 1995; Analysis.
409 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 216-217.
410 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-420 of 6 August 1995; Order.
129