storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Petrova Gora, swept by the MUP RH Special Police, was blocked jointly with the forces of
the Karlovac Corps District until 14 August. 402 Aft er mopping up, on 13 August some units
began to leave the former battlefi eld and return to their home stations, where they were
given a hearty welcome followed by demobilization. 403
128
Conclusion
In terms of its place in the theatre, the Zagreb Corps District (ZZP) occupied a special
place in the Croatian Army. It was larger and stronger than the other corps districts and,
because of the large number of its units, part of them was attached to other corps districts.
According to the order of battle, it was to be reinforced with several HV General Staff units,
among which the 81 st Guards Battalion was particularly signifi cant. However, the Corps
did not receive this and some other reinforcements. Th e plan had to be modifi ed, and units
of the Bjelovar Corps District committed on the Jasenovac - Hrvatska Kostajnica axis as
compensation for the missing reinforcements.
Th e success of the Zagreb Corps District in operation Storm was below expectations.
However, the blame does not seem to lie only with the missing reinforcements. On the very
fi rst day of the operation parts of the 2 nd Guards Brigade got stuck in the assault on Petrinja.
Th e halt of the brigade had an adverse eff ect on the subsequent course of the operation for
the whole Corps District. 404 Th e magnitude of the crisis called for the personal intervention
of the President of the Republic who appointed a new commander of the Croatian forces in
the region of Banovina. Th e report sent by the Chief of the HV General Staff to the President
of the Republic stated that “in breaking through the defences along the Sisak - Petrinja axis,
wrong judgments and wrong manoeuvring decisions of the ZZP commander occasioned
unnecessary casualties and disrupted morale. Th e subsequently achieved success aft er the
arrival and decisions of General Stipetić was not fully exploited because the two-day delay
allowed the withdrawal of a considerable part of the materiel of the 39 th Banija Corps and
the SVK Special Unit Corps”. 405
402 MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Analysis.
403 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/95, reg. no. 2125-02-95-66 of 1 September 1995; Analysis. MORH,
GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 3002-01-90/95-64 of 12 August 1995; Daily report. MORH, GSHV:
ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-Sisak cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 1075-IZpM-1/95-189 of 13 August 1995; Order. MORH,
GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 3002-01-90/95-67 of 14 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: ZZP
Zagreb, cl. 801-02/95-02/76, reg. no. 1075-11/95-2 of 13 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: APO 3008,
cl. 818-01/95-01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Observations. MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl.
8/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Action analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl.
8/95-01/4, reg. no. 3006-07-95-1059 of 4 September 1995; Action analysis.
404 CIA analysts fi nd the cause of HV’s problems in the assault on Petrinja in the decision of the ZPZ commander
to use the 2nd Guards Brigade in order to attack the town directly instead, as originally planned, to
have it bypass and encircle the town. Because of this several HV tanks were knocked out on the approaches
to Petrinja by the SVK 31th Infantry Brigade and thus barred infantry from gaining any signifi cant footholds
in the town. According to the Americans, the secondary attack towards Kostajnica also gained little or
no ground, and only the 125th Home Guard Regiment did a better job as it pushed towards Hrvatska Dubica
along the Una river. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1900-1995; 370.
405 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-595 of 21 August 1995; Report.