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Davor Marijan<br />
S T O R M<br />
1
2<br />
Published by<br />
Croatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre<br />
For the publisher<br />
Ante Nazor, Ph.D.<br />
Editor<br />
Ante Nazor, Ph. D.<br />
Author<br />
Davor Marijan, Ph.D.<br />
Appendix editor<br />
Mate Rupić<br />
English translation<br />
Janko Paravić<br />
Th is translation from Croatian into English has been made possible by Ante Kostelić<br />
Reviewers:<br />
Nikica Barić, Ph.D.<br />
Zdenko Radelić, Ph.D.<br />
Staff General Antun Tus, ret.<br />
Index editor<br />
Željka Križe Gračanin<br />
Document copy<br />
Indira Alpeza<br />
Makeready<br />
Naklada Stih<br />
Printed by<br />
Run<br />
CIP record available in the computer catalogue of the National and University Library<br />
in Zagreb under no. 650140<br />
ISBN 978-953-7493-08-8
Davor Marijan<br />
S T O R M<br />
Zagreb, August 2010<br />
3
Croatian soldier (guardsman)<br />
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Editor’s introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
Author’s biography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170<br />
Appendices (edited by Mate Rupić) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173<br />
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383<br />
List of names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389<br />
List of places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393<br />
5
Knin (the fortress), 6 August 1995 (photograph by Alem Hadžiegrić)<br />
Th e military-police operation Storm deserves to be presented in a study like this. It is the<br />
fullest and most comprehensive account of Storm I have read so far.<br />
6<br />
From the review by Staff General Anton Tus
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION<br />
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION<br />
The signifi cance of the liberation military-police operation Storm for the destiny<br />
of Croatia is extraordinary. With its victorious Storm in August 1995 Croatia<br />
successfully brought to a close a very dramatic period in its history which<br />
started with the armed rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia and the terrorist activity of<br />
Serbian extremists aft er August 1990. Th at was the introduction to the open aggression<br />
against the Republic of Croatia carried out, aft er July 1991, by the armed forces of the<br />
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (JNA and the territorial defence units of Serbia,<br />
Montenegro and Bosnia&Herzegovina), that is, of Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbian<br />
paramilitary, largely pro-chetnik units. It can freely be claimed that the survival of Croatia<br />
within its internationally recognized borders depended on the outcome of Storm, and<br />
that the failure of the operation would have had fateful and lasting consequences for<br />
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. Today, twelve years aft er victory, it is<br />
diffi cult even to imagine the drama behind the decision to launch Storm, because Croatia<br />
would never again, probably, have had another chance to reincorporate the occupied<br />
territory into its constitutional and legal system.<br />
Although a cool scientifi c analysis might show that Operation Storm, because of a<br />
number of problems in its preparation and execution, was not so irreproachable as some<br />
people claim - which is understandable considering the circumstances in which it was<br />
carried out and the great number of mobilized troops - for most Croats and citizens<br />
of other ethnic backgrounds who live in Croatia and consider it their homeland it is<br />
a magnifi cent event. First of all because of its result - the liberation of the occupied<br />
territory of the Republic of Croatia and the rescue of thousands of people from certain<br />
death in Bihać. Th is is why not even comments of military analysts and historians related<br />
to the shortcomings in the implementation of the operation can challenge its success.<br />
Th is is particularly true if we take into account - in the fi nal assessment of the success<br />
of Storm - the fact that such a complex operation was carried out by an army created<br />
in a very short time and organized in wartime conditions aft er Croatia managed to<br />
defend itself, in 1991, from the aggression of the superior Serbian forces and from total<br />
occupation focused on the creation of so-called Greater Serbia. Storm is actually the<br />
crown of Croatia’s Homeland War and the confi rmation of the military skill of Croatian<br />
offi cers, non-commissioned offi cers and soldiers, of their courage and determination,<br />
organization and ability to apply scientifi c achievements, but also of their skill in<br />
improvisation. Regardless of the higher or lower performance of his unit, every Croatian<br />
soldier or policeman who took honourable part in Storm deserves the appreciation and<br />
gratitude of other Croatian citizens who had waited for years for the liberation of their<br />
homeland and for the end of the war.<br />
* We express our deep gratitude to Mr. Ante Kostelić for making this translation possible.<br />
7
Th is crucial operation of the Croatian armed forces has been the subject of almost<br />
everyday discussions or comments. However, there are few studies based on historical<br />
sources such as Dr. Davor Marijan’s Storm. For the fi rst time in Croatian historiography<br />
it presents, chronologically and in terms of the corps districts of the Croatian armed<br />
forces, the preparation and the course of this military-police operation. Although the<br />
book presents relevant documents, it is precisely the lack of accessible sources - mainly<br />
because of still unsorted archive material, but also because some documents are in private<br />
hands - that creates major problems to anybody wishing to write about the operation.<br />
Maybe some people will not be satisfi ed with the presentation of their own role in Storm,<br />
some participants in the events will note, perhaps, certain incorrect data in the mentioned<br />
documents, which may raise the question of the objectivity of specifi c sources, or of their<br />
integrity and accuracy of the mentioned data. Because of that we would kindly ask all<br />
persons having argumented comments with regard to the contents of this study to pass<br />
them on to the Centre, so that we can record and fi le them, and make them available<br />
for a future publication. However, in spite of any possible shortcomings, this study is<br />
an excellent foundation for any future discussion of Operation Storm, the more so as it<br />
would be diffi cult to expect the very fi rst study of this type to answer all questions and<br />
deal with all problems related to a complex event such as this one.<br />
Th is study off ers the public an overview of Operation Storm from the perspective of<br />
a historian, based on currently accessible historical sources. Th e author has limited his<br />
account to the involvement of HV corps districts, and does not present the action of each<br />
brigade separately. Th ere is still hope, however, that this study will stimulate the writing<br />
of special monographs on the role of each corps district in Storm, describing in detail<br />
the engagement of each brigade and its battalions, and other units. Some already exist<br />
(e.g., Jakša Raguž, Th e HV 151 st Samobor Brigade in the War, Samobor, 2006; Aleksandar<br />
Božić - Damir Goršeta, Th e HV 153 rd Velika Gorica Brigade, Velika Gorica, 2002). But<br />
most are still to be written in order to confi rm or correct the current analyses.<br />
It is precisely in order to improve objectivity that distinguished commanders of the<br />
Croatian armed forces were given the opportunity to read the study and the parts related<br />
to specifi c corps districts; their remarks improved the quality and objectivity of the<br />
book, and off ered in some cases diff erent views regarding certain sources. Insight into<br />
written sources and comments by highly-positioned participants in the events covered<br />
in the book make this study a particularly valuable document. Th e intention was, along<br />
with the author’s interpretation of the written source, to draw attention as well to the<br />
views of the commanders personally involved in the events, whose statements have a<br />
particular bearing on the subject under consideration. In this way the reader can obtain<br />
the confi rmation of the accuracy of the written source, but also witness the inevitable<br />
diff erences between the written source and memoir material, as well as frequently<br />
diff erent interpretations of a specifi c event by people personally involved in it. Th at is<br />
to say, reports are oft en written automatically and mainly deal with results and less with<br />
explanations of the reasons why such results were achieved, and may therefore off er<br />
an incomplete picture of a specifi c event. Th is is why, in order to assure an objective<br />
presentation of an event, interviews with participants are desirable in order to explain<br />
8
why something was done in a specifi c way and not as planned. Of course, there is always<br />
the danger that the participant’s story might be too subjective just as various reports and<br />
other written documents, and it is up to historians and other scientists to assess the case.<br />
Moreover, there is always the “public correction” as well. Th is is why it is important to<br />
publish the sources (verbal and written) as soon as possible, or to have as many interviews<br />
as possible on the subject with the participants. At any rate, the reader ought to get, in a<br />
single spot, the substance or the interpretation of a historical source, and the explanation<br />
of the participants to which the source refers, because this will make his conclusion more<br />
realistic and more objective.<br />
Th is is why due gratitude ought to be expressed, for their readiness to help in the editing<br />
of this book, to the generals and commanders of the Croatian Army and special units of<br />
the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, as well as to the associations of<br />
the Croatian Homeland War veterans, whose useful comments enhanced objectivity in<br />
the presentation of those parts of Storm in which they were personally involved. Th eir<br />
names are mentioned in the notes, and next to their comments on the text or on the<br />
mentioned sources. Th e reviewers of the book, General Anton Tus, Zdenko Radelić,<br />
Ph.D., and Nikica Barić, Ph.D., deserve particular gratitude.<br />
In addition to the mentioned scientifi c study, this book is enriched by the Appendices,<br />
documents on important political and military events on the eve of Storm, which<br />
infl uenced its initiation (the process of annexation to Serbia and the unifi cation of the<br />
so-called Republic of Srpska Krajina 1 and Republika Srpska, that is, of the Serbs from<br />
Croatia and the Serbs from Bosnia&Herzegovina, into a single state, and the Bihać crisis),<br />
and on its aft ermath (the exodus of the Serbs from the occupied area), selected and<br />
edited by senior archivist Mate Rupić, Head of the Archival Material Department of the<br />
Croatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre. Th e chosen topics, and the<br />
respective selected and chronologically arranged documents, ought to help in fi nding<br />
answers to the question of why the issue, i.e., the occupied territory of the Republic of<br />
Croatia, could not be resolved by diplomatic means and peacefully, why Storm could not<br />
be deferred any longer, and why claims that the Croatian leadership expelled the Serbs<br />
from the so-called Krajina and carried out ethnic cleansing are historically unfounded.<br />
Th e documents in the Appendices of this book cover the period between 1991 and 1995<br />
in order to draw attention to the fact that the launching of Storm was not a sudden whim<br />
of the Croatian leadership but, rather, the consequence of a long process of fruitless<br />
1 In its publications the Croatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre mainly follows the rule whereby<br />
the names of self-proclaimed or unrecognized states or political creations are placed in inverted commas or<br />
qualifi ed as «so-called». However, on this occasion we accepted the author’s view that «the names of all states,<br />
political creations and movements, whether internationally recognized or not, lawful or unlawful, accepted or rejected<br />
- in a nutshell, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ - ought to be written without inverted commas, that is, as they call themselves,<br />
or as listed in historical sources» (see Nikica Barić, Th e Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995, Zagreb, 2005, pp.<br />
13-14). Of course, the fact that the text, when mentioning the «SAO Krajina» or the «Republic of Serbian Krajina»<br />
and its paramilitary formations, will have no inverted commas or the qualifi cation of «so-called», does not imply<br />
that the author considers the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia, in which the Serbians established their<br />
control and proclaimed their para-state, to be a legitimate state entity. Quite the contrary.<br />
9
negotiations with the leadership of the rebel Serbs on the peaceful reintegration of the<br />
occupied Croatian territory and of ineffi cient moves by the international community,<br />
and, fi nally, to stress that the launching of Storm cannot be limited to the events in July<br />
and August 1995. Since the intentions of the leadership of the rebel Serbs in Croatia<br />
to unite with Serbia and create, together with the Serbs from Bosnia&Herzegovina, a<br />
single Serbian state are confi rmed best by the documents produced by their own or by<br />
their allied (Belgrade) political and military institutions, the editor of the Appendices<br />
has limited his selection to sources of Serbian provenance. Th e same holds true for the<br />
part of the Appendices presenting the plans and preparations for the organized departure<br />
of Serbs from Croatia. A slight exception to this has only been made in the section of<br />
Appendices on the Bihać crisis; in order to recall the diplomatic eff orts of the Croatian<br />
leadership and the role of the big powers with regard to the developments in Croatia<br />
and Bosnia&Herzegovina, that section starts with a Croatian offi cial’s account of the<br />
negotiations for the settlement of the fi rst Bihać crisis. In order to evoke the dramatic<br />
situation in which the population of the Bihać enclave found itself late in July 1995,<br />
this section also includes several documents, actually cries for help sent to the Croatian<br />
leadership from besieged Bihać.<br />
Th e series of documents on the attempted unifi cation of the rebel Serbs from<br />
Croatia with Serbia starts with the Decision on the “unifi cation of SAO Krajina” with the<br />
Republic of Serbia, enacted by the “Executive Council of SAO Krajina” on 1 April 1991;<br />
the documents on the process of unifi cation of the Serbs from Bosnia&Herzegovina and<br />
Croatia start with the “Declaration on the Unifi cation of the Association of Municipalities<br />
of Bosnian Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina” of 27 June 1991.<br />
Th e list includes altogether 30 documents bearing witness to the intensive activities of<br />
Serbian politicians focused on preparing the unifi cation of the Serbs from the Republic<br />
of Serbia and from Bosnia&Herzegovina (i.e., from the so-called Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina and Republika Srpska) in a single Serbian state. It includes, in chronological<br />
terms, the “Protocol on Cooperation between the Government of Republika Srpska and<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina” (Banja Luka, 22 September 1992), the “Declaration<br />
on the Unifi cation of the Assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika<br />
Srpska” (Prijedor, 31 October 1992), the “Decision on the Constitution of the National<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska” (Banja Luka, 24 April<br />
1993), the “Proposal of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska and the National<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina to the National Assemblies of Serbia and<br />
Montenegro concerning Unifi cation in a Single State” (18 August 1994), the “Decision<br />
of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Concerning the Agreement on the<br />
Constitutional Law about the Provisional Constitutional Arrangement of the ‘United<br />
Republika Srpska’” (Knin, 29 May 1995), and other documents showing that the Serbs<br />
in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina continued to prepare legislative documents for<br />
the proclamation of the “United Republika Srpska” even aft er their defeat in Operation<br />
Bljesak (Flash; May 1995), and that the process, but a step away from its realization, was<br />
interrupted by Operation Storm.<br />
Th e collection of documents on the Bihać crisis, caused by attacks of Serbs from<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina and Croatia on the UN safe area of Bihać starts with a memoir<br />
10
material, the reminiscences of General Krešimir Ćosić regarding negotiations with<br />
American political and military offi cials in the United States, resulting in Operation<br />
Zima ’94 (Winter ’94) by Croatian armed forces and the resolution of the fi rst Bihać<br />
crisis. Th is is followed by 44 documents, largely of Serbian provenance, on events in the<br />
Bihać area - between 27 October 1994 and 3 August 1995 - showing that Bihać was an<br />
extremely important objective in the Serbian plans, which could not easily be achieved<br />
because of the tough resistance of the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Moreover, the documents show<br />
that Serbian strategists did not shrink from any means in their attempt to take Bihać.<br />
Th ey even carried out a covert operation involving the use of biological agents for food<br />
poisoning, to be smuggled into Bihać and intended to cause large scale poisoning of the<br />
5 th Corps troops and knocking them out of action.<br />
Th e third thematic section presents the plans of the rebel Serbs for the evacuation of<br />
the population from the occupied territory of Croatia. Th e 22 documents, demonstrating<br />
that evacuation plans in the case of an HV attack such as Storm had existed already in<br />
1993, include the “Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on the Evacuation of<br />
the Population from the Municipalities of Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, Gračac and Knin<br />
towards Srb and Lapac” adopted in the aft ernoon on 4 August 1995 in Knin.<br />
At the end, the Appendices present the contents of the so-called Plan Z-4, which<br />
the rebel Serbs refused even to consider, and reminiscences of the representatives of<br />
the international community involved in the attempt to implement the plan. Th eir<br />
statements on how the leaders of the Serbs in Croatia refused to accept the off ered Plan<br />
as a negotiating platform clearly confi rm that any attempt to peacefully reintegrate the<br />
occupied areas into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia would<br />
have been futile because of the narrow-mindedness of the Serbian leaders.<br />
Th e documents in Appendices are the direct and well-argumented answer to<br />
questions such as why, unfortunately, there was no alternative to the military option,<br />
why the Croatian leadership could no longer defer Storm, and who was responsible<br />
for the exodus of Croatian citizens, ethnic Serbs, on the eve of Storm and during the<br />
operation. Th e dramatic condition of Bihać defences, the collapse of which would have<br />
reinforced almost decisively the position of Serbian forces and their refusal of all peace<br />
initiatives - whether promoted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia or by<br />
the international community - and even of the “Plan Z-4” which granted the Serbs in<br />
Croatia an extraordinarily broad autonomy, and the continuous endeavours, ever since<br />
1991, of the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina to create a single Serbian<br />
state in the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina,<br />
which had entered, on the eve of Storm, the fi nal stage by the adoption of their common<br />
Constitution, clearly demonstrate how unconvincing are the claims that Croatia had<br />
been hasty in resorting to a military solution and that more time should have been<br />
foreseen for negotiations.<br />
In view of the experience acquired throughout the process of negotiation on the<br />
peaceful reintegration of occupied territory into the constitutional and legal system of<br />
the Republic of Croatia, it would indeed be very diffi cult to explain in a reasoned way the<br />
assumption that the rebel Serbs - if they had succeeded in taking Bihać and strategically<br />
11
improving, to a substantial extent, their military position with respect to Croatia - would<br />
have agreed to negotiate peaceful integration. Along with many documents, some of<br />
which are included in the Appendices of this book, this is also confi rmed by the interview<br />
given by SVK commander, Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrkšić, on the occasion<br />
of St. Vitus’ Day, 28 June 1995, in which he addressed all SVK members by “looking<br />
forward to the celebration of the next St. Vitus’ Day united - in one Serbian state” (Vojska<br />
Krajine/Army of the Krajina/; 11 July 1995, p. 24).<br />
Th e extraordinary importance of Bihać, the fall of which would probably have had<br />
crucial consequences for the eventual outcome of the war, was also confi rmed by<br />
the attention paid the Bihać crisis by the media. In early August 1995 Bihać was also<br />
mentioned in the Serbian press as “the key in future warfare and developments in B&H<br />
and Croatia”; the conclusion was reinforced by quotations from foreign media. Th us,<br />
according to Th e Independent, the fall of the Bihać safe area would deal a “colossal and<br />
maybe even deadly blow to the overall UN operation” (Sedma vojska/Th e Seventh Army/;<br />
Nin, 2327, 4 Aug. 1995, pp. 10-11). Accordingly, the situation on the ground in late July<br />
1995 simply demanded either the unconditional acceptance of immediate reintegration<br />
in the constitutional and legal order in the Republic of Croatia by the rebel Serbs in<br />
Croatia or a military action by the Croatian armed forces.<br />
Of course, in addition to military and strategic reasons due to the Bihać crisis, the<br />
decision of the Croatian Government to accelerate the process of reincorporation of<br />
the occupied territories into its constitutional and legal system was also infl uenced by<br />
economic reasons, which are not presented in this study. Th e Croatian economy was<br />
considerably aff ected by the Serbian aggression and occupation of a part of the Republic<br />
of Croatia, and particularly by the severance of communications between the southern<br />
and northern parts of Croatia via Knin as well as by the destruction of many industrial<br />
and business facilities due to the armed Serbian rebellion and aggression against Croatia.<br />
Any delay in eliminating the existing condition and the deferred reintegration of<br />
occupied territory meant new losses every day and the irreversible loss of considerable<br />
possible revenues - primarily of the tourist industry. It would be diffi cult to say how long<br />
the Croatian economy could have withstood such conditions, particularly with respect<br />
to the numerous displaced persons and refugees looked aft er by Croatia, for whom any<br />
delayed return caused new frustrations and threatened to develop into riots. In this<br />
regard, the question can also be raised of how Croatian authorities could have explained<br />
to the tens of thousands of displaced persons and the very dissatisfi ed and frustrated<br />
Croatian citizens, who had been waiting to return to their homes since 1991, that they<br />
would have to spend another year in exile and await a solution leading to their return for<br />
who knows how long.<br />
In his study the author has also reviewed one of the most intriguing issues related<br />
to Storm: did the rebel Serbs abandon the occupied area of the Republic of Croatia<br />
(UNPA Sectors North and South) of their own free will, or were they expelled - that is,<br />
did Croatia carry out ethnic cleansing of the rebel Serbs with its Operation Storm? Th e<br />
conclusion that the mass departure of the Serbs from Croatia during the operation was<br />
12
logical and that is was organized by the Serbian leadership, meaning that the Croatian<br />
Army could not have carried out any “ethnic cleansing”, is based on historical sources.<br />
Some of the documents of the so-called RSK, showing that the departure of the Serbs<br />
from the occupied area during Storm was planned and implemented by the political and<br />
military leadership of the rebel Serbs, are included in the Appendices to this book; this is<br />
also borne out by the testimony of Serbs who fl ed Croatia.<br />
Similarly, a review of Serbian press reports published immediately aft er Storm confi rms<br />
that the political and military leadership of the rebel Serbs in Croatia was responsible for<br />
the exodus of the Serbian population from Croatia during Storm. 2 Many questions and<br />
comments in the Serbian press suggest the conclusion that the Serbian journalists, but<br />
also the public, believed that the “Krajina leadership” was responsible for the tribulation<br />
of the Serbian people in Croatia: Why didn’t the Krajina leadership accept peace in time<br />
if it could not prevail in war? Who really issued the orders for the retreat of the people and<br />
of the troops? If they were independent enough to turn down the peace proposals, and the<br />
suggestions and demands in this respect from Belgrade, why didn’t they defend themselves?<br />
Th ese are only some of the questions raised in the Serbian press. Th e Serbian public<br />
wanted the “Krajina leaders, who did not fl ee at the rear of the column” to reply to<br />
the question: Why, and on whose advice, did they decide to get hundreds of thousands of<br />
inhabitants moving towards Serbia? (Zoran Jevđović, “Bežanje na čelu kolone”/Flight at<br />
the Head of the Column/; Večernje novosti, 16 Aug. 1995).<br />
Actually, on the very fi rst day of Storm the Yugoslav press denounced the behaviour<br />
of the “RSK leadership” because it sought justifi cation for its defeat by claiming that that<br />
it was allegedly sold out by Belgrade instead of admitting to its “very rigid and disloyal<br />
attitude towards Serbia”: Th ey spin a story about uniting all Serbian lands, and when the<br />
going gets tough, they call on Serbia to help them. Serbia gave them weapons, it sent them<br />
a commander to organize them. Th ey were told to negotiate with Croatia and thus pacify<br />
the situation. No! Th ey wanted a big show, a heavenly drama. However, the Croats are now<br />
deep in their territory and they have cut them off ; thus, they have also lost their diplomatic<br />
position and their stake is much lower. (“Pakao na Drini”/Hell on the Drina/; Monitor,<br />
independent MonteneHellHHegrin weekly, 250, 4 Aug. 1995, pp. 8-9).<br />
When appearing in the media the RSK offi cials themselves accused one another or<br />
justifi ed their decisions, and thereby actually admitted their responsibility. Th us, the<br />
last “president of the RSK government”, Milan Babić, expressed his dismay at the fact<br />
“that the SVK General Staff and President Martić” had ordered the general evacuation<br />
of the population and retreat of the troops. (“Povlačenje umesto borbe”/Retreat Instead<br />
of Battle/; Večernje novosti, 9 Aug. 1995). Th e censured president, Milan Martić, denied<br />
the allegations and claimed that he had only issued orders to provide shelter for the<br />
population in surrounding villages, and that “no mention was made” of troop retreat.<br />
(“Nisam naredio povlačenje vojske”/I Did Not Order Troop Retreat/; Politika, 13 Aug.<br />
2 Th e Serbian press from August to December 1995 was examined by Ivan Radoš, who also reviewed some of the<br />
collected articles together with Ana Holjević Turković. Th eir observations were used for this presentation. Boris<br />
Anić also deserves gratitude for the translation and analysis of selected texts from publications in English related<br />
to Operation Storm.<br />
13
1995). However, his statement about the provision of shelter for the population only in<br />
the “surrounding villages” is denied by the letter of Milivoj Vojnović, “foreign minister of<br />
RSK”, of 5 August, sent to the UNPROFOR spokesman Yury Miyahotnik, informing him<br />
that “the Government of the RSK and the SVK General Staff had decided to immediately<br />
evacuate children, women and old people from the territory of the so-called RSK to<br />
Yugoslavia, and asked for UNPROFOR help”. (Radovan Kovačević, “Ko je doneo odluku<br />
o evakuaciji?”/Who Decided to Evacuate?/; Politika, 27 Aug. 1995).<br />
But all ambiguities about who ordered evacuation, when and to which points were<br />
eliminated at the press conference in Belgrade on 22 August 1995; aft er the fall of the<br />
RSK, that was the fi rst public appearance of the members of its government and assembly,<br />
who actually confi rmed that the political and military leadership of the Serbs in the<br />
Republic of Croatia was responsible for the departure of the Serbs from Croatia. Th at is,<br />
the journalists were shown the “Decision on the evacuation of the population from the<br />
municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac”, issued by the “Supreme<br />
Defence Cuncil” and signed by Milan Martić. In their report of the conference Večernje<br />
novosti and Politika published a facsimile of the “Decision” according to which persons<br />
unfi t for combat duty were supposed to pull out via Otrić towards Srb and Lapac. Th e<br />
full text of the “Decision” was published in Radovan Pavlović’s article “Th e people were<br />
led from Knin by the Supreme Defence Council of RSK” Politika, 23 Aug. 1995): Because<br />
of the new situation caused by the outright general aggression of Croatia against the<br />
RSK, and aft er the fi rst initial defence successes, a substantial part of northern Dalmatia<br />
and part of Lika became endangered, and we have therefore decided as follows: planned<br />
evacuation of all combat-unfi t persons must be carried out from the municipalities of Knin,<br />
Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac. Th e evacuation shall be carried out in accordance<br />
with prepared plans along routes towards Knin and further on via Otrić towards Srb and<br />
Lapac. For evacuation purposes request the help of the UNPROFOR Command for Sector<br />
South headquartered in Knin.<br />
Th e statements of RSK offi cials issued aft er that were attempts to disclaim their<br />
responsibility. Th e “President of the RSK Assembly” Rajko Ležajić stated that he did not<br />
know about the decision, but thought that the population should have been evacuated<br />
only to the neighbouring villages because “the RSK did not even have a professional<br />
army, the people were the army, and it was therefore logical that fathers, husbands,<br />
brothers and sons should follow the weak and the infi rm”. Milan Ivanić, adviser to<br />
Milan Martić, declared the decision to be unlawful because there was no quorum at<br />
the meeting of the VSO (Supreme Defence Council) and all the decisions were made<br />
by Milan Martić and Mile Mrkšić as the other VSO members were not even in Knin.<br />
(Milan Babić was in Belgrade, the “minister of the interior” Tošo Pajić in Kordun, and<br />
the “minister of defence” Milan Šuput in Korenica). In his assessment of the “Decision”<br />
the “foreign minister” Milivoj Vojnović claimed that its goal was to draw the SRJ into war<br />
and confi rmed the existence of a split between two groups, “the negotiation-prone and<br />
the war-mongering one”, in the leadership of the so-called RSK. Although those present<br />
did not give an accurate answer to the question concerning the person who ordered<br />
the retreat of the army (M. Bošnjak, D. Dimitrovska, “Bežaniju naredio Martić”/Martić<br />
14
ordered the Flight/; Večernje novosti, 23 August 1995; “Odluku o evakuaciji doneo Martić”/<br />
Martić Ordered the Evacuation/; Politika, 23 August 1995), it seems that everybody<br />
already knew clearly that the leadership of the so-called RSK was responsible for the<br />
evacuation and tribulation of the Serbs in Croatia. A comment from the Serbian press<br />
is maybe the most appropriate confi rmation of this evaluation: “Th e fl ight from Krajina<br />
has a clear identifying code... by adopting the policy set at Pale, the entire RSK leadership,<br />
including the President of the Republic, the Government and the military leadership failed<br />
their history test and are exclusively responsible for the fate of 200,000 Serbs from the<br />
western part of Krajina (Radovan Kovačević, Ko je doneo odluku o evakuaciji RSK?/<br />
Who Decided to Evacuate the RSK?/; Politika, 27 August 1995.)<br />
Vuk Drašković, at the time the leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement,<br />
also sought the culprits “in his own back yard” by emphasizing the narrow-mindedness<br />
of the Serbs and their determination in the implementation of the decision according<br />
to which all Serbs had to live in one state. His answer to the reporter’s decision on the<br />
“blame for the fall of Krajina and the fate of the Serbian population in the region” clearly<br />
shows why the Serbian people experienced tragedy in Croatia and who was responsible<br />
for it: For years people in Serbia have been shouting that Krajina will never think of living<br />
anywhere else except in Greater Serbia. Th is unreality is so powerful that it has entered the<br />
consciousness and unconsciousness of quite a few people. Th ose that fed the people such a<br />
dangerous illusion are to be blamed. On the other hand we, who had a diff erent view, were<br />
unable to explain to the people that they were being grossly deluded. We did not tell our<br />
people in time what lay in store, and we are guilty. (Gurat ću na svaka vrata”/I’ll Push any<br />
Door/; Vreme, 21 August 1995).<br />
Th e Serbian press also described the circumstances in which evacuation was decided<br />
and the way in which the population was informed about it. Th us, according to the<br />
report of Milorad Bošnjak, journalist assigned to the “State Information Pool of the<br />
RSK” (since 10 June 1993), on 4 August 1995, at about 12 o’clock noon, in the Army<br />
Hall in Knin the commander of UN forces in Sector South Alain Forand met with the<br />
military and political offi cials of the so-called RSK (“Colonel Kosta Novaković - assistant<br />
SVK commander, Colonel Milan Trgovčić - head of the SVK military negotiating team,<br />
Mladen Kalapać - liaison offi cer with UNPROFOR, and Sava Štrbac - Secretary of the<br />
Government”); “at the same time, the Supreme RSK Defence Council was in permanent<br />
session; its members were RSK President Milan Martić, Prime Minister Milan Babić (then<br />
in Belgrade), SVK Commander Mile Mrkšić, Minister of the Interior Tošo Pajić (then<br />
in Kordun) and Defence Minister Milan Šuput (then in Korenica)”. At about 7 p.m., the<br />
account continues, Colonel Novaković informed the reporters about the order according<br />
to which the VSK General Staff and government institutions would be evacuated to the<br />
small town of Srb in Lika and added that, in accordance with the agreement between<br />
Colonel Novaković and the press, it was decided that civil protection runners would<br />
inform the population because “they did not want the Croats to hear the explanation of<br />
the order on Radio Knin”. Th e reporter also quoted part of the explanation of the order:<br />
Th e evacuation is carried out for preventive security reasons. Th e fi ghters on the front will<br />
also be relieved knowing that their loved ones are safe in Srb and Donji Lapac (Milorad<br />
15
Bošnjak, “Tvrdoglavost i naiva”/Stubbornness and Naiveté/; Večernje novosti, 22 August<br />
1995).<br />
Accordingly, even the debates in the Serbian press, in particular the statements<br />
of the offi cials of the so-called RSK, demonstrate how unconvincing and historically<br />
unfounded are the claims about the “ethnic cleansing” carried out by the HV during<br />
Storm and about the responsibility of the Croatian leadership for the exodus of the Serbs<br />
from Croatia. However, in view of the foregoing, the debate about evacuation has now<br />
mainly shift ed to questions about whether it was “devised and agreed with somebody in<br />
advance” (reference to the alleged “agreement between Tuđman and Milošević”) or due<br />
to the military situation and to the evaluation of the SVK military and political command<br />
that “they could not stand up to the Croatian Army” and that such a singular strategic<br />
move was made in the hope that the evacuation of civilians from the Knin area would<br />
make possible more concentrated operations by the SVK. Th us, the book of the Croatian<br />
Helsinki Committee (HHO) for Human Rights entitled Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’<br />
and Its Aft ermath (“Vojna operacija ‘Oluja’ i poslije”); Zagreb, 2001, pp. 13, 14, 21, 23<br />
ff .) lists examples showing that the retreat of the civilian population from the so-called<br />
RSK started even before Operation Storm, and that civilians were even forced to retreat,<br />
threatened by their compatriots at gunpoint; however, the text mainly suggests that<br />
the retreat was the result of a scenario planned in advance (alleged agreement between<br />
Tuđman and Milošević). In addition to such scientifi cally unfounded suggestions, the<br />
book claims that the Croatian leadership was also responsible for the departure of the<br />
rebel Serbs from Croatia because “the statements of the Croatian leaders, particularly<br />
Tuđman and the late Gojko Šušak, did not inspire hope in a possibly dignifi ed and<br />
honourable defeat, whether by peaceful reintegration or by any other kind of agreement”<br />
(HHO, Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath/“Vojna operacija ‘Oluja’ i poslije”,<br />
p. 21). Th e fate of the so-called Plan Z-4, which the leadership of the rebel Serbs did not<br />
even want to consider, is the best proof that such claims are neither correct nor objective<br />
and that, considering the position and the actions of the political leadership of the rebel<br />
Serbs, peaceful reintegration was not realistically possible.<br />
It is a historical fact that the public statements of the President of the Republic of<br />
Croatia F. Tuđman and of the Croatian Defence Minister G. Šušak did not infl uence the<br />
decision of the rebel Serbs in Croatia to turn down “Plan Z-4”, and that their leadership<br />
fi rmly rejected every suggestion on the reintegration of occupied Croatian territory, or<br />
of the so-called RSK, into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia,<br />
although it was favourable for them, actually maximalist considering the internationally<br />
recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. Aft er all, the view that “Plan Z-4” should<br />
have been accepted prevailed even in the Serbian press aft er Storm. Th us, one of the<br />
articles analyzing “Plan -4” reported that Serbs, among other things, were off ered their<br />
own fl ag, coat of arms, currency, police; in the author’s view, that was a maximum which<br />
should have been accepted because of the fact that the West would never have recognized<br />
the “RSK” (“Zašto zvona ne zvone?”/Why Don’t Bells Ring?/; Vojska, 159, 24 August<br />
1995, l2).<br />
16
In addition to the comment that “Plan Z-4” was the “last chance” plan permitting<br />
the Serbs to achieve the maximum because the West would never recognize the RSK”,<br />
the Serbian press reported that many political factors in Belgrade were also behind the<br />
rejection of the plan and “fuelling” the unrealistic ambitions of the so-called RSK. Th us,<br />
Borisav Jović is reported to have said that “Krajina is militarily strong enough to resist<br />
the possible attack of the Croatian Army”; according to Vojislav Šešelj, “Plan Z-4 was<br />
totally unacceptable”. Even Zoran Đinđić thought that ”the fact that the Serbian people<br />
in the RSK do not support the Plan suggests that we should not support it either”. In the<br />
same group of comments the most consistent advocate of “Plan Z-4” was Vuk Drašković<br />
(Miljenko Pešić, “Da li je propuštena istorijska šansa?”/Was a Historic Chance Missed?/;<br />
Politika, 8 August 1995). He obviously understood it as an inevitable reality because his<br />
position, publicly proclaimed some days before, that 85 percent of the territory of Bosnia<br />
and Herzegovina should be made part of a confederation with Serbia and Montenegro,<br />
showed that he had not given up his idea about a Greater Serbia: When I say that I accept<br />
the Contact Group plan as a basis for future negotiations, I do not mean, on any account,<br />
that 49% percent of Bosnia&Herzegovina ought to be Serbian, and the rest non-Serbian.<br />
No way! Even if the peace plan said that 60% of Bosnia is Serbian, and the rest non-Serbian,<br />
I would be against it! (“I dalje za veliku Srbiju”/On for Greater Serbia/; Intervju; 21 July<br />
1995, pp. 12-13).<br />
As opposed to the unargumented view that the exodus of the Serbs from Croatia<br />
during Storm was caused by the “Milošević-Tuđman” agreement, in various analyses of<br />
the operation military experts explain the evacuation of civilians from the RSK as a move<br />
intended to prevent SVK defeat, i.e., a move prompted by conditions on the front and the<br />
foreboding of total military defeat. Th us, according to the CIA analysis, evacuation was<br />
ordered only in Knin, and not in Sector North, in order to allow the SVK 7 th Corps to<br />
focus on fi ghting, and SVK commanders were forced to a choice - retreat or destruction<br />
of their forces (Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-<br />
1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Offi ce of Russian and European Analysis, Washington,<br />
DC 25505, May 2002, Chapter 89, pp. 371-372. 375).<br />
According to the same analysis (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 374), “it is not<br />
true that former US military offi cers trained the Croatian Army (and planned Storm),<br />
or that NATO supported the Croatian off ensive, or that Milošević sent General Mrkšić<br />
to the RSK in order to prepare the withdrawal of the Army and the population, and<br />
that the SVK did not really fi ght but simply retreated as soon as the HV attacked, or<br />
that Belgrade had sold out the RSK”, as SVK General M. Sekulić claims in his book.<br />
On the contrary, the analysis emphasizes that “the HV’s stunning victory rested on a<br />
combination of improvements made in force structure and doctrine before the operation<br />
and the key penetration of Serbian positions that the HV and the ARBiH 5 th Corps were<br />
able to open and exploit during the operation itself and that unraveled the SVK’s defence<br />
system”. Th erefore, as pointed out, the success of Storm was based on improvements in<br />
HV doctrine and force structure, implemented since 1993, because these professional<br />
improvements enhanced the HV’s capacity in planning and organizing operations of<br />
17
impressive magnitude and complexity, and the capacity of executing rapid breakthroughs<br />
deep behind the enemy’s defences. Of course, comments the analysis, doctrine in itself<br />
did not produce victory but had to be faithfully executed on the battlefi eld. However,<br />
since the Croatian Army was not immediately or everywhere successful in its planned<br />
attacks, its success, according to the analysis, lay in achieving breakthroughs in key<br />
sectors, enhanced by the disruption of the SVK command and control system, and<br />
all that undermined the SVK’s defensive system as a whole and caused its collapse. As<br />
a precondition for the successful completion of Storm, and its “fi rst and most visible<br />
critical individual action”, the analysis mentions the HV’s long-term advance up the<br />
Dinara Mountains and the Livno Valley, that gave it excellent jump-off positions for a<br />
quick and direct strike at Knin, bypassing the main SVK defences south of the town. Th e<br />
taking of Bosansko Grahovo, continues the analysis, eff ectively sealed Knin’s fate even<br />
before Storm got off the ground (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, pp. 374-375). Th e<br />
loss of Bosansko Grahovo and the HV attack on Knin from that direction was a major<br />
surprise for the SVK leadership, as shown by their “Evaluation of threat, and protection<br />
and rescue options” prepared in Knin in April 1995. Th at is, in listing the possible lines<br />
of HV action towards Knin it mentions Zadar, Split (Muć), Šibenik and Sinj as jumpoff<br />
points, while the leaders of the rebel Serbs did not even think of a possible attack by<br />
Croatian forces from Mount Dinara (see Appendix 3, document 10).<br />
Similarly, according to the CIA analysis, the battlefi eld successes of the HV and the<br />
ARBiH were facilitated by the SVK structural weaknesses - which, of course, the HV<br />
staff had calculated on exploiting. Th e SVK’s biggest problem was not that its troops were<br />
unwilling or unprepared to fi ght but that there were not enough of them - a problem<br />
recognized when General Mrkšić was brought in to reallocate defensive formations and<br />
establish a bigger and better mobile reserve force. Th e “Krajina Serbs had fought well”,<br />
notes the analysis, “in the attack in another country, during the Bihać battles, and during<br />
Storm many SVK formations were able to hold their ground against frontal attacks by<br />
stronger HV forces. However, the SVK General Staff and its corps commanders did not<br />
have enough combat formations to maintain the depth and mobility needed to contain<br />
an HV penetration. Th us, when the HV struck through SVK static defences at Knin, the<br />
SVK 7 th Corps had no units in reserve to resist and prevent its capture. Th e only unit left<br />
uncommitted had been cobbled together from bits and pieces stripped out of the corps’<br />
line brigades. Lack of reserves to cushion a fl ank attack forced the evacuation of the welldefended<br />
area south of Karlovac, and Petrinja’s stout defences yielded when the reserves<br />
it counted on were committed elsewhere (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 375).<br />
Of course, the reasons underlying the military collapse of the so-called RSK were also<br />
discussed in the Serbian press. In one of the analyses of the causes leading to SVK’s defeat,<br />
two unnamed Yugoslav Army generals agreed that there were many shortcomings, since<br />
the very beginning, in the organization of the defence of the so-called RSK and in the<br />
structure of its army. Th us, they pointed out the following:<br />
- lack of “discipline, courage and brains”, and the fact that the morale of the army “was<br />
destroyed by the awareness that some people were always getting rich while others<br />
languish in the trenches... and only the poor are fi ghting”;<br />
18
- the population was signifi cantly committed to defensive tasks, and the ratio of the<br />
active to the reserve component was defi nitively in favour of the former; thus, out of<br />
50,000 troops, as many as 38,000 were on the active list; 3<br />
- confl icts in the state leadership and frequent relief of command and corps offi cers, with<br />
no eff ect in terms of improved defence;<br />
- markedly negative impact of diff erent lines of command, primarily of special units of<br />
the ministry of the interior which oft en “exceeded authority, controlled the army and<br />
harassed offi cers”;<br />
- undisciplined volunteer paramilitary units with “self-styled voivode”, unwilling to<br />
accept subordination to the joint command.<br />
In remarking that his [Mrkšić’s] job was made even more diffi cult because “he got<br />
back fi ft een thousand mobilized refugees”, the generals noted that no major progress<br />
in the organization of the army was made either by Mile Mrkšić, “offi cer of an elite<br />
Yugoslav Army unit”, who was expected to organize rapid intervention units capable<br />
of deep strikes and “splitting Croatian territory”. Th e conclusion was that “in terms of<br />
personnel and equipment the SVK was inferior to the aggressor”; however, it also referred<br />
to exaggerated data about HV’s strength fl oated around in the public, which created<br />
panic in the population along with rumours such as “the ustashi (ustaše) are coming<br />
and slaughtering people” etc. Attention was also drawn to the “mistaken conviction”<br />
that Knin was being defended in Belgrade (Radovan Pavlović, “Uzroci vojnog poraza<br />
Krajine. Serija propusta u organizaciji vojske RSK”/Causes of the Military Defeat of the<br />
Krajina - A Series of Omissions in the Organization of the RSK army”/; Politika, 27 August<br />
1995).<br />
Th e causes of defeat were also commented on in an interview by Dragan Vasiljković<br />
- “Captain Dragan”. Disappointed by the outcome of the situation, he expressed a<br />
pronouncedly negative view about the “constantly” poor eff ect of Serbian myths<br />
because of which “since the Kosovo battle the Serbians have not admitted defeat and<br />
keep looking all the time for a new Vuk Branković”. According to his opinion, based on<br />
experience acquired over four years of combat action and training, the defeat was caused<br />
by lack of concern for the army, military and government disorganization, and neglect<br />
of basic military requirements such as food and equipment, resulting ultimately in a<br />
poorly prepared army. According to Vasiljković, “Krajina was in total disarray from the<br />
beginning to the very end”. When explaining the reason why he left the so-called RSK,<br />
he said that on the eve of the attack he met in Knin with Patriarch Pavle, Milan Martić,<br />
Mile Mrkšić and Ratko Mladić - who then claimed then that “his army would defend<br />
every inch of the RSK”. Since the fall of Bosansko Grahovo opened to the Croatian forces<br />
the route to Knin, Vasiljković claims that he suggested counter-strikes towards Šibenik<br />
and Zadar, but his proposals were pessimistically opposed by General Dušan Lončar.<br />
3 When considering the number of SVK troops, it is interesting to note that the proposal of «SVK commitment<br />
plan», prepared in early 1995, mentions 69,000 possible SVK members according to the «variant<br />
where SVK engages in defence without major reliance on the Yugoslav Army and the Army of the Republika<br />
Srpska». See Appendix 1, document 18.<br />
19
According to Vasiljković, the pessimistic position of one of the commanders and the<br />
fact that he could not set off on his own with only 60 trained men and lead them into<br />
sure death led him to leave Knin. 4 In the interview it was also mentioned that Captain<br />
Dragan had spent more than four years - from 4 April 1991 to 31 July 1995 - in the socalled-RSK,<br />
that he had, aft er arriving in Knin in 1991 - in spite of antagonism of Milan<br />
Babić, who wanted to turn the Krajina “into his own empire” - put in order the exercise<br />
range at Golubić near Knin, and trained 1200 troops in the fi rst three months; in setting<br />
up the training centre he was assisted by a fellow soldier from a British paratrooper<br />
regiment called Marko (Dijana Dimitrovska, “Politika oborila Krajinu”/Politics Brought<br />
Down Krajina/; Večernje novosti; 29 August 1995).<br />
Th e reasons underlying the fall of the so-called RSK, but also the role of the Yugoslav<br />
Army and Yugoslavia in the Serbian rebellion in Croatia, and the relation of the Krajina<br />
leadership with Belgrade, are also discussed in Miroslav Lazanski’s article “Strategija<br />
‘lako ćemo’” (No Problem Strategy). In Lazanski’s estimate, “Eastern Slavonija and Baranja<br />
cannot be defended without the protection of Yugoslavia, just as it was clear, already<br />
back in 1991, that Krajina could not hold its ground without Yugoslavia”. Th e reporter<br />
stressed that the “Croatian Army of 1995 was not the army of 1991” and that “Zagreb<br />
had taken advantage of the four years of RSK’s existence in order to create a professional<br />
army 75,000 strong organized in eight brigades and several self-contained battalions, and<br />
an additional component of 140,000 Home Guardsmen”. Moreover, continued Lazanski,<br />
“Zagreb has a military budget of 5.6 billion US dollars as compared to the total military<br />
budget of the RSK, Republika Srpska and the SRJ which does not exceed 1.3 billion<br />
dollars” (Strategija ‘lako ćemo’”/ No Problem Strategy; Nin; 2328, 11 August 1995, 16-<br />
17).<br />
In consideration of the foregoing, the following sentence from the magazine Nin can<br />
serve as a general conclusion of the analyses regarding SVK’s defeat in Operation Storm<br />
published in the Serbian press: War is won by fi rst-class organization, discipline and<br />
governance, and the Croats have achieved all that during these four years (“Hrvatska neće<br />
napustiti Baranju i Istočnu Slavoniju/Croatia Will Not Abandon Baranja and Eastern<br />
Slavonija/; Nin; 2329, 18 August 1995).<br />
Th e absence of powerful support by the Army of Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav<br />
Army, that is, of their attack on the Republic of Croatia aft er the start of Storm, has<br />
also been debated at length. Although some people see in that fact the confi rmation<br />
of the alleged Tuđman-Milošević agreement on the resettlement of the population, the<br />
conclusion that the military forces of Republika Srpska and SR of Yugoslavia were not at<br />
the moment capable of a major commitment in terms of an attack against the Republic<br />
of Croatia seems to be more likely. Th us, according to the CIA analysis of Storm, the SVK<br />
4 As opposed to his statement, the daily report of the «Security department of the GŠ SVK» of 3 August 1995<br />
states that «Captain Dragan demonstratively left the Krajina because the SVK commander did not agree<br />
with his request to be appointed commander of the 92nd motorized brigade of the SVK 7th Corps». (See<br />
Appendix 3, document 21).<br />
20
General Staff had traditionally counted on the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armies to act<br />
as their strategic reserve, and during Storm these reserves were not available. Th e Army<br />
of Republika Srpska (VRS) was still more than willing to fulfi ll this role, but the VRS<br />
General Staff itself was short of reserve formations it needed to contend with ARBiH<br />
attacks across Bosnia. Th e battlefi eld situation in Bosnia made it impossible for the<br />
Bosnian Serbs to contribute anything more than a few counterattacks around Grahovo<br />
and Bihać (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376).<br />
An overview of the war in Bosnia shows that such a conclusion is justifi ed. According<br />
to the CIA analysis, on instructions of the military leadership of Republika Srpska of 8<br />
March 1995 the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) planned a number of off ensive actions<br />
(“Sarajevo ‘95”, “Spreča ‘95”, Sadejstvo ‘95”, “Lukavac ‘95”, “Zvijezda ‘95”), intended to<br />
seize a large portion of ARBiH-held territory north of Tuzla, the areas of Mounts Igman<br />
and Bjelašnica, expand the Posavina corridor and remove the threat facing Doboj,<br />
strangle the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica and capture them if their UN protectors<br />
withdrew, and reduce the enclave of Goražde to a 3 km radius around the town itself.<br />
Plans had to include two additional operations to cut routes through the Neretva valley<br />
to the sea near Dubrovnik (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 73, pp. 289-290). Th ese very<br />
ambitious plans for the VRS show that that the Serbs wanted to use military actions<br />
in order to force the Muslim and Croatian leadership, and thereby the international<br />
community as well, to acknowledge the facts on the ground, which were abundantly to<br />
the favour of the “Serbian cause”.<br />
However, these plans were largely beyond the momentary capacity of the VRS because<br />
the changes in the balance of forces between the ARBiH and VRS, which fi rst became<br />
apparent in 1994, were very obvious by 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-<br />
303). Th us, instead of capturing territory the VRS had to defend itself from the reorganized<br />
Army of BiH. 5 Moreover, the VRS also had to defend itself from the attack of Croatian<br />
5 Th us, on 20 March 1995 the ARBiH launched spring off ensives, the targets being the Serbian-held radio<br />
transmitters atop Mount Vlašić near Travnik (Operation «Domet») and Stolice on Mount Majevica east of<br />
Tuzla. Th ere was also fi erce fi ghting on Mount Treskavica. Th e ARBiH was very successful in the fi rst attack,<br />
while in the second it suff ered a major defeat. However, in spite of its substantial losses in both operations,<br />
UN military observers reported obvious improvements in terms of equipment, planning, organization and<br />
execution of attacks; Bosnian soldiers now had adequate small arms and ammunition, fl ak jackets, helmets<br />
and radios. Similarly, the failure of the Serbian operation «Sadejstvo ‘95» in April 1995, intended to expand<br />
the corridor at Boderište 8 km south of Brčko, defended by ARBiH forces and the Croatian Defence Council<br />
(HVO) 108th brigade shows that the VRS - in spite of its superiority in armour, artillery and other heavy<br />
weapons - was unable to break through ARBiH defences (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-303).<br />
Of course, the VRS also had to prepare for defence from the long announced ARBiH off ensive intended to<br />
relieve Sarajevo, which started in mid-June 1995; although it failed and even if ARBiH had extremely high<br />
losses, the off ensive tied down considerable VRS forces which could not be committed elsewhere. Th e VRS<br />
also suff ered considerable losses (Chapter 80, pp. 307-314). Aft er January 1995 the fi ghting was particularly<br />
intensive in the Bihać enclave where the ARBiH 5th Corps assisted by the HVO 101st regiment and logistic<br />
support from Croatia put up a tough and active defence against the superior forces of Bosnian and Croatian<br />
Serbs, and special force units from Serbia. Th is is supported by the operations «Una ‘95» and «Zora ‘95» of<br />
the ARBiH 5th Corps in May 1995, and operations «Trokut 1» in June 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapters<br />
74, 75, 79).<br />
21
forces in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount Dinara. Aft er the success of Operation ”Cincar”<br />
and the liberation of Kupres in early November 1994, the Croatian forces carried out on<br />
Mount Dinara a serious of actions and operations which began to erode the strong VRS<br />
positions (“Zima ‘94”, “Skok 1” and “Skok 2”); aft er Operation “Ljeto ‘95” they entered<br />
Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, and opened the route for Knin (Balkan Battlegrounds,<br />
Chapter 77, pp. 364-365). In the meantime, Operation Flash (“Bljesak”) also liberated<br />
Western Slavonija. Th e SVK was unable to help their fellow fi ghters, and neither was the<br />
VRS; they retaliated instead by cowardly and terrorist attacks on Croatian cities with<br />
“Orkan” rockets fi tted with cluster munitions, to which Croatia did not respond (Balkan<br />
Battlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 296-298). 6<br />
Th erefore, being overstretched and overloaded, VRS forces could not provide<br />
signifi cant help to the SVK even during Operation Flash. Following that, failure in the<br />
retaliatory VRS off ensive (“Plamen ‘95”; the Croats called it “Revenge”) against Orašje<br />
(5 May to 10 June 1995), defended by HVO forces, vividly confi rmed the declining VRS<br />
capacity as compared with the fi rst war years. Although the attack was spearheaded by<br />
armoured and elite infantry units, of course with very strong fi re support, the Serbian<br />
army failed to achieve the planned targets because, unlike the case in 1992 and 1993, it<br />
was now attacking a well-organized enemy backed by considerably better fi re support as<br />
compared with previous years (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 298-299).<br />
However, aft er Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrkšić was appointed on 16 May<br />
1995 to command the SVK and run its reorganization, including the creation of the SVK<br />
Special Units Corps, the fall of Bihać into Serbian hands seemed to be inevitable in July<br />
1995; that was the starting date of the fateful Serbian off ensive against Bihać - Operation<br />
“Sword ‘95”. 7 Aft er a strategic dilemma - crush fi rst the ARBiH 5 th Corps or the Croatian<br />
forces on Mount Dinara, on 19 July 1995 the Serbian forces attacked the Bihać enclave<br />
and, in the battle for Cazin on 19-26 July 1995, brought the ARBiH 5 th Corps to the<br />
brink of defeat. Th e commander of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, General Atif Dudaković, later<br />
described this VSK off ensive as his most diffi cult experience of the war. Any objective<br />
analysis can easily confi rm the dramatic situation in which, in the event of Bihać falling<br />
into the hands of the Serbs, they would enjoy an extraordinary strategic advantage over<br />
the HV and cause a new, vast humanitarian disaster. 8<br />
6 Th e author of the comment in the CIA analysis notes that “President Tuđman showed unusual restraint<br />
when he refrained from ordering retaliatory strikes against the Serbs” (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77,<br />
p. 298).<br />
7 Th e CIA analysis stresses in particular that the Yugoslav Army had also sent «to Krajina a number of veterans,<br />
former JNA offi cers (at the time offi cers of the Yugoslav Army), in order to help with the implementation<br />
of changes, in the analysis of the SVK strategic and tactical-operational situation, and reinforce defence,<br />
because they also brought along additional equipment for the SVK new mobile reserve forces” (Balkan<br />
Battlegrounds, Chapter 88. p. 363).<br />
8 According to the CIA analysis, involved in the SVK off ensive were also an estimated 500 special operations<br />
troops of the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian State Security Service and Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guard,<br />
with additional reinforcements - troops from the VJ Special Units Corps - intended to provide shock troops<br />
and combat leaders during the attack of the VSK Special Units Corps (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88,<br />
p. 363).<br />
22
However, aft er the Split Agreement of 22 July 1995 between the Croatian President<br />
Franjo Tuđman and the President of the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović, along with<br />
the President of the BiH Federation Krešimir Zubak and the BiH Prime Minister<br />
Haris Silajdžić, the Croatian forces launched Operation “Summer ‘95” and, aft er<br />
liberating Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and mobilizing<br />
and deploying their troops, forced the Serbian army to relegate Bihać to a position of<br />
secondary importance and face the jeopardy of the Croatian strategic attack on the RSK<br />
with its threat of fatal changes in the battlefi eld (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88, p.<br />
363). Accordingly, the capture of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa was actually the<br />
only achieved VRS target among the many planned in March 1995, but even this was<br />
soon neutralized by the loss of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč. It was in such conditions<br />
- torn and overstretched, with a considerably eroded morale - that the VRS was faced<br />
with the Croatian military-police operation Storm, and even this brief overview of the<br />
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 shows why the so-called RSK and its army did not<br />
get the anticipated military help from the Bosnian Serbs, i.e., the VRS, during Storm.<br />
According to the CIA comment on the reasons why the Yugoslav Army did not give<br />
direct help and why Serbia allegedly sold the RSK out, “the claims of SVK General<br />
Milisav Sekulić that Milošević intentionally forced decisions that would lead to RSK’a<br />
fall do not hold water, because their were good arguments for most of them”. Th us,<br />
evacuation was ordered only in Knin, and not in Sector North, Moreover, the Yugoslav<br />
Army had already started (actually continued) - with Milošević’s concurrence - to supply<br />
equipment to the SVK and provide offi cers to stiff en its units, as well as some special<br />
operations units. Furthermore, “sending VJ units openly across its borders in support of<br />
the SVK was apparently more than Milošević was willing to do to save the RSK. But even<br />
if he had been willing, the rapidity with which the HV struck and enveloped the RSK left<br />
very little time for the VJ to send adequate forces to the region”. Storm did cause the VJ to<br />
mobilize and deploy large numbers of armour, artillery and infantry to the border with<br />
Eastern Slavonia as a warning to Zagreb, “but it would have taken a major VJ-supported<br />
off ensive out of the RSK enclave to actually deter or slow down the HV off ensive”. In the<br />
view of the CIA analysts, “even if Milošević’s failure to order in the VJ is taken as a sign<br />
of his indiff erence or at least callousness about the RSK’s fate, this does not imply that<br />
Milošević wanted the RSK to fall. He had committed his personal prestige and a lot of<br />
Yugoslav resources to propping up the RSK, and he had been sending VJ offi cers and<br />
equipment to help defend the Krajina Serbs since 1992”. But, as the conclusion goes,<br />
there was a line beyond which he was not willing to go (or could not go?) if by crossing<br />
it Yugoslavia incurred prolonged or increased Western sanctions or high military<br />
costs. With Western governments and their peoples increasingly focused on what was<br />
happening in places like Srebrenica and Bihać, Milošević had fi nally come to that line<br />
(Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376).<br />
Of course, the lack of direct VJ commitment in the defence of “Krajina” stirred up<br />
quite a reaction in the Serbian public. However, such developments did not surprise the<br />
23
people responsible for the defence of the so-called RSK. Specifi cally, already in early<br />
1995 the draft of the new “RSK Defence Plan” indicated “that at present it would not<br />
be realistically possible to plan the commitment, in the case of an attack on the RSK,<br />
of either VJ or VRS units” (see Appendix 1, document 18). Similarly, the Serbian press<br />
reported already in July 1995 that SR Yugoslavia, under the pressure of international<br />
economic sanctions, was not longer capable of helping the Serbs across the Drina either<br />
economically or militarily, and that precisely international sanctions had forced Slobodan<br />
Milošević to try to change his past policies by off ering his good services as a peace broker<br />
in the Balkans. Th us, in his interview to Th e Times Milošević claimed that Yugoslavia,<br />
if the sanctions were abolished, would bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table<br />
and added that “he would bring reasonable peace to that part of the country within six<br />
months” (“Poruka iz Srbije”/Message from Serbia/; Nin; 2327, 14 July 1995, pp. 13-14).<br />
Th erefore, it seems that open intervention in Croatia was not acceptable for Milošević<br />
because it would have directly jeopardized his negotiating status and possible lift ing<br />
of sanctions against Yugoslavia. In spite of that, however, Yugoslavia seems to have<br />
promised military help and diplomatic pressure on Croatia to the Krajina leadership.<br />
Specifi cally, Momir Bulatović, then member of the Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council,<br />
claimed that the Supreme Council had sent a telegram - from its extraordinary session<br />
held on 4 August 1995 in the command post at Dobanovci near Belgrade - to General<br />
Mrkšić encouraging him to keep organizing stiff resistance for at least another two days,<br />
aft er which Yugoslavia would be capable of helping him with all available resources (M.<br />
Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja: istiniti politički triler sa poznatim završetkom/Th e Silence<br />
Rules: A True Political Th riller with a Known Ending/; Belgrade, 2004, pp. 181-182; “Rat u<br />
Hrvatskoj 1991-1995”/War in Croatia 1991-1995/; www.centerforhistory.net). Mention<br />
is also made of Milošević’s telephone message to Martić, on the fi rst day of Storm,<br />
“to hold out for fi ve to six days, in order to leave Belgrade scope for action” (Milisav<br />
Sekulić, Knin je pao u Beogradu/Knin Fell in Belgrade/; Bad Vilbel, 2001; 178). Th is is<br />
also supported by the statement of Goran Hadžić, former “RSK” prime minister, aft er<br />
Storm; along with his faith in the survival of the “RSK” in Slavonia and Srijem and the<br />
message that he would never accept the fact that “Krajina” was gone, he answered to the<br />
question on a possible attack of the Croatian Army: I am certain that Serbia will help<br />
this part of Krajina and I have sure indications for that, but I cannot disclose them to the<br />
press at present. I am sure it would have helped that part of Krajina as well if it had put<br />
up at least some resistance(“Srbija će pomoći”/Serbia Will Help/; Nin; 2329, 18 August<br />
1995; pp. 17-19). Milan Milanović, “assistant RSK defence minister”, also spoke about<br />
the organizational capacity and readiness of the remaining “RSK” army to defend itself,<br />
noted that it would expect help from Yugoslavia if it were attacked by a bigger force, and<br />
added that no plans or actions were done without the agreement of Belgrade (“Svi se<br />
boje Srbije”/Everybody is Afraid of Serbia/; Intervju; 22 September 1995; pp. 6-7).<br />
Denying the allegations in the Serbian press about the poor military preparation and<br />
lack of fi nancial support to the SVK, Borislav Mikelić indirectly confi rmed Yugoslavia’s<br />
24
military support to the RSK. Specifi cally, he mentioned the considerable armaments of<br />
the “RSK” army - weapons inherited from the JNA and acquired later, and noted: “It is<br />
known that the RSK Army had an air force at Udbina, that it had rocket systems, that it<br />
had quite a few tanks, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, missiles”. Th is is confi rmed by the fact<br />
that “the Croatian Army captured weapons and ammunitions worth at least 700 million<br />
or up to an estimated one billion Deutschmarks” (“Tko je prevario Miloševića?”/Who<br />
Deceived Milošević?/; Intervju; 368; 8 September 1995; 110-11). Of course, numerous<br />
documents confi rm the help provided by Yugoslavia to the so-called RSK and the SVK.<br />
Th us, the “extraordinary operational report of the SVK General Staff ” sent to “the<br />
President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, the President of RSK Milan<br />
Martić and the Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff Colonel General Momčilo<br />
Perišić” on 11 June 1995 mentions the overall help sent by SR Yugoslavia to the Serbian<br />
Army of Krajina, including primarily the mobilization of combat-capable persons who<br />
had fl ed the area and sending them back to the Krajina”. Th e same document mentions<br />
under point 7 the “reception, currently under way, of the materiel authorized for the<br />
requirements of the Serbian Army of Krajina from the Yugoslav Army” (see Appendix<br />
2, document 26). Actually, because of the numerous documents confi rming this point,<br />
nobody can seriously deny the fact that the JNA, and subsequently the VJ, openly<br />
supported the rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia and the structuring of the SVK - to<br />
the extent that they may have been considered to be one and the same army. Th is was<br />
generally known, especially to the offi cials of the so-called RSK, as borne out by the<br />
statement of the “Deputy RSK Prime Minister” Stojan Španović at the “joint session of<br />
the Goverment of Republika Srpska and the RSK Government” held on 19 July 1993<br />
in Knin: In terms of offi cial SRJ documents the SVK is part of the Yugoslav Army (see<br />
Appendix 1, document 10).<br />
Milošević seems to have understood that he could not achieve the planned targets<br />
by military means, and tried instead to keep what he had already realized, or actually<br />
conquered, by a “policy of agreement” which he believed, together with the “Krajina<br />
Prime Minister” Borislav Mikelić, to be the most favourable for the Serbs in Croatia.<br />
However, the “Krajina” leadership turned to Pale claiming that Mikelić was a traitor<br />
and opposing his policy. At the session of the “Krajina Assembly” held in Knin on 29<br />
May 1995, Borislav Mikelić was relieved, and the Assembly expressed agreement with<br />
the “decision on the state unifi cation of the RSK and Republika Srpska”. Because of this,<br />
in an interview given on 9 June 1995, Mikelić censured Milan Martić and Milan Babić<br />
for openly obstructing any attempt to come to an agreement with Croatia. In explaining<br />
the reasons why he opposed “any fast, hasty and ill-considered unifi cation” he actually<br />
highlighted Milošević’s plan focused on lift ing the sanctions against Yugoslavia and<br />
achieving the ultimate goal of Serbian policy - the unifi cation of Serbian lands in one state:<br />
I have fi rst of all in mind the lift ing of sanctions against SR Yugoslavia and the acceptance of<br />
the Contact Group Plan by the leadership in Pale. In that case SR Yugoslavia could enter a<br />
confederation or establish a federal relation with Republika Srpska, and RS Krajina would<br />
then rely on such an arrangement (“Jesam Miloševićev čovjek” /I Am Milošević’s Man/;<br />
25
Intervju; 362, 9 June 1995, 15). Later on, the Belgrade daily Večernje novosti carried an<br />
article which criticized the policy of the “Krajina leadership” because of its drift ing apart<br />
from Belgrade and collusion with the Bosnian Serbs, and presented - as evidence that the<br />
Bosnian and Croatian Serbs pursued the policy of immediate mutual unifi cation - the<br />
Decision on the State Unifi cation of the RSK and the RS, the document prepared for the<br />
announced session of the assemblies of the RSK and the RS, never held because of Storm<br />
(“Tvrdoglavost i naiva”/Stubbornness and Naiveté/; Večernje novosti; 22 August 1995).<br />
Milošević and Mikelić must have been angry when their idea was not accepted (or<br />
understood?) by the leading politicians of the so-called RSK, who probably thought<br />
that the realization of such a plan would be too slow. Th is is why Mikelić accused the<br />
RSK leaders of thwarting every peace initiative and, in particular, found fault with the<br />
“rightist extremism” of Milan Martić and Milan Babić and with their political links with<br />
the “capital” of the Bosnian Serbs, Pale, and Radovan Karadžić. Mikelić reviewed the<br />
events on 29 March 1994 and the Zagreb Ceasefi re Agreement, and pointed out that it<br />
was concluded on the initiative of Belgrade with the objective to place “Krajina” under<br />
international protection aft er the unfavourable developments - the loss of Maslenica,<br />
the Miljevac Plateau, Zemunik, Peruča and the Medak pocket. Th e establishment of<br />
peace, continued Mikelić, was to be followed by economic negotiations, the opening<br />
of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway link and the opening of the oil pipeline. In Mikelić’s<br />
words, “such a development favoured the Krajina because it implied the extension of the<br />
agreement with the peacekeeping forces”. He also mentioned the negotiations in Erdut<br />
with the participation of the Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev who guaranteed<br />
the RSK, if it accepted the plan, the status of a “state within a state”, and added that<br />
the opposition of Babić and Martić, and their insistence on unifi cation with Republic<br />
Srpska, led to the interruption of peace negotiations and to confl ict between them and<br />
him - and thereby to confl ict with Belgrade. Th us, in Mikelić’s interpretation, Martić’s<br />
order to pull back the army in Storm and put up no resistance was in accordance with<br />
Karadžić’s slogan: If Petrinja and Knin fall, Belgrade will fall! (Ko je prevario Miloševića/<br />
Who Deceived Milošević/; Intervju; 368, 8 Sept. 1995, 10-11).<br />
Just as the accusations about “ethnic cleansing”, equally unfounded are the accusations<br />
about the Croatian excessive shelling of Knin, which some try to push by incorrectly<br />
referring only to statements supporting such claims. An example is the statement that<br />
“the Croats knew they were shelling civilian facilities, and out of the 3000 shells fi red on<br />
Knin only 250 hit military targets”, given according to Th e New York Times to the ICTY<br />
investigators by General Alain Forand, commander of UN forces in Sector South (HHO,<br />
Th e military operation ‘Storm” and Its Aft ermath, p. 28). However, all those who visited<br />
Knin immediately aft er Storm know how convincing is the claim, or actually accusation,<br />
about the excessive and uncontrolled shelling of civilian targets in Knin. Especially<br />
when they remember the JNA attacks on Croatian towns and villages in 1991... SVK<br />
commanding offi cers also know it because their reports on the start of the operation<br />
26
warrant the conclusion that Croatian artillery attacked military targets. 9 At any rate, the<br />
story about the excessive shelling of Knin passed off by “RSK offi cials” has been disproved<br />
by photographs of Knin, shown on TV and published in a Serbian newspaper. Th e same<br />
paper published the statement of Slobodan Jarčević, adviser to Milan Martić and former<br />
“RSK minister of foreign aff airs”, according to which there was in Knin no building that<br />
had not been shelled (M.A., “Egzodus naroda”/Exodus of the people; Večernje novosti, 6<br />
August 1995), along with the comment that “according to photographs taken in some of<br />
Knin’s main streets, no signs of major armed confl icts can be observed; only some trees<br />
are down, and tanks and troops are all over town” (S.P., “Snimci iz Knina”/Photographs<br />
from Knin/; Večernje novosti, 6 August 1995).<br />
In his study of Storm, which constitutes the main part of this book, the author did<br />
not omit certain problems such as the undisciplined conduct of some HV troops, and<br />
incidents - dishonourable actions (murder and torching of property) - committed against<br />
parts of the remaining Serbian population and their property in the just liberated area of<br />
the Republic of Croatia. Th ey are presented in greater detail in the book “Vojna operacija<br />
‘Oluja’ i poslije” (Military Operation Storm and Its Aft ermath) published by the Croatian<br />
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (Zagreb 2001). Th e book is actually a report on<br />
the conditions and events in the area liberated by the military-police Operation Storm -<br />
the former UN Sectors South and North - covering mainly the period between the start<br />
of the operation until the end of 1995, but also some later developments. Of course,<br />
the victims on the Serbian side during Storm are also discussed in the publications of<br />
the Veritas Information&Documentation Centre from Belgrade. However, there is no<br />
need to comment on them in particular because in its activity to date Veritas has not<br />
demonstrated any wish for a well-argumented record and objective representation of<br />
9 Th us, the report of the «command of the SVK 11th Infantry Brigade (str. conf. No. 239/2-95.) of 4 August<br />
1995 reads, among other things: Knin was shelled from Livanjsko Polje and from several directions, and<br />
until the draft ing of this report the town was hit by 200 to 300 projectiles of diff erent types and calibres. Th e<br />
target of the fi rst strike was the building of the Headquarters of the Serbian Army of the Krajina, which suffered<br />
great damage and the almost complete loss of the motor pool. Subsequently the fi re was focused on the<br />
‘1300 Corporals’ Barracks, the Tvik plant, the railway marshalling yard, housing below the fortress, and other<br />
targets... Th is is also borne out by a record of an SVK offi cer who was present in Knin when Storm started:<br />
the drumfi re barrage started all over Krajina. Everything had been planned from the smallest detail. Every<br />
shell and every artillery attack. Several days ago observers and gunners were infi ltrated in order to direct fi re.<br />
Th e most important targets in the town include the Headquarters building, the residence of the president<br />
of the state, the northern barracks, the Senjak barracks and the main crossroads in Knin... I jumped over<br />
the fence of the northern barracks and entered the building in which I had worked four months ago... Th e<br />
barracks was hit by quite a few shells, but we were lucky and avoided shells falling on our head... We got into<br />
a Golf and set off towards Headquarters. Shells were still falling, this time less frequently. We arrived at the<br />
Dešlić crossroads. Th e area round Headquarters was hit more heavily. I stopped the driver and told him to<br />
return to the barracks, and proceeded on foot... Seeking shelter behind trees I reached Headquarters. I enter<br />
the building: what a sight. Two shells hit the parking space between the buildings and destroyed the entire<br />
Headquarters motor pool. Th at must have been quite a gunner, to land them right there (Marko Vrcelj, Rat<br />
za srpsku krajinu, 1991-1995/War for the Serbian Krajina, 1991-1995/; Belgrade, 2002, pp. 212-213).<br />
27
history. Aft er all, it was precisely the Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO) that drew<br />
attention to the unreliable data in Veritas publications and the latter’s exaggerations in<br />
reporting the number of victims. Th us, HHO demonstrated that Veritas passed off , in its<br />
list of victims (e.g., in the pamphlet published in 1998), many members of the Krajina<br />
paramilitary as civilian victims, and claimed that living persons were dead (“HHO<br />
upozorava na lažne podatke beogradskog Veritasa”/HHO draws attention to false data<br />
published by Veritas of Belgrade/; Vjesnik, 11 January 2001).<br />
Th e abovementioned HHO report (Military Operation Storm and Its Aft ermath) lists<br />
410 persons who died or were killed in the former UN Sector South “during Operation<br />
Storm until the end of 1995”. Th e data reported in the list suggest that, during Operation<br />
Storm in the area under consideration, the death of approximately 31 persons was due<br />
to military action (mainly shelling), that approximately 52 Serbs and 2 Croats were<br />
killed by unknown perpetrators (no details are reported), and 43 persons are reported to<br />
have been killed by Croatian soldiers or persons wearing HV uniforms; the remainder,<br />
according to the report, died or were killed aft er the end of the operation (HHO, Military<br />
Operation Storm and Its Aft ermath; pp. 131-157). Th e report also lists 191 civilian<br />
persons who died, were killed or turned up missing in the former UN Sector North; the<br />
information suggests that, during Operation Storm, death in approximately 7 cases was<br />
due to military action (mainly shelling), approximately 30 ethnic Serbs were killed by<br />
unknown perpetrators (no details are reported), approximately 37 persons were killed<br />
by Croatian soldiers persons wearing HV uniforms, 7 persons were killed by soldiers of<br />
the Army of B&H, 3 persons (out of whom a Croatian couple) were killed by members<br />
of the so-called Army of Krajina, 24 persons turned up missing, and the remainder<br />
died, were killed or turned up missing aft er the end of the operation (HHO, Military<br />
Operation Storm and Its Aft ermath, pp. 221-244). A separate list includes 76 persons who<br />
died, were killed or turned up missing in the refugee column, mainly due to military<br />
action, while some are reported to have been killed by Croatian soldiers (HHO, Military<br />
Operation Storm and Its Aft ermath, pp. 208-215).<br />
Unfortunately, many allegations in the book are not accompanied by the required<br />
scholarly apparatus, and this the leaves the question of the reason why some notes<br />
include full information on the source for a specifi c event, while some events are<br />
mentioned without reference to any source. Similarly, this worthy attempt to collect data<br />
on dishonourable actions (murder, plunder and torching of property) committed by the<br />
Croatian side during and aft er Storm is partly encumbered by foisting an unargumented<br />
consideration of the political and military context of the operation, i.e., by emphasizing<br />
the alleged Milošević-Tuđman agreement on the so-called humane resettlement of<br />
the population. Of course, these observations do not deny the fact that individuals on<br />
the Croatian side (soldiers or civilians) killed Serbian civilians during and aft er Storm;<br />
instead, and on the basis of insight into diverse sources, attention is only drawn to the<br />
need for a fully argumented and accurate presentation of information, especially when<br />
comments refer to the way the victims died or to who killed them.<br />
It would be diffi cult to explain the motives of crimes committed against innocent and<br />
helpless people, and even more diffi cult to accept them as a reality which recurs in every<br />
28
war. But, it is certain that they cannot be justifi ed, regardless of their perpetrators, and that<br />
truth and justice require the detection and punishment of all those who were personally<br />
responsible for the crimes. Th is would give the victims at least some satisfaction, and<br />
the punishment of the actual perpetrators would demonstrate that the crimes were<br />
committed by individuals whose actions were in opposition to the action and conduct of<br />
the overwhelming majority of Croatian commanders, soldiers and policemen, who took<br />
honourable part in Operation Storm.<br />
Th is is also in the interest of historical truth: it requires the fi nal and accurate<br />
determination of the dishonourable deeds (murders of civilians and POWs, and torching<br />
of homes) committed against the Serbian population in the area covered by Operation<br />
Storm by members of the armed forces or civilians on the Croatian side, by members of<br />
the Army of B&H, and by members of the Serbian military units or Serbian civilians. 10<br />
10 Th e HHO book mainly mentions crimes against Serbian civilians committed by individuals on the Croatian<br />
side or members of the Army of B&H. However, the reports of refugee Serbs also mention the tribulations of<br />
Serbs and refugees of other ethnic groups due to the actions of the Serbian army, murders of Serbs by their<br />
fellow-countrymen and suicides during withdrawal. Th us, a note in the HHO book also mentions people<br />
killed because they did not want to join the refugee column: Our leadership informed the people about our<br />
fl ight. People were made afraid of the Croatian army, and we had to fl ee. Th ose of us who did not want to<br />
leave hid well, we did not want them to fi nd out that we were staying; otherwise, we would be forced to leave<br />
or Serbs would have killed us... Th ey went from home to home and checked whether people were leaving...<br />
(Statement by N. Drača, 23 July 1998; HHO, Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath; 14). Th ese<br />
were not mere threats, as shown by the statement of M.P. (details in the HMDCDR); she said that «Martić’s<br />
people killed her son because he refused to join the column» (HMDCDR, verbal testimony of O.N., details<br />
in the HMDCDR). M.K. (details in the HMDCDR) stated as follows: We were in the basement of the building<br />
in which Milan Babić, the dentist, had an apartment. Th e militia came and forced us to join the column<br />
(HMDCDR, protocol 1396 of 18 September 1995). M.M. (details in the HMDCDR) stated: I was wounded<br />
by a Serbian sniper. I came to save my son and we all wanted to come back (HMDCDR, protocol 1360 of<br />
14 September 1995). M.J. (details in the HMDCDR) , a Croat from Gračac who had to leave his home and<br />
was forced to join the column at gunpoint, stated that one of his neighbours was killed because she did not<br />
want to join the column (HMDCDR, protocol 1269 of 1 September 1995).L.I. (details in the HMDCDR)<br />
from Glina resisted when they tried to force him to join the column, and was beaten up by RSK soldiers<br />
(HMDCDR, protocol 74 of 19 January 1996). D.Ć. (details in the HMDCDR) stated that he had joined the<br />
column «because terror groups were left behind» (HMDCDR, protocol 247 of 12 March 1996). Th e daily<br />
Delo (Ljubljana) reported on the fate of the Serbian refugees rocketed by the Serbian air force: HTTP://www.<br />
hrt.hr/arhiv/oluja/950808/H/080895174801.html.<br />
Some Serbs in the refugee columns were crushed by tanks, e.g., the man in the militia car ran over by in Knin<br />
by an SVK tank before the arrival of Croatian troops... On the right side of the road (by the administration<br />
of the diesel fuel storage facility) I found a militia car, a ‘stojadin’ (Zastava 101). Tracks showed that it had<br />
been run over by a tank. It was quite fl attened, and a human leg protruded from it... I went on to Corps<br />
Command... I saw a ‘lada’ with two dead men in camoufl age RSK Army uniforms, 25-30 years old... Th e<br />
side of the car was riddled with bullet holes at chest level. Croatian troops had not yet entered the town, and<br />
I don’t know how they died. Th ey must have been killed by a burst. (HHO, Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’<br />
and Its Aft ermath, p. 27). Th ere is a well-known story about retreating Serbian tanks running over a column<br />
of Serbian refugee vehicles in the region of Banovina. Th us, commenting on the «sad column of 32,000<br />
refugees), the Zagreb reporter of Belgrade’s daily Večernje novosti, Milenko Predragović wrote: «According<br />
to eyewitnesses, the said column was rolled over by tanks under the command of the Serbian General Mile<br />
Novaković as he fl ed from Petrova Gora». Of course, he believed that Croatian media interpreted this version<br />
in order to blame «the Serbian leadership for the fate of the Serbian refugees». He even suggested that<br />
the column had been rolled over by «Serbian, but captured tanks» (Milenko Predragović, «Kolona izgažena<br />
tenkovima» (Column Rolled over by Tanks; Večernje novosti, 14 August 1995). Th e construction is not true,<br />
as confi rmed by recollections of Storm participants (HMDCDR, memoir material).<br />
29
Of course, the number of Serbian suicides must also be determined accurately<br />
because sources have shown that such cases were not rare either. 11 Another question<br />
is the suff ering of the Serbs in the refugee columns because civilians were mixed with<br />
soldiers, and tractors and cars with tanks. Moreover, many people not wearing uniforms<br />
(“civilians”) were armed. Croatian soldiers remembered being shot at by civilians from<br />
various weapons and attacked with grenades. 12 Th e same goes for the list of the torched<br />
and plundered houses abandoned by the Serbs because sources show that some of the<br />
property (homes, buildings) was set on fi re by the Serbs as they fl ed during Storm. 13<br />
11 Th is is also borne out by the reporter’s interview with a Serbian refugee who fl ed Croatia:...While he [the<br />
Serbian refugee] was telling me about the many suicides during their fl ight, babies and old people who<br />
had died, about the lack of bread and water, his fellow refugee sternly warned us that the stuff could not be<br />
published, that everything was alright but that it was forbidden to write anything about it. Who forbade it,<br />
I asked, but he just shrugged and went away... An old man, seventy-three, killed himself. He just got off the<br />
road into a maize fi eld and killed himself with a grenade... Th e bridge at Nova Grada was destroyed, and a<br />
women killed herself there. When we got to the bridge, she just jumped into the water, poor soul (“Progoni<br />
istočno od raja”/Persecutions East of Eden; Intervju; 367, 25 August 1995). Here is part of the moving story<br />
of Radmila Dragičević (34): Five babies died in our column, and many old people; we left them by the road<br />
because they told us that ambulances would collect them. Miloš Bradaš (39): A man who had no more fuel<br />
in his tractor, probably deranged, took out a gun and killed his wife, their two children and then himself.<br />
Th ey tried to stop him, but failed. (“Ljudi s traktora”/Th e people on the tractors; Nin, 2329, 18 August 1995,<br />
29). An old refugee also described the chaos in the Serbian refugee columns fl eeing Croatia: In the Topusko<br />
pocket we heard that the Muslims were slaughtering everybody at Glina. Chaos followed, people cried,<br />
moaned, armed and drunken soldiers threatened, two men killed themselves. Th en the police from Kordun<br />
restored order. Th ey beat people with sticks... (Milena Marković, “Kroz psovke i batine”/Th rough Curses<br />
and Beating; Večernje novosti, 15 August 1995). Testimony of Višnja, 32: We were in the column from 5 to<br />
10 August 1995. We just stood on the spot or moved slowly. We had food, what we had taken along, but I<br />
could hardly eat. I lost my appetite because of everything that had happened to us. We heard that there had<br />
been some negotiations and that we should move on. Th ey formed us into rank, set the column in order<br />
(Croatian militia) and ordered everyone to leave their weapons because the border could not be crossed with<br />
weapons. Th ey let people take the fuel from the remaining tanks, but not weapons. Some people could not<br />
bear being separated from their weapons and committed suicide... (Žene Krajine - rat, egzodus i izbeglištvo/<br />
Th e Women of Krajina - War, Exodus and Exile/, Belgrade, 1996, 287).<br />
12 Th is is borne out by the example, amply covered by the media, of grandmother Danica Obradović (shown<br />
on the “Krajina television” aft er the Medak Pocket operation), but also by the moving story of the widow<br />
Marina, 27: ... Near my house [village of Kašić in the Zadar hinterland] there is a hill from which we could<br />
see everybody approaching. We had a ‘broing’ [Browning]. I shot from it. Th at was an antiaircraft gun capable<br />
of mowing down anything. Th e people put in the bullets and set everything up, and I handled it... I had<br />
to think of my children. But where there were no men for the village guards, I never refused guard duty... (V.<br />
Nikolić-Ristanović, S. Konstantinović-Vilić, N. Mrvić-Petrović, I. Stevanović, B. Knežić, Žene Krajine - rat,<br />
egzodus i izbeglištvo/Th e Women of Krajina - War, Exodus and Exile/; Belgrade, 1996, 79). Testimonies of<br />
other women also suggest that quite a few civilians in the so-called RSK, including women, were armed.<br />
Th us, in the story about her tragedy and exile, Neda (born 1954) mentioned that she had taken “her weapons<br />
along because everyone had it” (Th e Women of Krajina, 263). Faced with a similar situation, Desanka (55),<br />
“grabbed a bag and stuff ed some bare necessities into it; I also took along a hunting gun, but no documents”<br />
(Th e Women of Krajina, 283).<br />
13 Th is is borne out by the statements of the Serbian refugees aft er Storm: ... According to Politika (Belgrade<br />
daily), a soldier from Kninsko Polje, who had been given leave just before the attack to go home and clean<br />
up, “packed” all the people in his hamlet (40) into a large trailer truck and drove them to Belgrade. Only<br />
30
Of course, this does not disprove the fact that the property of Croatian citizens, ethnic<br />
Serbs, in the liberated territory was mainly torched by individuals on the Croatian side.<br />
No dialogue can be established, and no badly needed peace reinforced in this area by<br />
denying the committed criminal off ences or by blaming only one side for them, and by<br />
drawing specifi c events out of the context of the historic process. Truth is also the only<br />
right avenue for the future of our children, because we can only expect new suff ering if<br />
everybody does not understand that crime cannot be justifi ed by anything. At the same<br />
time, resorting to half-truths or unverifi ed information and, thereby, the imposition<br />
of a conclusion that Storm was a “criminal scheme”, forcing upon Croatia a new guilt<br />
complex, are also unacceptable. Many examples support the claim that Storm was not<br />
intended to expel and exterminate the Serbs, and that Croatian soldiers were ordered<br />
to abide by the rules of international law of war. Th ey include the testimony of a bedridden<br />
old woman, recorded in the already mentioned HHO book (p. 29), saved thanks<br />
to the determined insistence of a Croatian soldier (probably a commanding offi cer),<br />
who had her put on a truck and taken to Knin, although his fellow-soldier suggested<br />
he should “leave her or kill her”. Although the story also shows that some individuals<br />
had no intention of respecting the international law of war, it actually confi rms - by the<br />
order to the superior to his subordinate to “look aft er the old woman as if she were his<br />
the driver’s father, 63, stayed behind: the man took a gun in order to fi ght as long as he could, then set his<br />
house on fi re and fl ed only then (Vreme weekly; 14 August 1995, p. 4)... As we pulled back to Srb and Drvar,<br />
we passed through empty villages. Th ere were no dead or wounded civilians or soldiers, just empty houses<br />
and livestock. Occasionally explosions were heard - the Serbs had blown up some facilities lest they should<br />
fall into the hands of the Croats - hospitals, post offi ces, storage facilities with weapons they could not take<br />
along... Th e refugee column was far ahead of us... (testimony of M.Č., 32, from Obrovac, wounded during<br />
retreat at Srb and transferred for treatment to the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade; recorded in the<br />
double issue of the “independent political daily” Naša borba, 193-194, of 12-13 August, p. 9). Statements<br />
by other Serbian refugees also show that buildings and other facilities were set to fi re, “in order not to leave<br />
them to the Croats”. Th us, before leaving Donji Lapac the Serbs set fi re to the Kamensko Hotel, the police<br />
station and “at least an additional 3-4 buildings” (HHO, Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath;<br />
Zagreb, 2001, 25, notes 23, 34). Another distressing testimony, one of the many by Serbs who fl ed the socalled<br />
RSK during Storm, by a women called Jagoda, 45-year-old mother of two minor children, bears witness<br />
to the suff ering of the people led by their leaders into exile, to the tribulations of civilians and burning<br />
homes before the arrival of the Croatian troops in the formerly occupied areas... Wherever we went, there<br />
was just wasteland... Homes were burning by the roadside (Th e Women of Krajina, 127-128). Testimony of<br />
Neda, born in 1954: ... Podgorje is about a mile away from the municipality of Krnjak; nobody had told us<br />
anything, but I saw the village burning and women running away. Panic set in, we didn’t know what to do...<br />
Somebody shouted ‘let’s move’, and just as we sat down I saw a house burning. Groups of Muslims appeared,<br />
torched homes, and people began to fl ee again. I took my gun along, because everybody did. People fl ed into<br />
the maize fi eld, and terrible slaughter followed... (Th e Women of Krajina, 262-263). Testimony of Desanka,<br />
55: In the evening, at about 8 p.m. (on 5 August), my husband went to bed, and I followed him. Th e people<br />
from the civil defence came and told us to go to the factory, the “assembly point”. I called my husband. - He<br />
said he could not go. I grabbed a bag and fi led it with the bare necessities. I also took a hunting gun, but no<br />
documents, because I thought we would be coming back... We assembled in the factory, about thirty of us,<br />
infi rm people; everything was already burning, in fl ames. One of the factory managers called a driver and<br />
gave us a bus to take us away, We drove through the burning village. Th e driver drove with lights off (Th e<br />
Women of Krajina; 282-283).<br />
31
own kin... at the cost of his life” - that Croatian soldiers were given the task of looking<br />
aft er the safety of the remaining Serbian civilians, in this case by transferring them to<br />
security in Knin. Moreover, many Croatian soldiers and policemen testifi ed that they fed<br />
and looked aft er Serbian civilians aft er operations Flash and Storm. Unfortunately, some<br />
individuals did not follow their example.<br />
Of course, humanitarian activities in the just liberated area are not a topic discussed<br />
in this book (Slobodan Lang - Vesna Ivanović, Pružena ruka: hrvatski “Pravednici” -<br />
djela dobra u ratu/Th e Off ered Hand: the ‘Righteous’ Croats - Good Deeds During the<br />
War; Zagreb, 2006, 196-209, and other reports). In this context, and since the Croatian<br />
army was supposed to lift the blockade of the UN safe area at Bihać in neighbouring<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina, one should not neglect the fact that Storm itself was also a singular<br />
humanitarian operation which saved from certain death thousands of innocent people<br />
in Bihać, surrounded by Serbian forces and threatened with the fate of the inhabitants of<br />
Srebrenica and Žepa.<br />
Croatian historiography has already demonstrated its maturity and impartiality, and<br />
readiness to face the most intriguing issues. Th is warrants the belief that this book on<br />
Operation Storm will contribute to its objective presentation and to the understanding of<br />
the procedures conditioned by circumstances, and clearly distinguish the consequences<br />
of combat action (suff ering of the population due to shelling and fi ghting) from the<br />
criminal off ences committed independently of military action (because of revenge or<br />
gain). Similarly, scientifi c analyses ought to help in understanding the objectives and<br />
the outcome of Storm: the defeat of the Serbian aggressor and the reintegration of<br />
the so-called UNPA Zones into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of<br />
Croatia, i.e., the liberation of the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia up to its<br />
international recognized borders, return of the refugees, and help provided to the Army<br />
of B&H in lift ing the blockade of surrounded Bihać and preventing a new humanitarian<br />
disaster. However, the book should also halt the manipulations whereby the legitimacy<br />
and the liberating character of this military&police operation is being questioned by<br />
referring to events which are not related to its objectives and which were committed by<br />
wilful individuals largely aft er its end.<br />
Ante Nazor<br />
32
Croatian soldiers (guardsmen)<br />
34
Davor Marijan<br />
S T O R M<br />
35
36<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<br />
Th e battlefi eld and the belligerents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42<br />
Th e Serbian rebellion in Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46<br />
Th e fi rst Bihać crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51<br />
Croatian force operations in Livanjsko Polje and Western Slavonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54<br />
Th e RSK in the fi rst half of 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59<br />
Th e second Bihać crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62<br />
Th e Croatian response to the second Bihać crisis - the Operation Ljeto ’95 (Summer ‘95) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64<br />
Political preparation for Operation Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65<br />
Krajina in anticipation of Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67<br />
War plans (defence plans and plans for the liberation of the occupied territory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70<br />
Final HV preparations for the operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72<br />
THE STORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77<br />
Split Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79<br />
Special MUP units in Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90<br />
Gospić Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96<br />
Karlovac Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106<br />
Zagreb Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117<br />
Bjelovar Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134<br />
Air Force in Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139<br />
Support of the Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145<br />
Osijek Corps District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145<br />
Southern theatre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146<br />
Croatian Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146<br />
Croatian Defence Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147<br />
Response of the SVK Slavonia-Baranja Corps, the VRS and the VJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148<br />
UNCRO, UN and international reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Overview of the execution of the operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152<br />
“Ethnic cleansing” or exodus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160<br />
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166<br />
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168<br />
37
(Croatian soldiers, 6 August 1995 (photograph by Robert Belošević)<br />
38
INTRODUCTION<br />
Few people in Croatia remain indiff erent to the word Storm. From the Croatian<br />
perspective, Storm is synonymous with victory, it is the symbol of the successful<br />
end of a years-long war. From the perspective of the Serbs, and not only of the<br />
Serbs in Croatia, Storm is an entirely diff erent symbol. Th e reason is simple: a diff erent<br />
view of the recent past and its interpretation. Ever since it has become the object of ICTY<br />
interest and proceedings, Storm has been a topical issue in Croatian everyday political<br />
life and not only a compelling event from the recent past.<br />
Apart from the press, in which it has been directly or indirectly a constant topic,<br />
Operation Storm is also the theme of papers having a more ambitious scope than a daily<br />
press release. In spite of the uncritical and celebratory texts of the Political Directorate<br />
of the Ministry of Defence, 1 the groundwork of Storm was matter-of-factly presented by<br />
the former Chief of the HV General Staff , Staff General Janko Bobetko (ret.). In his book<br />
All My Battles Bobetko published the complete directive which formed the basis for the<br />
subsequent execution of Operation Storm, 2 although the publication of the war plan of<br />
an army so soon aft er its draft ing was a rather unusual event. However, it could be said<br />
that Bobetko’s interpretation of Operation Storm is not correct, in principle, because he<br />
obviously was not familiar with the changes which were made aft er his retirement and<br />
which brought about modifi cations of the war plan. Th is is particularly the case with the<br />
presentation of the operation in the Banovina area, which totally omits the role of the<br />
Bjelovar Corps District, about which Bobetko knew nothing because he had not even<br />
envisioned it when he signed the directive for Storm-1 in June 1995. Operation Storm<br />
was also highlighted in the papers and a book by another Chief of the HV General Staff ,<br />
Admiral Davor Domazet Lošo (ret.), 3 although some authors challenge his claim that<br />
Storm was an air&land battle. 4 Th e Operation was also given due coverage in publications<br />
1 Oluja/Storm, Hrvatska vojna glasila (Croatian military press), 1, October 1995; Oluja, Hrvatska vojna<br />
glasila, 2, November 1995; Oluja, Hrvatska vojna glasila, 3, December 1995.<br />
2 Janko Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), self-published; Zagreb, 1996, 422-432, 441-451, 462-475<br />
and 484-491.<br />
3 Davor Domazet-Lošo, “Završne operacije Hrvatske vojske - uvjerljivost vojne moći i/ili promjena strategijskog<br />
odnosa (Final Operations of the Croatian Army - Convincing Military Power and/or Change of<br />
Strategic Balance), <strong>Hrvatski</strong> vojnik, Zagreb, 22/1997, 12-21; ibid., Hrvatska i veliko ratište (Croatia and the<br />
Great Battlefi eld), Udruga Sv. Jurja, Zagreb, 2002.<br />
4 Ozren Žunec, «Operacije Bljesak i Oluja», Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, 1991-1995 (Operations<br />
Flash and Storm; War in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, 1991-1995); Jesenski i Turk: Dani, Zagreb: Sarajevo,<br />
1999, 100-101.<br />
39
y infl uential Croatian politicians, e.g., in the books by Hrvoje Šarinić, Chief of Staff of<br />
the President of the Republic of Croatia, and Mate Granić, Minister of Foreign Aff airs. 5<br />
At the other end, Milisav Sekulić and Marko Vrcelj of the Serbian Krajina Army<br />
(SVK) authored books on Storm. 6 Major General Sekulić, Head of the SVK Training<br />
and Education Division, produced a valuable but also a questionable contribution. A<br />
signifi cant part of the book Knin Fell in Belgrade is really based on documents partly<br />
captured by Croatian forces during the operation. However, some of the claims are not<br />
documented; they derive from the author’s family education (primary socialization)<br />
and abound in biases, blanket assessments and deliberate insinuations. In a nutshell, a<br />
signifi cant part of the book is extremely incorrect. Th e author seeks to challenge the fact<br />
that the SVK was militarily defeated and, of course, accuses the political and military<br />
leadership of treason, introduces NATO (which was not involved) into the story - briefl y,<br />
resorts to everything in order to dispute his own account on earlier pages, i.e., the poor<br />
and ineffi cient political system which had produced an analogous military force.<br />
Th e operations of the ARBiH 5 th Corps are described by Bejdo Felić’s monograph<br />
which lacks a scientifi c approach and omits certain signifi cant facts regarding Storm and<br />
Bosniac-Croatian relations in the Bihać region. 7<br />
Th is book is based on my unfi nished manuscript which was commissioned by Mr.<br />
Jozo Radoš, then Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Th e documents to<br />
which I refer were then in the Archives of the HV General Staff ; today, to my knowledge,<br />
they are mainly in the MORH Central Military Archives. In late 2006 I again applied<br />
for access to the same documents to the cabinet of the Minister of Defence. I have never<br />
received any answer.<br />
A major problem in the analysis of the operations of the Croatian forces was the lack<br />
of part of documents related to the actual engagement. Part of these is certainly missing,<br />
and another part was apparently never written. Some units certainly never recorded<br />
daily operational reports, and others kept no war diary. Because of this some aspects and<br />
parts of specifi c operations will forever remain an unknown. Th us, one of the questions<br />
open to speculation is the claim of one HV unit that it was the fi rst to reach the suburbs<br />
of Slunj where for “well-known reasons it waited” for units of the 14 th Slunj Home Guard<br />
Regiment to enter their town fi rst. 8 Only time will show how much this can be set right<br />
by interviewing the participants. Another very frequently fl awed type of documents<br />
are combat action analyses by the units involved aft er the operation. Th e units were<br />
mainly focused on themselves and on their role, and it is diffi cult to establish what was<br />
happening with their ‘neighbours’ and analyze their contribution along specifi c lines of<br />
action. Some of the units produced analyses of no historic value, and others, apparently,<br />
none at all. Unfortunately, the latter include two of the fi ve guards brigades which were<br />
5 Hrvoje Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95/98» (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98). Globus, International, Zagreb, 1999; Mate Granić, «Vanjski<br />
poslovi: Iza kulisa politike” (Foreign Aff airs: Behind the Scenes of Politics). Algoritam, Zagreb, 2005.<br />
6 Milisav Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Nidda Verlag, Bad Vilbel, 2000; Marko<br />
Vrcelj, „Rat za Srpsku Krajinu 1991-1995“ (Th e War for Serbian Krajina, 1991-1995); Srpsko kulturno<br />
društvo “Zora”, Belgrade, 2002.<br />
7 Brigadier Bejdo Felić, «Peti korpus 1992-1995.» (Th e 5 th Corps 1992-1995); Ljiljan, Sarajevo, 2002.<br />
8 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (MORH), GSHV Archives: ZP Karlovac, IZpM Karlovac-<br />
Ogulin; Cl. 81/95-01/01, Reg. No. 1078-IZM-1/95-29 of 6 August 1995. Report.<br />
40
engaged in the Operation and contributed signifi cantly to its success. Apart from that,<br />
such documents usually and largely lack self-criticism. Th us, it is obvious that the analysis<br />
of an attached unit will not include the assessment of one Corps District Command that<br />
it could “not be committed any longer in action because of well-known reasons stated in<br />
previous reports. 9<br />
Today as well as in 2001 I had a negligible number of documents on the actions of the<br />
Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia; as a matter of<br />
fact, I hardly had any. Accordingly, the space devoted to the actions of the MUP Special<br />
Police is this book is totally below the level of its action and performance during the<br />
Operation.<br />
Th is study is not meant to deal in detail with the action of each and every unit. It<br />
seeks to describe the atmosphere in which the operation was run and its salient features.<br />
However, it can be noted that a more detailed analysis of Storm, not yet presented publicly,<br />
would not confi rm the claim about an “irreproachably executed operation”. Of course,<br />
this is obvious, considering the great number of quickly mobilized units and personnel<br />
in reserve brigades and Home Guard regiments, not prepared for such a demanding<br />
operation. Of course, for the Croats Storm will always remain “the mother of all battles”,<br />
an operation which deserves the epithet “brilliant” above all because its outcome is of an<br />
extraordinary, maybe even crucial historical signifi cance for the Croats and for Croatia.<br />
Croatian soldier<br />
9 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, Cl. 81/95-01/01, Reg. No. 1078-IZM-1/95-29 of 6<br />
August 1995, 17.00 hours. Report. MORH, GSHV: VP 2121, Cl. 81/95-01/01, Reg. No. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5<br />
September 1995. Analysis of combat action, Operation Storm.<br />
41
42<br />
THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE BELLIGERENTS<br />
Operation Storm was executed in the central part of the Republic of Croatia,<br />
occupied and wrested from the control of the legal authorities of the Republic<br />
of Croatia by synchronous action of the rebel Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s<br />
Army, and named the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Th e RSK consisted of three<br />
territorial units: the fi rst in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Srijem, the second in Western<br />
Slavonia and the third, the largest, which comprised the area along the state border<br />
between Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, from Jasenovac to Benkovac, Knin and<br />
the state border on Mount Dinara. Th e last two units accounted for 85% of the total<br />
area of the RSK. 10 For several years rebel Serbs controlled a territory of 17,028 square<br />
kilometres with a population - according to unreliable data - of about 430,000. Th e frontline<br />
923 km long separated this territory from the part of the Republic of Croatia under<br />
the control of lawfully elected Croatian authorities. Th e line dividing the RSK from the<br />
Cazin Krajina was 118 km long. Th e greatest depth of the area - 63.1 km - was between<br />
the villages of Škabrinja and Tiškovac. It was thinnest, about 2.5 km, at Jasenovac, then<br />
- 12.5 km - from Vedro Polje (Sunja) to Kostajnica and - 19.5 km - from the village<br />
of Čanak to the border with Bosnia&Herzegovina on Mount Plješivica. 11 Th e territory<br />
was drawn out and broken up, which had a negative impact on conduct of war and<br />
command, operational&strategic development and manoeuvring capability of the rebel<br />
Serbian army. Th e low depth of the territory hampered the establishment of air bases,<br />
the echeloning of material reserves and, hence, the support of combat operations, the<br />
selection of positions for rocket systems and manoeuvring. Because of its great length and<br />
relatively small depth the entire RSK battlefi eld could simultaneously be placed under<br />
fi re control by the Croatian Army, which favoured cutting-off with a high potential for<br />
strategic surprise. 12<br />
Th e Croatian Army indeed considered a possible strategic surprise. It was formed in<br />
1991 from police units, the National Guard and the Territorial Defence of the Republic of<br />
10 For a more extensive history of the RSK see Nikica Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995” (Serbian<br />
Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995), Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2005.<br />
11 N. Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995” (Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995), 171-173;<br />
Croatian State Archives (HDA), material on Republika Srpske Krajine (RSK): “Dostignuti nivo i dalji pravci<br />
razvoja SVK (nedatirano i nepotpisano) (Achieved level and further lines of SVK development - undated<br />
and unsigned).<br />
12 HDA, RSK: “Dostignuti nivo i dalji pravci razvoja SVK (nedatirano i nepotpisano) (Achieved level and<br />
further lines of SVK development - undated and unsigned), MORH.
Croatia in the diffi cult circumstances imposed by the Serbian rebellion and the allegedly<br />
neutral and actually pro-Serbian actions of the JNA. Its fi rst task was the defence of the<br />
Republic of Croatia, and aft er 1992 its strategic mission became the reintegration of the<br />
rebel-controlled and occupied regions into the constitutional system of the Republic of<br />
Croatia. Th e Croatian Army had no clear-cut or offi cial strategy during the war, although<br />
the matter was being studied by the Ministry of Defence. 13 Croatian intentions were<br />
also hampered by the demanding character of the territory of the Republic of Croatia<br />
under the control of legal authorities from the standpoint of military considerations, i.e.,<br />
defence and engagement of forces. Th e Serbian claim that “in today’s Europe there is no<br />
country comparable with Croatia in terms of the unfavourable set-up of its territory”<br />
was not far from the truth. 14<br />
By the second half of 1994 the structuring of the Croatian Army was fi nally completed,<br />
and with minor changes the setup was maintained until the end of the war. It comprised<br />
the various command, institutions and units. Th e umbrella command body was the<br />
HV General Staff , which controlled six corps districts (ZPs) and one war theatre, units<br />
directly subordinated to the General Staff , the Croatian Air Force and Air Defence<br />
and the Croatian Navy. Th e corps district was an operational group with a standing<br />
structure including HV reserve units and Home Guard units. In principle it consisted<br />
of various commands, a motorized Guards brigade, 3 to 6 HV infantry brigades, 3 to 6<br />
Home Guard regiments, a logistic base, artillery support battalions, anti-armour and<br />
air defence units, and a number of smaller units. Some corps districts (ZP Zagreb, Split<br />
and Gospić) included one Guards brigade, ZP Osijek had two Guards brigades, and<br />
ZP Karlovac and Bjelovar none. Th e last two corps districts were also smaller than the<br />
others. Th e units directly subordinated to the HV General Staff included the 1 st and<br />
7 th Guards Motorized Brigade, the 15 th Anti-armour Artillery-rocket Brigade, the 16 th<br />
Artillery-rocket Brigade, the 33 rd Engineer Brigade, the 40 th Communications Regiment<br />
and several smaller branch units. 15 Th e main HV forces were the seven Guards brigades,<br />
while reserve units includes 28 infantry brigades and 38 Home Guard regiments. 16 Th e<br />
organic HV structure did not include the 1 st Croatian Guards Corps which included<br />
a combat unit, the 1 st Croatian Guards Brigade. 17 In December 1994 the HV had 320<br />
artillery support 105 to 203 mm pieces - 52.81% of its organic requirements. 18 Aft er<br />
Operation Flash the army had 393 armoured vehicles, out of which 232 tanks. 19<br />
13 Cf., e.g., «Hrvatska strategija obrane» (Croatian Defence Strategy), Centar za strateška istraživanja (Centre for<br />
Strategic Studies), MORH, Zagreb, 1995.<br />
14 Radovan Radinović, «Realna pretnja na delu» (Real Th reat at Work), Vojska Krajine, 4-5, July-August 1993, 7.<br />
15 Central Military Archives of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (SVA MORH), holdings of the<br />
Political Directorate: GSHV, cl. 8/93-02/04; reg. no. 512-96-05-93-28 of 4 February 1993; Decision on the division of<br />
RH into Corps Districts; SVA MORH, holdings of the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia<br />
(KMORH): MORH, cl. str. conf. 801-01/93-02/02, reg. no. 512-01-93-320 of 16 February 1993; mobilization and<br />
deployment of the RH armed forces in peacetime conditions.<br />
16 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, HV combat readiness report, December 1994.<br />
17 SVA MORH, GSHV: RH, the President, no. PA7-61/1-94 of 31 March 1994; Decision; SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH,<br />
cl. SP 801-01/94-03, reg. no. 512-01-94-1259 of 29 March 1994; Amendments to the mobilization, deployment and<br />
organic OS RH structure.<br />
18 SVA MORH, GSHV: Materiel Report - Support Artillery, 15 December 1994.<br />
19 SVA MORH, GSHV: cl. 512-06-04/5-95, reg. no. 813-07/95-02/10 of 5 July 1995; Report on HV armoured forces.<br />
43
Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Defence included the Command, fi ve air bases and<br />
four Air Defence brigades. Th e Air Force had 40 aircraft , out of which 26 combat aircraft ,<br />
and 22 helicopters, out of which 10 combat helicopters. Th e Croatian Navy included<br />
the Command, the North, Central and South Adriatic commands, the fl eet, batteries,<br />
and infantry detachments and Home Guard battalions. Th e fl eet had 28 vessels. 20 In<br />
December 1994 the HV had about 96,000 troops. Th e army prevailed with more than<br />
89,000 troops. 21 For the requirements of operations Storm and Flash the numbers<br />
increased through additional mobilization and mobilization of reserve units.<br />
Until late autumn in 1992 the armed forces of the rebel Serbs were known as the<br />
Territorial Defence (TO); they were then renamed into Serbian Krajina Army (SVK). At<br />
the same time it was structured in terms of organization and organically, and retained<br />
the structure until its disappearance. Th e SVK included the General Staff and units<br />
subordinated to the General Staff , six corps, and air forces. Th e corps were organized<br />
along the regional principle. Northern Dalmatia was covered by the 7 th , North Dalmatian<br />
Corps, Lika by the 15 th , Lika Corps, Kordun by the 21 st , Kordun Corps, Banovina by<br />
the 39 th , Banovina Corps, Western Slavonia by the 18 th , Western Slavonia Corps, and<br />
Eastern Slavonia by the 11 th , Slavonia-Baranja Corps. In principle a corps comprised the<br />
command, three or more brigades, a logistic base and support artillery. Th e Slavonia-<br />
Baranja Corps was an exception in that it also included an infantry division. Th e air force<br />
included an air brigade, air bases, and an observation, reporting and guidance battalion. 22<br />
Aft er Operation Flash and the routing of the Western Slavonia Corps, Lieutenant Colonel<br />
General Mile Mrkšić became the new commander of the SVK. Mrkšić initiated a number<br />
of changes in the SVK structure, the most important one being the formation of the<br />
Special Unit Corps (Korpus specijalnih jedinica, KSJ). It comprised the Corps Command,<br />
2 armoured brigades, the 71 st Special Brigade, the 2 nd Guards Brigade, the Mountain<br />
Battalion, an MP battalion, and a light air defence artillery battalion. 23 In spite of the<br />
high-sounding name of the unit, it was of brigade rank; however, special units were<br />
usually regarded as being of the same rank as larger units. Th e HV paid great attention<br />
to the formation of the Special Unit Corps, and attributed to it an excessive signifi cance;<br />
time would show, soon, that its impact was nevertheless more modest than expected. 24<br />
In mid-1994 the SVK had 300 tanks, 295 armoured vehicles, and 360 artillery pieces<br />
of 100-plus mm caliber. 25 In late October 1994 it had 20,000 to 25,000 troops. 26 During<br />
20 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, HV combat readiness report, December 1994.<br />
21 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, HV combat readiness report, December 1994.<br />
22 Military Security Agency (Vojnosigurnosna agencija, VSA) MORH: RSK, GŠ SV, DT no. 947.23/1 of 27<br />
November 1992; Restructuring of TO and special militia units into the Serbian Army of the RSK; M. Sekulić,<br />
“Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin fell in Belgrade), 36-39.<br />
23 Counterintelligence Agency (Protuobavještajna agencija, POA): RSK, GŠ SV, str. conf., no. 3-268 of 22<br />
May 1995; SVK restructuring, Order; VSA MORH: Overview of Special Unit Corps (document with no<br />
number or date); M. Sekulić, Knin fell in Belgrade, 157.<br />
24 MORH, GSHV; GS HV, RP/13/85 of 5 July 1995; Appendix based on intelligence assessment.<br />
25 HDA, RSK: GŠ SV, str. conf. no. 26-216 of 12 May 1994. Overview of basic SVK materiel; HDA, RSK:<br />
Report to the commander-in-chief on the plan of SVK commitment (undated, early 1995).<br />
26 POA: GŠ SVK.IKM, str. conf., no. 3-503/552 of 30 November 1994. Data for the report of the defence<br />
minister to the RSK Assembly.<br />
44
Operation Flash its peacetime complement totalled 14,900 and the wartime complement<br />
62,500 troops. Th e numbers can be assumed to have been the same on the eve of Operation<br />
Storm, meaning that the SVK had about 43,000 men under arms in the western part of<br />
Croatia. 27<br />
Th e “real threat strategy”, as the RSK military strategy was called, was introduced in<br />
the summer of 1993. It was based on the assumption that the Croatian off ensive “against<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina would set off ... large scale fi re counteractions targeting<br />
vital facilities and objectives in Croatia and resulting in demolition, destruction and<br />
manpower losses, which the Croatian side would fi nd unacceptable”. Th at, it was believed,<br />
was the only way which “could force Croatia to accept the Krajina and its armed forces as<br />
a serious opponent and negotiating partner”. 28<br />
27 VSA MORH: Overview of reinforcement of the SVK peacetime complement on 1 May 1995; VSA MORH:<br />
Overview of reinforcement of the SVK wartime complement on 1 May 1995.<br />
28 R. Radinović, «Realna pretnja na delu» (Real Th reat at Work), 7.<br />
45
46<br />
THE SERBIAN REBELLION IN CROATIA<br />
August 1995 marked the fi ft h anniversary of the start of the Serbian rebellion in<br />
Croatia (Knin, 17 August 1990). In late 1991 the rebellion led to the creation of<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK). Th e anniversary<br />
of the rebellion in Knin could not be celebrated because the RSK had ceased to exist in<br />
the western parts of the Croatia a dozen days before. It disappeared in the action of the<br />
Croatian armed forces and police, code-named Storm. Although it did not mark the end<br />
of the war, Operation Storm announced the imminent end of hostilities and became the<br />
symbol of Croatian victory in the Homeland War.<br />
Th e way in which the RSK came into being along with the irrational behaviour of<br />
its leadership made liberation by an operation such as Storm inevitable. Th e Serbian<br />
rebellion in Croatia started in the summer of 1990 aft er the fi rst democratic elections<br />
in Croatia. Th e elections were won by the Croatian Democratic Union on a political<br />
platform of national reconciliation. In Serbia and among a signifi cant part of the Serbs<br />
in Croatia its victory was accepted as a confi rmation of the return of the ustashi to the<br />
political scene. In spite of the oft en tough political rhetoric of the HDZ, and in spite of the<br />
fact that research on the activity of that party is yet to come, it would be diffi cult to deny<br />
the claim that there was no reason for the Serbs to rise up in arms. Th e view according<br />
to which a part of the Serbs in Croatia was not prepared to accept any Croatian state also<br />
appears to be acceptable. 29<br />
Th e Serbian rebellion in Croatia also marked the fi nal stage of the crisis and collapse<br />
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Th e disintegration of the SFRY<br />
started aft er the death of Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, the communist system in<br />
Europe also fell apart quickly, and rather unexpectedly, in the late nineteen-eighties. All<br />
that led to the breakdown of the SFRY because the Serbian political, scientifi c, religious<br />
and other elite circles tried to impose their vision of the Yugoslav system upon the<br />
others. 30 Th ey attempt failed. Th e aggressive Serbian policy was tolerated in the other<br />
republics until the overthrow of the political leaderships in SAP Vojvodina and SAP<br />
Kosovo, and the abrogation of the autonomy of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.<br />
29 Boško Todorović/Dušan Vilić, Izdaja i odbrana Jugoslavije» (Th e Betrayal and the Defence of Yugoslavia);<br />
Privredapublik, Belgrade, 1990, 163-166, 169-170; Dejan Jović, «Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla»<br />
(Yugoslavia: Th e State that Withered Away), Prometej, Zagreb, 2003, 483; Nikica Barić, “Srpska pobuna<br />
u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995” (Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995), Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga,<br />
Zagreb, 2005, 58-59.<br />
30 Dušan Bilandžić, «Hrvatska moderna povijest» (Modern Croatian History), Golden marketing, Zagreb,<br />
2005, 750-764.
Th e overthrow of the political leadership of Montenegro in January 1989 marked the end<br />
of tolerance. Th e Slovenes reacted strongly and the rest of Yugoslavia found itself in a<br />
position where it had to opt for one of the sides in the confl ict. 31 In such circumstances,<br />
the Serbian attempt to destabilize Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, the republics with<br />
a substantial number of Serbs, failed to produce the desired results. In mid-1990 the<br />
Serbian rebellion broke out in Croatia; the (then) Croatian militia was unable to nip<br />
it in the bud because it was prevented to do so by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).<br />
Th anks to the JNA the Serbs were able to spread the rebellion, and by the end of 1990<br />
this led to the creation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina. 32 During 1991 two<br />
similar regions appeared in Slavonia, Baranja and Srijem: the Serbian Region of Slavonia,<br />
Baranja and Srem on 26 February 1991, and SAO Western Slavonia in August 1991. By<br />
the very end of 1991 they united into the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska<br />
Krajina, RSK), a self-proclaimed para-state entity. 33<br />
In accordance with the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia the Serbs were<br />
granted all civil rights, but also the status of an ethnic minority, which did not please<br />
them. 34 During 1991, aft er a series of crises and failed attempts to reach an agreement<br />
about a new Yugoslavia, the SAO Krajina began to expand to areas with a majority Serbian<br />
population or with a high percentage of Serbs. Th e open war of the JNA and the rebel<br />
Serbs against Croatia started in the summer of 1991. By the end of 1991 the JNA managed<br />
to gain control, i.e., occupy almost one-fourth of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina was proclaimed in that territory on 19 December 1991.<br />
Th e rebel Serbs were faced with the problem of retaining control over these areas. A<br />
solution was found in the international community and its peace-keeping forces. Th e<br />
truce signed between the JNA and the Republic of Croatia in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992<br />
permitted the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces. It soon became obvious that the<br />
Croats had entertained excessive and unrealistic expectations with respect to the “blue<br />
31 D. Jović, «Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla» (Yugoslavia: Th e State that Withered Away).<br />
32 Davor Marijan, «Smrt oklopne brigade» (Death of the Armoured Brigade), Naklada Zoro, Zagreb-Sara-<br />
jevo, 2002, 6-7.<br />
33 M.M., «Proglašena Republika Srpska Krajina» (Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina has been Proclaimed),<br />
Srpski glas, Glina, 29 December 1991, 1.<br />
34 Th e Historical Foundations of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 22 December 1990 state that<br />
“the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of<br />
members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks,<br />
Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and<br />
the realization of ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations Organization<br />
and the free world countries”. In commenting the claims of some authors that the Constitution in question<br />
was the fi rst “to remove overtones of dual sovereignty and unequivocally proclaimed the Croatian nation as<br />
the holder of the sovereignty of Croatia”, Z. Radelić notes that already the wording of the 1974 Constitution<br />
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia - “the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian<br />
nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia and the state of other nations and minorities living in it”<br />
does not permit the unequivocal interpretation that the Serbs were elevated to the status of a constituent<br />
nation in Croatia, and that it is obvious “only that they were recognized a special status in relation to other<br />
nations and minorities”. Cf. Zdenko Radelić, Davor Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing and Dražen Živić,<br />
“Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Th e Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War),<br />
Školska knjiga, <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2006, 94.<br />
47
helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relative peace along the line of disengagement, but not also the<br />
expected reintegration of the areas the administration of which had been turned over to<br />
the rebel Serbs by the JNA aft er its transformation into the Yugoslav Army in 1992 and<br />
withdrawal from Croatia. 36<br />
Until late autumn in 1992 the Croatian Army was busy liberating the occupied<br />
territory in southern Croatia and defending Bosnian Posavina. No major actions were<br />
taken against the other occupied areas, with few exceptions - apparently against the will<br />
of the state leadership. 37 Indeed, aft er the withdrawal of the JNA and the organizational<br />
and structural changes in the Croatian Army, until January 1993 there was no operational<br />
plan regarding the commitment of armed forces in operations focused on Krajina;<br />
however, as of January 1992 the HV General Staff was engaged in drawing up plans for<br />
the liberation of the territory of the Republic of Croatia occupied by the JNA and rebel<br />
Serb forces, code-named aft er Croatian rivers. Th e military directive in the event that the<br />
peaceful reintegration of the occupied territory into the Republic of Croatia should fail<br />
was not drawn up until January 1993. 38 By the end of 1993 the Croatian Army engaged<br />
in two minor operations which earned it, notwithstanding certain military success,<br />
negative political points on the international political scene. Aft er the operation in the<br />
Zadar hinterland in January 1993, Croatia was accused of fomenting war, an accusation<br />
hitherto reserved for Serbia and the Serbs. 39 Th e response was similar aft er the operation<br />
in the Medak pocket in September 1993, and some international circles accused Croatia<br />
of aggression and of breaking the truce. 40 If Croatia’s extremely unfavourable position<br />
due to its involvement in the war between the Bosnian&Herzegovinian Croats and<br />
Bosniaks-Muslims in Bosna&Herzegovina is added to the picture, it is obvious why<br />
Croatia’s political position was far from being rosy.<br />
Th anks to the eff orts of the international community the Cease-Fire Agreement was<br />
signed in Zagreb between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and of the rebel<br />
Serbs on 29 March 1994. It entered into force on 4 April and provided for the withdrawal<br />
of the belligerent troops at least one kilometre from the line of disengagement and the<br />
withdrawal of heavy weapons 10/20 km from that line. 41 Following the agreement, part of<br />
35 Mario Nobilo, <strong>Hrvatski</strong> feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata, 1990-1997” (Th e Croatian Phoenix:<br />
Diplomatic Processes Behind Closed Doors, 1990-1997; Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb, 2000, 247-<br />
260.<br />
36 D. Marijan, «Smrt oklopne brigade» (Death of the Armoured Brigade), 24-25.<br />
37 Specifi cally, Nos Kalik, Baranja and the Miljevac Plateau. See Davor Marijan in Zdenko Radelić, Davor<br />
Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing and Dražen Živić, “Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Th e<br />
Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War), Školska knjiga, <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest, Zagreb,<br />
2006, 150-151.<br />
38 Central Military Archives, General Staff holdings (hereinaft er SVA MORH, GSHV): GSHV, cl. 8/93-02/04,<br />
reg. no. 512-06-93-7 of 15 January 1993. Directive.<br />
39 «Ujedinjeni narodi: Rezolucije o Republici Hrvatskoj, UNPROFOR» (Th e United Nations: Resolutions on<br />
the Republic of Croatia, UNPROFOR); Pan liber, Osijek, 1995, 85. Cf. F. Tuđman, «Hrvatska riječ svijetu:<br />
razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima» (Croatia’s Word to the World: Talks with Foreign Representatives),<br />
243-248.<br />
40 M. Granić, “Vanjski poslovi: Iza kulisa politike” (Foreign Aff airs: Behind the Scenes of Politics), 83-84.<br />
41 “Kronologija rata 1989-1998” (Chronology of the War 1989-1998); <strong>Hrvatski</strong> informativni <strong>centar</strong>, Zagreb,<br />
1998, 360.<br />
48
the Croatian reserve troops was demobilized, and military activities abated throughout<br />
the Croatian theatre of war. 42 Th e eff orts of the Republic of Croatia focused on resolving<br />
the problem of the Serbian rebellion were transferred to the diplomatic fi eld. On 31 March<br />
and 30 September 1994 the UN Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate<br />
by six months. 43 Croatia was not satisfi ed with UNPROFOR’s effi ciency, and between 1<br />
July and 16 August 1994 displaced persons organized road blocks in order to pressure<br />
UNPROFOR and draw the attention of the international public to the ineffi ciency of<br />
the “blue helmets”. 44 Th e position of the RSK deteriorated owing to the confl ict between<br />
Belgrade and Pale because the Bosnian&Herzegovinian Serbs refused to sign the Contact<br />
Group peace plan for Bosnia&Herzegovina, aft er which Belgrade imposed on 4 August<br />
1994 political and economic sanctions which also aff ected the Krajina Serbs. 45<br />
In mid-September 1994 the US Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia Peter Galbraith<br />
proposed to the President of the Republic of Croatia a plan, later on called Plan Z4,<br />
according to which the autonomous districts of Glina and Knin would have certain<br />
elements of statehood, but would be reintegrated together with other occupied areas<br />
into Croatia. Th e acceptance of the plan would be equal to political suicide, as F. Tuđman<br />
was clearly aware, according to the testimony of one of his close associates. 46 However,<br />
regardless of whether he was equal to his function, Galbraith was the representative of<br />
a global power and his view had to be appreciated. 47 All the same, on 30 January 1995 F.<br />
Tuđman received the draft plan from the representatives of the international community<br />
and declared that the Croatian side would consider it. He also noted that he had serious<br />
objections to the plan, in particular because “the issue was defi ned as a controversy<br />
between two equal sides, while it actually involved an issue regarding a minority in a<br />
national state, and even not the entire minority but only a smaller part of it”. 48 However,<br />
the RSK leadership turned the plan down; actually, because it insistently pursued the<br />
policy of annexation of the RSK to the “Greater Serbia”, it even refused to consider it<br />
although the plan off ered the rebel Serbs in Croatia an extraordinarily great autonomy,<br />
almost a “state within a state”. Th e possibility of sustaining negotiations about the plan<br />
existed until the moment when conditions again brought the military option to the fore.<br />
Th e commitment of the Army of B&H and the Croatian Defence Council at Bihać and<br />
Kupres opened up the need for the engagement of Croatian forces, and aft er a six-month<br />
42 Command of the Zagreb Corps District, cl. str. conf. 8p/94-02/87, reg. no. 1075-11/01-94-3 of 16 March<br />
1994. Order for the demobilization of units and parts of HV units of the Zagreb Corps District.<br />
43 «Ujedinjeni narodi: Rezolucije o Republici Hrvatskoj, UNPROFOR» (Th e United Nations: Resolutions on<br />
the Republic of Croatia, UNPROFOR), 57-63.<br />
44 “Hronologija rata” (Chronology of the War),. 387, 400.<br />
45 “Hronologija događaja na prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije 1990-1995” (Chronology of Developments in<br />
the Previous Yugoslavia 1990-1995); Glas srpski - Centar za geostrateška istraživanja Univerziteta u Banja<br />
Luci, Banja Luka, 2002, 176.<br />
46 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95/98» (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 153-161.<br />
47 Ibid., 268.<br />
48 Ibid., 209-210. Date of meeting in “Kronologija rata” (Chronology of the War), 448.<br />
49
standstill the Croatian Army was set in motion because of the serious conditions in the<br />
Bihać safe area.<br />
HV engineers on Mount Dinara<br />
50<br />
JNA, later<br />
SVK airstrip<br />
at Udbina
THE FIRST BIHAĆ CRISIS<br />
Aft er the end of the war between the Croats and the Bosniaks (Muslims) in<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina, the confl ict between the Serbs and the Bosniaks/Muslims<br />
- previously reduced to a fairly local scale because of the former war - fl ared up<br />
again. Th e focal areas of the confl ict were Sarajevo, Konjic, Kupres, Teslić and Bihać. 49<br />
Th e Bihać area was strategically important for Croatia because it separated the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina from Republika Srpska along a considerable stretch (118 km). 50 Th e<br />
ARBiH 5th Corps tied down parts of both Serb armies and prevented their commitment<br />
in other parts of the theatre of war, whether in Croatia or in Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
By the end of October 1994 Serb forces waged several major campaigns in the Bihać<br />
area but failed to destroy the ARBiH 5th Corps. Th e winter&spring operation of the<br />
Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) exacted a heavy toll on the ARBiH 5th Corps. 51 Aft er<br />
this operation, from 16 to 21 August 1994 units of the 5th Corps defeated the autonomist<br />
army of Fikret Abdić and entered Velika Kladuša. About 45,600 refugees escaped to the<br />
provisionally occupied territory of Croatia: Turanj near Karlovac, the village of Batnoga<br />
near Slunj and Staro Selo near Vrginmost. 52 Aft er regrouping and rest, the ARBiH 5th<br />
Corps launched the off ensive operation codenamed Grmeč-94. It started aft er a part of<br />
VRS forces pulled out of encirclement and began to advance towards central Bosnia<br />
and the valley of the river Vrbas. Th e off ensive was intended to roll back Serbian forces<br />
at Bihać and free a larger area on the right bank of the Una from Lohovska Brda to<br />
Bosanska Krupa. 53 Th e 5th Corps scored major success, captured the Grabež barracks<br />
and set off in pursuit of the routed forces of the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps in the direction<br />
of Ripač-Dubovsko-Vrtoče and Dubovsko-Orašac-Kulen Vakuf. Th e Bosniak forces<br />
reached Dubovsko, Lipa and Kulen Vakuf. 54<br />
Although the action of ARBiH was focused only against Republika Srpska, on 26<br />
October 1994 the SVK General Staff took steps in order to prevent possible surprise<br />
49 Hasib Mušinbegović, Remzija Šiljak, Kemo Bećirević, «Operacija Vlašić» (Operation Vlašić), Sarajevo,<br />
1999, 8.<br />
50 HDA, RSK: Stanje i problemi odbrane RSK (RSK Defence - Condition and Problems) (undated material<br />
from early 1995).<br />
51 Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb, AMB/ZAG/03-11032/94 of 4 February<br />
1994; Request. B. Felić, “Peti korpus 1992-1995” (Th e 5th Corps 1992-1995), 168-188.<br />
52 VRH, USMP: RSK, GŠ SVK, IKM Muljava, str. conf., no. 1350/27 of 24 August 1994; Operativni izveštaj u<br />
vezi AP Zapadna Bosna (Operational Report on AP Western Bosnia); M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu”<br />
(Knin Fell in Belgrade), 91.<br />
53 Bejdo Felić, brigadir, «Peti korpus 1992-1995» (Th e 5th Corps 1992-1995); Ljiljan, Sarajevo, 2002, 275-<br />
283, 309-316).<br />
54 Ibid., 329-331, 343-344.<br />
51
attacks against the RSK. Th e Lika Corps was ordered to prevent, with two reinforced<br />
battalions, the penetration of Bosniak forces along the valley of the Una and help thereby<br />
the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps. Th e North Dalmatian and Slavonia-Baranja Corps were<br />
ordered to place one battalion each in full combat readiness for commitment outside<br />
their zone of responsibility. Th e combat readiness of the Kordun and Banija Corps was<br />
increased along the line of possible confrontation with the ARBiH 5 th Corps. 55<br />
Two days later the area was visited by the RSK President Milan Martić and the Chief<br />
of the General Staff Milan Čeleketić. Th is was a sign that that the Bosniak success had<br />
alarmed the Knin leadership. Th e response of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs to the<br />
success of the 5 th Corps was more pronounced because the latter was achieved at the<br />
expense of their 2 nd Krajina Corps. Th e Krajina Corps had already felt the pressure of<br />
the ARBiH 7 th Corps and the HVO at Bugojno and Kupres. Of course, the Serbs held<br />
that off ensive action in the direction of Bihać and Bosanski Petrovac was a sign of<br />
synchronous action with the forces of the 7 th Corps, focused on intersecting the forces of<br />
the 2 nd Krajina Corps and on dividing the RSK from Republika Srpska. In his telegram<br />
to the political and military leadership of the RSK Lieutenant Colonel General Manojlo<br />
Milovanović, Deputy Chief of the VRS General Staff , warned them that those were “the<br />
most critical moments in this war for the Serbs west of the Drina”. Only minor eff orts of<br />
both Serbian armies, he stressed, would be required “to remove the danger”. Milovanović<br />
boasted that the VRS had already succeeded in stopping the ARBiH off ensive towards<br />
Kupres and even engaged in a counteroff ensive towards Zloselo - Kupreška Vrata<br />
- Bugojno, and was ready to defend the Kupres plateau against the HVO attack from<br />
Livno, Šuica, Tomislavgrad, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf. Th e problem was the condition<br />
in the Bihać-Petrovac area as the VRS found it diffi cult to cope with it “because of the<br />
obstructive behaviour and fear of the local population and of the greater part of the RS<br />
fi ghters (local people)”. Th e VRS was successful in reinforcing defence by bringing in<br />
minor forces from certain theatres, and began to put up a combined unit of brigade<br />
strength from all parts of Republika Srpska for a counterstrike on the Bihać front.<br />
However, the problem was time - 3-4 more days to prepare the action - and the RSK<br />
political leadership was requested to use units of the Lika, Kordun and Banija Corps to<br />
put pressure on the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Th e request was also made to sever all channels<br />
(including black-marketeering) through which the ARBiH 5 th Corps resupplied itself<br />
with personnel and materiel (as per agreement of December 1993). 56 Th e conditions<br />
were deemed to be extremely serious, as evinced by R. Karadžić’s decision of 29 October<br />
to declare the state of war in the part of RS matching the area of action of the 2 nd Krajina<br />
Corps. Full mobilization of persons fi t for military service was organized and carried<br />
out. 57<br />
Th e SVK formed two tactical groups for the joint SVK and VRS action against the<br />
ARBiH 5 th Corps along the Bosanski Petrovac - Vrtoče road. 58 Th e operation started on<br />
55 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV, str. conf. no. 3-488 of 26 October 1994; Order Op no. 1; HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV,<br />
str.conf. no. 3-389 of 26 October 1994; Order Op.no. 2.<br />
56 POA: VRS General Staff , str. conf., no. 02/2-140 of 27 Otober 1994; Assistance in consolidating conditions<br />
in the «Drvar Krajina».<br />
57 HDA, RSK: Army Post Offi ce 7531 Bosansko Grahovo; conf. no. 4-504 of 31 October 1994. Information.<br />
58 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf., no. 3-502 of 31 October 1994. Order.<br />
52
1 November 1994. By 8 November Serbian forces cleared the valley of the river Una from<br />
Spasovo to the village of Lohovo, and blocked Ripač. 59 Bosniak forces found themselves<br />
in a tight spot, and on 12 November the President of the Republic of Bosnia and<br />
Herzegovina A. Izetbegović sent to the President of the Republic of Croatia F. Tuđman<br />
the request to prevent attacks on Bihać from Croatian territory. 60<br />
By 17 November Serbian forces recovered almost the entire territory formerly<br />
liberated by the Bosniaks. F. Abdić’s forces entered V. Kladuša, and units of the 2 nd Krajina<br />
Corps advanced to two kilometres from Bihać. 61 Th e forces of the Krajina Serbs were<br />
restructured, and the Command of Operational Group Pauk (Spider) became functional<br />
on 16 November. 62 Since the concentration of Croatian forces towards occupied areas had<br />
been observed, on 17 November the SVK General Staff ordered all units to ensure the<br />
appropriate degree of combat readiness “in order to prevent a possible surprise action by<br />
the HV”. 63 Two days later mobilization was ordered of all conscripts on wartime posting<br />
lists of the SVK units. 64<br />
Th e international community reacted to the Serbian attacks. On 9 November<br />
UNPROFOR warned the Krajina Serbs that it would use all available means if they did<br />
not stop shelling the Bihać safe area. Th e Serbs rejected the warning on grounds that it<br />
as untrue, and attributed it to false accusations by Croats and Bosniaks. 65 Th e attacks<br />
did not stop, and on 21 November NATO aircraft attacked the SVK airstrip at Udbina.<br />
Five persons were wounded and one of them died soon thereaft er; the attack caused<br />
considerable damage to the airstrip and mobile equipment. 66 On 22 November the<br />
Yugoslav Army informed the SVK that it had received from its military representatives<br />
in Rome and London the information that the air attacks would continue if the Serbian<br />
off ensive in the Bihać area should continue. 67 Because of the attack and of the threats of<br />
the international community F. Abdić’s units were given the role of main forces, while<br />
the SVK was supposed to organize and supply them, and direct their actions. 68<br />
59 HDA, RSK: Command of the 98th infantry brigade; str. conf., no. 32-103 of 12 November 1994. Information<br />
60 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95» (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 170-171.<br />
61 D. Radišić, Hronologija 1990-1995» (Chronology 1990-1995), 501.<br />
62 HDA, HMDCDR: War diary of GŠ VSK, note for 16 November 1994.<br />
63 HDA, RSK: GŠ SVK, IKM Korenica; str. conf., no. 3-503/174 of 17 November. Battle order.<br />
64 HDA, RSK: GŠ SVK; str. conf., no. 11-301 of 19 November 1994. SVK conscripts, mobilization order.<br />
65 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; conf., no. 40-66/94 of 10 November 1994. Response to the accusations.<br />
66 POA: RSK, GŠ SV, str. conf., no. 3-503/390 of 23 November 1994. Report of the commission for the examination<br />
of the consequences of the NATO air attack.<br />
67 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠSV; str. conf., no. 3-555 of 22 November 1994. Danger of air attack.<br />
68 POA: GŠ SVK-IKM; str. conf., no. 3-503/552 of 30 November 1994. Data for the report of the defence<br />
minister in the RSK Assembly.<br />
53
54<br />
CROATIAN FORCE OPERATIONS IN LIVANJSKO POLJE<br />
AND WESTERN SLAVONIA<br />
As might have been expected, the Serbian attacks on Bihać alarmed the Croatian<br />
leadership, which could not just sit back and watch the Serbs carry the day. Th e<br />
dilemma was where to provide assistance - by putting pressure on Okučani and<br />
Knin in order to stretch hostile forces or by a breakthrough across Slunj in order to help<br />
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. 69 In the meantime, on 3 November 1994 Croatian and Bosniak<br />
forces liberated Kupres and the greater part of the Kupres plateau, opening up a new<br />
possible route for the intervention of the Croatian army. Th e Split Corps District started<br />
to prepare secretly for operations in Herceg-Bosna, specifi cally on Mount Dinara and in<br />
Livanjsko Polje. 70<br />
Th e fi rst operation of the Split Corps District (ZP Split) in the area was Zima ‘94<br />
(Winter-94). Th e task of ZP Split was to rout Serbian forces along the stretch from<br />
Livanjsko Polje to the state border on Mount Dinara, repel them as far as possible from<br />
the Rujani-Sinj road and remain prepared for subsequent action. Th e main forces were<br />
concentrated along the Razdolje-Troglav line, and auxiliary units along the Rujani -<br />
Sajković line. In the eastern part of Livanjsko Polje the plan envisioned the crushing of<br />
Serbian forces and pushing them off the western slopes of Mount Staretina, followed by<br />
deep penetration towards the village of Bastasi in order to ultimately gain control over<br />
the greater part of Livanjsko Polje and provide support for the main attacking forces.<br />
Units of the 126 th Home Guard Regiment and HV 114 th Brigade were committed to the<br />
attack. Th ey were opposed by the VRS 9 th Light Infantry Brigade. Th e command post of<br />
OG Livno was set up in Livno. 71 In this operation the HVO mission was to attack Serbian<br />
forces throughout the area of the Tomislavgrad Corps District from the village of Čelebić<br />
in Livanjsko Polje to Kupreška Vrata. 72<br />
Th e operation started on 29 November 1994 and lasted 29 days on very diffi cult<br />
terrain and in adverse weather conditions, snow and low temperatures. Aft er the initial<br />
success of the Home Guard and reserve units, units of the 4 th and 7 th Guards Brigades<br />
69 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95 (98)» (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 170-171.<br />
70 A. Gotovina, “Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO”(Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations),<br />
25-26.<br />
71 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Split Corps District, cl. str. conf. 8/94-01/01, reg. no. 1080-01-94-180 of 16 November<br />
1994. Attack order.<br />
72 HR HB, GS HVO, cl. str.conf. 8/94-02/06-1, reg. no. 02-10-06/02-94-32 of 23 November 1994. Order for<br />
the off ensive operation Op. no. 2.
were committed to the attack and made additional inroads. Operations in the eastern<br />
part of Livanjsko Polje were also successful. By the end of the operation Croatian forces<br />
liberated an area 20 km deep and 10 km wide. Serbian forces were thrown back to the<br />
line: Zeleno Brdo - Škašin Vrh - Bat- Točila - village of Grkovci - slopes of Mali Orlovac<br />
- Orlovac - village of Nuglašica - Talijanov Vrh - Pitoma Kosa - Tavanak. 73 Th e Croatian<br />
attack put Knin at risk from the hitherto safe area of Republika Srpska. In the fi rst days<br />
of the operation the SVK General Staff tried to commit smaller forces of the North<br />
Dalmatian Corps and bolster the defence of the VRS 9 th Light Infantry Brigade and throw<br />
the Croatian forces back beyond the kickoff line. 74 However, the attempt failed. Because<br />
of the continued breakthrough of Croatian forces, in particular the capture of the village<br />
of Pržine on 23 December 1994 and the rolling back of Serbian forces to Nuglašice -<br />
Grkovci, it was decided to redeploy VRS forces from other theatres, including the one<br />
in Bihać, towards Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč. Under heavy snowfall, by the end<br />
of December two VRS brigades and two battalions from the 1 st Krajina, Herzegovinian<br />
and East Bosnian Corps were deployed in the Grahovo-Glamoč area. 75 Th eir arrival<br />
stopped the panic and the evacuation of the population ceased, especially from the<br />
Glamoč area. 76 Aft er assembling, the Serbian forces attempted a counterattack in order<br />
to drive the Croatian units out of the villages Sajković and Čelebić. 77 Although relatively<br />
frequent, the attacks were of lower intensity and analogously lower eff ect. Serbian units<br />
were not able to sustain their minor success. 78<br />
Th e reinforcement of positions in the Grahovo-Glamoč area was disadvantageous<br />
for the Serbian leadership because it halted the attacks on Bihać. Because of rumours<br />
circulating among the troops of a VRS brigade, manned by Serbs from the municipality<br />
of Bihać, they were informed that the Bihać operation had ground to a standstill<br />
temporarily “because of the situation in the Grahovo-Glamoč theatre; once control<br />
is again established, the operations against Bihać will continue until the 5 th corps is<br />
defeated. Th erefore, Bihać is not being forfeited”. 79<br />
73 A. Gotovina, “Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO” (Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations),<br />
28-32.<br />
74 HDA, RSK: GŠ SVK-IKM of 5 December 1994. Order op. no. 11/1.<br />
75 HDA, RSK: Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no 3693-6 of 23 December 1994. HDA, RSK: Command<br />
of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 2/1369 of 23 December 1994; Regular battle report. HDA, RSK: Command of<br />
the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 2/1 -370 of 24 December 1994; Regular battle report. HDA, RSK: Command of the<br />
2nd KK; str. conf. 2/1-372 of 26 December 1994; Regular battle report. HDA, RSK: Command of the 2nd<br />
KK; str. conf. no. 2/1-373 of 27 December 1994; Regular battle report. HDA, RSK: Command of the 2nd KK;<br />
str. conf. no. 2/1-374 of 28 December 1994; Regular battle report.<br />
76 HDA, RSK: Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 2/1-374 of 28 December 1994; Regular battle report.<br />
77 HDA, RSK: Command of the 9th light infantry brigade; str. conf. no. 11-33 of 30 December 1994; Excerpt<br />
from the attack order.<br />
78 SVA MORH, ZZPS: OG Livno, cl. 81/95-01/16, reg. no. 1085/5-01-95-2 of 8 January 1995; Daily operational<br />
report. SVA MORH, ZZPS: OG Livno, cl. 81/95-01/16, reg. no. 1085/5-01-95-3 of 9 January 1995;<br />
Daily operational report. SVA MORH, ZZPS: OG Livno, cl. 81/95-01/16, reg. no. 1085/5-01-95 of 12 January<br />
1995; Special report. SVA MORH, ZZPS: OG Livno, cl. 81/95-01/16, reg. no. 1085/5-01-95-11 of 22<br />
January 1995; Daily operational report.<br />
79 SVA MORH, GSHV: Command of the 15th light infantry brigade; conf. no. 2 of 6 January 1995; Information<br />
on current issues. Th e information was captured by the ARBiH 5th Corps and sent to General Bobetko<br />
on 19 January 1995.<br />
55
Th is was quite true, because the military and political leadership of Republika Srpska<br />
(RS) had no intention of desisting from the defeat of the ARBiH 5 th Corps and the<br />
capture of Bihać. 80<br />
Aft er the successful Croatian actions in Operation Zima ’94 relative calm prevailed<br />
in the Livno theatre until the spring of 1995. Croatian forces engaged in active defence<br />
and carried out planned replacements with units from the Split Corps District and the<br />
HVO. During the period certain minor tactical changes were made along the front line.<br />
As spring approached, so did the possibility that the Serbs could jeopardize Croatian<br />
positions on Mounts Dinara and Staretina. Accordingly, the Split Corps District decided<br />
to mount Operation Skok-1 (Leap-1). It was meant to push Serbian forces off dominant<br />
high ground on Mount Dinara and bring SVK forces in the valley of the Cetina within<br />
fi re range. 81 On 7 April 1995 the operation was completed by the 7 th Guards Brigade<br />
with the support of the 126 th Home Guard Regiment. It established control over Mount<br />
Dinara across an area 5 km deep and 15 km wide. In this way the positions of the Croatian<br />
forces in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount Dinara were assured the required stability, and<br />
there were no major Serbian actions in the eastern part of Livansko Polje aft er this<br />
operation. 82<br />
Aft er this success the Croatian forces were ready to mount subsequent operations.<br />
However, the next operation, called Flash (Bljesak) was mounted at the other end of<br />
the Croatian theatre, in Western Slavonia. Th e plan of Operation Flash envisioned a<br />
fast and vigorous breakthrough of armoured/mechanized and infantry units along the<br />
motorway from Nova Gradiška and Novska, the carving-up of the occupied area and the<br />
liberation of Okučani. In the following step the units committed to the operation were<br />
to advance to the river Sava and prevent the intervention of the Bosnian Serbs or the<br />
SVK Banija Corps. In the fi nal, second part of the plan, the Serbian units encircled north<br />
of the Novska - Nova Gradiška motorway would be wiped out. Th e fi nal preparations<br />
for the operation started in late April 1995 with the assembling of the planned units<br />
and mobilization of reserve forces. Th e execution of the operation was entrusted to the<br />
Bjelovar Corps District and the operational teams of the HV General Staff . 83<br />
Operation Flash started at dawn on the 1 st of May. 84 It mainly proceeded as planned<br />
and successfully. Th e occupied area was cut up aft er the Croatian forces took over control<br />
80 Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 3-36 of 16 February 1995. It refers to the meeting held by R.<br />
Karadžić in Bosansko Grahovo on 15 February 1995 with the representatives of 11 West Bosnian municipalities<br />
and seven brigades manned from these municipalities.<br />
81 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split Command; cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-01-95-75 of 4 April 1995.<br />
Attack order.<br />
82 SVA MORH, ZZPS: OG Livno, cl. 81/95-01/16, reg. no 1085/5-01-95-103 of 7 January 1995; Daily operational<br />
report. SVA MORH, HV 7th gbr: 7th Guards Brigade of 7 April 1995; Daily operational report.<br />
A. Gotovina, “Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO (Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations)”,<br />
38-40.<br />
83 MORH, GSHV, RP/5/94 of 5 December 1994; Directive Op. no. 5/94. Facsimile in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje<br />
bitke” (All My Battles), 392-399. SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-<br />
129 of 29 April 1995; Order.<br />
84 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. no. 4-2361 of 2 May 1995; Regular operational report.<br />
56
of the motorway; the hostile forces south of the intersection line were thrown back to<br />
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while a considerable part of the West Slavonian<br />
Corps and many civilians were encircled at Pakrac north of the intersection line. 85 Th ese<br />
forces surrendered on 4 May 1995 at 1400 hours. Altogether 1200 Serbian soldiers were<br />
taken prisoner in the second phase of Operation Flash. 86 Serbian civilians wishing to<br />
cross into Bosnia&Herzegovina were permitted to do so. 87 During the operation the SVK<br />
demonstrated the real threat strategy. Retaliatory rocket attacks followed on Croatian<br />
cities. In the attack on Zagreb fi ve persons were killed and 203 wounded. 88<br />
Aft er the success of Operation Flash the Croatian forces did not rest idle. Th ey<br />
continued to advance towards Livno-Bosansko Grahovo in Operation Skok-2 (Leap-2).<br />
Its objective was the continued routing of Serbian forces, the breakthrough at Mount<br />
Šator and, on Mount Dinara, gaining control of the Crvena Zemlja ridge in order to<br />
bring Bosansko Grahovo and the Bosansko Grahovo - Glamoč communication within<br />
fi ring range. Committed to the operation were the 4 th Guards Brigade as the main force,<br />
supported by the HVO 3 rd Guards brigade, the 126 th Home Guard Regiment, the 1 st<br />
Croatian Guards Task Force (HGZ), part of the HV 1 st Guards Brigade and units of the<br />
Herceg-Bosna special police. 89<br />
Th e Croatian successes on Mount Dinara did not suit the international community.<br />
At the meeting between General Gotovina and the commanding offi cer of the UN forces<br />
for Sector South, General Rastislav Kotil, held on 20 March 1995, the “blue helmet”<br />
commander asked General Gotovina to use his infl uence and have the HVO forces<br />
withdraw from the northern part of Livanjsko Polje. 90 Aft er the Croatian forces had<br />
gained control of the Crvena Zemlja ridge in Operation Leap-2, and advanced within<br />
fi ring range of Bosansko Grahovo and the Bosansko Grahovo - Glamoč communication,<br />
the UN repeated its request on 20 March. At the meeting held on 12 June 1995 General<br />
Kotil proposed to General Gotovina to withdraw the HVO from its positions on Mount<br />
Dinara; in return, the Krajina Serbs would pull back their weapons into depots as<br />
provided for by the Zagreb Agreement of 29 March 1994. 91<br />
85 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. no. 3-212 of 2 May 1995; Special operational report.<br />
86 MORH, Command of the Flash Military-Police Force; cl. str. conf. 200-01/95-156/08, reg. no. 3315-01/4-<br />
95-26 of 4May 1995. GSHV, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 512-06-10-95-92. IZM GSHV of 10 May<br />
1995.<br />
87 MORH, GSHV: Bjelovar CD Command, IZM Daruvar; cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no 1077-95-34 of 9 May 1995;<br />
GSHV War Diary, pp. 114, 122-128.<br />
88 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. 3-212 of 2 May 1995; Special operational report. HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ<br />
SV; str. conf. no. 3-219 of 3 May 1995; Special operational report. F. Tuđman, “Pet godina hrvatske pobjede”<br />
(Five Years of Croatian Victory), 15. Th e Večernji List daily (Zagreb) reported on March 2007: “In the attack<br />
on Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995 seven civilians (listed by full name) were killed and 176 wounded; Zagreb<br />
was hit by 23 missiles - the Children’s Hospital in Klaićeva, the Academy of Dramatic Arts and the Grammar<br />
School in Križanićeva were among the buildings hit.” Cf. Damir Luka Saft ić, “Kod Šoštarićeve prvi trg<br />
civilnim žrtvama” (Th e First Square Honouring Civilian Victims at the Corner of Šoštarićeva St.”), Večernji<br />
list, 8 March 2007, 26.<br />
89 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Split Corps District, cl. str.conf. 8/95-01/01; reg. no. 1080-o1-95-88 of 1 June 1995;<br />
Attack order.<br />
90 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZPS, IZM Zadar; cl. str. conf. 80-02/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-03-95-05 of 20 March<br />
1995 Information.<br />
91 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZPS, IZM Zadar; cl. 032-01/95-01/01; reg. no. 1080-03-95-372 of 12 June 1995; Report.<br />
57
Croatian guardsmen between Mali Šator and Bosansko Grahovo<br />
58
THE RSK IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1995<br />
The liberation of Western Slavonia was just another in a series of setbacks, although<br />
a major one, which dogged the RSK since late 1994. Th e Krajina was undergoing<br />
a diffi cult political and economic crisis. Regardless of diff erent interpretations,<br />
the signing of the economic agreement with Croatia in Zagreb on 2 December 1994 was<br />
a sign of weakness. Th e agreement regulated matters such as water and power supply,<br />
the motorway and the pipeline. 92 Soon aft er that, on 21 December, the Zagreb-Belgrade<br />
motorway was opened for traffi c. 93 Its opening had a devastating eff ect on the morale of<br />
the population and of the army of the Krajina Serbs. It facilitated the growth of blackmarketeering<br />
and opened up new avenues for Croatian promotional campaigns. 94 Th e<br />
Croatian military success on Mount Dinara and in Livanjsko Polje posed a serious threat<br />
for the morale of the Krajina Serbs.<br />
Th e political scene in the Krajina was turbulent. Th e prime minister, Borislav Mikelić,<br />
was the target of many attacks because part of the political forces saw in him an exponent<br />
of S. Milošević who was allegedly doing his best in order “to leave the Krajina within<br />
the borders of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia”. Aft er Operation Flash Mikelić’s<br />
position became untenable because the restrained position of the Federal Republic of<br />
Yugoslavia was considered treasonable. Finally, on 29 May 1995 Mikelić was relieved<br />
because he opposed the unifi cation of the RSK and the RS. 95 Unifi cation was also<br />
opposed by the leadership of the rebel Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western<br />
Srijem. Th ey founded the Coordinating Board of fi ve municipalities headed by Goran<br />
Hadžić. 96 Milan Babić returned to the political scene, and his government was accepted<br />
in Topusko on 27 July 1995. 97<br />
Another set of problems which plagued the Krajina were its relations with the<br />
international community. On 12 January 1995 the President of the Republic of Croatia<br />
informed the public that the Republic of Croatia had decided to cancel the mandate<br />
92 “Hronologija rata” (Th e Chronology of War), 430.<br />
93 HDA, RSK: RSK, Ministry of Defence, Government Staff for the Opening of the Motorway (undated, no<br />
number); Information on the opening of the Paklenica-Lipovac motorway. SVA MORH, 125th Home Guard<br />
Regiment; VP 2147; cl. 818-03/94-02/02, reg. no. 147-04/1-94-16 of 22 December 1994; Weekly report.<br />
94 POA: RSK, MUP, Okučani Secretariat of Internal Aff airs, no. 08-05/1-1086/1-05 of 16 March 1995. POA:<br />
SVK West Slavonian Corps, 4 March 1995; Support telegram. POA: Public Security Directorate, no. 08/1-1-<br />
3366/1-95 of 21 April 1995. Order.<br />
95 N. Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995.” (Serb Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995), 480-483.<br />
96 Ibid., 484.<br />
97 Ibid., 486.<br />
59
of UNPROFOR. In his letter to Boutros Boutros Ghali F. Tuđman stressed that the<br />
cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate did not imply that Croatia was desisting<br />
from a peaceful settlement of the confl ict with the rebel Serbs and that it was instead<br />
an endeavour to reach an agreement through direct negotiations between Zagreb and<br />
Knin. 98 Th e reaction of the Krajina Serbs was not long in coming. On 27 January M.<br />
Martić applied to the UN Secretary General Ghali and asked him for “UN force protection<br />
of the AP Western Bosnia from the army of Alija Izebegović, just as the peacekeeping<br />
forces are protecting, in the confl ict between the Croats and the Serbs, the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina from the Republic of Croatia, which has violated our territory as many<br />
as four times since 1992, perpetrated ethnic cleansing and committed crimes against the<br />
Serbian civilian population”. 99 In spite of their unfavourable position, of which they were<br />
partly aware, the Serbs turned down Plan Z4. Martić’s position that the plan should not<br />
be considered at all was accepted at the extraordinary session of the RSK Assembly held<br />
on 8 February in Knin. Th e Assembly accepted the proposal of the RSK Government<br />
to break off and postpone negotiations with the Republic of Croatia on economic and<br />
political issues “until Croatia withdraws its request for the cancellation of the mandate<br />
of UN peacekeeping forces or until the Security Council decides to extend the mandate<br />
of the UN peacekeeping forces in the protected zones in the territory of the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina. 100<br />
Th e next shock came on 31 March 1995 when the UN Security Council accepted the<br />
Croatian requests and passed Resolution 981 which confi rmed the territorial integrity<br />
of the Republic of Croatia and recognized that major provisions of the Vance Plan<br />
remained to be implemented. Th e role of the peacekeeping forces was redefi ned, and<br />
the name UNROFOR changed into UNCRO (United Nations Confi dence Restoration<br />
Operation in Croatia) with a mandate until 30 November 1995. According to the new<br />
mandate, UN forces were responsible for the establishment of effi cient control over the<br />
internationally recognized borders of Croatia, and for controlling and monitoring the<br />
crossing of military equipment and personnel from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<br />
or Republika Srpska into the protected areas. 101<br />
Aft er the military successes of the Croatian Army on Mount Dinara in late 1994 and<br />
early 1995 the area of Knin was threatened from Mount Dinara and Livanjsko Polje,<br />
i.e., from the territory previously held by the armed forces of Republika Srpska. Faced<br />
with the same danger, the rebel Serbs from Croatia and the Bosnian&Herzegovinian<br />
Serbs founded on 20 February the Joint Council of National Defence. 102 In the following<br />
months it was hardly active. An attempt to establish order in the army of the Krajina<br />
98 “Otkaz mandata UNPROFOR-u: Treća obljetnica međunarodnog priznanja Republike Hrvatske” (Cancellation<br />
of the UNPROFOR Mandate: Th e Th ird Anniversary of the International Recognition of the Republic<br />
of Croatia); MORH, Political Directorate, Zagreb, 1995, 12-18.<br />
99 VRH, USMSP: RSK, President of the Republic, no. 020/1-56 of 27 January 1995.<br />
100 POA: Abridged minutes of the fi rst extraordinary session of the RSK Assembly held on 8 February 1995.<br />
101 «Kronologija rata» (Th e Chronology of the War), 465.<br />
102 «Hronologija 1990-1995.»(Chronology 1990-1995), 222.<br />
60
Serbs was made only aft er the RSK was reduced by the liberation of the formerly occupied<br />
Western Slavonia. A new commanding offi cer was brought in, and a manoeuvring<br />
unit formed - the Special Unit Corps (KSJ). Aft er Operation Leap-2 Croatian forces<br />
directly threatened the Bosanski Petrovac - Drvar - Strmica - Knin communications and<br />
additionally aggravated the traffi c isolation of the western parts of the Krajina. Such a<br />
situation highlighted the strategic importance of Western Bosnia and of the ARBiH 5 th<br />
Corps. For the Serbian armies in Bosnia&Herzegovina and in the Republic of Croatia<br />
the successful resolution of the Western Bosnia “issue” would free considerable forces<br />
of the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps, which could then be committed in the southern part of<br />
the Corps’ zone of responsibility against the units of the Split Corps District and the<br />
Croatian Defence Council. Th e same applied to the forces of the SVK Lika, Kordun and<br />
Banija Corps committed in Western Bosnia, which could be taken off that theatre and<br />
concentrated along the borders of the Serbian para-state. 103<br />
103 GS HV, RP/13/95 of 5 July 1995; Annex to intelligence evaluation.<br />
61
62<br />
THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS<br />
On 11 July 1995 the Army of Republika Srpska captured the safe area of Srebrenica,<br />
and that was a sign that the situation had taken a radical course. 104 Th e<br />
Bosnian&Herzegovinian Serbs had no intention of stopping their war machine.<br />
Soon aft er Srebrenica a new attack was mounted on Bihać. Th e Bihać theatre had not<br />
remained quiet since the Serb off ensive in late 1994, but there were no major changes<br />
of the front line either. Aft er the Croatian forces had liberated Western Slavonia, Bihać<br />
again ranked very high on the priority list of both Serbian armies, especially because the<br />
observed grouping of Croatian forces towards Kordun and Banovina forced SVK units<br />
to shift their focus from Bihać to the defence of these areas. Th e pressure of Operational<br />
Group Pauk (Spider) on Bihać ceased, and the ARBiH 5 th Corps used the opportunity to<br />
attack Serbian positions. Developments clearly indicated the possible link-up of Croatian<br />
and Bosnian forces along the Bihać - Bosansko Grahovo line, as well as the danger posed<br />
by such a situation for Knin. Accordingly, the commander of the 2 nd Krajina Corps,<br />
responsible for the area under consideration, requested from the VRS General Staff to<br />
take every step in order to prevent the risk. 105 Th e proposal of the commander of the<br />
2 nd Krajina Corps to “deal jointly with Dinara and Plješivica” was accepted in principle<br />
at the meeting of the supreme RS and RSK command held on 4 May in Knin. For the<br />
new campaign Radovan Karadžić approved special police reinforcements and special<br />
units for operations on Mount Plješivica. 106 Serbian indecision and sluggish agreement<br />
worked to the advantage of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, which rolled back Serbian forces from<br />
Bihać on part of the front line. 107<br />
Preparations for the Serbian off ensive started aft er it was agreed by the general staff s of<br />
the VRS and the VSK on 4 July. Th e code name of the operation was Mač-95 (Sword-92)<br />
for the SVK and Štit-95 (Shield-95) for the VRS. Th e plan of the operation envisioned the<br />
routing of the ARBiH 5 th Corps followed by its encirclement and annihilation. Th e role<br />
of the SVK was to protect the operation, by preventive readiness, from possible attacks<br />
of the Croatian army. Th e SVK committed two operational and one tactical group to<br />
the attack itself. 108 Th e newly-formed Special Unit Corps was committed as the Second<br />
Operational Group (OG-2), and OG Pauk was renamed into First Operational group<br />
(OG-1). 109 A group of MUP members from the Republic of Serbia was also involved<br />
104 «Hronologija 1990-1995» (Chronology 1990.-1995), 246.<br />
105 Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 66-64 of 8 May 1995.<br />
106 Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 66-62 of 5 May 1995.<br />
107 B. Felić, “Peti korpus 1992-1995.” (Th e 5th Corps 1992-1995), 463.<br />
108 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 159.<br />
109 VSA MORH: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. no.105-41 of 17 July 1995; Delivery of regular battle reports. Warning:<br />
VSA MORH: Command OG-2, 17 July 1995, order of the chief of the artillery.
in the operation as part the SVK 101 st Detachment at the hamlet of Rekić (village of<br />
Tržac). 110<br />
Aft er a number of postponements, the operation started on 19 July 1995. 111 On 21<br />
July the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff that the<br />
Corps had sustained heavy losses “in personnel and a signifi cant loss of territory. [...]<br />
Ammunition and materiel supplies are below the critical level and the Corps cannot<br />
resist the aggressor for a longer period. [...] Considering the rate of the aggressor’s<br />
onslaught, we can sustain organized defence over the next two to three days”. 112 Two days<br />
later, on 23 July, the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff<br />
that conditions had deteriorated beyond control and that by the end of the day the Bihać<br />
area could be cut up into two parts, “and the 5 th Corps broken up”. 113 One day later, the<br />
Command of the 5 th Corps, the HVO General Staff for Bihać and the Bihać Municipal<br />
HDZ Board appealed for help to the political and military authorities in Zagreb. “Please<br />
consider this situation with utmost seriousness, and take urgent and radical steps in<br />
order to save the population and the territory of the Una-Sana Canton”. 114 Th e Serbian<br />
success at Bihać briefl y brought Fikret Abdić back to the front pages. He proclaimed the<br />
Republic of Western Bosnia in Velika Kladuša on 26 July 1995. 115<br />
Soldiers of the HVO 101 st Regiment in Bihać<br />
110 RSK, MUP, Special Unit Directorate; no. 08/4-2-6299/95 of 31 July 1995; Report.<br />
111 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 160-161.<br />
112 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać, 21 July 1995; Intelligence information.<br />
113 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać; 23 July 1995; Information on conditions in the<br />
zone of responsibility of the 5th Corps and HVO Bihać.<br />
114 Command of the 5th Corps, GS HVO Command Bihać, Bihać Municipal HDZ Board, 24 July 1995;<br />
Breakdown of the military and political situation in the territory of the Una-Sana Canton.<br />
115 “Hronologija 1990-1995.”(Chronology 1990-1995), 251.<br />
63
64<br />
THE CROATIAN RESPONSE TO THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS -<br />
THE OPERATION LJETO ‘95 (SUMMER ’95)<br />
Croatia responded to the second Bihać crisis just as it had done in the fi rst one. Th e<br />
leadership of the Republic of Croatia had followed the new Serb off ensive very<br />
attentively. 116 As the crisis reached its climax, President A. Izetbegović received<br />
the unexpected invitation of the Croatian President F. Tuđman to come to Split for<br />
“important talks”. 117 On 22 July 1995 both Presidents signed in Split the Declaration on the<br />
Implementation of the Washington Agreement. However, the most important part of the<br />
document was the agreement on military cooperation. 118 On the basis of the agreement<br />
between the politicians, Croatian forces took concrete steps in the direction of Livno -<br />
Bosansko Grahovo and Livno - Glamoč in order to help encircled Bihać. Th e objective<br />
of the operation, called Ljeto ’95 (Summer ’95), was to crush VRS forces at the eastern<br />
and north-eastern end of Livanjsko Polje, and capture Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč,<br />
thus stopping Serbian attacks on Bihać and creating the conditions for the liberation of<br />
Knin and northern Dalmatia. Th e operation was executed between 25 and 29 July 1995.<br />
Croatian forces entered Glamoč and Bosansko Grahovo, and intersected the Knin - Drvar<br />
communication, vital for the fate of the RSK. 119 Th e road to Knin was open.<br />
Th e signing of the Declaration<br />
on the Renewal of the<br />
Washington Agreement, Joint<br />
Defence Against Serbian Aggression<br />
and Realization of a<br />
Political Solution with the Aid<br />
of the International Community,<br />
Split, 22 July 1995.<br />
116 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95 (98)» (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 261.<br />
117 Alija Izetbegović, “Sjećanja: autobiografski zapisi” (Memories: Autobiographical Notes); Šahinpašić, Sarajevo,<br />
2001, 201.<br />
118 Miroslav Tuđman, “Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: dokumenti 1991-1995.” (Th e Truth About Bosnia&Herzegovina:<br />
Documents 1991-1995); Slovo M, Zagreb, 2005, 614-616.<br />
119 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Command OG North, cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/07, reg. no. 1080-01-95-294 of 25 July 1995; Attack<br />
order; A. Gotovina, “Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO”(Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations), 59-64.
POLITICAL PREPARATION OF OPERATION STORM<br />
In his message to the public on 3 May 1995, aft er the end of Operation Flash, the<br />
President of the Republic of Croatia F. Tuđman pointed out that “with such a victory<br />
Croatia [...] has demonstrated to the rebel Croatian Serbs, and to international<br />
factors, that it has an armed force capable of liberating all the still occupied areas if that<br />
is not achieved in a peaceful way in cooperation with the international community”. 120<br />
Along with its success in Western Slavonia, the Croatian army also mounted a number<br />
of successful military operations along the border between the Republic of Croatia and<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina, and created conditions for the liberation of temporarily occupied<br />
areas. 121 Th e Croatian leadership was aware that there would be no peaceful reintegration,<br />
and that the inactivity of the Croatian Army in the Western Bosnian theatre could only<br />
adversely aff ect the general balance of forces, which had never been so favourable until<br />
that point in time. Having been given the green light by the political leadership the<br />
Croatian Army had a free hand to set off the process for the liberation of the temporarily<br />
occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia. At the meeting held on the Brijuni Islands on<br />
31 July 1995, the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman and top-level<br />
HV offi cers considered the forthcoming operation and sought to defi ne the political<br />
justifi cation for it. F. Tuđman wanted the rebel Serbs totally defeated within the shortest<br />
possible time. 122<br />
At the political level, the last attempt for a peaceful resolution of the issue of rebel<br />
areas was made on 3 August 1995 at the meeting of the representatives of Croatian<br />
authorities and of the rebel Serbs from Knin. Th e meeting started at 10 a.m. in the Saugy<br />
Villa at Genthod, a dozen kilometres from Geneva. Th e Croatian delegation included<br />
Ivić Pašalić (MP), Vesna Škare Ožbolt (Assistant Chief of Staff of the President), Smiljan<br />
Reljić (Assistant Minister of the Interior) and Lieutenant-General Petar Stipetić (Assistant<br />
Chief of the HV General Staff ). During the negotiations it produced the following<br />
demands: immediate peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas; immediate opening<br />
of all communications across the occupied areas, especially the Zagreb-Split railway via<br />
Knin; opening of the pipeline within 24 hours of the end of negotiations, with Croatian<br />
control throughout the pipeline route; immediate enforcement in the occupied areas of<br />
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and of the provisions of the Constitutional Law<br />
on the Rights of the Serbian Ethnic Community guaranteeing political, civil and ethnic<br />
rights; surrender of weapons to the Croatian authorities witnessed by UNCRO within 3<br />
120 HDA, HUPMEZ: Message of the President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tuđman, 3 May 1995.<br />
121 For basic information about the actions of the Croatian forces in the spring of 1995 see A. Gotovina, “Napadajni<br />
bojevi i operacije HV i HVO” (Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations), Knin 1996. 37-56.<br />
122 N. Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995.» (Serb Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995), 514-516.<br />
65
to 8 days; guarantee of civil safety and general amnesty to all persons other than perpetrators of<br />
war crimes. At the same time, the Croatian authorities off ered to the rebel Serbs from Croatia the<br />
holding of free elections for local self-government, and participation in civil authorities and civil<br />
police structures on the basis of the ethnic breakdown of the population according to the 1991<br />
census, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Constitutional Law. Th e answers<br />
of the rebel Serb delegation - which consisted of the General Mile Novaković, Milivoj Vojnović,<br />
Ilija Prijić and Lazo Macura - were not deemed to be satisfactory by the Croatian side. 123 Th e<br />
mission of reintegrating the occupied areas was entrusted to the Croatian Army, especially aft er<br />
the Serb artillery attack, on the very same day, from eastern Herzegovina against the Dubrovnik<br />
area, in which three civilians were killed and three wounded, two of them severely. 124<br />
Croatian Hrvatske forces snage in na Grahovo Grahovskom Polje,<br />
polju, summer ljeto 1995. 1995<br />
123 «Kronologija rata 1989-1998.» (Chronology of the War 1989.1998), <strong>Hrvatski</strong> informativni <strong>centar</strong>, Zagreb 1998, 502;<br />
HMDCDR: Collection of copies of Homeland War documents; Offi ce of the President of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
124 HMDCDR: Collection of copies of Homeland War documents; Offi ce of the President of the Republic of<br />
Croatia, 2.<br />
66
THE KRAJINA IN ANTICIPATION OF STORM<br />
Aft er the operation Summer ‘95 the RSK found itself in a very precarious position,<br />
the worst since its foundation. Th e state of war was proclaimed throughout the<br />
RSK on 28 July. 125 All SVK units were forbidden rest periods based on shift duty.<br />
Th e troops were allowed to rest only on their order of battle positions. 126 On 30 July<br />
General Ratko Mladić stated in Knin that the Croatian forces had committed a decisive<br />
mistake by capturing Glamoč and Grahovo, and that it would cost them dearly. 127 On<br />
the same day General Milovanović, Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Republika<br />
Srpska, declared that he had received from the President of Republika Srpska Radovan<br />
Karadžić the order to stop the breakthrough of the Croatian forces and mount a<br />
counterattack in order to free Grahovo and Glamoč: «I do not known whether the army<br />
will accomplish its mission within 24 hours or 24 days, but it is clear that it will free the<br />
occupied territories very soon». 128 On 31 July Martić also held a press conference: he<br />
stated that he had talked to the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević and<br />
obtained from him the promise that «Serbia could not be indiff erent» if Croatia attacked<br />
Knin. 129 Speaking on behalf of the Supreme Defence Council of the Republika Srpska<br />
and the Republika Srpska Krajina, which met on 2 August in Drvar, Radovan Karadžić<br />
urged the international community to sanction the Croatian conduct. Yugoslavia was<br />
called upon to help, Karadžić claimed, because the confl ict was no longer a civil war but<br />
the continuation of World War Two and an attempt to create a Greater Croatia. 130<br />
All these media appearances were focused on the same goal - boosting the morale of<br />
the Krajina Serbs which was at a very low ebb. Th e HV operation intended to achieve a<br />
link-up with the ARBiH 5 th Corps had been announced since early July. 131 On 25 July the<br />
command of the 39 th Corps informed the subordinate units that the HV would “almost<br />
certainly” attack the 27 th Corps on 26 or 27 July, and probably, at approximately the<br />
same time, land airborne troops in the area of Bihać or Brekovica. 132 Th e daily report of<br />
the Sector for Military and Civilian Aff airs of the RSK Ministry of Internal Aff airs of 31<br />
125 RSK Supreme Defence Council; no. 020/1-846/95 of 28 July 1995; Decision.<br />
126 RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. no. 3-470 of 31 July 1995; Order.<br />
127 D. Radišić, “Hronologija 1990-1005.” (Chronology 1990-1995), 605.<br />
128 Ibid., 605.<br />
129 Ibid., 605.<br />
130 Ibid., 608.<br />
131 Command of the 24th infantry brigade, no. 32-81 of 5 July 1995; Order.<br />
132 Command of the 39th Corps; str. conf., no. 64-185 of 25 July 1995; Intelligence information.<br />
67
July noted that on the previous evening someone in the village of Strmica “had spread<br />
the rumour that the ustashi had broken through the defence line and were entering<br />
Strmica, causing panic and uncontrolled movement of the population. Owing to the<br />
timely intervention of the head of the Municipal Civil Defence Headquarters in Knin<br />
and of his staff the panic was averted, and the people remained in their homes”. 133<br />
On 2 August the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters ordered all subordinate units to<br />
start preparing for the evacuation of material assets, archives, birth, death and marriage<br />
registers, records and confi dential documents, movable cultural assets, cash assets,<br />
securities and other documents. 134 Th e implementation of the order had already been<br />
prepared in advance. On 31 July the head of the municipal civil defence headquarters<br />
in Drniš informed his superiors in Knin that his staff was informed about the current<br />
situation, and about the measures and actions “which they were obliged to take, with<br />
particular focus on providing shelter and evacuation-related preparatory actions”. 135<br />
Th e order of the civil defence headquarters of the municipality of Dvor na Uni, one<br />
day before the start of Storm, indicates how quickly the order of the RSK Civil Defence<br />
Headquarters began to be implemented. 136<br />
According to the report of the HV electronic reconnaissance unit, which followed<br />
intensively the Krajina radio traffi c in late July, “all civilian telephone conversations in<br />
Lika refl ect fear among the civilian population in the area, one could almost say panic<br />
caused by the possible attack of Croatian forces. In line with this, evacuation routes have<br />
also allegedly been set; however, just as shown by all other conversations, there is nothing<br />
signifi cant in terms of intelligence, and it all boils down to hearsay. People are said to be<br />
physically and mentally exhausted by the continuous psychosis and expectation of the<br />
attack, and at the end of their tether”. 137 Th e attack of the HV was expected at Sunja and<br />
Glina in the night of 28 July. On 29 July reports listed thousands of women and children<br />
being bussed out of Knin in the direction of Belgrade. 138 A day later, on 30 July, the state<br />
of war was proclaimed in the RSK. Alarm and panic were reported on the same day (part<br />
of the population began to prepare for escape in the village of Krnjak near Karlovac). 139<br />
One day before the start of the operation, on 3 August, Radio Petrinja announced the HV<br />
attack on the RSK. 140 On 4 August at 0030 the SVK Kordun Corps reportedly possessed<br />
133 RSK, Ministry of Defence, Sector for Military and Civilian Aff airs; str. conf. no. 403-201/95 of 31 July;<br />
Regular daily report.<br />
134 POA: RSK, Republican Civil Defence Headquarters; str. conf., no. 01-83/95 of 2 August 1995; Preparations<br />
for the evacuation of material, cultural and other assets.<br />
135 POA: RSK, Drniš Municipality, Ministry of Defence, Drniš Department; str. conf. no.01-10/95 of 31 July<br />
1995; Report on steps taken with regard to the new developments.<br />
136 POA: Dvor na Uni, civil defence headquarters; str. conf. no.270/1-95 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
137 MORH GSHV: ED-1 Centre; cl. 833-05/95-01, reg. no. 105/3-12711-95-218 of 1 August 1995; Intelligence<br />
report.<br />
138 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Dept., cl. 81/95-02/01, reg. no. 1075-10/95-53 of 29 July 1995.<br />
139 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Dept., cl. 81/95-02/01, reg. no. 1075-10/95-54 of 30 July 1995.<br />
140 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Dept., cl. 81/95-02/012, reg. no. 11075-10/95-56 of 3 August<br />
1995.<br />
68
information that the HV attack would start at 5 a.m. Th e preparations for the evacuation<br />
of the population continued and RSK police offi cers were reportedly moving their<br />
families to Bosnia&Herzegovina. 141 Only women and children were allowed to cross the<br />
bridges to Bosnia&Herzegovina. On the same day the inhabitants of Dvor na Uni were<br />
ready for evacuation. 142<br />
141 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Directorate., cl. 804-08/95-172/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/1-95-<br />
1924 of 4 August 1995.<br />
142 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Dept., cl. 81/95-02/01, reg. no. 1075-10/95-58 of 4 August<br />
1995.<br />
69
70<br />
WAR PLANS<br />
(DEFENCE PLANS AND PLANS FOR THE LIBERATION<br />
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY)<br />
Serious planning for Operation Storm started in December 1994. 143 Aft er the<br />
signifi cant success scored by the Split Corps District on Mount Dinara and<br />
in Livanjsko Polje, the HV General Staff draft ed a new plan and directives<br />
codenamed Flash (Bljesak). Th e plan was partly tested in Western Slavonia, and part<br />
of uncommitted forces was used to reinforce the Split, Osijek, Zagreb, Karlovac and<br />
Gospić Corps Districts. In mid-May the name of the operation was changed from Flash<br />
into Storm. 144 Th e directives were attuned to the conditions on the ground and signed<br />
in the HV General Staff on 26 June 1995. As decided by the Chief of the HV Staff , the<br />
available forces of the Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts were given<br />
orders to start intensive preparations, “along with the required regrouping and additional<br />
mobilization”, for bringing forces to a state of readiness guaranteeing the execution of the<br />
operation in accordance with the directives. 145 Th e remainder of the Croatian Army, the<br />
forces of the Southern Th eatre and of the Osijek Corps District, with the support of the<br />
Croatian Navy and the Croatian Air Force, were to secure the successful execution of the<br />
operation by steady and decisive defence. Th e mission of the Bjelovar Corps District was<br />
the defence of the border along the river Sava. All the units were supposed to be ready<br />
for the operation by 15 July. 146<br />
Th e mission of the Zagreb Corps District (ZP Zagreb) was to break through the<br />
defences of the SVK Banija Corps, free Banovina and link up with the ARBiH 5th Corps<br />
in the area of the villages of Obljaj and Žirovac. Th e Corps was to be reinforced with the<br />
following General Staff units: the 81 st Guards Battalion, the 16 th Artillery-Rocket Brigade<br />
(without the 2 nd and 3 rd Battalions), the 2 nd Battalion of the 15 th Anti-Armour Artillery-<br />
Rocket Brigade, the 2 nd Battalion of the 33 rd Engineer Brigade, and special MUP units.<br />
Th e 125 th Home Guard Regiment from Novska, attached to the Bjelovar Corps District,<br />
was reallocated back to the Zagreb Corps District. In order to reinforce other corps<br />
143 Work on plans for the liberation of the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia started already in late<br />
1991 and early 1992. Over the years the plans were updated. Th e last plan for Storm was modifi ed a few days<br />
before the operation, and provided for the simultaneous attack of Croatian forces in all operational and tactical<br />
directions, and advance to the border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, over<br />
a period of up to seven days. Th is achieved a strategic surprise to which the enemy had no valid response.<br />
HMDCDR: Review of General Antun Tus for the text about the Military-Police Operation Storm.<br />
144 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02-08, reg. no, 512-06-05/01-95-213 of 16 May 1995; Order.<br />
145 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-1-95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive, Op.no. 12-1/95, Storm-1. Published<br />
in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), 422-432.<br />
146 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-1/95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive Op. no 12-1/95, Storm-1.
districts ZP Zagreb shift ed the 99 th Brigade to ZP Karlovac, the 150 th Brigade to ZP<br />
Gospić, the 145 th Brigade to ZP Split and the 144 th Brigade to the Southern Th eatre. 147<br />
Th e task of the Karlovac Corps District was to crush the SVK Kordun Corps and<br />
free Kordun. It was to receive reinforcements comprising the HV 99 th Brigade from the<br />
Zagreb Corps District, the HV 104 th Brigade, the 13 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket<br />
Battalion, a tank company (of six tanks which never arrived), all from the Bjelovar Corps<br />
District, a company from the 33 rd Engineer Brigade, and special MUP units from the<br />
Karlovac Police Department (which never arrived because they were transferred to<br />
Lika). 148<br />
Th e mission of the Gospić Corps District was to smash the SVK Lika Corps, free Lika<br />
and link up with the ARBiH 5 th Corps at Korenička Kapela - Tržačka Raštela. According<br />
to the plan, the corps was to be reinforced with the HV General Staff 1 st Guards Brigade,<br />
the HV 150 th Brigade, the 2 nd Company of the ABKO 50 th Battalion from ZP Zagreb, and<br />
special MUP units from the Rijeka-Senj and Istria police departments. 149<br />
In cooperation with special MUP forces, ZP split was to deal with the SVK North<br />
Dalmatian Corps and free the occupied parts of Dalmatia. Planned reinforcement<br />
comprised the HV General Staff 7 th Guards Brigade, the 2 nd Battalion of the ZP Gospić<br />
9 th Guards Brigade, the 145 th ZP Zagreb Brigade (which did not arrive and remained<br />
within ZP Zagreb), a 203 mm howitzer battery from ZP Zagreb and MUP units. 150<br />
Th e Osijek Corps District supported the operation as provided for by Directive Feniks<br />
(Phoenix) of the Chief of the HV General Staff . Its mission was to be monitored by<br />
the forward command post of the HV General Staff set up in Đakovo with Lieutenant-<br />
General Petar Stipetić in command, appointed to the post on 3 August 1995, one<br />
day before the start of the operation. 151 Th e Southern Th eatre was responsible for the<br />
defensive operation codenamed Maestral (Breeze). 152<br />
147 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-1/95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive Op. no 12-1/95, Storm-1.<br />
148 SVA MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-2-95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive, Op. no. 12-2/95, Storm-2. Published<br />
in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), 441-451.<br />
149 SVA MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-3-95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive, Op.no. 12-3/95, Storm-3. Published<br />
in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), 462-475.<br />
150 SVA MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-4-95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive, Op. no. 12-4/95, Storm-4. Published<br />
in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), 448-491. In commenting on the mission of ZP Split as defi ned in<br />
the GSHV Directive of 26. June 1995, General R- Rakić noted that the foregoing was at the time one of the variants<br />
for ZP Split which was not implemented aft er 4 August 1995 because major and essential changes had taken<br />
place in the meantime, both for ZP Split and for the HV in general (the Srebrenica massacre, the Split Declaration,<br />
the military-police operation Summer ’95 which freed Grahovo and Glamoč); he also noted that ZP Split was<br />
reinforced by the HV 144th Brigade rather than by the HV 145th Brigade, and Special MUP RH forces on Mount<br />
Velebit were only present on the left fl ank of ZP Split (their zone of responsibility having been between ZP Split<br />
and ZP Gospić), that the main route of attack of ZP Split in Storm was diff erent than planned, Velebit-Otrić, and<br />
that due account needs to be taken of the fact that the Directive under consideration was written 35 days before<br />
the well-known meeting at Brijuni, and that on 29 July 1995 that Directive could have been “shelved or modifi ed”.<br />
HMDCDR: General Rajko Rakić’s comments on the text about ZP Split in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
151 GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-3512 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
152 MORH, GSHV: Southern Th eatre Comm., cl.8/95-02/115, reg. no. 3105-01-01-95-103 of 7 August 1995; Report.<br />
Southern Th eatre Comm., cl. 8/95-02/115, reg. no. 3105-01-01-95-127 of 10 August 1995; Excerpt from the<br />
defence order of the Southern Th eatre commander.<br />
71
Under the pressure of Croatian attacks, the Krajina Serbs prepared in February 1995 a<br />
new plan for the commitment of their armed forces called Gvozd. Th ey anticipated Croatian<br />
attacks to come in segments and believed that the HV did not have the strength for the radical<br />
option - attack on the entire occupied area - and that it would attack instead the edges of the<br />
Krajina, northern Dalmatia and Western Slavonia in order to crush the North Dalmatian<br />
and Western Slavonian Corps. Only then, aft er it had demonstrated its superiority, the<br />
Croatian army would attack the Lika and Kordun corps in cooperation with the ARBiH 5 th<br />
Corps. Th e SVK intended to apply decisive defence, followed by “off ensive operations, also in<br />
cooperation with forces of the VJ and the VRS, focused on crushing ustashi forces along the<br />
lines of attack in Eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia and Gorski Kotar, thus creating conditions for<br />
subsequent off ensive actions in order to establish control and prevent the communication<br />
and supply of the Croatian armed forces and population in Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia”. In<br />
their anticipated counterattack the Krajina Serbs saw an opportunity to seize the Spačva<br />
Forest in Eastern Slavonia and advance to the coast between Šibenik and Biograd. 153<br />
Specijalne Special snage MUP MUP-a RH RH forces na<br />
on Mount Velebitu Velebit<br />
153 VSA MORH: Directive for the commitment of the Serb Army of the Krajina; Op. no. 1, “GVOZD”, February<br />
1995. Annex to the plan of SVK commitment, ˝GVOZD”.<br />
72
FINAL HV PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION<br />
Aft er the draft ing of the HV General Staff Directive on 30 June 1995, the General<br />
Staff signed the fi rst orders regulating the operational subordination of the units<br />
attached to the commands of the corps districts. Th is was completed by 3 July. 154<br />
Th e implementation of these orders and the deployment of units to the assembly areas<br />
started with the Serbian attacks on Bihać and the Croatian operation Summer ’95. 155 On<br />
30 July all holidays and furloughs of HV members were revoked and orders issued for<br />
their immediate reporting to their units and assignments. 156 Th e last major innovation<br />
in the plan of the operation was introduced on 2 August, when ZP Bjelovar was included<br />
into off ensive operations although it had previously been designated exclusively for<br />
support and defence of the state border. 157<br />
On 2 August the HV General Staff established the Staff Operational Centre (SOC)<br />
responsible for data collection, processing and analysis, and for the control of “units and<br />
commands at the operational strategic level”. Th e operational team of the Centre was<br />
expected to suggest force deployment to the HV General Staff and it was responsible<br />
for monitoring and overseeing the situation in the individual corps districts. Th e SOC<br />
was divided into two groups. Major-General Pavao Miljavac was the leader of the fi rst<br />
and Major-General Vinko Vrbanac of the second group. Th e advance command post of<br />
the HV General Staff in Ogulin was staff ed with additional offi cers, and a special group<br />
of the Chief of the HV General Staff for overseeing special missions and orders was<br />
also set up. In accordance with the war plan and the directive of the Chief of the HV<br />
General Staff the GSHV Advance Command Post was set up in Đakovo. 158 On 3 August<br />
the Command of the Southern Th eatre war ordered to mount Operation Maestral. 159<br />
154 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-256, 258, 260, 261, 265 and 266 of<br />
30 June 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-259, 270, 273-277 of 3<br />
July 1995; Order.<br />
155 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-05-314 of 24 July 1995, 325 of 28 July<br />
1995, 331 and 333 of 30 July 1995, 337 and 338 of 31 July 199, 339 of 1 August 1995, 342, 343, 346, 347 and<br />
348 of 2 August 1995, 354 and 360 of 3 August 1955; Order. Some of the ZP Karlovac units, noted General<br />
M. Crnjac, only arrived in the assembly area one day before the start of Storm, and one battalion arrived<br />
with almost no weapons. HMDCDR: comments by General Miljenko Crnjac on the text about ZP Karlovac<br />
in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
156 MORH, GSHV:GSHV, cl. 8-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-330 of 30 July 1995; Order.<br />
157 MORH, GSHV: Command of ZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1285 of 13 September<br />
1995; Assessment of execution of the off ensive operation Storm.<br />
158 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-340 of 2 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-351 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
159 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02-08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-349 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
73
Croatian Navy units received orders for an active naval defence of the Republic of Croatia<br />
focused on “anti-naval, anti-submarine, anti-mine operations, and anti-sabotage and air<br />
defence”. Naval defence in the South Adriatic area was incorporated into the overall defence<br />
operations in the Southern Th eatre. 160<br />
Military police units were issued orders related to their domain of activity with the<br />
additional obligation to cooperate with civil police. 161 Reporters were “forbidden all access<br />
to areas of responsibility of Croatian army units without a special permission issued by the<br />
MORH Political Directorate”. HV members were forbidden to give “any statements to (national<br />
and foreign) media without the express approval of the MORH Political Directorate”. 162<br />
On 3 August at 2115 hours the Chief of the HV General Staff issued battle readiness orders<br />
to units of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts, and to the special<br />
units of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia; units of ZP Osijek, the<br />
Southern Th eatre and of the Croatian Navy received defence readiness orders at 0300 hours<br />
on 4 August. Battle readiness for the Croatian Air Force was set at 0500 hours on 4 August. 163<br />
Th e fi rst air strike was scheduled for 0600 hours, the second one to follow “depending on<br />
weather conditions”. 164 At 0700 the Croatian Army was to “repossess Croatian materiel from<br />
the UNCRO depots”, where it was stored under the provisions of the Zagreb Agreement<br />
concluded in the spring of 1994. 165<br />
74<br />
Th e political and<br />
military leaders<br />
of the Republic<br />
of Croatia watch<br />
the progress of<br />
Operation Storm.<br />
160 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08. reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-350 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
161 MORH, GSHV: MORH, Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19/01-95-474<br />
of 3 August 1995.<br />
162 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 818-04/95-01/02-03, reg. no. 1075-04/95-17 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
163 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-364 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
164 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-0605/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
165 MORH, GSHV: GSH, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. Because of<br />
the impression that the preparation of Storm (unit mobilization, their assembly and deployment, order reception,<br />
knowledge of the terrain and briefi ng, assessment of the situation and battle order of the enemy) unfolded<br />
in a disorganized way or in the nick of time, General Petar Stipetić believes that the overall conduct and command<br />
of the GSHV needs to be analyzed in particular, including the selection of people for key positions. HMD-<br />
CDR: comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZP Zagreb in the military-police operation Storm.
THE STORM<br />
77
Knin (the fortress), 5 August 1995 (photograph by Damir Čobanov)<br />
78
SPLIT CORPS DISTRICT<br />
Unlike other corps districts, the Split Corps District (ZP Split) mounted Operation<br />
Storm under the code name Kozjak-95. It is not clear why that was done, and<br />
that is not the fi rst instance involving the change of the name of an HV General<br />
Staff operation at the local level. In January 1993 the Command of the Split Operational<br />
Zone had mounted in the hinterland of Zadar the operation Winter-93, codenamed<br />
Gusar (Pirate) by the HV General Staff and popularly called Maslenica. 166 Th e order for<br />
the off ensive action was written by the Command of ZP Split on 1 August 1995. Th e idea<br />
of the ZP Split commander was to crush Serbian forces in the greater area of northern<br />
Dalmatia, cut the communications leading from Knin to the north, and surround and<br />
free Knin. Th e main objective of ZP Split was the town of Knin, and the main forces<br />
of the Corps were concentrated along the lines Bosansko Grahovo - Knin, Jasenice -<br />
Muškovci and Uniški Doci - Kijevo. In the remaining part of the theatre auxiliary forces<br />
were supposed to roll back Serbian forces and penetrate the territory, thereby facilitating<br />
the mission of the main forces. Th e operation was planned in two to three phases and<br />
in the duration of three to four days. In the fi rst phase, which was to last one day, the<br />
plan envisioned the smashing of the Serbian forces along the fi rst line of defence and the<br />
capture of important landmarks and communications in the tactical depth of the enemy.<br />
In the second phase, also planned for execution in a single day, the main forces of the<br />
North Dalmatian Corps had to be cut up, and conditions created for engaging the second<br />
combat echelon. Th e plan for the third, two-day phase included the elimination of the<br />
main enemy forces, gaining control over key defence points, and establishing a situation<br />
in which hostile units could only surrender or pull out. As provided for by preparations<br />
for the operation, some forces were to strike along the Glamočko Polje - Vitorog line in<br />
order to tie down the operational reserve of the Army of Republika Srpska. Th e overall<br />
operation was entrusted to operational groups Sjever, Sinj, Šibenik and Zadar. 167<br />
OG Sjever (North) was the main force of the operation. It comprised the HV 4 th and 7 th<br />
Guards Brigades, the 81 st Guards Battalion with the First Tactical Group, the 1 st Croatian<br />
Guards Brigade. the HVO 2 nd Guards Brigade with the Th ird Tactical Group, and the<br />
166 According to some views, the switching of the code names Storm and Kozjak could have been the consequence<br />
of the wish to provide additional cover for the planning of Storm; it is also possible that the offi cers<br />
responsible for drawing the orders in ZP Split simply did not know that the operation already had a code<br />
name. Of course, there is no doubt that Kozjak was part of Storm executed by ZP Split.<br />
167 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command; cl. DT 8/95-01/01. reg.no. 1080-01-95/2 of 1 August 1995;<br />
Order for off ensive operation.<br />
79
HVO 3 rd Guards Brigade with the Second Tactical Group. Th e HVO Tomislavgrad Corps<br />
District under the command of the OG Sjever IZM (advance command post) in the<br />
village of Vrba near Glamoč was responsible for supporting the assault. 168<br />
Th e 4 th and 7 th Guards Brigades were to crush Serbian forces along the Dinara - Knin<br />
line and gain control of Knin. Th e previous battle line of the 4 th Guards Birgade and<br />
part of the line of the 7 th Guards Brigade from Mačja Greda to Veliki Kik were taken<br />
over by the 81 st Guards Battalion which switched to decisive defence. Th e 1 st Croatian<br />
Guards Brigade was the operational reserve for intervention along jeopardized defence<br />
lines or for assault commitment. HVO forces, the 2 nd and 3 rd Guards Brigades and the<br />
Tomislavgrad Corps District were to attack along the line Glamočko Polje - Mount<br />
Vitorog in order to gain control of Vitorog and the Mlinište pass and thereby facilitate<br />
advance towards Jajce.<br />
Th e mission of Operational Group Sinj was to mount the attack at Dinara - Kijevo and<br />
Svilaja - Kozjak, encircle and eliminate Serbian forces in the valley of the Peruča, gain<br />
control of Kozjak and stand ready for sustaining the advance towards Knin. It comprised<br />
the HV 6 th Home Guard Regiment from Split, the HV 126 th Home Guard Regiment from<br />
Sinj and the HV 144 th Sesvete Brigade. Th e task of the 126 th Home Guard Regiment was<br />
to crush Serbian forces by a spirited pincer movement in the greater area of Uništa along<br />
the line of attack, gain control, as quickly as possible, over the Kijevo - Polača area, and<br />
thereby support the assault of the 6 th Home Guard Regiment on Mount Kozjak. During<br />
its attack the regiment was responsible for protecting the left fl ank of the 4 th and 7 th<br />
Guards Brigade. Along the Vještića Gora - Bravčev Dolac - Vinalić axis the 144 th Brigade<br />
was supposed to eliminate the Serbian forces in the area of Bravčev Dolac and sustain the<br />
attack towards the village of Vinalić in order to eff ect linkup with the 126 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment. Th e 6 th Home Guard Regiment was to break down the Serbian units along<br />
the attack line, gain control of Ivova Glavica, Lisin, Konjska Glava and Razvale Otišićke;<br />
following that, it was to continue its attack towards the village of Maovice and advance<br />
towards Mount Kozjak together with the 126 th Home Guard Regiment.<br />
Attack along the lines Miljevci - Promina, Skradin - Plastovo - Tomasovića Stanovi<br />
and Dragišići - Brbir was entrusted to Operational Group Šibenik, which comprised<br />
168 As an addition to the foregoing, General R. Rakić observed: «In the military-police Operation Storm ZP<br />
Split had two front-lines: 1) from the Velebit range to Mount Dinara (more precisely, to Bosansko Grahovo)<br />
- and all its units were to attack and liberate the hitherto occupied region of Northern Dalmatia (territory<br />
of the Republic of Croatia up to the border with neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina); 2) the front-line from<br />
Bosansko Grahovo to Kupreška Vrata (about 100 km) was operationally subordinated, and all the HV and<br />
HVO units in the area were engaged in active defence, protecting the rear of HV units advancing towards<br />
Knin. Th e ZP Split IZM for Operation Storm was in the village of Sajković (Livanjsko Polje), and it controlled<br />
off ensive and defensive units. Th e attacking forces were controlled by the commands of the operational<br />
groups Sjever (village of Sajković), Sinj (Sinj), Šibenik (Šibenik) and Zadar (village of Poličnik). It should be<br />
noted that the ZP Split IZM in Zadar was also functional, overseeing and commanding operational groups<br />
Zadar and Šibenik. Defence units, made up mainly of HVO formations - with the exception of the 81st<br />
Guards Brigade at Bosansko Grahovo, were under the command of IZM ZP Tomislavgrad in the village of<br />
Vrba near Glamoč. HMDCDR: Comments of General Rajko Rakić on the text about ZP Split in the militarypolice<br />
operation Storm.<br />
80
the 142 nd Home Guard Regiment, the 15 th Home Guard Rgiment and the 113 th Infantry<br />
Brigade. Aft er breaking down the Serbian forces at Miljevci - Promina - Vrbnik, the 142 nd<br />
Home Guard Regiment had to gain control of the greater area of the villages of Žitnić,<br />
Trbounje, Oklaj, Promina and Vrbnik. Th e task of 15 th Home Guard Regiment was to<br />
eliminate the Serbian forces along the Skradin - Plastovo - Kistanje line, gain control of<br />
Velika Glava, Sonković, Bratiškovci and Laškovica, and continue to advance along the<br />
left bank of the river Krka up to the village of Radučić. Th e 113 rd Infantry Brigade had<br />
to eliminate the Serbian forces along Dragišići - Bribir and gain control over Ždrapanj,<br />
Međare, Žažvić, Vaćani, Bribir and Ervenik.<br />
Operational Group Zadar, which comprised the 2 nd Battalion of the 9 th Guards<br />
Brigade, the 112 th Brigade, and the 7 th and 134 th Home Guard Regiments, had to roll back<br />
the Serbian forces along the lines Novigrad - Donji Karin - Kaštel Žegarski, Suhovare -<br />
Smiljčić - Benkovac, Prkos - Nadin, Gorica - Raštević, Vrana - Miranje, Pristeg- Cerane<br />
Gornje and Bila Vlaka - Vukšić - Mandino Selo. Th e 2 nd Battalion of the 9 th Guards<br />
Brigade and the 2 nd Battalion of the 134 th Home Guard Regiment had to cut the Gračac<br />
- Obrovac communication and seize the area of Muškovci. Th e 112 th Brigade had to<br />
gain control in the greater area of Karin - Smiljčić - Kaštel Žegarski, and the 7 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment, advancing towards Vrčevo - Vinterinci - Vijenac - Šopor, was to take<br />
the village of Veljane, Ražovljeva Glavica, Nadinski Vijenac and Benkovac. Th e 134 th<br />
Home Guards Brigade (minus one battalion) ome GuaedHomeHiwas to capture Miranje<br />
Gornje and Vukšić, and continue to advance towards the village of Parčić.<br />
Th e Special MUP units left of ZP Split were responsible for the operation along the<br />
general Velebit - Gračac axis and for cutting the communications connecting Knin and<br />
Obrovac with Gračac. Th e commander was Lieutenant-General Mladen Markač.<br />
Th e attacks of Operational Groups Sjever, Šibenik and Zadar were supported by fi ve<br />
artillery-rocket and artillery groups: the HVO 10 th Artillery-Rocket Regiment, the<br />
14 th Artillery Battalion, the 20 th Howitzer Battalion and part of the composite artillery<br />
battalion of the HV 5 th Guards Brigade and howitzers of the HV 112 nd Infantry Brigade.<br />
All units were required to possess organic anti-armour capability. An exception was<br />
the Anti-Armour Unit, formed out of the 11 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket Battalion<br />
for the requirements of OG Zadar. Antiaircraft artillery was responsible for protecting<br />
artillery and rocket groups, major industrial plants, important communications and the<br />
towns of Šibenik, Zadar and Biograd. It was implemented by organic components of<br />
the engaged forces and the 204 th Air Defence Artillery-Rocket Brigade. Th e primary<br />
responsibility of the engineer units was the securing of passages through mine fi elds.<br />
Forward advance posts were set up in Zadar and the village of Sajković in the lower part<br />
of Livanjsko Polje. Th e commander of the Split Corps District was Lieutenant- General<br />
Ante Gotovina. 169<br />
Th e units of the Split Corps District were opposed by the SVK North Dalmatian Corps<br />
headquartered in Knin. Th e Corps comprised the 75 th and 92 nd Motorized Brigades, the<br />
169 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, cl. DT 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-01-95-75/2 of 1 August 1995;<br />
Order for off ensive operation.<br />
81
1 st and 4 th Light Brigades, the 2 nd and 3 rd Infantry Brigades, the 7 th Composite Artillery<br />
Regiment, the 7 th Composite Anti-Armour Artillery Regiment, the 7 th Light Artillery-<br />
Rocket Regiment and the 7 th Rear Base. Th e Corps commander was Major-General<br />
Slobodan Kovačević. 170 According to the war plan, in the fi rst stage of the operation<br />
the Corps had to prevent HV breakthrough along the axes Zadar - Benkovac - Knin,<br />
Šibenik - Drniš - Knin, Sinj- Velika Vrlika - Knin and on the Velebit range. In the second<br />
part of the operation the Corps had to redeploy its forces, advance to the Adriatic<br />
coast between Šibenik and Biograd, and fortify the achieved line. Th e 105 th Air Force<br />
Brigade, and the Republika Srpska air force and air defence were allocated for support. 171<br />
As compared with the defence plan of February 1995, by early August the situation<br />
changed substantially. Th e Corps did not get the envisioned two brigade reinforcements,<br />
the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps which was to guard the left fl ank was knocked out, and the<br />
Knin - Bosansko Grahovo route had to be closed by a provisional tactical and combat<br />
unit. In the period under consideration the Corps was reinforced with a 130 mm gun<br />
battalion and an SVLR Oganj battery. Th e Corps included the 2 nd Guards Brigade of<br />
the SVK Special Unit Corps. On the eve of the Croatian attack the brigade pulled back<br />
from Mount Dinara to Knin. A military police battalion was also present in the Knin<br />
greater area. Knin was also the headquarters of the SVK General Staff and of some units<br />
subordinated to it - the 101 th Intelligence Centre and the 75 th Rear Base. 172<br />
As the political and military centre of the RSK, Knin had a great moral signifi cance, and<br />
its liberation would certainly motivate Croatian troops to fi ght on, just as its successful<br />
defence would provide an analogous motivation to the rebel Serbs. Quite logically, the<br />
Split Corps District committed its most successful units, two Guards brigades, to the Knin<br />
operation. Although tired because of the just completed battles for Bosansko Grahovo,<br />
the two brigades were ready to liberate Knin. Th at was certainly a special task in their<br />
battle record, and for the 4 th Brigade an appropriate conclusion of its war path which had<br />
started four years earlier precisely by the defence of parts of Northern Dalmatia from the<br />
threat posed by the JNA and the rebel Serbs from Knin. 173<br />
170 HDAS, RSK: 7th Corps Command; DT no. 37-3of 13 February 1995; Order of the 7th Corps Commander<br />
for defence and off ensive operations, Op.no.1; M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade),<br />
188-202.<br />
171 VSA MORH: Directive for the commitment of the Serb Army of the Krajina, Op. no.1, “GVOZD”, February<br />
1995.<br />
172 VSA MORH MORH: GŠ TO RSK, DT no. 947-2/1 of 27 November 1992; Overview of the mobilization<br />
and deployment of the units of the Serbian Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina; M. Sekulić, “Knin je<br />
pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 223, 239.<br />
173 In discussing the issue of which Guards brigade (the 4th or the 7th) entered Knin fi rst, General Rakić<br />
believes that “this is not a formal matter but rather a point of prestige”. However, as a witness and a person<br />
involved in planning the attack on Knin, he also noted: “Aft er the liberation of Bosansko Grahovo, the 4th<br />
Brigade, which had attacked Grahovo on the right of the 7th Brigade, turned in preparation for the advance<br />
towards Knin via the Derala pass. At the same time, the 7th Brigade, which had advanced towards Grahovo<br />
left of the 4th Brigade, turned with the same goal in mind towards Knin across Crvena Zemlja. At the time<br />
no rotation of the two brigades was possible, and they just remained in position aft er the taking of Grahovo.<br />
At the ZP Split command post in Sajković the two brigade commanders (Ivan Korade and Damir Krstičević)<br />
82
Th e operation started early in the morning of 4 August. Aft er artillery preparation,<br />
the 7 th Guards Brigade set off towards Knin along the axis Risovac - Golubićko Suvo<br />
Polje - village of Kovačić. In its off ensive path was the Th ird Battle Group (BG-3), a<br />
unit scraped together from several parts of the North Dalmatian Corps and RSK militia<br />
units. By the end of the day the 7 th Guards Brigade gained control over the dominant<br />
positions of Borova Glava, Visibaba, Badanj and Pitomi Vrh. Th is completed its mission<br />
for the day, and opened up the avenue for the commitment of the 4 th Guards Brigade to<br />
the attack. 174<br />
Forces of the neighbouring Operational Group Sinj also achieved progress. Advancing<br />
towards Uniški Doci - Uništa - Kijevo the 126 th Home Guard Regiment took Uništa and<br />
thereby created conditions for proceeding along the valley of the Peruča to Kijevo. Its left<br />
neighbour, the 144 th Brigade, descended from Vještića Gora and captured Bravčev Dolac.<br />
In the Svilaja - Kozjak area the 6 th Home Guard Regiment took Lisina, important for the<br />
commitment and deployment of its main forces. By the end of the day the regiment<br />
broke through the defence lines in three spots, and took Konjska Glava, the hamlets of<br />
Strunje and Lunići, and the village of Gornji Baljci. 175<br />
Forces of Operational Group Šibenik faced one of the tougher units of the SVK North<br />
Dalmatian Corps, the 75 th Motorized Brigade and part of the 2 nd Infantry Brigade. Th e<br />
main mission of OG Šibenik was to push back the Serbian forces and it scored minor<br />
advances along the line: during the day the 142 nd Home Guard Regiment broke through<br />
the Serbian defences along the section from the river Krka to Drniš; the 15 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment penetrated the line at the village of Laškovica while the 113 th Infantry Brigade<br />
was the most successful throughout the assigned area and reached the line Morpolača -<br />
Čista Velika - Lađevci - Sveti Bartul by the end of the day. 176<br />
Th e units of OG Zadar were opposed by the best unit of the North Dalmatian Corps,<br />
the 92 nd Motorized Brigade, and by the 3 rd Infantry Brigade which defended the routes<br />
agreed that joint advance towards Knin would be the best option. Th e commander of ZP Split agreed. In<br />
line with the foregoing, it would be correct to say that the town of Knin was liberated by the joint actions of<br />
the 4th and 7th brigades, just as recorded on the photography showing the two commanders on Knin fortress.<br />
Of course, that was the subject of several proposals and variants, but there was no time for any formal<br />
speculation”. HMDCDR: comments of General Rajko Rakić on the text about ZP Split in the military-police<br />
operation Storm.<br />
174 SVA MORH, 7th Guards Brig.: 7th Guards B., cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 3112-03-T-95-134 of 4<br />
August 1995; Daily operational report. SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19,<br />
reg. no. 1080-01-95-96 of 15 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation Kozjak-95; M. Sekulić, “Knin<br />
je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 189-190.<br />
175 ZP Split Command; cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/16, reg. no.1080-01-95-226 of 4 August 1995; Daily report. SVA<br />
MORH, ZP Split Command: 6th Home Guard Reg., IZM Gorje, cl. 8/95-01-88, reg. no 8311-01-01/95 of 12<br />
August 1995; Report; SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no.<br />
1080-01-95-56 of 15 August 1995; Analysis of Operation Kozjak-95.<br />
176 SVA MORH, ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, cl. 81/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-95-267 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Report. ZP Split Command, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/126, reg. no. 1080-01-95-226 of 4 August 1995; Daily<br />
report. SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, cl. 81/95-01/19-35, reg. no. 1080/5-01-95-35 of 4 August<br />
1995; Report. SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, l. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no.1080-<br />
01-95-56 of 15 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation Kozjak-95.<br />
83
of access to Benkovac. 177 Along the Miranje - Vukšić - Parčić line the 134 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment (minus one battalion) made no progress. 178 Th e 7 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
was able to achieve some advances in the area of Zemunik Gornji: in the morning it<br />
seized the line it had held before the signing of the Zagreb Agreement, then liberated<br />
the hamlets of Goleš and Banići and almost reached Potkosa. 179 In the Paljuv - Smiljčić<br />
sector the HV 112 th Brigade achieved a breakthrough at the village of Pridraga. 180<br />
Th e forces on the Velebit range - the 2 nd Battalion of the 9 th Guards Brigade, reinforced<br />
with a company of the 7 th Home Guard Regiment and the 2 nd Battalion of the 134 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment - attacked along the lines Gornja Bukva - Modrići and Bukovo Pleće -<br />
Tulove Grede - Bužanjkin Vrh. Aft er stiff Serbian resistance the battalion seized the area<br />
Dulibe - Tulove Grede thus facilitating the use of the communication Obrovac - Mali<br />
Alan - Sveti Rok. 181<br />
In the night of August 4 there was no further movement of Croatian forces towards<br />
Knin, in which the political and military leadership of the RSK was considering decisions<br />
of fateful importance for the survival of their para-state. In order to stop the Croatian<br />
attack towards Knin from Bosansko Grahovo one battalion of the 75 th Motorized<br />
Brigade was to be committed in the morning of 5 August. Th e Supreme Council decided<br />
to evacuate the population from Dalmatia and the southern part of Lika. As it soon<br />
turned out, it meant the withdrawal of the entire population and RSK troops, leading to<br />
direct collapse. Late in the night of 4 August the SVK General Staff abandoned Knin and<br />
moved to the village of Srb. 182 Th e next day, on 5 August, the North Dalmatian Corps<br />
almost ceased to exist, the fi rst of the SVK operational formations to be eliminated. Th e<br />
fate of the Corps and of its operations were described best in the assessment of the HV<br />
6 th Home Guard Regiment, which states that “hostile forces no longer exist and are not<br />
active; remnants of hostile forces in the form of individuals or more or less organized<br />
groups are no longer present as a collective enemy”. 183<br />
Th e assault of Croatian forces continued in the morning on 5 August. For the second<br />
time in less than ten days the Split Corps repeated the successful model applied in<br />
the fi ghting for Bosansko Grahovo, seized by the parallel action of the HV 4 th and 7 th<br />
Brigades. Th e route towards Strmica was blocked by the Th ird Tactical Group of the SVK<br />
North Dalmatian Corps which had begun to crumble the night before. Th e 4 th Guards<br />
177 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 196-197, 201.<br />
178 SVA MORH, ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, cl. 81/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-95-267 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Report. SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split, cl. 81/95/01/19, reg. no. 1080/5-01-95-35 of 4 August 1995; Report by<br />
1200 hours; SVA MORH, ZP Split Command: ZP Split, cl.81/95/01/16, reg. no. 1080-01-95-226 of 4 August<br />
1995; Daily report.<br />
179 MORH, GSHV: APO 8312 Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8312-01-95-443 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: APO 8312 Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95t-01/12, reg. no. 8312-01-95-03 of 4 August<br />
1995; Report.<br />
180 SVA MORH, ZTP Split Command: APO 3178/9 Zadar, cl. 818-04/95-01/18, reg. no. 3178/9-31-95-29 of<br />
11 August 1995; Report.<br />
181 SVA MORH, ZP Split Command: APO 3178/9 Zadar, cl. 818-04/95-01-01/18, reg. no. 3178/9-31-95-29<br />
of 11 August 1995; Report.<br />
182 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 178-182.<br />
183 MORH, GSHV: APO 8311 Split, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8311-01-01/95-464 of 5 August 1995; Regular<br />
daily report.<br />
84
Brigade captured Golubić, Vrpolje and Kninsko Polje, and advanced to Debelo Brdo<br />
from which it secured the left fl ank of the 7 th Guards Brigade in the area of Biskupija. Th e<br />
Brigade was engaged more heavily in the area of Golubić and in the villages of Radijevci<br />
and Očestovo. 184 Th e 7 th Guards Brigade met with no signifi cant opposition along its<br />
line of attack and at 1100 hours it entered Knin “with minimum losses”. 185 Th e liberation<br />
of Knin was the main event in the theatre, not only on 5 August but also throughout<br />
the operation. On the same day the President of the Republic of Croatia F. Tuđman<br />
appointed Reserve General Ivan Čermak as commander of the Knin Assembly Point,<br />
responsible for the organization of life and of the garrison service in the town. 186 One day<br />
later President Tuđman visited Knin, accompanied by the Speaker of the Parliament of<br />
the Republic of Croatia Dr. Nedjeljko Mihanović, and the Ministers of Foreign Aff airs,<br />
Defence and Internal Aff airs, Mate Granić, Gojko Šušak and Ivan Jarnjak, resp. Th e<br />
liberation of Knin, the centre of the Serbian rebellion in the Republic of Croatia, held<br />
a great symbolic signifi cance because it spelt the collapse of the Serbian rebellion in<br />
Croatia. Tuđman’s arrival in Knin symbolically marked the end of the Serbian para-state<br />
in Croatia and the start of the restoration of sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia over<br />
the area liberated in Operation Storm. 187<br />
Operational Group Sinj - the HV 126 th Home Guard Regiment, the HV 144 th Brigade<br />
and the HV 6 th Home Guard Regiment - completed its battle mission by establishing<br />
control over the area of Polača and Kozjak. It liberated the villages of Kijevo and Vrlika,<br />
the known Croatian strongholds from 1991. 188 Th ere was little fi ghting because in the<br />
night of 4 August the units of the 1 st Light Brigade pulled back to Polača (Sivo Brdo),<br />
where they disintegrated, and the remnants withdrew to Knin and farther off to Lika. 189<br />
Th e SVK 75 th Motorized Brigade, deployed in the line of attack of OG Šibenik, began<br />
to pull back towards Brljan - Pađene - Srb - Bosanski Petrovac in the morning of 5<br />
August. 190 By 2000 hours the HV 113 th Brigade reached the Žažvić - Bribirska Glavica -<br />
184 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split Command, cl. 032-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-03-95-34 of 5 August<br />
1995; Daily report. SVA MORH, 4th Gbr: 4th Gbr; cl. str. conf. 8/95/01/17, reg. no. 1114-01-02-95-371 of<br />
14 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation Storm 95. M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell<br />
in Belgrade), 192.<br />
185 SVA MORH, ZZPS: 7th Guards Brigade, cl. str.- conf. 8/95-01/05, reg. no. 1080-01-95-138 of 13 August<br />
1995; Analysis of the off ensive actions of the 7th Guards Brigade during the off ensive operation Storm. SVA<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080-01-95-56 of 154<br />
August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation Kozjak-95.<br />
186 MORH, GSHV: Republic of Croatia, the President, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-388/2 of<br />
5 August 1995; Decision.<br />
187 A. Gotovina, «Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO» (HV and HVO Off ensive Battles and Operations),<br />
80. MORH, GSHV: 7th Gbr, cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 3112-03-T-95-136 of 6 August 1995; Daily<br />
operational report.<br />
188 SVA MORH, ZZPS: 6th Home Guard Reg., IZM Gorje, cl. 8/95-01-88, reg. no. 8311-01-01/95-1170 of 12<br />
August 1995; Report. SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no.<br />
1080-01-95-56 of 15 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation Kozjak-95.<br />
189 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 192-193.<br />
190 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 193-194.<br />
85
Bribirske Mostine line on the way to its objective, Poličnik and Đevrske; the 15 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment reached Vačani - Bratiškovci and Smrdelji en route to Kistanje, and<br />
some units of the 142 nd Home Guard Regiment, aft er liberating Drniš, seized the village<br />
of Siverić and - having captured Velika Promina - advanced to the villages of Zvjerinjac<br />
and Vrbnik. Th e other units of the Regiment advanced from Oklaj to Mala Promina<br />
and the village of Lukar in order to eff ect linkup, at Vrbnik, with forces advancing from<br />
Siverić. 191<br />
OG Zadar met with no resistance along its line of advance. Early in the morning on<br />
5 August the SVK 3 rd Infantry Brigade began to pull back towards Srb, followed by the<br />
92 nd Motorized Brigade. 192 Units of the HV 7 th Home Guard Regiment freed Zemunik<br />
Gornji, Biljane Donje, Škabrnja, Nadin and entered Benkovac in the evening; 193 the HV<br />
112 th Brigade freed the village of Smilčić, continued to advance towards Debelo Brdo, 194<br />
and entered Karin - Debelo Brdo - Biljane Gornje by the end of the day. 195 Th e second<br />
battalion of the HV 9 th Guards Brigade reached Golovro - Pećica, and some units entered<br />
Obrovac during the night. 196<br />
Th e liberation of Knin on 5 August accelerated the collapse of the North Dalmatian<br />
Corps which had started the night before. It could almost be said that the Corps was<br />
“eliminated” by that time, although on that day some of its units were still in the<br />
territory of the Republic of Croatia close to the border with Bosnia&Herzegovina - from<br />
D. Tiškovac to the Una railway station at Martin Brod. However, in the report on the<br />
execution of the operation the HV General Staff reproached the Split Corps District for<br />
having ground to a standstill for two days because of the celebration. 197 According to<br />
an opposite view, this report is the result of ignorance about events round and in Knin<br />
because, it is claimed, the operational break in the activity of the Split Corps District was<br />
due to security reasons, i.e., preparations for the arrival of the President of the Republic<br />
of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman in Knin on 6 August. Th us, as reported, most of the units<br />
of the Split Corps District present in the area of Obrovac, Benkovac, Kistanje, Drniš and<br />
Vrlika on 6 August were engaged in “sweeping and mopping up the liberated territory”<br />
in order to make it free in the full sense of the word and secure from possible surprises.<br />
On the same day the 2 nd Battalion of the HV 9 th Guards Brigade combined with the 1 st<br />
191 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, IZM Zadar, cl. 032-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-03-954812 of 5 August 1995; PD<br />
Service report. ZP Split, IZM Zadar, cl. 81/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-95-269 of 5 August 1995; Daily report.<br />
192 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 196-201.<br />
193 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, cl. 032-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-03-95-34 of 5 August 1995; Daily report.<br />
SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, IZM Zadar, cl. 032-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-03-95-481 of 5 August 1995; PD<br />
Service report. SVA MORH, 7th dp: APO 8312 Zadar, cl.032-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 8312-05-95-73 of 10 August<br />
1995; Report on Operation Storm.<br />
194 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, cl. 032-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-03-95-34 of 5 August 1995; Daily report.<br />
195 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, IZM Zadar, cl. 032-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-03-95-481 of 5 August 1995; PD<br />
Service report.<br />
196 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, IZM Zadar, cl. 032-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1080-03-95-481 of 5 August 1995; PD<br />
Service report. SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, APO 3178/9 Zadar, CL. 818-04/95-01/18, REG. NO. 3178/9-31-95-<br />
29 of 11 August 1995; Report.<br />
197 GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report on Operation Storm.<br />
86
Croatian Guards Brigade and an ATG squad of the 72 nd Military Police Battalion seized<br />
Muškovac and Kaštel Žegarski. 198<br />
Aft er the President of the Republic of Croatia left Knin, the commander of the Split<br />
Corps District singled out the units for the push from the Otrić - Gračac communication<br />
towards Srb and the border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
On 7 August units of the 4 th and 7 th Guards Brigade, the 2 nd Battalion of the 9 th Guards<br />
Brigade and the 1 st Croatian Guards Brigade prepared for the advance to the state border, 199<br />
and, aft er reaching the jump-off positions, reconnoitred the ground. Th e commander and<br />
part of the command of the Split Corps District moved aft er the operational break to the<br />
northern barracks in Knin from which they issued orders and monitored the action on<br />
8 August. Th e mentioned units accomplished their mission on 8 August and established<br />
defence positions along the axis Kuk - Biljeg - Rodića Plećina - Lička Kaldrma - Dolovi<br />
- Bosanski Osredci - Begluci. In its daily report to the HV General Staff the Command<br />
of the Split Corps District wrote: “With this mission the Split Corps District has fully<br />
(100%) accomplished all its off ensive combat actions”. 200<br />
Croatian troops in Knin, 5 August 1995 (photograph by Josip Bistrović)<br />
198 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Split Command, IZM Zadar; cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1989-01-95-56 of 15<br />
August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation Kozjak-95. Th e 1st Croatian Guards Brigade, notes General R.<br />
Rakić, formerly in reserve and responsible for possible defensive or off ensive intervention (as required), was airlift ed<br />
via helicopter, by order of the ZP Commander, from Livanjsko Polje to the area of the village Rovanjska (near the<br />
Maslenica bridge) and ordered to attack towards Obrovac - Kaštel Žigarski. HMDCDR: comments of General Rajko<br />
Rakić on the Split Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
199 SVA MORH, ZP Split Command, IZM Sajković; cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/17, reg. no. 1080/01-95-348 of 7 August<br />
1995; Order.<br />
200 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Plit Command, IZM Knin; cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080-01-95-47 of 8 August<br />
1995; Report.<br />
87
88<br />
Conclusion<br />
Th e Split Corps District (ZP Split, ZPS) had more combat experience than any other<br />
operational HV unit. It began to enjoy relative peace only in the second half of 1993. In<br />
late 1994 it was engaged again in the fi ghting on Mount Dinara and in Livanjsko Polje, and<br />
Storm was only one in the series of operations in which it was committed, although the<br />
most demanding one. Its main strength lay in the 4 th and 7 th Guards Brigades, then among<br />
the best professional units of the Croatian armed forces. Th ese brigades were entrusted with<br />
the main part of the mission, which was facilitated by the order of battle of the SVK North<br />
Dalmatian Corps. Along the line of attack of the two Croatian brigades the SVK had two<br />
groups, scraped together from diff erent units, which were no match in any respect for the<br />
Croatian forces. Th at was only one of the problems of the North Dalmatian Corps. Literally<br />
on the eve of Storm it got a new commander, General Slobodan Kovačević, formerly head<br />
of the armoured-mechanized units in the General Staff of the Yugoslav army. M. Sekulić<br />
claims that he did not even have the time to meet with the commanders of the subordinate<br />
units, but that this fact does not clear him of responsibility. According to the same source,<br />
Kovačević did not organize his command, and sent the chief of his staff to command a<br />
combat group instead of keeping him in the Corps command. 201 Th e decision of the SVK<br />
Supreme Defence Council to “cut down” the front by pulling back from Knin was the last<br />
straw in the poor performance of the command of the North Dalmatian Corps. 202 Because<br />
of this the Split Corps District accomplished the fi rst stage of the operation very quickly<br />
and with unexpectedly little eff ort. However, in the report on the subsequent engagement<br />
of the ZP Split, addressed to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the Chief of the<br />
HV General Staff wrote: “In the second phase, intended to exploit the breakthrough, the<br />
Split Corps District - which could have proceeded even to pursuit - having halted the<br />
attack, for reasons unknown, of its main units for 2 days and having falsely reported the<br />
achieved line - did not cut off 203 the communications in due time allowing the enemy<br />
to pull out a considerable share of the materiel of the 7 th Knin and the 15 th Lika Corps”.<br />
According to the same report, the units of the Split Corps District reached the state border<br />
on 8 August 1995, two days later than it had been objectively possible. In the opinion of<br />
General Rajko Rakić, the report was improper, and the conduct of the commander of the<br />
Corps justifi ed and better for everyone concerned; he also supported this belief by the fact<br />
that “the President did not react at all to such a tendentious report”. 204<br />
200 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Plit Command, IZM Knin; cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080-01-95-47 of<br />
8 August 1995; Report.<br />
201 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 188-189.<br />
202 Aft er the fall of Knin and Gračac on 5 August, notes the CIA analysis, the SVK commander General<br />
Mile Mrkšić and the commander of the SVK North Dalmatian Corps General Kovačević were faced with<br />
a diffi cult choice: withdraw entirely from the Benkovac - Obrovac - Kistanje pocket or face defeat and the<br />
destruction or surrender of the entire 7th Corps. Of course, they chose to pull out, with the Serbian population.<br />
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict 1990-1995, 371-372.<br />
203 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02-08, reg. no. 412-06-05/01-95-5o5 of 21 August 1995; Report on<br />
Operation Storm.<br />
204 HMDCDR: Comments of General Rajko Rakić on the text about the role of ZP Split in the military-police<br />
Operation Storm.
According to the data in the analysis of 15 August 1995 the casualties of the Split<br />
Corps District in the operation totalled 5 dead and 21 wounded. 205<br />
SVK General Staff<br />
Intelligence Department<br />
Str. conf. No. 2/31/3110-1<br />
4 August 1995<br />
Intelligence report<br />
Serbian document on the shelling of Knin, 4 August 1995<br />
Th e attack of the Croatian Army on the RSK started on 4 August 1995 at 05.00 with the shelling of the towns<br />
of Knin, Drniš, Benkovac, Karin, Obrovac, Gračac, Korenica, the Udbina airstrip, Vojnić, Vrginmost and<br />
Petrinja. Th e artillery preparation lasted until 05.30, followed by engagement of individual weapons of 130,<br />
152 and 152 mm calibre and multiple rocket launchers.<br />
Th e ustaše infantry attack started at about 06.00 from Sunja towards Kostajnica, with the engagement of<br />
tanks, but units of the 39th Corps successfully repelled the attack. Another infantry attack was mounted from<br />
the village of Brlog (Otočac) - Drenov Klanac - village of Glavace, but it was also successfully beaten back.<br />
Knin was shelled from Livanjsko Polje and from several directions, and by the time of this report the<br />
town has been hit by 200 to 300 projectiles of diff erent types and calibres. Th e target of the fi rst strike<br />
was the building of the General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina, which sustained considerable<br />
damage and the almost complete loss of the motor pool. Subsequently the fi re was focused on the ‘1300<br />
Corporals’ barracks, the TVIK plant, the railway junction and housing below the Knin fortress [area of<br />
the residence of the “RSK president” Mile Martić - author’s note] and other targets.<br />
At 10.00, as this report is being written, hostile forces continue to attack Knin alternately with guns and<br />
multiple rocket launchers, shell the Udbina airstrip continuously, and occasionally open fi re on other<br />
settlements in the RSK.<br />
By monitoring the radio links of the Croatian Army and their mobile telephones we have been able to<br />
establish that the ustaše are sustaining considerable losses at Dubrovnik, Biograd-na-Moru, Gospić, Otočac,<br />
Sisak ad Sunja. You will be duly informed of all the latest information.<br />
Head of Department<br />
Lieutenant Colonel Mihajlo Knežević<br />
Copy to:<br />
7th, 11th, 21st, 39th Corps, Special Unit Corps<br />
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army - Second Directorate<br />
General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia<br />
and Herzegovina - Intelligence Directorate<br />
Command of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
205 SVA MORH, GSHV: Split Corps Command, IZM Knin, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080-01-95-56<br />
of 15 August 1995; Analysis of the Operation Kozjak-95. General Gotovina’s book, referring to information<br />
provided by the head of the medical corps of the ZPS Command, lists 20 killed, 47 severely wounded and<br />
141 lightly wounded, and 1 missing in action for the period from 4 to 12 August 1995. (Cf. A. Gotovina,<br />
“Napadajni bojevi i operacije HV i HVO” /Off ensive HV and HVO Battles and Operations/, 187). However,<br />
this probably includes the troops of the 14th Brigade killed in action at the Derala Pass on 12 August 1995,<br />
i.e., four days aft er Operation Storm was formally over also for the Split Corps District.<br />
89
90<br />
SPECIAL MUP RH UNITS IN OPERATION STORM<br />
Forces of the MUP [Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia] Special<br />
Police were present on the Velebit range from 1992. By the time Storm set off they<br />
had enough time to adjust to living in mountain conditions, sometimes to the limit<br />
of endurance. While in the area the members of the Special Police gained substantial<br />
information on the routes of movement and order of battle of Serbian forces in the Lika<br />
valley, kept in top shape and acquired specifi c combat experience. Th ese were the main<br />
reasons why the HV General Staff decided to commit the Special Police units to Operation<br />
Storm: from their jump-off position on Velebit they were supposed to cut the Medak -<br />
Gračac communication, free the northern Velebit foothills (Sveti Rok, Lovinac) and link<br />
up with HV forces at Lički Ribnik. Before that, they were to cut the Gračac - Obrovac<br />
communication, and seize the dominant points on Velebit above Obrovac, especially the<br />
Ćelavac communications centre, the main communications node of the Serbian forces.<br />
Further objectives of the MUP special units included seizure of the strategic road hub<br />
at Otrić, linkup with HV forces and penetration towards the international recognized<br />
border of the Republic of Croatia with Bosnia&Herzegovina in the area of Donji Lapac,<br />
Gornji Lapac and Borićevac (Kulen Vakuf). 206 Th e composite MUP Special Police force<br />
was assigned a special mission in the area between the Split and Gospić Corps Districts,<br />
and was directly subordinated to the Chief of the HV General Staff . Th eir commander<br />
was Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.<br />
On the fi rst day of the operation, at 0500 hours on 4 August, the composite Special<br />
Police force attacked from its positions on the Velebit range - from Ivine Vodice and Sveto<br />
Brdo in the western to Bukva and Tulove Grede in the eastern part of the Velebit range.<br />
Th eir main and auxiliary objectives were the Serbian forces fortifi ed on Mali Alan pass<br />
and deep in the northern Velebit foothills, and the Medak - Sveti Rok - Gračac - Obrovac<br />
communication. Th e Special Police units were deployed to their jump-off positions<br />
covertly (on foot) with all the required logistic and medical support, which is indicative<br />
of the high level of motivation and organization, and of the stamina and discipline of the<br />
troops. Particular skill was required in the covert deployment of artillery-rocket units<br />
- six 120 mm mortar batteries, a VRL 128 mm battalion and other weapons, together<br />
with the required ammunition. Th e Serbian units in all the positions along the Velebit<br />
range were at the highest level of combat readiness, and immediately aft er 0500 hours<br />
they opened heavy rocket and artillery fi re on the positions of the MUP units which had<br />
come close to their forward battle line.<br />
206 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).
Aft er heavy and strenuous fi ghting the special units broke through the defence lines<br />
of the 4 th Light Brigade and parts of the 9 th Motorized Brigade of the SVK Lika Corps.<br />
Th e Light Brigade was rolled back to the Oščenica - Bolič - Osmatračnica line. At about<br />
1300 hours the MUP units seized from the 9 th Motorized Brigade the fi rst strategic point<br />
on the Velebit range - the Mali Alan pass, and at about 1700 hours also took the village of<br />
Sveti Rok. 207 Before nighfall, at about 2000 hours, the Special Police also gained control<br />
over the Medak - Sv. Rok road up to Ričice. Along the Mali Alan - Ćelavac axis the<br />
Special Police units reached the area of Male Žuljine and Velike Žuljine, where it faced<br />
extremely tough resistance until 2100 hours. 208 Combat action of the MUP units ceased<br />
on 2200 hours, when the units regrouped for defence of the achieved lines, while the<br />
majority of the force rested, under heavy guard, in fi eld conditions until 0500 hours. On<br />
the fi rst day casualties totalled 5 dead and more than 30 wounded (of varying severity;<br />
some of the troops were dehydrated because of an insuffi cient quantity of drinking<br />
water). Th e casualty toll was substantially reduced by the presence of surgical and<br />
anesthesiological teams in the fi rst line of battle, which promptly provided the necessary<br />
medical assistance to the wounded. One company of the Grom (Th under) Special Police<br />
unit from the Karlovac Police Department, whose members were from the area of Slunj,<br />
was attached to the HV 1 st Guards Brigade advancing towards Plaški - Saborsko - Slunj;<br />
two of its members were wounded in the operation. 209<br />
Aft er losing its position on the Velebit range, part of the SVK 9 th Motorized Brigade<br />
started to abandon other positions as well in order to secure withdrawal towards Udbina<br />
because the Medak - Gračac road was cut. At midnight on 4 August the HV General Staff<br />
ordered the MUP special force to take Gračac “by a vigorous attack and manoeuvre”. 210<br />
In the morning of 5 August the SVK General Staff planned to halt the Croatian advance<br />
by committing part of the 2 nd Guards Brigade of the Special Unit Corps and, later on, by<br />
deploying one battalion from the 92 nd Motorized Brigade and another from the 4 th Light<br />
Brigade. 211<br />
However, on 5 August in the morning (at about 1030 hours) the Special Police units<br />
freed the village of Lovinac at the foot of Mount Velebit, cut the Gospić - Gračac road and<br />
entered Gračac at about 1115 hours. Aft er entering Gračac they continued to advance<br />
towards Čolovac - Brezić. Th is brought the police troops into the area of the Gospić<br />
Corps District, i.e., the Lika theatre. 212 On its western front the Special Police liberated<br />
207 According to the CIA analysis, the HV’s greatest success on 4 August came in the Velebit range and Northern<br />
Dalmatia. Th e pace of the MUP advance, stresses further the analysis, left the SVK 9th Motorized Brigade<br />
no time to regroup or consolidate its defences. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav<br />
Confl ict, 1990-1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Offi ce of Russian and European Analysis, Washington DC<br />
20505, May 2002, 371.<br />
208 MUP, Command, 4 August 1995; Report MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-<br />
95-381 of 4 August 1995; Report. HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
209 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
210 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95.02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-384 of 5 August 1995; Order.<br />
211 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 223-224.<br />
212 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, cl. 032-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-03-95-34 of 5 August 1995; Daily report.<br />
HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
91
Medak at about 2000 hours and then, at about 2130, linked up with units of the Gospić<br />
Corps District at Lički Ribnik. Combat action and advance of the Special Police units<br />
- whose casualties on that day totalled one killed, 12 severely wounded and 5 injured -<br />
stopped at 2300 hours in order to give the troops a chance to rest. 213<br />
In view of such favourable developments in the Velebit theatre, the Chief of the<br />
HV General Staff General Zvonimir Červenko ordered two Special Police battalions<br />
to proceed deep into enemy territory in order to prevent regrouping and a possible<br />
counterattack. One of the battalions advanced towards the crossroads at the village of<br />
Bruvno (at the point where the road leads from Gračac to Udbina and from Gračac to<br />
Gornji Lapac and Donji Lapac), while the second one proceeded on foot towards the<br />
village of Otrić and the strategic hub of roads leading to Knin, Srb and Gračac. Th e<br />
next morning (6 August) at about 0700 hours the special MUP units seized the Bruvno<br />
crossroads and, a few hours later, Malovan and the crossroads at Otrić (at about 1100). 214<br />
Two men were severely and three lightly wounded on that particular day. 215<br />
Pursuant to the order of the Chief of the HV General Staff regarding the continuation<br />
of combat operations focused on exploiting the success achieved, the MUP Special Police<br />
units were to sustain the attack towards Donji Lapac and, in cooperation with units of<br />
the Gospić Corps District on the left fl ank and of the Split Corps District on the right<br />
fl ank, capture the greater area of Donji Lapac. 216 Accordingly, at 0930 on 7 August the<br />
MUP Special Police liberated the village of Mazin on the road to Gornji Lapac and Donji<br />
Lapac, and continued to advance towards these localities, taking them in the aft ernoon<br />
(Gornji Lapac at 1300 and Donji Lapac at 1400 hours). At the same time they established<br />
contact with UN troops stationed in the area. At Otrić, along the Gračac - Otrić axis,<br />
the Special Police established tactical contact with units of the 4 th Guards Brigade of the<br />
Split Corps District at 1430 hours, and with units of the Gospić Corps District at Udbina<br />
(1500) and Donji Lapac (1930). At about 1600 hours a battalion-strong Special Police<br />
unit advanced from Gornji Lapac towards Boričevac and Kulen Vakuf and crushed<br />
the resistance points along the state border in the greater area of Kulen Vakuf. 217 On 7<br />
August two Special Police men were severely wounded. Combat activities ceased and<br />
most of the committed Special Police forces switched to night rest and guarded the<br />
achieved positions along the state border under continuous attack, along with the village<br />
of Boričevac, of artillery-rocket fi re from neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
On the next day, 8 August 1995, regular police units entered Gornji Lapac, Donji<br />
Lapac and Udbina in order to safeguard public peace and order, and prevent all violations<br />
213 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
214 MORH, GHSV: War diary GS OS RH, note 258 of 6 August 1995. MORH, GSHV: GS HV cl. 80-01/95-<br />
02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-413 of 6 August 1995; Report. HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u<br />
Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
215 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
216 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-409 of 6 August 1995; Order.<br />
217 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-431 of 7 August 1995; Order.<br />
MORH, GSHV: SJP MUP RH. MUP, Special Police Sector, no. 511-01-VT-106/95 of 8 August 1995; Report<br />
on achieved line; HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
92
of Croatian laws. Even on that day two Special Police men were wounded and several<br />
injured. On 9 August 1995 the Special Police units turned over the achieved line on the<br />
border with Bosnia&Herzegovina to HV forces. In the aft ernoon of the same day most of<br />
the Special Police units returned to their headquarters throughout Croatia for a several<br />
days’ rest. 218<br />
Conclusion<br />
As a group which accomplished its mission with the least problems and reproaches, the<br />
composite forces of the MUP RH Special Police - equal in terms of strength to a light<br />
reinforced shock brigade - contributed extraordinarily to the success of Storm. Th eir<br />
troops covered, practically on foot, more than 100 kilometres, liberated a number of<br />
towns and settlements in the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia, and carried on<br />
their back everything they needed in order to survive and wage war in the extremely<br />
diffi cult conditions such as prevailed on the Velebit mountain range. Special Police<br />
casualties totalled 6 killed and about 60 wounded men. 219<br />
From the diary of an offi cer of the Army of Serbian Krajina on the shelling of Knin,<br />
4 August 1995<br />
Marko Vrcelj, then Artillery Chief of the SVK General Staff was present in Knin when<br />
Storm started:<br />
Th e drumfi re barrage started all over Krajina. Everything had been planned from the<br />
smallest detail. Every shell and every artillery attack. Several days ago observers and<br />
gunners were infi ltrated in order to direct fi re. Th e most important targets in the town<br />
include the General Staff building, the residence of the president of the state, the<br />
northern barracks, the Senjak barracks and the main crossroads in Knin... I jumped<br />
over the fence of the northern barracks and entered the building in which I had worked<br />
four months ago... Th e barracks was being hit by quite a few shells, but we were lucky and<br />
avoided shells falling on our head... We got into a Golf and set off towards the General Staff .<br />
Shells were still falling, this time less frequently. We arrived at the Dešlić crossroads. Th e<br />
area round the General Staff was hit more heavily. I stopped the driver and told him to<br />
return to the barracks, and proceeded on foot... Seeking shelter behind trees I reached the<br />
General Staff . I entered the building: what a sight. Two shells had hit the parking space<br />
between the buildings and destroyed the entire motor pool. Th at must have been quite a<br />
gunner, to land them right there. (Marko Vrcelj, Rat za Srpsku Krajinu, 1991-1995/War<br />
for the Serbian Krajina, 1991-1995/; Belgrade, 2002, pp. 212-213).<br />
218 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
219 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).<br />
93
Special Police units of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior<br />
94
Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a RH<br />
Special Police units of the<br />
Croatian Ministry of the Interior<br />
95
96<br />
THE GOSPIĆ CORPS DISTRICT<br />
The mission of the Gospić Corps District (ZP Gospić) in Operation Storm was to<br />
crack and split the forces of the Lika Corps in the greater area of the Plitvice Lakes<br />
with the support of the Croatian Air Force, and link up, along the Korenička<br />
Kapela - Tržačka Raštela axis, with the ARBiH 5 th Corps. For this purpose the ZP was<br />
reinforced with the HV General Staff units: the 1 st Guards Brigade, a company of the<br />
50 th ABKO Battalion and the HV 150 th Brigade from Zagreb. 220 Th e envisioned special<br />
MUP units from the Rijeka-Senj and Istrian Police Departments were not subordinated<br />
to the ZP Gospić Command. It only coordinated with the Lika-Senj Police Department<br />
the engagement of civil protection teams responsible for looking aft er livestock in the<br />
liberated areas. 221<br />
According to the plan of the ZP Command, in the fi rst stage of the operation the 138 th<br />
and 133 rd Home Guard Regiments were to push on the Glibodol - Saborsko - Drežnik<br />
Grad line, gain control of the Saborsko area and the Pavlovac hill, facilitating thereby the<br />
commitment of the 1th Guards Brigade along the Saborsko - Selište Drežničko - Drežnik<br />
Grad - Sadilovac axis. Th e 128 th Brigade and the 154 th Home Guard Regiment were to<br />
crush the Serbian forces along the Čanak - Korenica line, and capture the village of<br />
Homolje and Homoljački Klanac; this would support the commitment of the 8 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment towards Homoljac - Čujića Krčevine - Prijeboj - Ličko Petrovo Selo.<br />
Along with the 9 th Guards Brigade, the 118 th Home Guard Regiment and the 3 rd Battalion<br />
of the 11 1th Infantry Brigade, the Croatian forces were to rout the hostile units at Perušička<br />
Kosa - Ljubovo, take Ljubovo, roll back Serbian forces from Lički Osik and Gospić, and<br />
establish a defence line at Počitelj - Barlete - Svračkovo Selo - Bunić. Aft er that, the units<br />
would regroup, the majority of the HV 9 th Guards Brigade held in the Corps reserve, and<br />
prepare for pushing on towards Korenica or Krbavsko Polje.<br />
Th e plan for the second phase of the operation involved the continuation of the assault<br />
and the crushing of Serbian forces, linkup of the main forces with the ARBiH 5 th Corps,<br />
while auxiliary forces would encircle hostile units and force their unconditional surrender<br />
or annihilate them. Aft er linkup with the ARBiH 5 th Corps, the ZP Gospić units would<br />
liberate the region of Lika north of Gospić - Korenica, regroup and proceed to clearing the<br />
rest of Lika, break out to the state border and establish a defence line at Plješivica - Panos.<br />
220 ZZPGospić, cl. 80-02/95-02/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation<br />
Storm.<br />
221 SVA MORH, GSHV: GS HV, RP/12-3/95 of 26 June 1995; Attack directive, Op. no. 12-3/95, Storm-3,<br />
published in J. Bobetko, “Sve moje bitke” (All My Battles), 462-475.
Artillery support was to be provided by two artillery&rocket groups from the 12 th<br />
Artillery Battalion, the 1 st Guards Brigade and the 9 th Brigade. Th e artillery groups would<br />
provide support along the axes Glibodol - Lička Jesenica - Drežnik - state border, Čanak<br />
- Homoljačko Polje - Prijeboj - Ličko Petrovo Selo and Lički Osik - Ljubovo - Bunić. Th e<br />
artillery of the brigades and regiments engaged targets along the lines of attack of the<br />
parent units or of the units to which they were attached.<br />
Th e brigades and regiments were responsible for anti-armour combat with their own<br />
capabilities and attached reinforcements. Th us, three anti-armoured groups and one<br />
anti-armour company were formed. Th e fi rst group comprised the anti-armour rocket<br />
artillery of the 1 st Guards Brigade for anti-armour operation along the Glibodol - Lička<br />
Jesenica - Drežnik Grad line. Th e second included the 100 mm anti-armour gun battery<br />
of the 9 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket Battalion responsible for action along the Čanak<br />
- HomoljačkoPolje - Prijeboj - Ličko Petrovo Selo line. Th e third anti-armour group,<br />
consisting of weapons of the 111 th Infantry Brigade and an anti-armour gun battery from<br />
the 9 th Anti-Armour Rocket-Artillery Battalion, was to operate in the Begluk - Bilaj - Lički<br />
Osik area. Th e 9 th Guards Brigade line anti-armour company was the corps reserve. A task<br />
force of two Mi-24 helicopter gunships was added to the forces for anti-armour combat.<br />
Th e air defence artillery was responsible for protecting artillery&rocket units, armour,<br />
command posts, major industrial facilities, airports and important communications. It<br />
was provided by units of the committed forces and by the 203 rd Air Defence Artillery-<br />
Rocket Brigade. Th e engineers’ missions included securing free movement and manoeuvre,<br />
construction of obstacles along the achieved lines and interdiction of enemy counterattacks.<br />
Th e command post of the Gospić Corps District was in Gospić, and local command posts<br />
in the villages of Lipice and Obućine. Th e commander of the Corps District was Major-<br />
General Mirko Norac. 222<br />
Th e Gospić Corps District faced forces of the SVK Lika Corps headquartered in<br />
Korenica. It comprised the 9 th Motorized Brigade, the 18 th , 50 th and 70 th Infantry Brigades,<br />
the 103 rd Light Brigade, the 37 th Infantry Battalion, the l5th Composite Artillery Battalion,<br />
the 15 th Composite Anti-Armour Artillery Battalion and the 81 st rear base. Th e Corps<br />
commander was Major General Stevo-Ševo. 223 Th e mission of the Corps was to prevent,<br />
along the Ogulin- Plaški - Plitvice Lakes, Otočac - Vrhovine - Korenica, Perušić - Bunić -<br />
Udbina and Gospić - Medak - Gračac lines, all deeper penetrations and fl anking thrusts<br />
of the HV intended, as it was believed, to gain control over Kapela, Velebit and Novi Lički<br />
Osik. Th e plan for the second phase of the operation envisaged attack and destruction of<br />
the HV wedges. Th e Corps was supported by the General Staff SVLR 262 Orkan Artillery<br />
Group, and by the SVK air force and air defence. 224<br />
222 ZP Gospić Command, cl. DT 80-02/95-01, reg. no. 1043-04-95-27 of 8 July 1995; Attack order. ZP Gospić<br />
Command, cl. DT 80-02/95-01, reg. no. 1043-04-95-27/1 of 3 August 1995; Attack order (annex); ZP Gospić<br />
Command, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation<br />
Storm 95.<br />
223 VSA MORH: APO 9065 Korenica; str. conf. no. 546-1 of 12 June 1995; additional 15th Corps complement,<br />
order. M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 202-214.<br />
224 Directive for the commitment of the Serbian Army of the Krajina, Op. No.1, “GVOZD”, February 1995.<br />
97
98<br />
Execution of the Operation<br />
Th e assault of the 138 th Home Guard Brigade together with the 1 st Battalion of the 1 st<br />
Guards Brigade started on 4 August in the morning hours from Dubrava via Danguba -<br />
Osmagino Brdo towards Veliki Lisac, and along the communication Glibodol - Glibodolski<br />
Križ - Lička Jesenica railway station. Notwithstanding the stiff resistance of parts of the<br />
SVK 70 th Infantry Brigade, the Regiment cut the Dabar - Lička Jesenica communication<br />
and captured the dominant points of Danguba. Konjska Glava, Osmagino Brdo and Mala<br />
Kapela. 225 Aft er its engagement the 1 st Guards Brigade broke through the Serbian defence<br />
line and reached the Podgradak - Glibodolski Križ - Potkapela line by nightfall. 226<br />
Th e main body of the 133 rd Home Guard Regiment advanced towards Letinac - Dabar<br />
- Vrhovina, and the auxiliary units towards Sinac - Zalužnica - Crni Tavan. Th e mission of<br />
the regiment was to crush Serbian forces along the axis of the attacks, capture dominant<br />
heights and envelop Serbian forces in the greater area of Dabar, Glavace and Doljani. 227 It<br />
advanced against the 50 th Infantry Brigade and smaller forces of the SVK 103 rd Infantry<br />
Brigade. 228 Along its main attack axis one of the regiment line battalions took the village<br />
of Dabar, but the second battalion was halted at the Budimka point of defence. Along<br />
its secondary line of attack the regiment entered the village of Zalužnica, where it was<br />
halted aft er suff ering losses. While withdrawing the regiment entered a mine fi eld, and<br />
several of its troops were killed and wounded. Th e regiment’s casualties totalled 15 killed<br />
and 46 wounded, “resulting in failure of the action”. 229<br />
By 4 August in the evening, in spite of strong Serbian resistance at Cicer and Mali<br />
Cicer, the 128 th Brigade liberated the village of Trnavac, reached Homoljačko Polje and<br />
cut the Vrhovine - Korenica communication at Homoljački Klanac - Pogledalo. Its left<br />
fl ank was protected by the 3 rd Battalion of the 8 th Home Guard Regiment. Advancing<br />
towards Stipanov Grič - Hinići - Božića Brod the battalion intersected the Vrhovine -<br />
Turjanski communication. 230<br />
Th e HV 9 th Guards Brigade faced the toughest part of its mission on the fi rst day of<br />
the operation. It was opposed by the sturdy SVK 18 th Infantry Brigade of the Lika Corps.<br />
Th e 9 th Guards attacked towards Perušića Kosa - Ljubovo and took Trla and Čukovac.<br />
Aft er running into strong opposition at Tepsija and Griči, a battalion of the 118 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment was brought in as reinforcement. By the evening the Brigade took the<br />
225 SVA, MORH, GSHV: 138th Home Guard Reg., cl. str. conf. 035-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1089-01-95-314 of<br />
16 August; Action report.<br />
226 ZZP Gospić, cl. 818-01/95-01/02, reg. no. 1043-05-95-434 of 4 August 1995; Daily report. ZZP Gospić,<br />
cl.80-02/9501/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
227 ZZP Gospić, cl.80-02/95/01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive op-<br />
eration Storm 95.<br />
228 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 209-210.<br />
229 MORH, GSHV: 133rd Home Guard Reg., cl. 80.01/95-01/01, reg. no. 2155-03-95-24 of 22 August 1995;<br />
Analysis of the Storm action.<br />
230 ZZP Gospić, cl. 818-01/95-01/02, reg. no. 1043-05-95-434 of 4 August 1995; Daily report. ZZP Gospić,<br />
cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
HMDCDR, comments of the Association “HV 128th Brigade - Sveti Vid” on the text about ZP Gospić in the<br />
military-police operation Storm.
Repetitor (repeater) point of resistance and reached the Kriva Gliva - Stanići - Čukovac<br />
line. 231<br />
Th e 118 th Home Guard Regiment and the HV 111 th Infantry Brigade were supposed<br />
to liberate the greater area of Novi Lički Osik. Th ey were opposed by parts of the SVK<br />
18 th Infantry Brigade. 232 Th e Regiment attacked towards Alivojvodići - Murgići - Serdari<br />
and Bukovac - Lisina - Široka Kula. “Aft er breaking through the enemy defence line<br />
our forces ran against very stiff resistance. In dealing with the problem at Bukovac<br />
the Regiment commander Major General Ivan Čanić was killed. On the fi rst day, in<br />
spite of stiff resistance, the Regimen broke through the defence line in both directions<br />
and reached the Podovi - Varošina - Vujatovo Brdo line by the evening hours”. 233 With<br />
artillery and tank support one battalion of the 111 th Infantry Brigade advanced towards<br />
Stari Budak - Novoselija - Zubar. By the end of the day the batallion broke through the<br />
fi rst line of Serbian defence up to Urija - Nikšić - Rujnica - Novoselija. Th e fi ghting was<br />
heavy, as borne out by the casualties suff ered by the Brigade: fi ve killed (including the<br />
battalion commander) and 29 wounded. 234<br />
In the fi rst day of the operation the Gospić Corps District failed to achieve all its<br />
planned missions. Its attacks were mounted in eight directions with eight brigades and<br />
regiments. Th e SVK Lika Corps had expected the assault, and the factor of surprise<br />
was therefore missing, but did not succeed in withstanding the attack from so many<br />
directions. Th e Corps put up the stiff est assistance at Ljubovo, Novi Lički Osik and in the<br />
area of Otočac. At Zalužnica near Vrhovina the Corps halted the assault of a battalion<br />
of the HV 133 rd Home Guard Regiment, while the defence line was breached at other<br />
points. Th e rate of HV advance was somewhat slower than anticipated because of strong<br />
resistance at Gliodol - Lička Jesenica attacked by the 1 st Guards Brigade. However, in<br />
spite of diffi culties Dabar was taken by the end of the day, and control gained over the<br />
greater part of Ljubovo threatening Novi Lički Osik. 235<br />
At 2400 hours on 4 August the HV General Staff ordered the Gospić Corps District to<br />
seize the area of Ljubovo with the 9 th Guards Brigade and to place the Udbina Air Base<br />
under control. Th e 1 st Guards Brigade was ordered to commit the majority of its forces<br />
and intersect the Slunj - Plitvice Lakes road. 236<br />
On the second day of the operation, 5 August. units of the 138 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
advanced towards the railway stations of Lička Jesenica and Javornik. By the end of the<br />
231 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, cl. 818-01/95-01/02, reg. no. 1043-05-95-434 of 4 August 1995; Daily report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-01/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-012/06 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
232 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 205-206.<br />
233 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
234 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
the off ensive operation Storm 95. HMDCDR: comments on the text about the Gospić Corps District in the<br />
military-police operation Storm.<br />
235 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-46 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
236 GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512.96-05/01-95-384 of 5 August 1995; Order.<br />
99
day they reached the planned line: village of Živice - Markovac (tp 1081) - southern<br />
slopes of Veliki Javornik - Dobri Vrh - Lička Jesenica - Javornik railway line - Lička<br />
Jesenica railway station. Th e fi rst stage of the mission was thereby fully completed. 237<br />
Th e HV 1 st Guards Brigade entered Lička Jesenica, continued to advance towards<br />
Saborsko - Sertić Poljana - Poljanak and reached by the evening the area of Selište<br />
Drežničko. In cooperation with the 2 nd battalion of the Brigade, the 2 nd battalion of the HV<br />
119 th Brigade was committed in the drive towards Glibodol - Lička Jesenica - Saborsko,<br />
and seized Tisovi Vrh, Pištenica and Deriguz. In the early evening, one battalion and the<br />
General Staff units of the HV 119 th Brigade were committed in the area of the village of<br />
Saborsko. 238<br />
Aft er the unsuccessful fi rst day, in the morning of 5 August the HV 133 rd Home Guard<br />
Regiment was reinforced with one battalion of the HV 150th Brigade. 239 Aft er regrouping<br />
and the commitment of the battalion of the HV 150 th Brigade, the 133 rd Home Guard<br />
Regiment liberated Petrinić Polje and encircled from the north and south the Serbian<br />
forces at Vrhovine, Doljani, Škare and Glavace. 240 Th e 8 th Home Guard was also committed<br />
in the same action. Its 1 st Infantry Battalion was engaged in the advance towards Turjanski<br />
- Obljaj with the mission to seize the Vrhovine - Korenica communication and encircle<br />
the Serbian forces at Vrhovine from Kangrgino Brdo - Veliki Obljaj. By the evening the<br />
battalion liberated the area of Turjansko Polje and Sječevice. Aft er taking Donji Babin<br />
Potok the battalion intersected the Vrhovine - Korenica road. 241<br />
During 5 August the HV 128 th Brigade advanced to Homoljačko Polje and intersected<br />
the Vrhovine - Korenica road at Homoljački Klanac - Pogledalo. Aft er mobilization the<br />
154 th Home Guard Regiment was deployed in the greater area of Ličko Lešće. 242<br />
Th e HV 9 th Guards Brigade routed the Serbian forces along its line of attack, liberated<br />
Ljubovo, intersected the Lički Osik -Korenica road and advanced to Svračkovo Selo and<br />
Bunić. 243 Aft er the Croatian units broke through the Serbian defence line the Serbian<br />
237 MORH, GSHV: 138th Home Guard Reg., cl. str. conf. 035-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1089-01-93314 of 16<br />
August 1995; Action report.<br />
238 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-08 of 5 August 1995; Regular daily report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis<br />
of the off ensive operation Storm 95. HMDCDR: comments of Mirko Vuković, commander of the 119th<br />
Brigade, on the text about the Gospić Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
239 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-03 of 5 August 1995; Order.<br />
240 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
the off ensive operation Storm 95. MORH, GSHV: APO 3007 (150th Brigade) cl. 8-/95-01/4, reg. no. 3007-<br />
02/1-95-32 of 5 September 1995; Analysis of battle actions in operation Storm.<br />
241 MORH, GSHV: 8th Home Guards Reg., cl. 035-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 8313-02-95-253 of 30 August 1995;<br />
Analysis of the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
242 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
243 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis<br />
of the off ensive operation Storm 95. According to the CIA analysis, the 9th Guards Brigade of the Gospić<br />
Corps District achieved on 5 August some notable successes at Ljubovo, while the MUP Special Forces<br />
seized Gračac and Medak. Th is chopped the 15th Corps into three pockets: one centered on the 50th Brigade<br />
at Vrhovine, another around the remnants of the 18th Brigade at Bunić, and the third around the 103rd<br />
Light Infantry Brigade at Donji Lapac - Korenica onthe Bosnian border. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military<br />
History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1900-1995, 372.<br />
100
system was destabilized and reduced to unconnected resistance of groups which slowed<br />
down along certain lines of advance the progress of the HV. Deep in Lika the Serbian<br />
forces began to evacuate the Udbina Air Base. 244<br />
In the middle of the day the HV 111 th Brigade crushed the Serbian forces at Urija -<br />
Nikšić - Rujnica - Novoselija, liberated part of Novi Lički Osik and linked up with forces<br />
of the HV 118 th Home Guard Regiment. Part of the Brigade sustained its assault on<br />
Ostrovica - Barlete. Advancing towards Alivojvodići - Murgići - Serdar and Bukovac -<br />
Lisina - Široka Kula the 118 th Home Guard Regiment liberated Klenovica, Široka Kula,<br />
Nikšić and part of Novi Lički Osik, in which it linked up with the 111 th Brigade. 245<br />
In the southern part of the Lika theatre, special police forces advanced downhill from<br />
the Velebit Massif, and liberated Lovinac and Gračac in the morning hours. Late in the<br />
evening they linked up with the units of the Gospić Corps District at Lički Ribnik. 246<br />
Th e SVK 9 th Motorized Brigade retreated from the greater area of Gračac, Ploče, Bruvno<br />
and Mazin towards Mazin - Dobroselo - Bosanski Petrovac. 247 At the order of the Chief<br />
of the HV General Staff pursuit was mounted by the MUP RH Special Forces, with one<br />
battalion advancing towards Bruvno and the other towards Otrić. 248<br />
On the third day of the operation, 6 August, the HV 1 st Guards Brigade reached<br />
Rakovica and linked up with the ARBiH 5 th Corps at Drežnik Grad and Vaganac. 249<br />
Aft er linkup the Brigade disengaged from the Gospić Corps District and returned under<br />
the command of the HV General Staff . 250 Th e HV 119 th Brigade was committed in its line<br />
of action and took over its positions at Tržačka Raštela - Kordunski Ljeskovac - Ličko<br />
Petrovo Selo, while one battalion pushed on to Čorkova Uvala. 251 At Trnavac - Brzovac -<br />
Čujića Krčevine - Prijeboj one battalion of the 154 th Home Guard Regiment “reached the<br />
state border at Ličko Petrovo Selo - Vaganac - Pešina Luka and linked up with the units<br />
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps and the 119 th Brigade”. 252<br />
244 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-03 of 5 August 1995; Regular daily report<br />
No. 3. .<br />
245 In the analysis of the Gospić Corps District the HV 111th Brigade liberated the area of Zubar and Oštrica, and the<br />
118th Home Guard Regiment the area of Široka Kula, Klenovac, Nikšić and Novi Lički Osik. MORH, GSHV: ZZP<br />
Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
HMDCDR: comments on the text about the Gospić Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
246 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-05/01-95-400 of 5 August 1995; Report. HMDCDR: Ž.<br />
Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji (Special Police in Storm).<br />
247 M Sekulić,”Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 205.<br />
248 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji (Special Police in Storm).<br />
249 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-23 of 6 August 1995; Regular daily report No. 6.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive<br />
operation Storm 95.<br />
250 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-46 of 26 September 1995; Analysis of the<br />
off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
251 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the of-<br />
fensive operation Storm 95.<br />
252 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the of-<br />
fensive operation Storm 95.<br />
101
Th e 138 th Home Guard Regiment pushed on from the north, from Lička Jesenica,<br />
liberated Rudopolje and intersected at Gornje Vrhovine the Vrhovine - Korenica road.<br />
Aft er linking up with the 8 th Home Guard Regiment Vrhovine was completely encircled. 253<br />
Units of the 8 th Home Guard Regiment cracked the disorganized Serbian defences at<br />
Gornji Babin Potok and reached Trtice and Plitvički Ljeskovac by the evening. 254<br />
Th e main body of the HV 133 rd Home Guard Regiment reinforced with one battalion<br />
of the HV 150 th Brigade and supported by one battalion of the HV 8 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment advanced towards Runjevica - Naprte - Marjani. By the end of the day it<br />
liberated the encircled area of Vrhovine - Doljani - Škare and Glavace. 255<br />
At Homoljački Klanac - Pogledalo the HV 128 th Brigade crossed the Pogledalo pass<br />
and entered Korenica from Vrelo. 256<br />
At about 1100 hours on 6 August the HV 9 th Guards Brigade seized Bunić and<br />
continued to advance via Svračkovo Selo to Udbina. Th e Bunić - Lički Osik road was fully<br />
freed and ahead of the village of Medak tactical contact was established with the MUP<br />
Special Forces. Th e Gospić - Gračac road was also under HV control and it was used for<br />
combat action. 257 Th e Chief of the HV General Staff ordered sustained assault focused<br />
on exploiting the success achieved. Th e MUP Special Forces were to carry on with their<br />
attack towards Donji Lapac and, in cooperation with units of the Gospić Corps District<br />
on their left fl ank and the Split Corps District on their right fl ank, seize the greater area<br />
of Donji Lapac. 258<br />
On 9 August in the morning the 9 th Guards Brigade entered Udbina. Following that,<br />
units of the Gospić Corps District continued to advance in several directions towards Donji<br />
Lapac, to which Special Police units were also pushing. Part of the forces was committed to mopping<br />
up, terrain sanitization and collection of war booty. 259 Th e main body of the HV 154 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment linked up at Bunić - Debelo Brdo - Pećani - Jošani - Udbina Air Base with the 9 th Guards<br />
253 MORH, GSHV: 138th Home Guard Reg., cl. str. conf. 035-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1089-01-95-314 of 16 August<br />
1995; Action report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995;<br />
Analysis of the off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
254 MORH, GSHV: 8th Home Guard Reg., cl. 035-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 8313-02-95-253 of 23 August 1995;<br />
Analysis.<br />
255 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the<br />
off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
256 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, c. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-17 of 16 August 1995; Regular daily report<br />
No. 5. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995. Analysis<br />
of the off ensive operation Storm. Aft er the liberation of Korenica on 6 August units of the 128th Brigade pulled<br />
back to the outskirts of the town, while part of the forces proceeded to the state border and the top of Mount<br />
Plješivica, where contact was established with the Army of BiH. From its jump-off position in the village of<br />
Čanak to Korenica the Brigade had covered on foot about 40 km of mountainous and diffi cult terrain. HMD-<br />
CDR: comments of the Association “HV 128th Brigade - Sveti Vid” on the text about the Gospić Corps District<br />
in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
257 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-17 of 6 August 1995; Regular daily re-<br />
port.<br />
258 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-409 of 6 August 1995; Order.<br />
259 MORH, GSHV: ZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-28 of 7 August 1995; Regular daily report.<br />
102
Brigade, which had been advancing from the southern edge of Krbavsko Polje. In the evening forces<br />
of the Gospić Corps District entered Donji Lapac, liberated a few hours before by the Special Police. 260<br />
Already in the morning special police units liberated the village of Mazin, and established control over<br />
Gornji Lapac and Donji Lapac in the aft ernoon. Special Police forces one battalion strong overran by<br />
1900 hours the points of resistance along the state border in the greater area of Kulen Vakuf. 261<br />
Drive to the state border<br />
Forces of the Gospić Corps District drove to the state border between the Republic of Croatia and<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina on 6 August. Th e fi rst units to reach the border were the HV 119 th Brigade<br />
and the HV 154 th Home Guard Regiment. 262 Th e other units reached the border a day later. Th e<br />
daily report of the Command of the Gospić Corps District of 7 August, which reached the HV<br />
General Staff at about 2000 hours, stated that the Corps’ mission in the operation had been<br />
accomplished and that “the entire area in the zone of the Gospić Corps District was liberated”. 263<br />
V General Staff G During 8 August defence was organized along the state border of the Republic<br />
of Croatia in the zone of responsibility of the Gospić Corps District. Th e main body of artillery<br />
and armoured units was deployed along the Udbina - Donji Lapac - Kulen Vakuf line. Th e zone<br />
of responsibility was divided into fi ve parts, each covered by one reserve infantry battalion. Th e<br />
units engaged from the north to the south, from left to right, were the following: the 138 th Home<br />
Guard regiment from Savina Glava to Gola Plješivica; the 128 th Brigade from Gola Plješivica<br />
to Snjevita Glava; the 154 th Home Guard Regiment from Snjevita Glava to Demirovića Brdo;<br />
the 118 th Home Guard Regiment from Demirovića Brdo to Pilipovići; and the 8 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment from Pilipovići to the Una railway station. Th e 9 th Guards Brigade was<br />
deployed in the area of Gospić as reserve, and the 111 th Infantry Brigade was pulled back<br />
to its former deployment at Klanac - Studenci - Donje Pazarište. 264<br />
260 MORH, GSHV: MUP, Special Police Sector, no. 511-01-TV-196/95 of 8 August 1995; Report on achieved line.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation<br />
Storm 95.<br />
261 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 8o-01/95-02/o8, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-431 of 7 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV:<br />
SJP MUP RH, MUP, Special Police Sector, no. 511-01-VT-106/95 of 8 August 1995; Report on achieved line. HMDCDR:<br />
Ž. Sačić, “Specijalna policija u Oluji” (Special police in Storm).<br />
262 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of the off ensive<br />
operation Storm 95. Th e wartime commander of the HV 119th Brigade, Mirko Vuković, noted that the 3rd Battalion<br />
of the 119th Brigade was the fi rst unit to reach the state border in that area, and that the remaining units of the Brigade<br />
were deployed along the border later on; he also noted that the HV 119th Brigade had accomplished its mission in Storm<br />
according to plan. Furthermore, according to Vuković, the 154th Home Guard Regiment did not mobilize in time, and<br />
appeared two days aft er these events and took over the points in the villages of Prijeboj and Ličko Petrovo Selo; because<br />
of its later commitment the mission of the 8th Home Guard Regiment was changed in the last moment. HMCDDR:<br />
comments of the wartime commander of the HV 119th Brigade Mirko Vuković on the text about the Gospić Corps<br />
District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
263 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-31 of 7 August 1995; Regular daily report.<br />
264 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-33 of 8 August 1995; Regular daily report No. 10.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/01, reg. no. 1043-04-95-106 of 9 August 1995; Proposal.<br />
103
Croatian soldiers (Guardsmen)<br />
104<br />
Conclusion<br />
Th e balance of forces and the features of the theatre under consideration warrant the<br />
conclusion that the Gospić Corps District had the advantage of the most favourable<br />
conditions for the operation. 265 Th e Corps District was opposed by two infantry brigades<br />
and part of one motorized brigade. On its left fl ank, the SVK 50 th Infantry Brigade of<br />
the Lika Corps was deployed along the assault axis of the Karlovac Corps District, and<br />
on the right fl ank the MUP Special Forces faced part of the SVK 9 th Motorized Brigade.<br />
Considering the engagement of two Guards brigades, and MUP Special Forces the quality<br />
of which matched (if not even exceeded) that of the Guards brigades, it can be concluded<br />
that the HV enjoyed the best balance of forces for the operation in the region of Lika.<br />
265 Th e review received by the Centre regarding the text about the Gospić Corps District in the Operation<br />
Storm notes that preparations of the fi nal operations for the liberation of the occupied areas in the zone<br />
of the Gospić Corps District started in mid-October 1994 through battalion live fi re exercises in areas resembling<br />
the envisioned assault lines, and that until the start of the operation exercises were carried out in<br />
all battalions within the scope of their parent brigades/regiments. It also points out that the quality of the<br />
preparations, i.e., the fact that the units were adapted to the lines of commitment, contributed substantially<br />
to the speed of the operation, its momentum and dynamics. HMDCDR: comments on the text about the<br />
Gospić Corps District in the military-police Operation Storm.
Th e front was elongated and of small depth - less than 20 km from the village of Čanak<br />
to the border with Bosnia&Herzegovina on Mount Plješivica. An additional problem<br />
for the Lika Corps were the forces of the Army of BiH in the “Bihać pocket” because of<br />
which it also committed part of its forces in that area. It is no surprise, therefore, that the<br />
Gospić Corps District was among the fi rst to complete the operation and advance to the<br />
state border.<br />
Th e Serbian line of defence was breached already on the fi rst day of the operation by<br />
attacks from eight directions. In this way the Gospić Corps District tried and succeeded in<br />
compensating for the surprise factor on which it could not count. 266 Th e SVK defence line<br />
on the Velebit range was also penetrated on the same day. Th e Serbian forces responded<br />
on 4 August by an air raid on Gospić in which civilians were killed and wounded, with<br />
extensive material damage. 267 Th at was the major Serbian action in the theatre. 268 In<br />
the night of 4 August the Serbs were also aff ected by the syndrome of line “reduction”,<br />
due among other things, according to post-war reports, to the decisions of the Chief of<br />
the SVK General Staff . 269 Aft er the penetration of the Serbian defence line the Serbian<br />
system was destabilized and reduced to unconnected resistance by individual groups<br />
“which slowed down the rate of HV advance”. 270 Th ere was no signifi cant opposition and<br />
already on 6 August the Gospić Corps District started to control the state border. An<br />
extremely important contribution was provided by the MUP RH Special Police, a group<br />
that accomplished its share of the mission in Storm with least problems and objections.<br />
Operation Storm-3 liberated the entire zone of responsibility of the Gospić Corps<br />
District. Its casualties totalled 68 killed and 298 wounded. Seven offi cers were killed,<br />
among them the commander of the 118 th Home Guard Regiment and the commander of<br />
one battalion of the 111 th Brigade. Th e heaviest losses were sustained while penetrating<br />
the fi rst line mine fi elds. Th ree armoured vehicles were destroyed, and 17 tanks and<br />
armoured vehicles damaged. 271 Th e Special Police had three men killed and about 60<br />
wounded. 272 According to Serbian sources, by 8 August the casualties of the Lika Corps<br />
totalled 65 killed, 300 wounded and 110-120 missing. 273<br />
266 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-43 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
267 As reported by the Vjesnik daily (Zagreb), 3 persons were killed and 15 severely wounded in the Serbian<br />
air raid on Gospić.<br />
268 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/02, reg. no. 1043-04-95-434 of 4 August 1995; Daily re-<br />
port.<br />
269 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 202-203.<br />
270 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-03 of 5 August 1995; Regular daily<br />
report.<br />
271 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Gospić, cl. 80-02/95-01/06, reg. no. 1043-04-95-46 of 30 August 1995; Analysis of<br />
off ensive operation Storm 95.<br />
272 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, “Specijalna policija u Oluji” (Special Police in Storm).<br />
273 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 204.<br />
105
106<br />
KARLOVAC CORPS DISTRICT<br />
According to the order of the HV General Staff , the Karlovac Corps District (ZPK)<br />
was responsible for the execution of the operation in its zone of responsibility -<br />
the greater area of Karlovac, Ogulin and Kordun. Th e overall objective did not<br />
diff er from the missions of the other corps districts engaged in the operation. Aft er fullscale<br />
mobilization and along with the attached reinforcements and the support of the<br />
Croatian Air Force (HRZ), the initial phase called for neutralizing the Serbian artillery<br />
and rocket systems and quick penetration of the defence line of the SVK Kordun Corps in<br />
order to prevent Serbian artillery from shelling urban and industrial areas in the zone of<br />
responsibility of the Corps. As planned, Turanj was to be cut off aft er the forced crossing<br />
of the river Korana, and enemy forces annihilated along the Karlovac - Babina Gora -<br />
Vojnić axis. Plaški was to be outfl anked on both sides, and Primišlje - Obljajac - Veliki<br />
Pištenik seized. Th e last but not least important mission involved, in coordination with<br />
the Gospić Corps District, the protection of the left fl ank of the HV 1 st Guards Brigade at<br />
Saborsko - Selište Drežničko. Th e reinforcements to be attached to the Corps included the<br />
HV 104 th Brigade, the 13 th Anti-Armour Artillery&Rocket Battalion, a tank company (6<br />
tanks), all from the Bjelovar Corps District, the HV 99 th Brigade from the Zagreb Corps<br />
District, one company of the HV General Staff Engineer Brigade and MUP special units<br />
from the Karlovac Police Department. 274 Except the Special Police and the tank company<br />
from the Bjelovar Corps District all the reinforcements were duly allocated. 275<br />
Pursuant to the order of the HV General Staff , the Command of the Karlovac Corps<br />
District draft ed in mid-July the order for the attack. Th e forces were grouped for the<br />
initial action from the area of Karlovac and Ogulin. Th e units committed in the former<br />
area included the 104 th Brigade and the 110 th and 137 th Home Guard Regiments. Th e 14 th<br />
and 143 rd Home Guard Regiments, and the HV 99 th Brigade, were engaged for action from<br />
Ogulin towards Plaški. One battalion of the HV 148 th Brigade was kept in reserve. 276<br />
274 GS HV, RP/12-2/95 of 26 June 1995. Attack directive Op. No. 12-2/95, Storm-2. Facsimile published in J.<br />
Bobetko, «Sve moje bitke» (All My Battles), 441-451.<br />
275 MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-143 of 24 July 1995; Excerpt from the<br />
Attack Order Op. No. 1. MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-265 of 29 July<br />
1995; Modifi cation of attack order Op. No. 1. MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-<br />
03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis of Storm-2.<br />
276 MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-143 of 24 July 1995; Excerpt from<br />
attack order Op. No. 1. MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-265 of 29 July<br />
1995; Change of attack order Op. No. 1.
Artillery support was to be provided by the organic and attached artillery units in<br />
the brigades and regiments. Th e Karlovac Corps District formed two artillery&rocket<br />
groups out of artillery units of the 10 th Artillery Battalion and the HV General Staff<br />
16 th Artillery&Rocket Brigade. Th e groups had to neutralize Serbian artillery at Brezova<br />
Glava, the villages of Vukmanić, Veljun, Egići, Latin, Latasi, Kukići, Lončari and<br />
Karajlovići, and prevent, by barrage fi re, possible Serbian counterattacks from Vojnić -<br />
Brezova Glava, Vrginmost - Skakav and Primišlje - Poloj - Perjasica. It was also supposed<br />
to support the attack of the 110 th Home Guard Regiment at its request or at the order to<br />
the commander of the Corps District.<br />
Th e brigades and regiments also had to provide anti-armour capability with organic<br />
units and attached reinforcements. At Corps level an anti-armour detachment and an<br />
anti-armour company were formed from the 7 th and 13 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket<br />
Battalions. Both anti-armour systems were deployed in the areas of Mrežnički Brest,<br />
Grginčići, Siča - Cerovac, ready for anti-armour defence and intervention as ordered by<br />
the commander of the Corps District.<br />
Air defence artillery was responsible for protecting the artillery&rocket groups,<br />
armoured units, depots for the storage of ammunition, mines and explosive devices,<br />
command posts, crossings of the Kupa and Korana, and towns. Two Mi-24 helicopter<br />
gunships for air support were available to the Corps on call for anti-armour actions and<br />
destruction of major centres of resistance. Every unit was responsible for its own RBKO<br />
(radio-biochemical protection) capability. Th e engineer part of the operation focused<br />
on the forced crossing of the rivers Kupa, Korana and Mrežnica, manoeuvring support<br />
at Rečica - Bođani - Vukmanić, and obstructions placement at the achieved positions.<br />
Th e Command of the Corps District was in Karlovac, and the Advanced Command in<br />
Ogulin. Th e commander of the Corps District was Major-General Miljenko Crnjac. 277<br />
Th e enemy forces in the zone of responsibility of the Karlovac Corps District were<br />
the Kordun Corps and the 70 th Infantry Brigade of the SVK Lika Corps. Th e Corps was<br />
headquartered on (mount) Petrova Gora and comprised the 11 th , 13 th and 19 th Infantry<br />
Brigades, the 21 st Border Detachment, the 21th Reconnaissance&Sabotage Department,<br />
the 21 st Composite Artillery battalion, the 75th Composite Anti-Armour Artillery<br />
Battalion, the 75 th Engineer Battalion and the 85 th Rear-Echelon Base in Slunj. Th e<br />
Corps commander, Colonel Veljko Bosanac, was replaced by Colonel Čedo Bulat on<br />
5 August in the evening. 278 According to the commitment directive of February 1995,<br />
the Kordun Corps was to draw out and destroy HV forces by persistent defence along<br />
the Gradac- Lasinja - Vrginmost, Karlovac - Vojnić and Generalski Stol - Slunj lines,<br />
277 MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-143 of 24 July 1995; Excerpt from<br />
attack order Op. No. 1. MORH, GSHV: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-265 of 29 July<br />
1995; Modifi cation of attack order Op. No. 1.<br />
278 HDA, RSK; Kordun Corps Command, conf. no. 160-556/2 of 15 November 1994; War manning report.<br />
VSA MORH: 21th Corps Command, conf. no. 308 of 27 July 1995; Information to subordinate units. M.<br />
Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 214-223.<br />
107
and prevent deeper penetration on the main thrusts. In the second part of the operation,<br />
by off ensive action at Vojnić - Banjsko Selo the Corps would reach the river Mrežnica<br />
and switch to active defence. Support would be provided by the 75 th Composite Artillery<br />
Brigade, and the air force and air defence. Th e mission of the 70 th Infantry Brigade was<br />
to prevent by persistent defence the penetration of HV forces along the Ogulin - Plaški -<br />
Plitvice Lakes Line. 279 Th e 75 th Composite Artillery Brigade - a 130 mm gun battalion, a<br />
SVLR Oganj battery and an Orkan battery - and the SVK Special Unit Corps (KSJ) without<br />
the 2 nd Guards Brigade were also present in Kordun. 280 Th e task of the last Corps, formed<br />
later, is not known. It can be assumed that it was not supposed to hold the line but, rather,<br />
for manoeuvring purposes in the theatre. Th e KSJ Corps commander was Major-General<br />
Milorad Stupar. 281<br />
108<br />
Execution of the Operation<br />
Th e attack of the HV 99 th Brigade and the attached Saborsko Company (of the 143 rd Home<br />
Guard Regiment) started at 0500 from the village of Vera towards the village of Varići,<br />
towards the Plaški - Plavča Draga road and from the village of Prodanić towards Plaški.<br />
Aft er a slight advance, the attack of the Brigade ground to a halt. Following the evaluation<br />
of the ZPK Command of 1800 hours on the same day, the Brigade retreated to its kickoff<br />
position in complete disarray. In order to avoid possible encirclement the Saborsko<br />
Company stopped aft er seizing Trntor hill. 282<br />
In spite of running into mine fi elds and stiff Serbian resistance from Josipdol towards<br />
Plaški, the HV 143 rd Home Guard Regiment controlled by the end of the day the Veliki<br />
Humac - Sekulića Poljane - Sekulića Vršak - Drenovica - Kameniti Vrh line. 283<br />
Th e task of the 14 th Home Guard Regiment was to liberate Slunj, the small native town of<br />
most of its members. Th e Regiment advanced towards the village of Barlovići - Kosijersko<br />
Selo while its left fl ank, aft er the successful forced crossing of the river of Mrežnica, pushed<br />
on to Primišlje. On its right fl ank, aft er seizing Glavičurak - Simića Brdo - Ravidjenica -<br />
Gornji Tržič the Regiment linked up with units of the 143 rd Home Guard Regiment. 284<br />
279 Directive for the commitment of the Serbian Army of the Krajina, Op. No. 1, Gvozd, February 1995.<br />
280 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 224, 227, 239.<br />
281 «New SVK Generals and Colonels», Vojska Krajine, 11, july 1995, 6.<br />
282 APO 2121 (99th Br.), cl. 81-95-01/01, reg. no. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Analysis of off ensive operation<br />
Storm. SVA MORH, GSHV, ZZPK: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/81, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August<br />
1995. SVA MORH, GSHV, ZZPK: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August 1995.<br />
283 SVA MORH, ZZPK: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August 1995. APO 110 Ogulin<br />
of 3 September 1995; Analysis of combat action of the 143rd Home Guard Regiment in Operation Storm.<br />
284 SVA MORH, ZZPK: ZPP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August 1995. General M.<br />
Crnjac noted that the liberation of Slunj, the task of the 14th Home Guard Regiment, was planned in the second<br />
phase of the operation, provided the necessary conditions were met; he also added that the Regiment had fulfi lled<br />
its task entirely and on foot because of the demanding terrain and forced crossing of the river. HMDCDR: Comments<br />
of General Miljenko Crnjac on the text about the Karlovac Corps District in the military-police operation<br />
Storm.
In the Karlovac theatre the 137 th Home Guard Regiment infi ltrated four<br />
reconnaissance&sabotage groups into the rear of the SVK 13 th Infantry Brigade - at the<br />
village of Oreško, Kestenak, the Bosiljevac forest and Kozlinska Glavica - at midnight on<br />
3 August. Aft er artillery preparation which started at 0500 hours and the forced crossing<br />
of the river Korana, a bridgehead was established at Šćulac. 285 At Šćulac - Skradska Gora<br />
- Dugi Dol and at Mateško - Oreščani - Perjašica the SVK 13 th Infantry Brigade put up<br />
stiff resistance and tried to recover the lost positions by committing armoured units. Th e<br />
assault was halted at the approaches to Koransko Selo. Aft er one killed and three wounded<br />
members the regiment fully completed the fi rst part of its task by reaching the line village<br />
of Oreščani - Bosiljevac forest - village of Milinkovići - village of Grubješići - Kestenak hill<br />
- Donji Skrad - Kozlinska Glava. 286<br />
Th e HV 110 th Home Guard Regiment with the attached company of the HV 137 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment mounted its attack from the village of Zastinje across Slunjska Brda<br />
towards Cerovac Tušilovački and Babina Gora, and from Selište via Podrijevci towards<br />
Brezova Glava. Th e attack was mounted with no artillery support in order to achieve<br />
surprise. Aft er the 2 nd battalion reached the Karlovac - Tušilović road, it came under heavy<br />
infantry and artillery fi re. In the ensuing panic some of the troops ended up in a mine<br />
fi eld in which 6 men were killed and 52 wounded. Th e casualties had a disastrous eff ect<br />
on the morale of the regiment, and its condition did not guarantee any further success.<br />
Th e attached company of the HV 137 th Home Guard Regiment did not accomplish its<br />
mission and that left open the fl ank of the 2 nd battalion towards Babina Gora. A similar<br />
situation developed on the left fl ank of the regiment, where the HV 10 th Brigade also failed<br />
to perform as planned. Th ese developments exposed the fl ank of the regiment to a possible<br />
counterattack from Popović Brdo and Štrekovac. 287<br />
At 0500 the HV 104 th Brigade attempted a forced crossing of the Korana. 288 Th e attempt<br />
failed and aft er 0800 the brigade returned to its jump-off position. 289 According to the<br />
opinion of the brigade commander, the failure was due to stiff resistance, reinforcements<br />
engaged in the form of four troop truckloads, good fortifi cations and the unexpectedly<br />
higher number of Serbian troops. Th e attached company of the 110 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment has two men killed and two wounded. 290 As a result of the failed mission of the<br />
285 SVA MORH, ZZPK: IZM 136th Home Guard Reg., cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 2159-01/95-25-1 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Operational daily report.<br />
286 SVA MORH, ZZPK: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/110, reg. no. 1078-03/2-95-25-2 of 4 August 1995; Action report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: Command of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 8/95-01/110, reg. no. 2159-01-95-103 of 28 August<br />
1995; Analysis of the results accomplished by the 137th Home Guard Reg. in Operation Storm. SVA MORH, ZZPK:<br />
ZPP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August 1995. M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu”<br />
(Knin Fell in Belgrade), 215, 218.<br />
287 SVA MORH, ZZPK: 110th Home Guard Reg., cl.8/95-01/29, reg. 3333-01/1-95-95-27 of 4 August 1995; Report.<br />
288 SVA MORH, ZZPK: APO 2126 Varaždin, K. str. conf. 803-02/95-06/1, reg. no. 2126-01-95-4 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Daily operational report.<br />
289 MORH, GSHV: War Diary, GS OS RH, note 99 of 4 August 1995.<br />
290 SVA MORH, ZZPK: APO 2126 Varaždin, K. str. conf. 803-02/95-06/1, reg. no. 2126-01-95-4 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Daily operational report. Th e commander of the Karlovac Corps District noted that the 104th Brigade was not prepared<br />
for combat, particularly not for a forced crossing. HMDCDR: comments of General Miljenko Crnac on the<br />
text about the Karlovac Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
109
104 th Brigade, the Serbs committed additional reinforcements - an infantry company and<br />
a tank platoon, which opened fi re on the left fl ank of the 110 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
from Jelaš and Latković. 291<br />
Aft er this setback the Command of the Karlovac Corps District desisted from<br />
committing the 104 th Brigade to the mission, and decided to attempt a breakthrough<br />
towards Turanj - Slunjska Brda with the 110 th Home Guard Regiment. 292 In the judgment<br />
of the HV General Staff the attack was to be sustained with the 104 th Brigade in the zone<br />
of responsibility of the 110 th Home Guard Regiment. At Ogulin the HV 14 th and 143 rd<br />
Home Guard Regiments were to sustain their assault. 293 Because of ineff ectiveness of the<br />
99 th Brigade one of its companies was attached to the 143 rd Home Guard Regiment for<br />
action on 5 August. At the same time a combat group was formed with about 250 troops<br />
from the same brigade and subordinated to the advance command post at Karlovac. 294<br />
On the second day of the operation (5 August), in the Ogulin theatre the 143 rd Home<br />
Guard Regiment seized Mount Hum and pushed on to Plaški and Plavča Draga. During<br />
the night the regiment pushed back the Serbian forces towards Vrelo Mrežnice, gained<br />
control of the Plavča Draga - Tobolić road and Plaščanska Dolina, liberated Plaški and<br />
advanced towards Vrelo Mrežnice. 295 “With major eff orts” the main body of the HV 99 th<br />
Brigade was shift ed towards Sabljaki - Plaški - Plavča Draga in order to follow the 143 rd<br />
Home Guard Regiment and protect the right fl ank of the thrust. 296<br />
In the night of 4 August the 14 th Home Guard Regiment committed new forces and<br />
mounted the attack in the morning. Having gained control of Raletina - Kurjevac -<br />
Primišlje - Glumačka Glavica and liberated Primišlje, the regiment accomplished fully<br />
its mission for the fi rst phase of the attack. 297<br />
In the Karlovac theatre, in the night of 4 August (half an hour aft er midnight) the<br />
Serbian 13 th Infantry Brigade reinforced with a company of the SVK 19 th Infantry Brigade<br />
291 SVA MORH, ZZPK: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-25 of 4 August 1995, 2240<br />
hours.<br />
292 MORH, GS HV: War diary GS HV RH, note 191, 4 August 1995. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-<br />
01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557, 4 August 1995; Analysis of Storm-2.<br />
293 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 8o-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-384 5 August 1995, 0000 hours;<br />
Order.<br />
294 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no., 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis<br />
of Storm-2. MORH, GSHV: APO 2121,cl. 81/95/010/01, reg. no. 2121-02/22-95-28 of 5 November 1995;<br />
Analysis of the off ensive operation Storm.<br />
295 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, ZZP Karlovac, cl. 80/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September<br />
1995; Analysis of Storm-2. MORH, GSHV: APO 1110 Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01-475, reg. no. 1110-01-954410 of 5<br />
August 1995; Unit action report. MORH, GSHV: recce. platoon of the 143rd Home Guard Reg., reconnaissance<br />
platoon report for 4 to 8 August,1995. MORH, GSHV: APO 1110 Ogulin, 3 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis for the 143rd Home Guard Reg. in operation Storm-2. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, IZpM Ogulin,<br />
cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-27 of 5 August 1995, 1915 hours; Report.<br />
296 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 85-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-55-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis of<br />
Storm-2.<br />
297 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl.8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis<br />
of Storm-2.<br />
110
counterattacked, with artillery, tanks and infantry, the 137 th Home Guard Regiment which<br />
secured the bridgehead at Kozlinska Glavica - Gradina. Th ree members of the 137 th Regiment<br />
were killed and several wounded in the very strong attack. Th e main body, which held the<br />
bridgehead, pulled back because of the force of the assault and panic. Only one platoon held<br />
its ground at Kozlinska Glavica. Th e attack stopped in the morning, the Serbian forces did<br />
not exploit their success, and the line held by the 137 th Home Guard Regiment remained<br />
under its control. Th e regiment was reinforced with a combat group from the 104 th Brigade<br />
(350 troops), a company from the 148 th Brigade (operational reserve of the Karlovac Corps<br />
District), a tank platoon (3 tanks) and an RAK-12 multiple rocket launcher squad from<br />
the 104 th Brigade. 298 Aft er artillery preparation at 0700, the infantry attack started at 0800<br />
hours; the regiment advanced from Mateško - Perjasica to Martinović - Mandika, while<br />
the attached combat group of the 104 th Brigade supported by the tank platoon reached<br />
Maurovići. Having concurrently swept the area, the units reached Perjasica and Gornji<br />
Poloj by 1600 hours, where they stopped and consolidated their positions for defence. Th e<br />
casualties of the regiment included one wounded and one slightly damaged tank, and those<br />
of the HV 104 th Infantry Brigade three wounded. 299 In the night of 5 August the SVK 13 th<br />
Infantry Brigade was ordered to withdraw to the right bank of the Korana and take up<br />
positions from Donji Skrad to Slunj. 300<br />
On 5 August the 110 th Home Guard Regiment held the positions it had achieved in its<br />
attack. During the day it attempted to break through at Turanj - Slunjska Brda with tank<br />
support, but the well-fortifi ed Serbian forces repelled the attack. Th e regiment lost one man<br />
and 26 were wounded; two tanks were damaged. 301<br />
Aft er two days of combat, the units of the Corps District had 14 men dead and 86<br />
wounded. Th e Command of the Karlovac Corps District decided to commit units of the<br />
14 th and 143 rd Home Guard Regiments, the 99 th Brigade and one battalion of the 148 th<br />
Brigade in order to sustain the attack with artillery support, liberate Slunj, intersect the<br />
Slunj - Rakovica road at Broćanac and link up with units of the Gospić Corps District<br />
at Plitvice - Cetingrad. Th e Home Guard regiments with reinforcement were ordered to<br />
push on towards Slunj: the 14 th Regiment along the Plitvice - Slunj axis, the 143 rd Regiment<br />
towards Vrelo Mrežnice and on to Slunj, while the 99 th Brigade had to focus on mopping up<br />
operations in Plaščanska Dolina. 302 In the Karlovac theatre the Corps District Command<br />
298 SVA MORH, ZZPK: IZM, 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 81/95-01/1, reg. no. 2159-01-95-3 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Operational daily report. MORH, GSHV: Command of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 8/95-01/110, reg. no.<br />
2159-01-95-103, 28 August 1995; Analysis of mission accomplishment for the 137th Home Guard Reg. in<br />
operation Storm. M Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 218-219.<br />
299 SVA MORH, ZZPK: IZM, 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 81/95-01/1, reg. no. 2159-01-95-3 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Operational daily report. MORH, GSHV: Command of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 8/95-01/110, reg.<br />
no. 2159-01-95-103, 28 August 1995; Analysis of mission accomplishment for the 137th Home Guard Reg.<br />
in operation Storm. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac,cl.8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September<br />
1995; Analysis of Storm.<br />
300 M. Sekulić, »Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 218.<br />
301 SVA MORH, ZZPK: 110th Home Guard Reg., cl.81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3333-01/1-95-1 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Operational report- MPRH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September<br />
1995; Analysis of Storm-2.<br />
302 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac. IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01/19, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-1 (no date).<br />
111
decided to engage units of the 110 th Home Guard Regiment and 104 th Brigade in order to<br />
reinforce the 137 th Home Guard Regiment and exploit the bridgehead established on the<br />
river Korana. 303<br />
On 6 August in the morning, aft er regrouping, the HV 143 rd Home Guard Regiment<br />
mounted an assault from Vrelo Mrežnice towards Slunj. At Broćanac the regiment linked<br />
up to forces of the HV 1 st Guards Brigade and in the aft ernoon, in cooperation with parts<br />
of the 1 st Brigade and the 14 th Home Guard Regiment, it entered Slunj. 304 During the day<br />
the HV 99 th Brigade, aft er mopping up along the Božić - Komadine - Plavča Draga line,<br />
advanced by 1400 hours to the planned line in the area of Vrelo Mrežnice, where it blocked<br />
the Slunj training site. Aft er 1400 hours it was in reserve of the Corps commander at Plavča<br />
Draga. 305<br />
Pushing on from Primišlje via Mrzlo Polje and Zečja Varoš, the 14 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment entered and liberated Slunj at about 1500 hours. Th e regiment was reinforced<br />
with two companies of the HV 148 th Brigade, which had to exploit the success and protect<br />
the fl anks of the regiment. 306 Th e crumbling forces of the SVK 13 th Infantry Brigade pulled<br />
back with civilians towards Topusko. 307<br />
Th e attack of the 137 th Home Guard Regiment with the attached reinforcements along<br />
the Barilović - Dugi Dol - Krnjak axis had to start on 6 August at 0500 hours. It started at<br />
about 0800 because of the delayed arrival of the battle group from the 110 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment and of a tank platoon, and of the battle group from the HV 104 th Brigade. Aft er<br />
initial success, the assault ground to a halt because of the strong resistance on the right<br />
fl ank at Skradska Gora. In the village of Kurepi and Kurepić Glavica the Serbs had several<br />
tanks which stopped the advance of the Croatian forces. 308 Progress was resumed aft er an<br />
Mi-24 helicopter gunship attacked at 1800 hours the Serbian positions at Kurepi. On the<br />
left fl ank of the 137 th Home Guard Regiment, the battle group of the 148 th Brigade liberated<br />
Kosjersko Selo and reached the Bolići - Kosjersko Selo road. Together with the battle groups<br />
of the 104 th and 148 th Brigades the regiment pushed on towards Gornji Poloj - Primišlje,<br />
linked up with the 14 th Home Guard Regiment and seized the village of Veljun. 309<br />
303 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-01/1-95-368 of 6 August 1995; Action report<br />
for the zone of responsibility of the Karlovac Corps District. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88,<br />
reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis of Storm.<br />
304 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac. IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-1-29 of 6<br />
August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1/95-557 of 4 September<br />
1995; Analysis of Storm.<br />
305 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac. IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95-29 of 6<br />
August 1995, 1700 hours; Report. MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81-/95-01/01, re. go. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5<br />
September 1995; Analysis of operation Storm.<br />
306 ZP Karlovac, IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-IZM-1/95 of 6 August 1995; Report.<br />
307 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade).<br />
308 SVA MORH, ZZPK: IZM, 137th Home Guard B., cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 2159-01-95-4 of 6 August 1995;<br />
Operational daily report.<br />
309 MORH, GSHV: Comm. of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 85/95-01/110, reg. no. 2159-01-95-103 of 28<br />
August 1995; Analysis of mission accomplishment by the 137th Home Guard Reg. in operation Storm.<br />
112
For the purpose of subsequent operation, on the order of the HV General Staff the<br />
149 th Brigade minus one battalion from the Zagreb Corps District (Ivanić Grad) was<br />
allocated to the Karlovac Corps District and ordered to prepare for combat commitment<br />
by 1000 on 7 August. 310 Th e brigade joined the Karlovac Corps District during the night,<br />
and in the morning it formed a battle group which was attached to the 137 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment. 311<br />
In the meantime, the 1 st Guards Brigade, which had linked during the day to the<br />
units of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, entered the zone of responsibility of the Karlovac Corps<br />
District. General Mareković (head of the advance command post of the HV General<br />
Staff ) was responsible for the organization of the link-up of the Croatian Army and the<br />
Army of Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e two armies linked up at the crossroads of the roads<br />
Slunj - Ličko Petrovo Selo and Slunj - Plitvice (MG Motel) and at the village of Prijeboj.<br />
In the aft ernoon a media-covered link-up was organized at Tržačka Raštela. 312<br />
Th e arrival of the 1 st Guards Brigade changed the plans of the HV General Staff in<br />
Kordun. Th e General Staff had intended to commit the forces of the Karlovac Corps<br />
District in order to seize the area of Piljak - Brezova, push on and liberate Vojnić. 313 Aft er<br />
the arrival of the 1 st Guards Brigade the HV General Staff ordered the brigade to pursue<br />
attack on the Cetingrad - Johovo - Vojnić axis and, “in cooperation with the forces of the<br />
Karlovac Corps District”, crush the enemy, liberate Vojnić, rush on to Topusko and set<br />
up active defence. Th e Karlovac Corps District was ordered to provide artillery support<br />
for the assault of the 1 st Guards Brigade, protect its rear and left fl ank and exploit its<br />
success by following up. Th e Croatian Air Force was to provide support as required and<br />
called for. General Mareković took over the command of the 1 st Guards brigade and<br />
coordination of its action with the Karlovac Corps District. 314<br />
During 7 August the forces of the 1 st Guards Brigade, the 14 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
and the 99 th Brigade were operationally subordinated to the advance command post of<br />
the HV General Staff , which was transferred to Slunj. Reserve units were engaged for<br />
the protection of the state border, relieving the 1 st Guards Brigade for the anticipated<br />
attack. 315 Units of the 14 th Home Guard Regiment secured the area of Slunj and searched<br />
the ground on the left bank of the Korana along the line of attack of the Special Police<br />
from the Karlovac Police Department. Th e regiment also took over the defence of the state<br />
310 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-415 of 6 August 1995; Order.<br />
311 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis<br />
of Storm-2.<br />
312 MORH, GSHV:IZM GSHV. cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/12, reg. no. 512-06-1095-04 of 15 August 1995; Analysis<br />
of unit combat action in the IZM GSHV zone of responsibility, Ogulin - Slunj, in operation Storm.<br />
313 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-410 of 6 August 1995, 134o hours;<br />
Order.<br />
314 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-411 of 6 August 1995, 1340 hours;<br />
Order.<br />
315 MORH, GSHV: IZM GSHV, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/12, reg. no 512-06-10-95 of 15 August 1995; Action<br />
analysis.<br />
113
order from Pašin Potok to the village of Basara, while the HV 99 th Brigade was responsible<br />
for the same mission from the village of Gejkovac to the village of Pašin Potok. 316<br />
Th e Karlovac Corps District committed its main body towards the interior of Kordun.<br />
Part of the 143 rd Home Guard Regiment secured the Slunj training site and Primišlje, while<br />
another part was shift ed from Poloj and committed at Veljun - Vojnić. At about 1540 the<br />
unit entered Vojnić, and part of it was engaged for sweeping the villages on the right bank<br />
of the river Korana. 317 Aft er entering the village of Zagorje part of this group was ordered to<br />
let through the 1 st Guards Brigade, and then proceeded to Krnjak and entered Vojnić aft er<br />
the Brigade late in the aft ernoon. 318<br />
Th e 137 th Home Guard Regiment had advanced to Vojnić via Dugi Dol - Krnjak with<br />
reinforcements from the 110 th Home Guard Regiment, and the HV 149 th and 104 th Brigades.<br />
Th e group entered Krnjak at about 1200 without encountering any resistance. Aft er<br />
sweeping the area of the village the group pushed on towards Krnjak - Grabovac Vojnićki -<br />
Kolarić - Vojnić. At Kolarić Križ the group captured a group of members of the Army of the<br />
Republic of Western Bosnia, whose main body was at Miholjsko. 319 “Encountering almost<br />
no resistance, in the early aft ernoon”, aft er advancing from Mekušje - Kamensko - Popović<br />
Brdo, Turanj - Cerovac Tušilovački - Vukmanić and Turanj - Tušilović - Brezova Glava, the<br />
110 th Home Guard Regiment entered Vojnić together with the attached reinforcements,<br />
parts of the HV 104 th Brigade and an armoured platoon of the Karlovac Corps District. 320<br />
Vojnić was empty, and a small number of civilians found refuge in the centre of the<br />
International Red Cross. In the evening the command of the 137 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
and other HV units also arrived at Vojnić. 321<br />
Aft er the liberation of Vojnić part of the forces of the Karlovac Corps District was engaged<br />
for the sweeping of the liberated area. 322 In one of such actions units of the 104 th Brigade<br />
316 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl.81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-565 of 7 August 1995; Operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: IZM GSHV, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/12, reg. no. 512-06-10-95-04 of 15 August<br />
1995; Action analysis.<br />
317 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-565 of 7 August 1995; Operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01/478, reg. no. 1110-01-95-4782<br />
of 7 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: APO 1110 Ogulin, cl. 8/95-01-46, reg. no. 1110-01-95-4791 of 7<br />
August 1995; Report.<br />
318 MORH, GSHV:: Report of the 143rd Home Guard Regiment; Report of the reconnaissance platoon for<br />
4 to 10 August 1995.<br />
319 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-565 of 7 August 1995; Operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: Command of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 85-01/110, reg. no. 2159-01-95-103<br />
of 28 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
320 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-565 of 7 August 1995; Operational<br />
report.<br />
321 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-565 of 7 August 1995; Operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: Command of the 137th Home Guard Reg., cl. 85-01/110, reg. no. 2159-01-95-103<br />
of 28 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
322 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-566 of 8 August 1995; Operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06/05/01-95-438 of 8 August 1995; Report.<br />
114
were ambushed on 8 August by the Serbs at the village of Križ south of Banski Kovačevac.<br />
In the bus carrying the troops of the brigade four men were killed and 20 wounded by<br />
infantry fi re. One Serbian soldier was also killed in the exchange of fi re. 323 Part of the<br />
forces was also committed towards the SVK Kordun Corps which was negotiating its<br />
surrender. 324 Because of this the planned attack of the 1 st Guards Brigade towards Slavsko<br />
Polje was called off . Th e other forces subordinated to the advance command post of the<br />
HV General Staff - the 14 th Home Guard Regiment and the 99 th Brigade - were deployed<br />
along the state border. 325<br />
On 9 August the HV 1 st Guards Brigade entered Vrginmost, followed by other units. 326<br />
During the day units of the Karlovac Corps District were engaged in sweeping the liberated<br />
area: the 110 th Home Guard Regiment covered the Vrginmost - Lasinja area, the 137 th<br />
Home Guard Regiment the Vojnić area, the 143 rd Home Guard Regiment the Vrginmost -<br />
Lasinja - Skakavac area, and the 14 th Home Guard Regiment the area of the town of Slunj,<br />
Cetingrad and Rakovica up to the state border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 327<br />
Photograph by Michael Sharp<br />
323 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-567 of 8 August 1995; Operational report.<br />
324 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95-566 of 8 August 1995; Operational report<br />
325 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-434 of 8 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: IZM GSHV, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/12, reg. no. 512-06-10-95-04 of 15 August 1995; Action analysis.<br />
326 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/2-95-407 of 9 August 1995; Analysis of off ensive<br />
Vrginmost action.<br />
327 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-03/2-95-568 of 9 August 1995; Operational report.<br />
115
116<br />
Conclusion<br />
Th e mission of the Karlovac Corps District was very demanding. It was one of the small<br />
corps districts and it was given a more demanding mission than other corps districts. It<br />
faced the complete Kordun Corps, one brigade of the Lika Corps, an artillery brigade<br />
of the SVK General Staff and the main body of the SVK Special Unit Corps. Th e corps<br />
had no professional troops, and the brunt of its mission rested on reserve units. Th e<br />
reinforcements it received were also from the reserve. Th is made the mission of the Corps<br />
even more diffi cult because it included the forced crossings of the rivers Kupa, Korana<br />
and Mrežnica. Th e operation showed that some of the attached units were not up to<br />
the task assigned them and that they were not a match for the Corps’ line units. In this<br />
regard command during the operation was demanding and had a signifi cant impact on<br />
the outcome of the operation. 328 Th e Serbian defence was very strong, and their forces<br />
even mounted several counterattacks with some success. Strong defence was the only way<br />
out for the Kordun Corps because it was the only formation with no direct link to the<br />
Bosnian&Herzegovinian Serbs. Th e ARBiH was in its rear, and it did not crumble to the<br />
extent observed with the other corps. It can be assumed that the fi ghting in the region of<br />
Kordun was the closest to what might have been expected throughout the theatre if the<br />
RSK Supreme Defence Council had not ordered the evacuation of the population from<br />
Dalmatia. M. Sekulić speculates that Kordun should have been exploited to demonstrate<br />
the “Croatian genocidal character” because the Serbian population, allegedly, had not been<br />
informed about the decision to withdraw from Krajina. 329 Because of this the operation<br />
developed diff erently as compared to the other theatres. Th e Special Units Corps and<br />
its armoured brigade played no role of any signifi cance. 330 During the operation up to 8<br />
August the casualties of the Karlovac Corps District totalled 33 killed and 262 wounded,<br />
106 of them severely. 331<br />
327 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-03/2-95-568 of 9 August 1995; Operational<br />
report.<br />
328 According to the CIA analysis the role of the Karlovac Corps District under Major-General Miljenko<br />
Crnjac was a minor one compared to the other three HV corps. Crnjac’s mission was to conduct a holding<br />
attack against the SVK Kordun Corps to pin it down and keep it away from the fl anks of the Zagreb and<br />
Gospić Corps Districts. His forces would also try to capture SVK-held areas south of Karlovac, around the<br />
town of Vojnić, to limit Serbian shelling of Karlovac. On 4 August the Karlovac Corps District succeeded<br />
in its primary mission of pinning down the Kordun Corps, but fared poorly in terms of ground gained. Th e<br />
Kordun Corps, continues the analysis, held fast on 5 August as well at Slunj and south of Karlovac, where<br />
the HV was not able to wrest much from the SVK, with the exception of Primišlje, seized by the 14th Home<br />
Guard Regiment. Nevertheless, concludes the analysis, the days of the SVK Kordun Corps were numbered,<br />
especially when the Karlovac Corps District, now reinforced and led by the 1st Guards Brigade, mounted on<br />
7 August a concentric attack on the SVK 21st Corps around Vojnić and when, on the same day, the ARBiH<br />
5th Corps overwhelmed the forces of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and marched into Velika<br />
Kladuša. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995; 368-369, 371.<br />
329 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 220-221.<br />
330 Ibid., 222-223.<br />
331 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl. 8/95-01/88, reg. no. 1078-03/1-95-557 of 4 September 1995; Analysis<br />
of Storm-2.
THE ZAGREB CORPS DISTRICT<br />
Pursuant to the Storm-1 directive of the HV General Staff , the Command of the<br />
Zagreb Corps District (ZZP) completed on 1 August its attack order. Th e plan<br />
of the operation involved two stages to be carried out with existing forces and<br />
envisioned reinforcements. In the fi rst, two-day stage, the main body of the Corps was<br />
to cut off Petrinja, eliminate the encircled Serbian forces or force their unconditional<br />
surrender, and liberate Petrinja. Th e auxiliary forces were to advance from Sunja via the<br />
village of Mračaj and liberate Kostajnica. In the second stage, the main body of the Corps<br />
was to advance from the village of Maja and liberate Glina, and push on to the villages<br />
of Obljaj-Žirovac in order to link up with the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Aft er regrouping and<br />
destruction of the remnants of the Banija Corps in the area of Zrinska Gora the Corps<br />
would reach the state border and set up defensive positions. 332<br />
Th e mission clearly outlined three lines of action: towards Kostajnica, towards Petrinja<br />
and towards Glina. For the attack towards Kostajnica the units assembled at Sunja<br />
included the line 17 th Home Guard Regiment and the 103 rd and 151 st Brigades. Petrinja<br />
would be cut off and liberated by the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade, the HV 57 th Brigade, and the<br />
HV 12 th and 20 th Home Guard Regiments. Th e HV 153 rd Brigade and the HV 20 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment were engaged for the attack on Glina. Th e plan for the second phase of<br />
the operation involved the commitment of the second combat echelon and exploitation<br />
of the achieved success: the 1 st and 140 th Home Guard Regiments and the 3 rd Battalion of<br />
the HV 102 nd Brigade from Sunja to Kostajnica, and the HV 101 st , 102 nd , 148 th and 149 th<br />
Brigades towards Glina and Dvor na Uni. 333 Th e order planned the commitment of the<br />
HV 125 th Home Guard Regiment, but it received a day later its combat mission from the<br />
Command of the Bjelovar Corps District and was therefore subordinated to it. 334<br />
Th e other forces of the Zagreb Corps District - the 202 nd Artillery-Rocket Brigade,<br />
the Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company, the 67 th Military Police Battalion, the 252 nd<br />
Independent Communications Company, the 502 nd Mechanized ABKO Company, a<br />
battalion of the 33 rd Engineer Brigade, the 31 st Engineer Battalion, the 36 th Engineer-<br />
332 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 8/95-0174, reg. no. 1075-12/95-171 of 1 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: ZP Zagreb Command, cl. 81-95-01/3, reg. no. 1075.-12/95-213 of 22 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
333 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 8/95-0174, reg. no. 1075-12/95-171 of 1 August 1995; Order. General<br />
Stipetić noted that the HV 101st Brigade was committed at the last moment at Komarevo-Mađari. HMD-<br />
CDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police<br />
operation Storm.<br />
334 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1053. Operational order.<br />
117
Pontoon Battalion and the 1 st Sisak Composite River Task Force - were committed to<br />
other missions within the scope of the operation, from air defence of the vital military<br />
facilities and infrastructure in Zagreb and Sisak to engineer support of the operation.<br />
Th ree artillery-rocket groups were formed for artillery support, including the 6 th<br />
Artillery Battalion, the 8 th Howitzer-Artillery Battalion, one battalion of the 16 th Artillery-<br />
Rocket Brigade, some artillery units of the 2 nd Guards Brigade and the 202 nd Air Defence<br />
Artillery-Rocket Brigade. Th ey were to provide artillery support along the axes Sunja -<br />
Kostajnica, Madžari - Blinja, the village of Brkiševina - the village of Viduševac - Glina<br />
and Sisak - Petrinja - Maja - Obljaj.<br />
Two anti-armour detachments were formed from the 5 th Anti-Armour Artillery-<br />
Rocket Brigade and two platoons of the 33 rd Engineer Brigade. Th eir mission was antiarmour<br />
combat at Glinska - Polaja - Nebojan, Župić - Nebojan and Petrinja - Moščenica,<br />
and defence against attacks from Vedro Polje and the village of Novoselci. In the second<br />
phase they were responsible for anti-armour action at Kostajnica - village of Panjani and<br />
the village of Volinja - Kostajnica, and direct engagement of targets on the right bank<br />
of the river Una in order to prevent traffi c between Bosanska Kostajnica and Bosanski<br />
Novi. Two Mi-24 helicopter gunships would provide air support. Th e command post<br />
was in Zagreb, and advance command posts in Sisak and Sunja. Th e commander of the<br />
Zagreb Corps District was Major-General Ivan Basarac. 335<br />
Th e temporarily occupied area of Banovina was defended by the SVK Banija Corps,<br />
headquartered in Glina. It included the 24 th , 26 th and 33 rd Infantry Brigades, the 31 st<br />
Motorized Brigade, the Caprag and Obljaj detachments and the 87 th rear base. Th e Corps<br />
commander was Major-General Slobodan Tarbuk. 336<br />
Th e mission of the Banija Corps was to stop the HV breakthrough to Glinska Poljana<br />
- Glina, to the village of Farkašić - Petrinja - Dvor and from Sunja to Kostajnica, break<br />
the attack and create conditions for off ensive actions. Following that, aft er regrouping<br />
the Corps would counterattack, crush the HV forces and set up defensive positions along<br />
the rivers Kupa and Sava. Th e artillery group of the SVK General Staff , the 105 th Air<br />
Brigade and the Air Force of Republika Srpska were earmarked for support. 337<br />
118<br />
Execution of the Operation<br />
Th e HV 20 th Home Guard Regiment set off towards Glina as planned on 4 August. Aft er<br />
the successful forced crossing of the river Kupa at the village of Brkiševina, it pushed<br />
on to Stražišće and Gornje Jame. Th e assault ground to a halt because of stiff Serbian<br />
resistance and heavy casualties; many members of the regiment were killed or wounded.<br />
Th e regiment retreated to the village of Slana and held on to the bridgehead at the village of<br />
335 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 8/95-0174, reg. no. 1075-12/95-171 of 1 August 1995; Attack order.<br />
336 HDA, RSK: APO 9136 Glina, conf. no. 31-247 of 15 November 1994; Manning as per wartime complement.<br />
M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade).<br />
337 VSA, MORH: Directive for the commitment of the Serbian Army of the Krajina, Op. no. 1, “GVOZD”.<br />
February 1995. M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 239.
Stankovac. 338 Th e HV 153 rd Brigade attacking towards Pokupsko - Šišinec - Brkiševina fared<br />
no better. Two of its battalions crossed the Kupa and returned to their jump-off positions.<br />
One battalion remained on the left bank of the Kupa at the village of Gornja Bučica and the<br />
hamlets of Božurići - Kaurići. 339 Although Glina was not seriously threatened, late in the<br />
evening the SVKJ General Staff ordered the commander of the Special Unit Corps to shift<br />
the 2 nd Armoured Brigade from the Slunj training site to the greater area of Glina in order<br />
to prevent a quick breakthrough of Croatian forces towards Topusko and Dvor na Uni. 340<br />
Th e liberation of Petrinja was the main objective of the Zagreb Corps District in the fi rst<br />
stage of the operation. Strong forces were assembled for the mission - the envelopment and<br />
the liberation of the town. Along the western axis the main body of the 12 th Home Guard<br />
Brigade attacking via Konjska Glava was stopped in front of mine fi elds, and forced to<br />
retreat by mortar and artillery fi re. At its right fl ank the regiment succeeded in seizing the<br />
greater part of Župić Brdo by nightfall. 341 Th e main body of the 2 nd Guards Brigade liberated<br />
the villages of Sibić, Gora, Graberje and part of the village of Strašnik. Because of fi ve men<br />
killed in action, including one company commander, the brigade had a passing crisis,<br />
refl ected in the incomplete capture of the village of Strašnik. 342 Th ere was also panic on the<br />
other side in the ranks of the SVK 31 st Motorized Brigade, which managed to stabilize its<br />
position by bringing in reinforcements as well as owing to reduced Croatian pressure. 343<br />
Th e main role along the eastern axis of the attack of Petrinja was entrusted to Tactical<br />
Group 2 (TG-2), which comprised a reinforced battalion of the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade, some<br />
smaller units of the HV 12 th Home Guard Regiment, the 5 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket<br />
Battalion and the 31 st Engineer Battalion. Aft er artillery preparation, TG-2 pushed on via<br />
Moščenica towards Petrinja, liberated the hamlet of Kolonija Češkog Sela and eliminated<br />
the Serbian forces in the Finel plant. Aft er this it was stopped with heavy casualties in the<br />
centre of Češko Selo. Six Guardsmen were killed in action, including the commander of<br />
the 2 nd Battalion of the 2 nd Guards Brigade, Colonel Predrag Matanović, ten were severely<br />
and twenty lightly wounded. Two T-55 tanks and one M-80 infantry fi ghting vehicle were<br />
destroyed, one T-55 tank with mine clearance gear got stuck, and one armoured fi ghting<br />
vehicle was captured. 344 Aft er receiving reinforcements the command of the SVK 31 st<br />
Motorized Brigade stabilized its position. 345<br />
338 MORH, GSHV: APO 8259, cl. 81/95-01/08, reg. no. 8259-01/95-40 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
339 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/08, reg. no. 3010-01/95-40 of 4 August 1995; Report for 4 August.<br />
340 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 182.<br />
341 MORH, GSHV: APO 8252, cl. 81/05-95/02, reg. no. 8258-06/95-60 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
342 MORH, GSHV: deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Brigade of 12 August 1995; data concerning action<br />
along the main attack line. MORH, GSHV: APO1112/10, cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/30, reg. no. 1112-30/01-95-86<br />
of 31 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: APO 1112/30, cl. 8/95-01/32, reg. no. 1112-32/01-95-175 of 4<br />
September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
343 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade).<br />
344 MORH, GSHV: TS-2 commander, 12 August 1995; Report on TS-2 action. MORH, GSHV: APO 1112/20<br />
(2/2nd Guards Brig.), c l. str. conf. 030-03/95-01/6, reg. no. 1112-31/01-95-1 of 3 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis.<br />
345 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 234.<br />
119
Before the start of the operation, in the night of 3 August the HV 57 th Brigade had<br />
some problems at its jump-off positions as it turned them over to the 101 st Brigade. 346 Th is<br />
is why the entire brigade reserve and the reserve of the 1 st battalion were kept as defence<br />
of the villages of Komarevo and Vučjak. Aft er artillery preparation parts of the brigade<br />
attacked at Novo Selo - Moštanica in order to cut the Petrinja - Kostajnica road. Some<br />
units of the brigade reached the village of Stražbenica and Bijela Cesta, where they were<br />
halted by deep mine fi elds. On the order of the Corps District commander the brigade<br />
sent help to TG-2 at Bijela Cesta - Slatina. Th e brigade commander, Major Stjepan Grgac,<br />
and the deputy commander of the 2 nd battalion were killed in the action, and this had a<br />
detrimental eff ect on the morale and combat readiness of the unit. 347 Th e action of the<br />
101st Brigade did not succeed because it failed to take over completely the line from<br />
the 57 th Brigade and because of the strong Serbian artillery attack. During the advance<br />
from Blinjski Put to the Sokolovac trigonometrical point fi ve men were killed and seven<br />
wounded by Serbian artillery fi re. Th e casualties and the strong artillery fi re had an<br />
adverse eff ect on the morale and combat readiness of the brigade, which had advanced<br />
200 to 500 metres. 348<br />
In the Sunja theatre the HV 17 th Home Guard Regiment attacked in the morning the<br />
positions of the SVK 26 th Infantry Brigade in the villages of Vedro Polje, Novoselci, Staza<br />
and Strmen, and along the Strmen - Slovinci road. It was allocated one company of the<br />
151 st Brigade for the assault towards Strmen. Th e regiment failed to break through the<br />
Serbian defence line and returned to its jump-off position early in the evening. 349 It failure<br />
upset the action of the HV 151 st Brigade because it could not be committed. One battalion<br />
of the brigade attempted to attack the village of Šaš, but it was stopped by Serbian forces at<br />
the Sunja canal and withdrew to its jump-off position. 350 Th e main body of the HV 103 rd<br />
Brigade attacked the village of Petrinjce intending to push on to Drljača - Četvrtkovec. It<br />
reached the Sunja - Sisak railway and withdrew because of strong Serbian fi re. 351<br />
On the fi rst day of the operation the Zagreb Corps District scored no success. Th e main<br />
body of the SVK Banija Corps on the main assault axis was not crushed, Petrinja was not<br />
cut off , and the Serbian forces along the auxiliary lines of attack Sunja - Mračaj - Kostajnica<br />
and Pokupsko - Glina were not eliminated either. 352 Th e overall progress towards the<br />
346 MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl. 85-01, reg. no. 2123-02/2/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
347 MORH, GSHV: APO 3099, cl. 119-01/95-01, reg. no. 3099-01/95-092/1 of 13 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. 512-06-05/01-95-391 of 5 August 1995; Report on the situation<br />
in the Zagreb Corps District.<br />
348 MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl. 8/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
General Stipetić noted that the HV 101st Brigade was not originally planned for action along that line, and<br />
that an explanation is called for of the reasons why it was deployed there. HMDCDR: Comments of General<br />
Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
349 MORH, GSHV: APO 8314, cl. 81/95-01, reg. no. 8314-01/01-2-95-184 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
350 MORH, GSHV: APO 3008, cl. 818-01/95-01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Action comments.<br />
351 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/95, reg. no. 2125-02-95-66 of 1 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
352 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/3, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213 of 22 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
120
liberation of Petrinja on the fi rst day of the operation was below expectations; only the<br />
main body of the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade was able to advance, but that was not judged<br />
to be suffi cient by the HV General Staff . 353 Th e tactical departure from the assault plan<br />
caused a crisis along the TG-2 axis, slowed down the action of the main body of the 2 nd<br />
Guards Brigade and thereby set the rate of action for the whole Corps District. Th e moves<br />
of the Zagreb Corps District demonstrate that its command blamed subordinates and<br />
insuffi cient manpower for the failure. Th e HV General Staff was requested to mobilize<br />
the HV 102 nd Brigade and the HV 1 st and 2 nd Home Guard Regiments. 354 Th e HV 2 nd<br />
Guards Brigade was reinforced with a part of the 1 st battalion of the HV 149 th Brigade.<br />
Th e main body of the brigade was still at Ivanić Grad ready for commitment. 355<br />
On the second day of the operation, 5 August, part of the 2 nd Guards Brigade was<br />
committed for the attack towards Glina. By joint action with the 20 th Home Guard<br />
Regiment it liberated Glinsko Novo Selo; part of the regiment still held defence positions<br />
in the villages of Slana and Glinska Poljana. 356 Its neighbour on the right, the HV 153 rd<br />
Brigade, pulled its third battalion as well to the left bank of the Kupa and ended up, on<br />
the second day of the operation, in the same spot where it had started. 357<br />
No anticipated advance towards Petrinja was achieved on 5 August either. Along<br />
the western attack axis the 12 th Home Guard Regiment seized Župić Brdo, pushed on<br />
between the villages of Gora and Župić, and cut the Glina - Petrinja road. 358 During<br />
the day the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade took the villages of Šanja, Vilusi, Pecki and half of<br />
the village of Luščani. One armoured vehicle was damaged in the action. 359 Th e fi rst<br />
battalion of the 140 th Home Guard Regiment, until then the operational reserve of the<br />
Zagreb Corps District, was committed at the brigade fl anks. 360<br />
In the morning parts of TG-2 repeated their attack on Češko Selo. One T-55 tank<br />
was destroyed in the attack, and the unit returned to its jump-off position. Th e Serbs<br />
counterattacked Kolonija; the attempt was repelled with the help of the MUP special<br />
unit, and the attack on Češko Selo was resumed. Several men were killed and wounded<br />
in the Croatian counterattack, and one T-55 tank was destroyed along with one infantry<br />
armoured vehicle of the 2 nd Guards Brigade. All further action was halted by General<br />
Petar Stipetić, appointed commander of the Croatian forces in the Banovina region by<br />
353 MORH, GSHV: War diary GS OS RH, note 116 of 4 August 1995.<br />
354 MORH, GSHV: War diary, GS OS RH, note 116 of 4 August 1995.<br />
355 MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl. 803-02/95-06, reg. no. 3006-07/95-56 of 4 August 1995; Daily operational<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl. 8/95-01/4, reg. no. 3006-07-95-1059 of 4 August 1995; Action analysis.<br />
356 MORH, GSHV: APO 1112/30, cl. 8/95-01/32, reg. no. 1112-32/01-95-175 of 4 August 1995; Action analysis.<br />
MORH, GSHV: APO 8259, cl. 81/95-01/08, reg. no. 8259-01/95-40 of 5 August 1995; Action analysis.<br />
357 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3010-01/95-05 of 5 August 1995; Report for 5 August<br />
1995.<br />
358 MORH, GSHV: APO 8252, cl. 81/05-95/02, reg. no. 8258-06/95-60 of 5 Septeember 1995; Action analysis.<br />
359 MORH, GSHV: Deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Brigade, 12 August 1995; combat information for<br />
the main attack axis.<br />
360 MORH, GSHV: War diary, 140th Home Guard Reg., 5 August 1995. MORH, GSHV: APO 1106, cl. 8/95-<br />
01/49, reg. no. 1106-02-95-2 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis report.<br />
121
order of the President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tuđman. General Stipetić regrouped the<br />
153 rd Brigade and the Glina Regiment and ordered the commitment of the 102 nd Brigade<br />
on the Glina axis. Darkness and the lack of a reserve for TG-2 frustrated the intention. At<br />
the left fl ank of TG-2 two infantry platoons of the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade and 12 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment attacked the Hunting Lodge. Th e commander of a company of the 12 th<br />
Home Guard Regiment was killed in the attack, which was discontinued and the units<br />
withdrew, partly in a disorganized fashion, from the area. 361<br />
East of Petrinja units of the HV 57 th and 101 st Brigades held their positions set up the<br />
day before, 362 while the 57 th Brigade was reinforced in the morning by the commitment<br />
of the second battalion of the HV 149 th Brigade in order to protect the fl anks of the<br />
achieved line in the envelopment of the Komarevo - Blinja road. 363<br />
In the Sunja theatre, aft er failure on the fi rst day of the operation and regrouping, the<br />
17 th Home Guard Regiment again tried at noon to break through the Serbian defence<br />
line. Aft er artillery preparation and with the support of two tanks of the 2 nd Guards<br />
Brigade it attacked and captured the village of Strmen and then seized the Strmen -<br />
village of Slovinci road. In the evening part of the regiment attacked Vedro Polje but<br />
gained no ground. 364 Th e 151 st Brigade also achieved some progress. By pushing on from<br />
Bobovac towards the bridge on the river Sunja in reached by early evening the village<br />
of Slovinci, while some of its units set up the position for sustaining the assault west<br />
of the same village in front of the railway. 365 During the day the HV 145 th Brigade was<br />
transferred by order of the commander of the Zagreb Corps District from Popovača to<br />
the villages of Bobovac, Stremen and Kratečko. In the evening the brigade was ordered<br />
to mount the attack towards Selište Kostajničko through the battle formation of the HV<br />
151 st Brigade. 366 By 2200 it seized the Sunja railway station at the entrance to the village<br />
of Drljače. Th e attack was not continued because of the dark. 367<br />
361 MORH, GSHV: TG commander, 12 August 1995, report on TG action. According to other sources, TG-2<br />
units did not «engage in combat actions» on 5 August, and the commander of the Moščenica company,<br />
Lieutenant Božan Martan, was killed on 4 August. Domagoj Bernić, Hrvoje Bešlić, Vladimir Krpan, «Katalog<br />
izložbe ‘Pobjeda’: Povodom 10. obljetnice vojno-redarstvene operacije ‘Oluja’. 1995-2005» (Catalogue of<br />
the Exhibition ‘Victory’: On the Tenth Anniversary of the Military-Police Operation ‘Storm’, 1995-2005),<br />
Petrinja 2005. Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police<br />
operation Storm.<br />
362 MORH, GSHV: APO 3099, cl. 119-01/95-01, reg. no. 3099-01/95-092/1 of 13 August 1995; Analysis. MORH,<br />
GSHV: APO 2123, cl. 8/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/02/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
363 MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl. 803-02/95-06, reg. no. 3006-07-95-0927 of 5 August 1995; Daily opera-<br />
tional report.<br />
364 MORH, GSHV: APO 8314, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8314-01/01-2-95-184 of 5 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis.<br />
365 MORH, GSHV: APO 3008, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Action com-<br />
ments.<br />
366 MORH, GSHV: AP0 3002, cl. 030-01/95-01, reg. no. 3002-01/95-1451 of 6 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
367 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/951, reg. no. 2125-02/95-66 of 1 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
On 5 August, comments the CIA analysis, the Zagreb Corps District was still making heavy weather against<br />
General Tarbuk’s SVK Banija Corps, but the weight of the HV was beginning to wear down the Serbs. Th e<br />
122
Petrinja was fi nally liberated on 6 August, and the main body of the SVK Banija Corps<br />
withdrew towards Dvor na Uni. Aft er vigorous artillery preparation TG-2 mounted its<br />
attack, captured Martinovo Vrelo and, via Češko Selo, reached at 0700 the entrance<br />
to Petrinja. 368 Th e 12 th Home Guard Regiment entered Petrinja from the west and was<br />
deployed in and around the town. 369 Th e 57 th Brigade seized the greater area of Petrinja<br />
with no major resistance, took the villages of Stražbenica and Blinja and gained by noon<br />
total control of the Petrinja - Kostajnica road. 370 Th e second battalion of the 149 th Brigade<br />
was left in charge of the Komarevo - Letovanci communication. 371<br />
Aft er the liberation of Petrinja and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces towards<br />
Dvor na Uni, the liberation of Glina became a matter of hours in spite of stiff Serbian<br />
opposition encountered by the 20 th Home Guard Regiment in some places, e.g., at<br />
Marinbrod, Prekopa and Hađer. 372 Nevertheless, parts of the regiment entered Glina in<br />
the evening, 373 along with police units and part of the HV 153 rd Brigade, which had been<br />
transferred to the village of Gora aft er two days of aborted actions via Pokupsko and<br />
Hotnja. 374 Th ere it received the order to assist with part of its units the advance of the<br />
20 th Home Guard Regiment towards Glina. 375 Th e Brigade seized Graberje - Novo Selo<br />
Glinsko - Brkići in order to push on towards the village of Maja with the 2 nd Guards<br />
Brigade. 376 Glina was liberated in the night of 6 August, and units of the 20 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment took over control of the surrounding villages. 377<br />
Aft er the liberation of Petrinja and during the capture of Glina the main body of the<br />
Zagreb Corps District was engaged in the liberation of the Banovina region and the<br />
mopping-up of the region, especially of the Zrinska Gora massif. Th e main role was<br />
played by the 2 nd Guards Brigade by enveloping the Glina - Dvor na Uni communication.<br />
By 6 August at noon the main body of the brigade seized Gornja Bačuga and Donja<br />
fi rst break against the SVK came was the loss of Hrvatska Dubica, liberated by the 125th Home Guard Regiment.<br />
A renewed drive from the Sunja area forced the SVK to begin falling back towards Kostajnica. Th e<br />
breakout of the ARBiH 5th Corps from the Bihać enclave early on 5 August forced the SVK to use its only<br />
reserve unit - the 33rd Infantry Brigade - to block this drive into the corps’ rear area. Th is was particularly<br />
important because without this reserve the SVK was unable to stop the tenacious HV 2nd Guards Brigade<br />
from grinding down the SVK 31st Brigade troops around Petrinja. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History<br />
of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995, 371.<br />
368 MORH, GSHV: TG commander, 12 August 1995. TG action report.<br />
369 MORH, GSHV: APO 8252, cl. 81/05-95/02, reg. no. 8258-06/95-60 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
370 MORH, GSHV: APO 3099, cl. 119-01/95-01, reg. no. 3099-01/95-092/1 of 13 August 1995.<br />
371 MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl. 8/95-01/4, reg. no. 3006-07-95-1059-01 of 4 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
372 MORH, GSHV: TG commander, 12 August 1995; TG action report.<br />
373 MORH, GSHV: APO 8259, cl. 81/95-01/08, reg. no. 8259-01/95-06 of 6 August 1995; Action analysis.<br />
374 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3010-01/95-06 of 6 August 1995; Operational daily<br />
report.<br />
375 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3010-01/95-07 of 7 August 1995; Operational daily<br />
report.<br />
376 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3010-01/95-06 of 6 August 1995; Operational daily<br />
report.<br />
377 MORH, GSHV: Command of the 20th Home Guard Reg., 7 August 1995; Battle report no. 07.<br />
123
Bačuga. On the Petrinja - Jabukovac road the brigade linked up with some of its units<br />
in the Second Tactical Group, and pushed on to <strong>Hrvatski</strong> Čuntić, Prnjavor Čutnićki and<br />
Jabukovac. By nighfall the brigade liberated Veliki Šušnjar and Majski Trtnik. During its<br />
advance the Group clashed with the Serbian rearguard covering the withdrawal of its main<br />
body and of civilians towards Glina. Part of the rearguard was destroyed, and the remainder<br />
pulled back with the main body of the Banija Corps. Th e 2 nd Guards Brigade reached by<br />
nightfall the Majski Trtnik - Banski Grabovac - Veliki Šušnjari line. 378 A battalion of the<br />
140 th Home Guard Regiment also reached Banski Grabovac in the early evening and took<br />
up positions in the villages of Vlahović and Veliki Šušnjar. 379 TG-2 reached Blinja with no<br />
major eff ort and, by the evening, seized the village of Umetić together with part of the HV<br />
57 th Brigade, and set up defensive positions there. 380<br />
During 6 August the forces in the Sunja Th eatre also began to achieve success. Th e<br />
HV 103 rd Brigade seized the area around the villages Drljača and Radonja Luka. Aft er<br />
regrouping and running into weak Serbian resistance along a 3 km stretch between the<br />
villages of Prevršac and Panjani the brigade reached the Kostajnica - Petrinja road. 381 Units<br />
of the 17 th Home Guard Regiment and the HV 151 st Brigade advanced along Slovinci -<br />
village of Timarci - Selište Kostajničko - village of Rosulje - Hrvatska Kostajnica. In the<br />
aft ernoon hours a reinforced battalion of the HV 145 th Brigade was committed along the<br />
same line. At 1200 hours the HV 151 st Brigade linked up with the units of the Bjelovar<br />
Corps District on the Dubica - Sunja road. In the evening these forces reached Kostajnica<br />
liberated at noon by units of the Bjelovar Corps District, and secured the communications<br />
in the liberated area. 382<br />
On 7 August in the morning the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade advanced towards Maja - Donji<br />
Klasnić - Donji Žirovac - Dvor na Uni. Up to the crossroads at the village of Januzi it was<br />
opposed by small enemy groups which were eliminated without halting the advance. At<br />
Januzi and the village of Grabno the Serbian forces set up defensive positions acting as a<br />
rearguard for the troops and civilians withdrawing via Veliki Obljaj and Mali Obljaj from<br />
Vojnić and Vrginmost. Th e brigade blocked the area with part of one of its battalions,<br />
while the main body pushed on to Brezovo Polje - Donji Žirovac. At the foot of the Vratnik<br />
pass its advance was halted by a Serbian tank platoon from Gornji Žirovac, which engaged<br />
targets on Vratnik and controlled the road to Donji Žirovac with its fi re. Th e brigade<br />
fortifi ed the achieved line and mopped-up the villages of Čavlovica, Brđane and Ličine. 383<br />
378 MORH, GSHV: 2nd Guards Brigade, 12 August 1995. Action report for the main line of attack.<br />
379 MORH, GSHV: War diary, 140th Home Guard Reg., 6 August 1995. MORH, GSHV: APO 1106, cl. 8/95-<br />
01/49, reg. no. 1106-8/95-01/49 of 5 September1995; Report.<br />
380 MORH, GSHV: TG commander, 12 August 1995; TG action report.<br />
381 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/95, reg. no. 2125-02/95-66 of 1 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/03, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213/1 of 13 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
382 MORH, GSHV: APO 8314 Sunja, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8314-01/01-2-95-184 of 5 September 1995;<br />
Analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 3008, cl. 818-01/95-01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Observations.<br />
MORH, GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 030-01/95-01, reg. no. 3002-01/95-1451 of 6 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
383 MORH, GSHV: 2nd Guards Brigade, 12 August 1995; Action report for the main line of attack. MORH,<br />
GSHV: APO 1112/30, cl. 8/95-01/32, reg. no. 1112-32/01-95-175 of 4 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
124
Th e small town of Dvor na Uni was the scene of the last major battle in the Banovina<br />
region. From 4 to 7 August the SVK 33 rd Infantry Brigade confronted the ARBiH 5 th Corps.<br />
Its most important mission was to hold the bridgehead on the river Una towards Republika<br />
Srpska, used aft er 5 August for troop withdrawal from deep inside the Banovina. Th e<br />
brigade began to crumble aft er the Croatian forces liberated Petrinja and Kostajnica. On 7<br />
August the brigade withdrew across the Una. According to Serbian data, units of the SVK<br />
13 th Infantry Brigade and civilians from Kordun also reached the proximity of Dvor. 384 East<br />
of Dvor, at the village of Rosulje, parts of the 17 th Home Guard Regiment, and of the 145 th<br />
and 151 st Brigade, advanced from Dubica on the approaches to Kostajnica. 385 In the middle<br />
of Dvor Croatian forces clashed with Serbian troops mixed with civilians and crossing the<br />
river into Bosnia. According to Serbian sources, HV units ran up against the remnants<br />
of the SVK 13 th Infantry Brigade and troops assembled from other Serbian units. i.e., the<br />
Glina 24 th Infantry Brigade, and six tanks of the 2 nd Armoured Brigade of the Special Unit<br />
Corps, which attacked from Bosanski Novi and the village of Vanjići. Aft er a night battle the<br />
Croatian forces were thrown back to the outskirts of the place and to the village of Zamlača,<br />
because they could not manoeuvre and regroup in the town. Moreover, Serbian forces from<br />
the surrounding hills held the access road from Kostajnica under fi re. Th e civilians were<br />
pulled out during the fi ght. A column of refugees at Žirovac was intersected for a short time<br />
by the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Aft er deblocking, the withdrawal of the civilians and troops across<br />
the bridge continued, and was completed in the late evening on 9 August. Soon thereaft er<br />
Croatian forces entered Dvor and linked up with units of the ARBiH 5 th Corps. 386<br />
While the fi ghting for Dvor was going on, the 2 nd Guards Brigade advanced on 8 August<br />
to the Galijaši - Donji Žirovac line, where it linked up with part of the 505 th Brigade of<br />
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Its tactical group cut the Glina - Obljaj - Žirovac road and pushed<br />
on to Šibine - Hajetić - Donja Buzeta - Svračica. 387 On 10 August, aft er the offi cial end of<br />
the operation, parts of the brigade advanced without combat via Donji Žirovac - Komora<br />
- Grmušani to Dvor na Uni. 388 On the following day parts of the brigade, aft er passing<br />
through Donji Dobretin and Gornji Dobretin, linked up at the village of Ivanjska with the<br />
ARBiH and thereby practically completed their involvement in the operation. 389 During<br />
384 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (KninFell in Belgrade), 218-219, 236.<br />
385 According to the data of the ZZP Zagreb Intelligence Department, the HV 151st and 145th Brigade entered<br />
Dvor between 1800 and 1900 hours. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, Intelligence Dept., cl. 81/95-02/01,<br />
reg. no. 1075-10/95-63 of 8 August 1995.<br />
386 MORH, GSHV: APO 8314, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8314-01/01-2-95-184 of 5 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 030-01/95-01, reg. no. 3002-01/95-1452 of 6 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
MORH, GSHV: APO 3008, cl. 818-01/95-01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Observations.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/03, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213/1 of 13 September 1995; Analysis. M.<br />
Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 218-219, 227.<br />
387 MORG, GSHV: 2nd Guards Brigade, 12 August 1995; information on combat along the main line of attack.<br />
MORH, GSHV: TG commander, 12 August 1995; TG action report.<br />
388 MORH, GSHV: 2nd Guards Brigade, 12 August 1995; information on combat along the main line of attack.<br />
389 Ibid.<br />
125
advance the fl anks and the rear of the 2 nd Guards Brigade were occasionally secured by the<br />
140 th and 12 th Home Guard Regiments and the HV 148 th Brigade. From 6 August to the<br />
end of the operation two battalions of the 140 th Home Guard Regiment were continuously<br />
subordinated to the 2 nd Guards Brigade and responsible for holding the battle position and<br />
securing the fl anks. 390<br />
Aft er its involvement in the liberation of Petrinja, the 12 th Home Guard Regiment was<br />
engaged in the securing of the area along the line of advance of the HV 2 nd Guards Brigade.<br />
During 8 August the regiment was transferred to the Vratnik pass - village of Žirovac, and<br />
along the Dragotina- Donji Klasnić road. Over the next two days the regiment pushed on to<br />
the state border at Donji Žirovac - Matijevići, where it established contact with the ARBiH<br />
5 th Corps. 391<br />
During the greater part of the operation the HV 148 th Brigade (minus one battalion) was<br />
in the HV General Staff reserve. On 9 August it was deployed in the villages of Veliki Šušnjar<br />
and Martinovići, where one battalion was subordinated to the 2 nd Guards Brigade in the<br />
village of Donji Klasnić. Until 11 August it was engaged in the mopping-up and sweeping of<br />
the villages of Donji Klasnić, Kozaperovica and Gradac Mali, aft er which it was pulled back<br />
from the Banovina and demobilized. 392<br />
Most of the units committed to the liberation of Petrinja and Kostajnica were engaged<br />
in the sweeping of (mount) Zrinska Gora. On 8 August units of the 57 th Brigade reached<br />
via Moštanica, Jabukovac and the village of Miočinovići the area of Zrinska Gora at the<br />
Šamarica Lodge. Because of about 20,000 refugees on the Žirovac - Dvor road the brigade<br />
halted its advance. One day later it liberated the villages of Rujevac and Bešlinac and on 10<br />
August reached the state border at Majdan - Kolabin Jarak - Makarovača. 393<br />
Aft er crossing the Knezovljani - Kostajnica road, the 101 st Brigade swept the north-eastern<br />
slopes of Zrinska Gora. By 1900 hours on 9 August it reached Trgovi - Grmušani - Vanjići,<br />
and one day later Ljubina - Sočanica - Kotarani and linked up with the ARBiH 5 th Corps<br />
at Kotarani. 394 Th e 103 rd Brigade was also engaged several days in sweeping operations of<br />
Zrinska Gora. Aft er the mopping up of the eastern part of Zrinska Gora the brigade was<br />
deployed along the state border on the river Una from the village of Zamlača to Volinje. 395<br />
Aft er the liberation of Dvor na Uni units of the 17 th Home Guard Regiment and of the<br />
145 th and 151 st Brigades were responsible for the sweeping of the area, linkup with the ARBiH<br />
5 th Corps and securing the state border in the area of the Municipality of Dvor na Uni. 396<br />
390 MORH, GSHV: APO 1106, cl. 8/95-01/49, reg. no. 1106-02-95-2 of 5 September 1995; Report. MORH,<br />
GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95/01/3, reg. no. 1075-12/95r-213 of 22 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
391 MORH, GSHV: APO 8252, cl. 81/05-95/02, reg. no. 8258-06/95-60 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
392 MORH, GSHV: APO 3005, cl. 81/95-01, reg. no. 3005-01/1-95-80 of 4 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
393 MORH, GSHV: APO 3099, cl. 119-01/95-01, reg. no. 3099-01/95-092/1 of 13 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
394 MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl. 8/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/95-733 of 6 September 1995; Analysis of action<br />
in operation Storm.<br />
395 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/95, reg. no. 2125-02-95-66 of 1 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
396 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/3, reg. no. 1075-12/95-13 of 22 August 1995; Analysis. MORH,<br />
GSHV: APO 8314, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 8314-01/01-2-95-184 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
MORH, GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 030/95-01, reg. no. 3002-01/95-1451 of 6 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
126
5 th Corps and HHAnother group of units from the 153 rd Brigade, the 20 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment, the 102 nd Brigade and the 140 th Home Guard Regiment swept the<br />
greater area of Glina, fronting the encircled Kordun Corps, and (mount) Petrova Gora.<br />
Aft er 11 August the 153 rd Brigade and the 20 th Home Guard Regiment secured the state<br />
border. 397<br />
On 10 August in the aft ernoon the command of the Zagreb Corps District reported to<br />
the HV General Staff that its forces “had fully accomplished their missions and reached<br />
the state border of the Republic of Croatia”. 398 On 11 August the positions of the 1 st<br />
Guards Brigade were also taken over. 399 Th e two-day mopping up action of Zrinska Gora<br />
in order to eliminate SVK remnants started on 12 August. 400 Some of the ZP Zagreb units<br />
mopped up the area along the state border and secured the liberated area. 401 (Mount)<br />
Croatian troops (Guardsmen) at Budičina<br />
397 MORH, GSHV: War diary of the 140th Home Guard Reg. aft er 8 Aug. 1995. MORH, GSHV: HV 102nd<br />
Brigade CP, D cl. 8/95-01/36, reg. no. 2124-03/1-95-21 of 17 August 1995; Action report. MORH, GSHV:<br />
ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/03, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213 of 22 August 1995; Analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO<br />
8259, cl. 81/95-01/08, reg. no. 8259-01/95-40 of 5 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
398 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-1-Sisak, cl. 8/95-01/49, reg. no. 1075-IZpM- 1-95-139 of 10 August<br />
1995; Report.<br />
399 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80/-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-464 of 11 August 1995; Order.<br />
400 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-2 Dvor, cl. 8/95-01/12, reg. no. 1075-NZpM-2/95-11 of 12 August<br />
1995; Order.<br />
401 MORH, GSHV: APO 3010, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 3010-01/95-014 of 12 August 1995; Operational daily<br />
report. MORH, GSHV: APO 8252, cl. 81/05-95/02, reg. no. 8258-06/95-28 of 5 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81/95-0/01, reg. no. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Action<br />
analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl. 81/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Order.<br />
127
Petrova Gora, swept by the MUP RH Special Police, was blocked jointly with the forces of<br />
the Karlovac Corps District until 14 August. 402 Aft er mopping up, on 13 August some units<br />
began to leave the former battlefi eld and return to their home stations, where they were<br />
given a hearty welcome followed by demobilization. 403<br />
128<br />
Conclusion<br />
In terms of its place in the theatre, the Zagreb Corps District (ZZP) occupied a special<br />
place in the Croatian Army. It was larger and stronger than the other corps districts and,<br />
because of the large number of its units, part of them was attached to other corps districts.<br />
According to the order of battle, it was to be reinforced with several HV General Staff units,<br />
among which the 81 st Guards Battalion was particularly signifi cant. However, the Corps<br />
did not receive this and some other reinforcements. Th e plan had to be modifi ed, and units<br />
of the Bjelovar Corps District committed on the Jasenovac - Hrvatska Kostajnica axis as<br />
compensation for the missing reinforcements.<br />
Th e success of the Zagreb Corps District in operation Storm was below expectations.<br />
However, the blame does not seem to lie only with the missing reinforcements. On the very<br />
fi rst day of the operation parts of the 2 nd Guards Brigade got stuck in the assault on Petrinja.<br />
Th e halt of the brigade had an adverse eff ect on the subsequent course of the operation for<br />
the whole Corps District. 404 Th e magnitude of the crisis called for the personal intervention<br />
of the President of the Republic who appointed a new commander of the Croatian forces in<br />
the region of Banovina. Th e report sent by the Chief of the HV General Staff to the President<br />
of the Republic stated that “in breaking through the defences along the Sisak - Petrinja axis,<br />
wrong judgments and wrong manoeuvring decisions of the ZZP commander occasioned<br />
unnecessary casualties and disrupted morale. Th e subsequently achieved success aft er the<br />
arrival and decisions of General Stipetić was not fully exploited because the two-day delay<br />
allowed the withdrawal of a considerable part of the materiel of the 39 th Banija Corps and<br />
the SVK Special Unit Corps”. 405<br />
402 MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
403 MORH, GSHV: APO 2125, cl. 8/95-01/95, reg. no. 2125-02-95-66 of 1 September 1995; Analysis. MORH,<br />
GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 3002-01-90/95-64 of 12 August 1995; Daily report. MORH, GSHV:<br />
ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-Sisak cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 1075-IZpM-1/95-189 of 13 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: APO 3002, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 3002-01-90/95-67 of 14 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: ZZP<br />
Zagreb, cl. 801-02/95-02/76, reg. no. 1075-11/95-2 of 13 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: APO 3008,<br />
cl. 818-01/95-01, reg. no. 3008-01/95-559 of 4 August 1995; Observations. MORH, GSHV: APO 2123, cl.<br />
8/95-01, reg. no. 2123-02/2-95-733/2 of 6 September 1995; Action analysis. MORH, GSHV: APO 3006, cl.<br />
8/95-01/4, reg. no. 3006-07-95-1059 of 4 September 1995; Action analysis.<br />
404 CIA analysts fi nd the cause of HV’s problems in the assault on Petrinja in the decision of the ZPZ commander<br />
to use the 2nd Guards Brigade in order to attack the town directly instead, as originally planned, to<br />
have it bypass and encircle the town. Because of this several HV tanks were knocked out on the approaches<br />
to Petrinja by the SVK 31th Infantry Brigade and thus barred infantry from gaining any signifi cant footholds<br />
in the town. According to the Americans, the secondary attack towards Kostajnica also gained little or<br />
no ground, and only the 125th Home Guard Regiment did a better job as it pushed towards Hrvatska Dubica<br />
along the Una river. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1900-1995; 370.<br />
405 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-595 of 21 August 1995; Report.
As a whole, all its initial problems notwithstanding, ZP Zagreb accomplished its<br />
mission. During Storm it was probably the weakest operational unit of the HV. 406 Poor<br />
and uncoordinated command also distinguished the other side, the SVK Banija Corps.<br />
Because of Croatian oversights in the fi ghting around Petrinja the general impression<br />
of the worth of the Banija Corps and its 31 st Motorized Brigade is higher than its actual<br />
performance. 407 During the operation the casualties of the Zagreb Corps District totalled<br />
80 dead, 380 wounded and 16 missing men. 408<br />
Th e Encirclement and Surrender of the Kordun Corps<br />
On 5 August in the early evening the main body of the Kordun Corps along with part of<br />
the population of the Kordun region was semi-encircled by the Croatian forces. Th e road<br />
towards Lika was cut, and the communication leading via Glina to Dvor na Uni could<br />
be easily threatened. General Mile Novaković, commander of the Serbian forces in the<br />
regions of Kordun and Banovina, ordered the command of the Kordun Corps to reduce<br />
its defence lines and set up positions on the right bank of the river Koran from Skrad to<br />
Tržić. Th e Kordun Coordinating Committee, which sat in session since 4 August as the<br />
government authority, decided to evacuate the population towards Vojnić - Vrginmost -<br />
Glina - Dvor, fearing that Croatian forces could enter Glina and cut the road. As planned,<br />
Glina would be protected by deploying the 2 nd Armoured Brigade of the Special Units<br />
Corps and one company of the 19 th Infantry Brigade at Viduševac. Only the company<br />
executed the order, while the armoured brigade proceeded towards Dvor na Uni. During<br />
the day Croatian and Bosniak forces split the SVK Kordun and Lika Corps entirely at<br />
Rakovica and the Plitvice Lakes. Late on 6 August the Croatian forces entered Glina, and<br />
the main body of the Kordun Corps with about 35,000 civilians remained encircled in<br />
the greater area of Topusko. Th e Corps command applied to UNCRO for protection. 409<br />
Th e HV General Staff intended to commit the 1 st Guards Brigade against the Kordun<br />
Corps. On 6 August in the aft ernoon the brigade was ordered to prepare for the assault<br />
along the Cetingrad - Johovo - Vojnić axis in order to crush Serbian forces, liberate<br />
Vojnić and push on to Topusko, and set up active defence there. 410 Th e Chief of the HV<br />
General Staff halted all off ensive operations against the Serbian forces aft er midnight<br />
406 General Stipetić does not agree with this assessment before thorough research required for it is carried<br />
out. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZPZ in the military-police operation<br />
Storm. In evaluating the action of ZPZ in Storm, believes General Tus, due account should be taken of<br />
the fact that the mistakes committed on the fi rst day were corrected the next day and had no eff ect on the<br />
course of the operation or on its outcome, because by the end of the second day the situation proceeded as<br />
planned in the region of Banovina as well. HMDCDR: General Tus’s review of the text on the military-police<br />
operation Storm.<br />
407 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 239-240.<br />
408 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/3, reg. no. 1075-12/95-213/1 of 13 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
409 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 216-217.<br />
410 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-420 of 6 August 1995; Order.<br />
129
in the night of 6/7 August and ordered Croatian forces to establish a cease-fi re at 0600<br />
hours in the area of Vojnić - Vrginmost - Glina - Kostajnica - Dvor na Uni. On the<br />
basis of contacts with UNCRO representatives, it was felt that the surrender of Serbian<br />
forces in the Banovina region was a matter of course. According to sources, the Zagreb<br />
Corps District was ordered to prepare a brigade-strong unit, to seize Dvor na Uni<br />
by 0700 accompanied by UNCRO, and to allow only unarmed persons - offi cers and<br />
non-commissioned offi cers would be allowed handguns - to cross into Bosnia and<br />
Herzegovina. All other weapons and materiel were to be handed over to the HV in the<br />
presence of UNCRO. 411<br />
Soon it transpired that this ‘scenario’ would not get off the ground. Th e Serbian side<br />
did not “respect the agreed conditions related to the cease-fi re in the region of Banovina<br />
and the surrender of weapons and military equipment”, and on 7 August in the morning<br />
the Chief of the HV General Staff revoked the cease-fi re order and ordered continuation<br />
of action “in order to eliminate the enemy in Banovina and push on to the state border<br />
of the Republic of Croatian in accordance with earlier orders”. Th e order called attention<br />
to the observance and respect of the Geneva Convention in the treatment of POWs and<br />
civilians. Th e commanders of the Karlovac and Bjelovar Corps Districts, and General<br />
Stipetić, were to be responsible for the execution of the mission. 412 Croatian forces were<br />
prepared to negotiate only in the case of unconditional surrender. 413 However, on the<br />
basis of the order of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman, combat<br />
actions by the Croatian forces were halted in the aft ernoon of 8 August. 414 Soon thereaft er<br />
the news was received that the Kordun Corps had agreed to unconditional surrender<br />
and that General Stipetić was “engaged in technical preparations for the surrender”. 415<br />
Negotiations on the surrender of the Corps started at 1320 hours in the command of the<br />
Ukrainian battalion in Glina, in the presence of UNCRO representatives. Surrender was<br />
signed at about 1400 hours in the Brijuni hotel near Topusko. Croatia was represented by<br />
General Petar Stipetić, and the Serbian side by Colonel Čedo Bulat and Tošo Pajić, RSK<br />
minister of the interior. 416 On the same day in the evening a second meeting was held<br />
411 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-420 of 7 August 1995; Order. General<br />
Stipetić noted that he had never received such an order and that the surrender of all weapons of the<br />
defeated adversary was insisted upon in the negotiations. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić<br />
on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
412 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08 reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-421 of 7 August 1995; Order. Contrary<br />
to the source, General Stipetić stated that he had not been informed about the order and that it could<br />
have been received by General Basarac. HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about<br />
the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
413 MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 347 of 8 August 1995. Just as in the case of the previous<br />
order, General Stipetić claimed that he had never received such an order. HMDCDR: Comments of<br />
General Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation Storm.<br />
414 MORH, GSHV: OS RH War diary, note 350 of 8 August 1995.<br />
415 MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 353 of 8 August 1995.<br />
416 MORH, GSHV: Minutes of the surrender of the 21st Kordun Corps, 8 August 1995.<br />
130
in Glina in order to specify the obligations of both sides and details of the surrender. 417<br />
It was agreed that the Kordun Corps would hand over all its weapons and equipment;<br />
however, offi cers of the defeated army were allowed to retain their hand arms in order to<br />
keep order in their ranks. Withdrawal was agreed along the line Topusko - Glina - Sisak<br />
- Lipovac (motorway). Croatian authorities were obliged to ensure undisturbed and safe<br />
passage. 418<br />
Th e surrender of the Corps was completed on 8 August, and weapon collection began<br />
on 9 August at 0800. 419 Th e undisciplined behaviour of some HV troops at Topusko<br />
hampered surrender, but they were quickly put in order. 420 Aft er the surrender of the<br />
Corps, Military Police units in cooperation with the MUP RH civil police secured the<br />
line of movement for the troops of the Corps and civilians from Topusko via Glina -<br />
Petrinja - Sisak - Popovača - Lipovac (motorway) from 1500 hours on 9 August until<br />
1615 on 12 August. Th ere were 16 columns with 1600 cars, 129 trucks, 30 buses, 1436<br />
tractors and about 13,000 persons. In Sisak stones were thrown on the column on two<br />
occasions and, according to the analysis, one HV soldier used his weapon - with no<br />
consequences. 421<br />
417 MORH, GSHV: Minutes of the meeting between the representatives of the Croatian Army and civil authorities<br />
with the representatives of the 21st Kordun Corps in the presence of UNCRO, EM and UNHCR<br />
representatives on 8 August 1995.<br />
418 MORH, GSHV: Agreement on the surrender of the 21st Corps, 8 August 1995.<br />
419 As recorded in the war diary, surrender started at 0920 on 9 August, and lasted through the next day.<br />
MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 371 of 9 August 1995; MORH, GSHV: OS RH General<br />
Staff , War diary, note 399 of 10 August 1995.<br />
420 MORH, GSHV: OS RH General Staff , War diary, note 399 of 10 August 1995.<br />
421 MORH, GSHV: Military Police Directorate, cl. SP-80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19-01-95-632 of 16 September<br />
1995; Analysis.<br />
131
Colonel Čedo Bulat, commander of the 21 st Kordun Corps of the so-called Army of the Serbian Krajina<br />
(SVK) signs the surrender to the Croatian armed forces on 8 August 1995.<br />
132<br />
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF<br />
SERBIAN SIDE OF THE CROATIAN ARMY<br />
1. Commander of the 21 st 1.Lieutetant General Petar<br />
Kordun Corps Stipetić<br />
Colonel Čedo Bulat<br />
2. Tošo Pajić 2. Brigadier Vlado Hodalj<br />
3.Commander of the 11 th Brig. 3. Lieutenant Miroslav Vidović<br />
of the 21 st Kordun Corps<br />
Colonel Dragan Kovačić<br />
Glina, 8 August 1995<br />
WITNESSED BY:<br />
Commander of UNCRO, Sector North<br />
Colonel Col Mokrents<br />
Signatures on the “Agreement on surrender of the 21 st Corps”
Croatian troops pushing on towards Dubica, 4 August 1995 (photograph by: Željko Gašparović)<br />
133
134<br />
BJELOVAR CORPS DISTRICT<br />
Aft er successful participation in Operation Flash (Bljesak) the Bjelovar Corps<br />
District (ZP Bjelovar) was committed to the protection of the state border of the<br />
Republic of Croatia along the rivers Una and Sava. Th e latest defence order was<br />
signed in mid-July 1995. 422 Th e defence mission was in force until 2 August when the Chief<br />
of the HV General Staff issued a verbal order concerning the engagement of the Bjelovar<br />
Corps District in the liberation of the Banovina region within the scope of Storm. 423<br />
For this mission the Bjelovar Corps District was reinforced with the 121 st Home Guard<br />
Regiment from the Osijek Corps District, the 125 th Home Guard Regiment and a battalion<br />
of the 202 nd Artillery-Rocket Air Defence Brigade from the Zagreb Corps District. Aft er<br />
the forced crossing of the river Sava with strong artillery support, the ZPB was to eliminate<br />
the enemy on the right bank and push on with its main body to Jasenovac - Dubica; an<br />
auxiliary line of advance, Orahova - Dubica, was supposed to liberate Dubica and reach<br />
the Dubica - Sunja road. Aft er the commitment of the operational reserve, the assault was<br />
to be sustained in the valley of the river Una along the Dubica - Kostajnica and Dubica -<br />
Sunja axes until linkup with forces of the Zagreb Corps District. In the fi rst stage of the<br />
operation the Sava was crossed by the HV 125 th Home Guard Regiment, the main body<br />
of the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment and the HV 34 th Engineer Battalion. Th e plan for the<br />
second phase of the assault envisioned the commitment of a battle group comprising the<br />
24 th Home Guard Regiment and a battalion of the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment. Th e 121 st<br />
Home Guard Regiment was to organize persistent and decisive defence of the state border<br />
from the confl uence of the Mali Strug canal with the river Sava to Davor. One battalion<br />
would be kept in reserve for other combat missions.<br />
Field guns from the 18 th Artillery Battalion and a 105 mm howitzer battery from the<br />
121 st Home Guard Regiment were engaged as the artillery support group. It was deployed<br />
in the Plesmo - Sušije - Orahovo Polje area for the neutralization of hostile artillery,<br />
manpower and fi re systems. Th e organic units of the committed forces were responsible<br />
for anti-armour combat. A battalion of the 202 nd Air Defence Artillery-Rocket Brigade<br />
and air defence platoons in the Home Guard regiments provided air defence. All the units<br />
were responsible for engineer operations, in particular the 34 th Engineer Battalion, with<br />
focus on security of movement, placement of obstacles and fortifi cation of the state border.<br />
Th e commander of the Corps District was Major-General Luka Džanko. 424<br />
422 MORH, GSHV, ZZP Bjelovar, Bjelovar, 14 July 1995 - Operational defence order.<br />
423 MORH, GSHV: Zap. ZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1285 of 13 September 1995; Assessment.<br />
424 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1053 of 2 August 1995; Operational order.
Th e opponent of ZP Bjelovar in the Banovina region was the main body of the<br />
26 th Infantry Brigade of the SVK Banija Corps, and in Bosnia&Herzegovina the 11 th<br />
Dubica Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska which, according to the promise of<br />
its commander before the operation, was supposed to provide help in the form of one<br />
company at Dubica - Rosulje. 425<br />
Aft er receiving the operational order the ZP Bjelovar Command and its line units<br />
had only 30 hours to prepare for action. Aft er two mobilization runs in the evening of 3<br />
August the units were deployed in the planned area. 426 At 0300 on 4 August all the units<br />
to be committed in the fi rst and second echelon were ready for their missions. 427 Th e<br />
signal at 0530 marked the start of artillery preparation engaging the Serbian front and<br />
in-depth line of defence, aft er which the units mounted their assault as planned. 428<br />
Aft er the successful forced crossing of the river Sava at Krapje and Klenov Bok near<br />
Jasenovac, two battalions of the HV 125 th Home Guard Regiment pushed on towards<br />
Višnjica - village of Uštica - village of Tanac - Dubica and the village of Predore - village of<br />
Donji Cerovljani - Dubica. At Višnjica Serbian forces halted for a short time the advance<br />
of part of the regiment. Aft er breaking down Serbian resistance, the regiment liberated<br />
the villages of Višnjica, Predore, Uštica and Tanac. Th is allowed the commitment of the<br />
second battle echelon, a company of the 125 th Home Guard Regiment, a battalion of<br />
the ome Huard Rgime52nd Home Guard Regiment, the 265 th Reconnaissance-Sabotage<br />
Company and, somewhat later, the battle group of the 14th Home Guard Regiment.<br />
By the evening parts of the 115 th Home Guard Regiment reached the village of Donji<br />
Cerovljani and the railway, where they were stopped and set up defensive positions. 429<br />
Th e 52 nd Home Guard Regiment had to tie up parts of the forces of the Army of<br />
Republika Srpska, leaving one battalion in reserve for ZP Bjelovar. Th e reconnaissance<br />
platoon of the regiment crossed the river Sava at Mala Ciperna, cut the Orahova - Bosanska<br />
Dubica road and allowed the commitment of two infantry companies towards the village<br />
of Orahova. Aft er intersecting the Bosanska Gradiška - Orahova - Bosanska Dubica road<br />
these forces withdrew to the territory of the Republic of Croatia. 430 In the assessment of<br />
the ZPO Bjelovar Command this manoeuvre “misdirected the attention of the enemy,<br />
which failed to detect the main line of our attack”. 431 In the region of Banovina, aft er<br />
425 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade).<br />
426 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1072 of 3 August 1995; Report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-1285 of 13 September 1995; Evaluation<br />
of performance in the off ensive operation Storm.<br />
427 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZpM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-510 of 4 August 1995.<br />
428 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZpM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-512 of 4 August 1995.<br />
429 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-518 of 4 August 1995; Report. MORH,<br />
GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-520 of 4 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV:<br />
ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-526 of 4 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar,<br />
APO 2147, cl. 8-/95-01/140, reg. no. 2147-01-95-39/1 of 14 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
430 MORH, GSHV: APO 4822 Daruvar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 8222-02-95-19 of 14 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
431 MORH, GSHV: APO 2147, cl. 8-/95-01/40, reg. no. 2147-04/95-526 of 14 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
135
the 125 th Home Guard Regiment captured the villages of Uštica and Višnjica, at 1600<br />
a battalion of the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment and the 265 th Reconnaissance-Sabotage<br />
Company were committed at Tanac - Dubica. By 21.00 hours these units seized the Jelas<br />
and Željezara (ironworks) plants east of Donji Cerovljani. 432<br />
In the fi rst phase of the operation the battle group of the 24 th Home Guard Regiment<br />
was part of the ZP Bjelovar reserve, while in the second it was to secure the left fl ank of<br />
the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment in the assault against Jasenovac - Hrvatska Dubica. Th e<br />
group was committed at 1930 from Jasenovac towards Tanac, linked up at about 2100<br />
with one battalion of the 52nd Home Guard Regiment and stopped for the night along<br />
the Tanac - Crne Grede road. 433<br />
ZP Bjelovar completed the fi rst day of the operation in an impressive way. Th at was<br />
undoubtedly the reason why it was ordered by the HV General Staff , in the night of<br />
4 August, to liberate Hrvatska Dubica the following day and support, “by vigorous<br />
intervention along the valley of the river Una and the Dubica - Rausovac road”, the<br />
assault of ZP Zagreb towards Sunja - Kostajnica. 434 At the time it was already clear that<br />
the Jasenovac - Dubica - Kostajnica assault axis pursued by ZP Bjelovar had become the<br />
central line of action of the Croatian forces in the Banovina region because of the hitch<br />
in the zone of responsibility of the Zagreb Corps District. 435<br />
“Driven back by strong artillery fi re” in the night of 4 August the enemy withdrew<br />
together with civilians from Hrvatska Dubica across the river Una to Bosanska Dubica.<br />
A battalion of the 52nd Home Guard Regiment and the battle group of the 24 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment entered the empty and undefended town from the northeast, and<br />
the 125 th Home Guard Regiment from the north. A battalion of the 52 nd Home Guard<br />
Regiment and the battle group of the 24 th Home Guard Regiment sustained their attack,<br />
while security and the defence of Dubica and the state border on the river Una were<br />
taken over by the HV 125 th Home Guard Regiment. 436<br />
Th e battalion of the HV 52 nd Home Guard Regiment pushed on from Dubica towards<br />
Živaja - Šaš, the area of planned linkup with forces of the Zagreb Corps District. Th ere<br />
was no linkup, and later in the evening the battalion reached the access to the village of<br />
Šaš. 437<br />
Th e battle group of the 24 th Home Guard Regiment advanced from Dubica towards<br />
Rusovac and Kostajnica. Th e group reached the village of Baćin, where it ran into stiff<br />
432 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-518 of 4 August 1995; Report.<br />
433 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04/95-5268 of 4 August 1995; Report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: APO 2147, cl. 8/95-01/140, reg. no. 2147-01-95-39/1 of 14 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
434 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-384 of 5 August 1995; Order.<br />
435 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
436 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95 of 5 August 1995; Report. MORH,<br />
GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
437 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95 of 5 August 1995; Report. MORH,<br />
GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-534 of 5 August 1995; Report.<br />
136
esistance and fi re from Bosnia&Herzegovina; “it returned fi re, but was unable to continue<br />
and fortifi ed the achieved line”. 438<br />
Because of the lost momentum in the attack from Dubica towards Baćin - Kostajnica the<br />
command of the Bjelovar Corps District decided to use one battalion and the reconnaissance<br />
platoon of the HV 121 st Home Guard Regiment for the liberation of Kostajnica. In the<br />
aft ernoon these forces were transferred from Nova Gradiška to Hrvatska Dubica, where<br />
they rested for the night. 439<br />
Th e ZP Bjelovar objective for 6 August was Hrvatska Kostajnica. Th e brunt was to be<br />
borne by a reinforced battalion of the 121 st Home Guard Regiment attacking towards<br />
Rosulja - Čaire - Kostajnica and Kaluđer - Tadić Kosa - Kostajnica. Aft er liberating the<br />
village of Slabinje the battalion battled its way through the village of Čaire, and entered<br />
Kostajnica at about 1700 hours aft er running into “weak but constant resistance of the<br />
remaining” Serbian forces. 440<br />
Th e battalion of the 121 st Home Guard Regiment was followed by the battle group of<br />
the 24 th Home Guard Regiment which seized and secured the state border from Hrvatska<br />
Dubica to Šuplji Kamen. 441<br />
At 1200 on 6 August parts of the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment linked up by the Slovinci<br />
railway station with units of the Zagreb Corps District. Aft er linkup the regiment pushed<br />
on from Slovinci towards Raušovac - Selište - Kostajnica, its objectives being the liberation<br />
of Kostajnica and the securing of the state border on the river Una. In the aft ernoon it took<br />
the village of Utolica and Rausovac, and linked up with ZP Zagreb at Selište Kostajničko. In<br />
the evening the regiment entered Kostajnica and spent the night there. 442<br />
By liberating Kostajnica ZP Bjelovar completed the off ensive part of its operation. It<br />
now had to consolidate the achieved line, secure the state border and mop up the liberated<br />
areas between the rivers Sava and Una. During its three-day action the Bjelovar Corps<br />
District had 7 men killed, 7 severely wounded and 15 lightly wounded. 443 Aft er the off ensive<br />
operations the Corps District took over the securing of the state border with its 125 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment from the village of Uštica to Dubica; the battle group of the 24 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment secured the Čaire - Rosulja line, and the 52 nd Home Guard Regiment<br />
was pulled back from Kostajnica to the Šaš - Živaja area where it was stationed as the<br />
operational reserve of ZP Bjelovar. 444<br />
438 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-532 of 5 August 1995; Report.<br />
439 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 818-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-05-95-435 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
440 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZPM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-547 of 6 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZPM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-550 of 6 August<br />
1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06--05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
441 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
442 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZPM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95 of 6 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
443 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZPM Novska, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-558 of 6 August 1995;<br />
Report.<br />
444 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar IZpM Novska, cl. 8J0-01/95-02/02, reg. no. 1077-04-95-564 of 7 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
137
138<br />
Conclusion<br />
Th e Bjelovar Corps District was not originally planned for Operation Storm. Aft er<br />
Operation Flash it was entrusted with the organization of the system for state border<br />
defence on the river Sava. It received its mission concerning involvement in Storm on 2<br />
August. Th e time was not suffi cient for adequate troop preparation, and the execution<br />
implied a high degree of risk. Th e precondition for the successful start of the mission<br />
was the forced crossing of the river, which posed an additional diffi culty for the Corps<br />
District. In spite of all this, the HV 125 th Home Guard Regiment crossed the Sava<br />
successfully. “Th e forced crossing was executed disregarding all rules by using a small<br />
number of assault craft ”. Th at was the hardest part of the mission aft er which the Corps<br />
District, notwithstanding the problem of its exposed fl anks, penetrated 43 km into enemy<br />
territory. Since it was committed at the eleventh hour and since it performed almost the<br />
major role in the Banovina theatre although it was originally envisioned as an auxiliary<br />
force, the Bjelovar Corps District is one of the most gallant units in Operation Storm. In<br />
the operation 8 HV troops were killed and 42 wounded. 445<br />
445 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, cl. 80-01/95-02/01, reg. no. 1077-04-05-95-1285 of 13 September 1995;<br />
Assessment.
THE AIR FORCE IN STORM<br />
The basic mission of the Croatian Air Force (HRZ) in the off ensive operation was air<br />
defence, focused particularly on the Zagreb -Karlovac - Sisak - Kutina area, air support<br />
of ground forces of the committed corps districts, reconnaissance, and airlift ing of<br />
troops and wounded HV members. 446 Th e entire Air Force was engaged in the operation: 17<br />
combat aircraft , 5 combat helicopters, 9 transport helicopters, 3 transport aircraft , one An-2<br />
aircraft and one Mi-24 helicopter for electronic-thermovision action. Th e forces were deployed<br />
at the air bases of Pleso, Pula, Divulje and Lučko, and the helidromes in Sinj and Požega. Th e<br />
situation in the air space was monitored by ZMIN (Air Surveillance and Guidance System)<br />
units, particularly in the sectors Kutina - Okučani - Banja Luka; Zagreb - Kupčina - Vrginmost<br />
- Udbina; Valtura - Crna Punta - Udbina; and Zemunik - Bruška - Otočac - Udbina. 447<br />
Execution<br />
Th e fi rst HRZ combat mission was the air strike against fortifi ed Serbian objectives, to be<br />
carried out at exactly 0600 hours on 4 August. 448 On the fi rst day of the operation the HRZ,<br />
according to its own assessment, knocked out the Ćelavac radio-relay node and damaged the<br />
Magačevac radio-relay node, destroyed the command post of the 18 th Infantry Brigade of the<br />
SVK Lika Corps at Bunić, destroyed the command post at Banski Grabovac and neutralized<br />
the Serbian positions at point 160 near Petrinja and point 206 near the confl uence of the<br />
rivers Glina and Kupa. Th irteen MIG-21s were committed in the strikes. Four MIG-21s were<br />
committed to the air defence of the Ivanić Grad - Kutina zone and Sinj. Th ree Mi-8 helicopters<br />
transported 5 severely and 15 lightly wounded troops. Four MIG-21s were damaged in action,<br />
three of them lightly. 449<br />
On 5 August, the second day of the operation, the HRZ knocked out the communications<br />
centre on the Zrinska Gora mountain, neutralized Serbian positions on the hill Generalovo<br />
Brdo near Petrinja, attacked hostile positions and armour at Turanj, destroyed several tanks<br />
and motor vehicles west of Knin on the road near Biovičino Selo, put out of action part of<br />
the equipment in the Udbina Air Base, destroyed a larger number of motor vehicles on the<br />
446 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 26 September<br />
1995; Report.<br />
447 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 17 August<br />
1995; Analysis.<br />
448 GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
449 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 8/95-01/09, reg. no. 3044-14-95-54 of 4 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
139
Batnoga - Cetingrad road and hit the “Stara Straža” depot near Knin. Eleven MiG-21s were<br />
committed in the strikes. An Mi-24 helicopter was engaged successfully for anti-armour<br />
combat: it attacked Serbian positions and armour along the Sisak - Moščenica road. Th e eff ect<br />
of the strike against Serbian armour at Kamensko is not known. Th ree MiG-21s were engaged<br />
for air defence in the Ivanić Grad and Sinj zone. Five Mi-8 helicopters transported 7 wounded<br />
men, 231 troops and 15.5 tons of payload. Five MiG-21s were lightly damaged in action. 450<br />
On 6 August HRZ aircraft destroyed a multiple rocket launcher and several tanks in the<br />
area between Babina Gora and Velika Brda, neutralized a number of tanks at Marinbrod,<br />
neutralized a command post and mortar positions at Brezova Glava, and destroyed a bridge at<br />
Mala Glina. An Mi-24 anti-armour helicopter destroyed 2 tanks north of Slunj at the hamlet<br />
of Kozlina. Two MiG-21s patrolled the Ivanić Grad zone, but failed to intercept two lowfl<br />
ying Republika Srpska aircraft because of heavy haze. Th ree Mi-8 helicopters transported 19<br />
wounded troops and 2.5 tons of payload. 451<br />
On the fourth day of the operation, 7 August, the HRZ reported the neutralization of the<br />
command post at Srb, the destruction of several tanks at Medeno Polje near Bosanski Petrovac<br />
and the destruction of a depot in Lička Kaldrma. 452 Th e aircraft also carried out a demonstration<br />
overfl ight of Serbian units refusing to surrender in the area of Topusko - Žirovec. 453<br />
Th e last HRZ action took place on 8 August. It reported the destruction of several tanks on<br />
the Bosanski Novi railway station and the destruction of a small armoured column at Svodne<br />
on the Bosanski Novi - Prijedor road. Two MiG-21s were lightly damaged. 454<br />
Th e impact of the SVK Air Force and Air Defence was insignifi cant. Its main units were the<br />
105 th Air Brigade and the Air Defence 44 th Rocket Brigade. Th e Air Brigade was supposed to<br />
support the North Dalmatian and the Lika Corps. Helicopters were prepared for anti-armour<br />
action on call. On the fi rst day of Storm the brigade carried out several strikes against Croatian<br />
forces on Mount Dinara and against Gospić. On 5 August it began to move to the VRS Zalužani<br />
airport near Banja Luka and completed the operation by the evening on 6 August. 455<br />
Th e SVK Air Force and Air Defence focused on protecting Knin, the Udbina airbase and the<br />
Special Unit Corps at Slunj. One rocket battalion of the Air Defence 44 th Rocket Brigade was<br />
deployed in the area of Šamarica and prepared the attack on Sisak, Sunja and Nebojan; aft er<br />
the start of Storm, it fi red eight rockets on these localities. Th ose were also the last rockets<br />
fi red. According to Serbian sources, the Croatian Air Force did not manage to reach the<br />
area protected by the KUB-M rocket system. 456<br />
450 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 8/95-01/09, reg. no. 3044-14-95-62 of 5 August 1995; Regular battle<br />
report.<br />
451 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 8/95-01/09, reg. no. 3044-14-95-81 of 6 August 1995; Regular battle<br />
report.<br />
452 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 17 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
453 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 8/95-01/09, reg. no. 3044-14-95-101 of 7 August 1995; Report.<br />
454 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 8/95-01/09, reg. no. 3044-14-95-106 of 8 August 1995; Analysis. MORH,<br />
GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 17 August 1995; Analysis.<br />
455 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 240-245.<br />
456 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 242-246. In his overview of Storm Sekulić frequently<br />
claimed that NATO had helped the Croatian armed forces. Th ere is no proof supporting such a claim, and it only refl ects<br />
a world view which saw an anti-Serbian conspiracy in everything.<br />
140
Conclusion<br />
Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Defence participated in Operation Storm with “all<br />
their forces, and operated from all airports and air strips in the Republic of Croatia”. 457<br />
In its combat overview, the Air Force Command stated that “the Air Force had a decisive<br />
and in some parts of the theatre even a crucial impact on the outcome of operation by its<br />
actions against enemy communications centres, command posts and depots, and, later<br />
on, by fi re support of HV and police units”. 458<br />
Th e assessment may appear to be exaggerated, but the main mission was accomplished<br />
because the Air Force prevented all signifi cant action by Serbian aircraft from the air<br />
bases at Udbina and Mahovljani near Banja Luka.<br />
Both the Air Force and the Air Defence had no losses either in manpower or aircraft .<br />
Eleven planes were damaged, one of them heavily and disabled for a longer time. Th e<br />
other damage was slight and the aircraft soon resumed their mission. Planned fi re<br />
support was provided by twelve attack MiG-21s and one anti-armour Mi-24; the aircraft<br />
fl ew altogether 67 sorties and delivered 8.6 tons of weapons. Fift een MiG-21s fl ew fi re<br />
support missions on call with 55 sorties and 27.4 tons of weapons. Th e Mi-24 helicopter<br />
fl ew three sorties and delivered seven anti-armour guided rockets, 30 non-guided<br />
rockets and 400 machine-gun rounds. One Mi-24 helicopter, two MiG-21s and one<br />
An-2 fl ew seven air space reconnaissance sorties. Four fi ghter MiG-21s fl ew 50 sorties<br />
on air defence missions. Eleven transport Mi-8 helicopters fl ew 111 sorties, transporting<br />
84.7 tons of payload and 485 troops. 459<br />
MiG-21 of the Croatian Air Force<br />
457 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 17 August<br />
1995; Analysis.<br />
458 MORH, GSHV: HRZ and PZO command, cl. 813-07/95-01/04, reg. no. 3044-14-95-192 of 17 August<br />
1995; Analysis.<br />
459 Ibid.<br />
141
142<br />
ARBiH FIFTH CORPS IN STORM<br />
With their operation Summer-95 the Croatian forces relieved the position of<br />
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Th e Serbian off ensive in July did not continue over<br />
the fi rst three days in August. Attacks were still mounted, but of a much<br />
lower intensity, and 5 th Corps forces began to mount counterattacks. Th e 5 th Corps also<br />
provided its own contribution on the fi rst day of Storm. Part of its forces was also engaged<br />
towards Croatian territory at Bugar - Rakovica and Glodina - Ivanjska - Dvor na Uni.<br />
Two battalions were committed along the Plitvice - Korenica axis with the objective to<br />
link up as quickly as possible with Croatian forces. 460<br />
At the request of the HV General Staff , on 5 August the HVO General Staff informed<br />
the Joint Staff of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia&Herzegovina that ARBiH and<br />
HV forces would link up at the intersection of the Slunj - Ličko Petrovo Selo and Slunj<br />
- Plitvice roads. 461 One day later, on 6 August in the morning, ARBiH and HV forces<br />
linked up for the fi rst time at Rakovica. On the same day, in the confusion created by<br />
Storm the ARBiH dealt for good with the autonomist ambitions of Fikret Abdić and his<br />
armed forces, and thus remained the only Bosniak political and military option in the<br />
theatre. 462<br />
It is advance towards Dvor na Uni the ARBiH 5 th Corps attacked along the Čokovača -<br />
Visoka Glava - Kotorani axis and point 551 - Hleb. Dvor na Uni was defended by the SVK<br />
3 rd Infantry Brigade. Until 6 August it put up an organized defence, which was disrupted<br />
aft er reports that Petrinja and Kostajnica had been liberated. Until late aft ernoon the<br />
brigade held the Žirovac - Dvor line. On 7 August part of the brigade was engaged in the<br />
460 B. Felić, «Peti korpus 1992-1995» (Th e Fift h Corps 1992-1995), 518-520.<br />
461 HR HB, GS HVO, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/03, reg. no. 02-10-03-95-01 of 5 August 1995. According<br />
to the HVO report on Storm, troops of the ARBiH 5th Corps passed Nebljuse and entered the village of<br />
Kruge, 10 km from Donji Lapac, already on 4 August (Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath,<br />
Croatian Helsinki Committee, Zagreb 2001, 16). Aft er the linkup between the HV 1st Guards Brigade and<br />
the ARBiH 502nd Mountain Brigade at Rakovica on 5 August, states the CIA analysis, on 6 August the two<br />
formations were directed to press north towards Slunj, liberated by Croatian forces in the aft ernoon hours.<br />
Petrinja, Kostajnica and Glina were liberated on the same day. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History<br />
of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995, 373. Of course, the ARBiH 502nd Brigade did not participate in the<br />
liberation of Slunj.<br />
462 B. Felić, «Peti korpus 1992-1995» (Th e Fift h Corps 1992-1995), 523-525.
defence of the bridgehead on the river Una and withdrawal to Bosnia&Herzegovina. 463<br />
Th ere was fi erce fi ghting between the ARBiH and the SVK remnants on 8 August at<br />
Žirovac -Dvor na Uni during the withdrawal of the Serbian population and some units<br />
from Kordun and Banovina to Bosnia&Herzegovina. 464<br />
5. Th korpus e ARBiH Armije 5 BiH<br />
th Corps<br />
HV General Marijan Mareković and ARBiH<br />
General HV-a Marijan Marekovi} i general<br />
ABiH<br />
General<br />
Atif<br />
Atif<br />
Dudakovi},<br />
Dudaković<br />
6. kolovoza<br />
at Tržačka<br />
1995.<br />
Raštela<br />
kod<br />
Tr`a~kih on 6 August Ra{tela 1995.<br />
463 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 236. According to CIA analysts, the ARBiH<br />
5th Corps also deserves credit for the Croatian breakout at Petrinja because the ARBiH attack deprived the<br />
SVK Banija Corps of reserves which could have been fed to the Petrinja battle. Of course, they admit that<br />
in time the HV would have broken through the SVK positions even without the help of the ARBiH, but at a<br />
greater cost in manpower and time. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict 1990-<br />
1995, 370. CIA analysts neglected the situation in the remaining parts of the theatre and the fast withdrawal<br />
of other SVK corps, which certainly had a bearing on the action of the SVK Banija Corps. Th ey also underestimated<br />
the performance of the SVK 33rd Infantry Brigade, which held back ARBiH forces for three days.<br />
Accordingly, their assessments about a major contribution of the ARBiH in Banovina are unfounded. Cf. M.<br />
Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 218-219, and B. Felić, «Peti korpus 1992-1995»<br />
(Th e Fift h Corps 1992-1995), 520-521.<br />
464 B. Felić, «Peti korpus 1992-1995» (Th e Fift h Corps 1992-1995), 523-525.<br />
143
Th e Joint Staff of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia&Herzegovina asked the HV<br />
General Staff not to insist on the immediate withdrawal of ARBiH units from the territory<br />
of the Republic of Croatia “until interstate commissions defi ne the state borders, the<br />
future use of the Plješivica radio-relay facility, the Željava airport and other possible<br />
controversial issues”, and to provide, “as early as feasible, an overland corridor for the<br />
delivery of materiel and supplies for the units of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, and to reduce the<br />
required procedure to a minimum”. 465<br />
144<br />
Conclusion<br />
From the standpoint of Croatian state interests the role of the ARBiH 5 th Corps in Storm<br />
was determined by its advantageous position. With its very existence the Corps hampered<br />
the defence of the RSK and facilitated the implementation of Croatian strategic ideas.<br />
In the operation the Corps took advantage of the disarray in Serbian ranks for several<br />
breakthroughs with a promotional rather than a military impact if the overall scope of<br />
the operation is taken into account. Th e only exception was the opportunity to eliminate<br />
Fikret Abdić’s autonomist political and territorial option. Th e 5 th Corps did not miss it.<br />
465 HR HB, GS HVO, cl. str. conf. 818-01/95-02/03, reg. no. 02-10-03-95-143 of 7 August 1995; ARBiH request.
SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION<br />
Osijek Corps District<br />
Th e Osijek Corps District (ZP Osijek) was responsible for the defensive operation<br />
codenamed Fenix. It was supposed to prevent the breakthrough of Serbian forces along the<br />
Šid - Županja and Ernestinovo - Čepin lines, and create conditions for a counteroff ensive<br />
towards Borinačka Kosa - Bobotski Kanal - Trpnja. Almost all the units of the Corps<br />
District - the 3 rd and 5 th Guards Brigades, the 106 th , 108 th , 122 nd , 127 th and 132 nd Brigades,<br />
and the 5 th , 9 th , 10 th , 107 th , 109 th , 131 st and 136 th Home Guard Regiments - were deployed<br />
in two defence echelons. Th e HV 105 th Brigade was also allocated from ZP Bjelovar to<br />
Osijek, along with parts of the following HV General Staff units: the 16 th Artillery-Rocket<br />
Brigade, the 15 th Anti-Armour Artillery-Rocket Brigade, the 33 rd Engineer Brigade, the<br />
50 th ABKO Battalion, and part of the anti-armour combat helicopter squadron. 466<br />
Prior to the operation the units of ZP Osijek were placed in a state of full combat<br />
readiness. Th e 108 th and 132 nd Brigades, the Air Defence 201 st Artillery-Rocket Brigade,<br />
the 121 st Home Guard Regiment, the 2 nd River Task Force, the 68 th Military Police<br />
Battalion, the 32 nd and 37 th Engineer Pontoon Battalions and the 501 st ABKO Company<br />
were mobilized to their full complement; the 127 th Brigade and the 136 th and 157 th Home<br />
Guard Regiment were mobilized partly. Th e following units were mobilized on 2 August:<br />
the 106 th and 122 nd Brigades, the 5 th , 9 th , 10 th and 109 th Home Guard Regiments, the 261 st<br />
Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company and the 251 st Communications Company. 467 On 2<br />
August the 122 nd Brigade and the 5 th and 107 th Home Guard Regiments were deployed in<br />
their zones of responsibility; the remaining units followed suit on 3 August, 468 and police<br />
units on 5 August. 469 During the operation there was an exchange of fi re with units of<br />
the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, but there were no attempts to mount a serious operation.<br />
As regards its responsibility, the Osijek Corps District accomplished its mission with full<br />
success.<br />
466 MORH, GSHV: GDHV, RP/115 of 19 June 1995; Defence directive Op. no. 11/95, Fenix.<br />
467 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-518 of 2 August 1995; Daily opera-<br />
tional report.<br />
468 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-519 of 3 August 1995; Daily opera-<br />
tional report.<br />
469 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-528 of 5 August 1995; Daily opera-<br />
tional report.<br />
145
146<br />
Southern Th eatre<br />
During Storm the forces in the Southern Th eatre were deployed in a state of preventive<br />
combat readiness on the fi rst line, facing the VRS Herzegovinian Corps and units of the<br />
Yugoslav Army. In line with the plan for Operation Maestral, the units committed to<br />
the mission were the 114 th , 115 th Brigades, the 116 th and 156 th Home Guard Regiments,<br />
the 1 st Dubrovnik Home Guard Battalion, composite naval infantry detachments from<br />
Korčula, Brač and Hvar, the 16 th Artillery Battalion, the 39 th Engineer Battalion, the 415 th<br />
mobile coastal artillery battery and MUP Special Police units; air forces included two<br />
MiG-21s and two M-24 anti-armour helicopters in Split. 470 Aft er its participation in<br />
the fi rst stage of Storm, the HV 144 th Brigade was pulled back from the Sinj section of<br />
the North Dalmatian theatre and subordinated on 8 August to the Southern Th eatre. 471<br />
Th e VRS artillery engaged occasionally targets in the Dubrovnik area, but there were no<br />
infantry or other movements. 472<br />
Croatian Navy<br />
Like the Southern Th eatre, the Croatian Navy was also in a state of high combat<br />
readiness during Storm. It was prepared for active naval defence focused on anti-naval,<br />
anti-submarine and countermine warfare. Naval defence in the Northern and Central<br />
Adriatic was implemented in line with order Turs-2, and in the Southern Adriatic within<br />
the scope of the defensive operation Maestral in the Southern Th eatre. 473 Committed<br />
to the mission were primarily rocket-artillery fl eet forces, a mixed naval battalion for<br />
antisubmarine warfare, a composite battalion for countermine warfare, assault vessels<br />
and commandos. Th e coastal artillery batteries of Šipan, Gruž and Molunat were<br />
mobilized, and the Fleet brought up to its full complement along with the Hvar and Brač<br />
composite naval infantry detachments. 474<br />
470 MORH, GSHV: Southern Th eatre Command, cl. 8/95-02/115, reg. no. 3105-01-01-95-77 of 5 August<br />
1995; Report. Th e report also refers to the participation of the naval infantry detachments of Pelješac and<br />
Dugi Otok - Ugljan; however, the text acknowledged the comment of Admiral Vid Stipetić that the units<br />
involved were actually the Brač and Hvar naval infantry detachments, and that due mention should also be<br />
made of MUP Special Police units, and air forces (two MiG-21s and two M-24s).<br />
471 MORH, GSHV: Southern Th eatre Command, cl. 8/95-02/115, reg. no. 3105-01-01-95-109 of 8 August<br />
1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: APO 3001, Command, cl. 031/09/95-02, reg. no. 3101-03/1-95-1-1104 of 8<br />
August 1995; Daily operational report.<br />
472 MORH, GSHV: Southern Th eatre Command, cl. 81/95-02-01, reg. no. 3105-03-02-95-252 of 5 August<br />
1995; Daily operational report.<br />
473 MORH, GSHV: Southern Th eatre Command, cl. 8/95-01/01, reg. no. 6030-03-95-7 of 3 August 1995;<br />
Order.<br />
474 MORH, GSHV: APO 6030 Split, cl. str. conf. 813-07/95-01/02, reg. no. 6030-11/95-434 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Daily operational report. Th e report also refers to the participation of the Korčula and Pelješac naval infantry<br />
detachments; however, the text acknowledged the comment of Admiral Vid Stipetić that the units<br />
involved were actually the Brač and Hvar naval infantry detachments.
Croatian Defence Council<br />
Th e role of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in Storm is generally speaking not mentioned,<br />
giving rise to the impression that there was none - which, of course, is not true. During Storm some<br />
HVO units committed in Livanjsko Polje were already under the commander of the Split Corps<br />
District. 475 Aft er operation Summer-95 two HVO Guards Brigades were engaged in the defence<br />
of Livanjsko Polje and Glamoč, and the forces of the Tomislavgrad Corps District endeavoured to<br />
exploit the success achieved during the operation in order to gain better positions in the Kupres<br />
theatre. 476 For the accomplishment of the mission in Glamočko Polje and Kupreško Polje OG<br />
North set up an advance command post in the village of Vrba near Glamoč. Th e mission included<br />
the seizure of dominant points, the placing of the Kupres - Šipovo area under fi re control and<br />
creation of conditions for advance towards Šipovo and Jajce. 477 Accordingly, on 4 August the<br />
advance command post North ordered the HVO 2 nd and 3 rd Guards Brigades to mount the attack<br />
on the following day. 478 Over the following days the units were able to make some advances,<br />
drawing attention to their action and tying down units of the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps. 479<br />
Croatian Guardsmen<br />
475 A. Gotovina, “Napadajni bojevi HV i HVO” (Off ensive HV and HVO Battles), 47.<br />
476 MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/17, reg. no. 1080-01-95-307 of 29 July 1995;<br />
Active defence order.<br />
477 MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, cl. str. conf. 8/95-01/17, reg. no. 1080-01-95-307, reg. no. 1080-01-<br />
95-324 of 1 August 1995; of 29 July 1995; Attack order.<br />
478 MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, cl. 8/95-02-03, reg. no. 1402/95-03-25 of 4 August 1995; Order.<br />
479 MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080/5-01-95-36 of 4 August<br />
1995; Operational report. MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, cl. 818-01/05-02/05, reg. no. 1402-05-95-<br />
39 of 5 August 1995; Daily operational report. MORH, GSHV: OG North Command, l. 818-01/95-02/05,<br />
reg. no. 1402-05-95-71 of 5 August 1995; Daily operational report.<br />
147
148<br />
RESPONSE OF THE SVK SLAVONIA-BARANJA CORPS,<br />
THE VRS AND THE VJ<br />
Although the SVK commitment plan clearly regulated the mission and<br />
commitments of the Slavonia - Baranja Corps, it failed to produce any impact on<br />
developments in the theatre. Th e Corps was fully mobilized, but did not pursue<br />
its war plan mission for political reasons. Th e position of the Corps was specifi c. It was<br />
physically separated from the other parts of the SVK and leaned directly on the Yugoslav<br />
Army, i.e., on its Novi Sad Corps. According to the war plan they were supposed to act<br />
together. Th at did not take place because the Yugoslav leadership, S. Milošević, did not<br />
approve off ensive action. Because of this the Slavonia - Baranja Corps focused on decisive<br />
defence and occasional provocative artillery and infantry fi re against Croatian positions.<br />
Th e Intelligence Directorate of the HV General Staff was fully right in its assessment that<br />
“there was no major commitment of the 11 th Corps because of the lack of any decision<br />
by the SRJ leadership” and that “the artillery attacks and minor assaults along the front<br />
were geared to providing ‘moral support’ rather than being actual endeavours to carry<br />
out off ensive operations”. 480<br />
Until 1700 hours on 5 August two civilians were killed, 12 persons were wounded<br />
(out of whom 5 civilians), and one soldier went missing between Nuštar and Marinci,<br />
because of the fi re from the 11 th Corps. Serbian artillery caused great material damage<br />
because it did not attack only HV positions but settlements as well. Th e HV responded<br />
with artillery fi re. 481 On 5 August a plane out of Vukovar rocketed Nuštar on three<br />
occasions. 482 On the same day an attempt was made to mount an infantry and armour<br />
assault towards Cerić - Nuštar and Jankovac - Hendrikovac. 483 Th ere were no further<br />
attacks. As M. Sekulić noted bitterly, the Slavonia-Baranja Corps “behaved as if it were<br />
part of the Yugoslav Army rather than of the Serbian Army of the Krajina. 484<br />
Th e agreed action of the Army of Republika Srpska also failed to materialize. During<br />
Storm it was undergoing a serious internal crisis due to the confl ict between Radovan<br />
Karadžić, RS President and VRS Commander-in-Chief, and General Ratko Mladić, Chief<br />
480 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Intelligence Directorate, cl. 804-08/95-172/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/1-95-1953 of 5<br />
August 1995; Intelligence information.<br />
481 MORH, GSHV: ZO Osijek Command, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-527 od 5 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-528 of 5 August 1995; Daily<br />
operational report.<br />
482 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Osijek, cl. 81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/2-95-525 of 5 August 1995; Report.<br />
483 MORH, GSHV: IZM GSHV Đakovo, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-02/119, reg. no. 512-06-04-95-09 of 5 August<br />
1995; Daily operational report.<br />
484 M. Sekulić, ”Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade).
of the General Staff . On 4 August Karadžić tried to assume command of the armed forces<br />
and off ered General Mladić the post of “special adviser to the commander-in-chief for<br />
the coordination of joint RS and RSK defence”. However, General Mladić turned down<br />
the off er and kept his position with the support of the army. 485<br />
Actions of the VRS land forces intended to help the SVK were negligible. On 7 August<br />
in the morning two VRS aircraft attacked the village of Mačkovac in the municipality of<br />
Nova Gradiška, zone of responsibility of the 121 st Home Guard Regiment. Th ree cluster<br />
bombs were dropped on the village church and a near-by house; one HV soldier was<br />
killed and seven wounded. One civilian was also killed in the raid, and fi ve wounded, out<br />
of whom two children. 486 Altogether 5 people were killed and 38 wounded by Serbian<br />
attacks in the area under consideration. 487<br />
Banovina, 7 August 1995<br />
485 “General Mladić na čelu vojske” (General Mladić at the Head of the Army); Krajiški vojnik, August 1995,<br />
19-22; “Hronologija” (Chronology), 255.<br />
486 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZpM Novska cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-04-95-573 od 7 August 1995;<br />
Report. MORH, GSHV: ZZP Bjelovar, IZpM Novska cl. 80-01/95-01, reg. no. 1077-06/03-95-575 of 7 August<br />
1995; Report.<br />
487 MORH, GSHV: ZP Osijek Command, cl. 560-01/95-01/01, reg. no. 1076-02/5-95-02-3 of 7 August 1995; Report.<br />
149
150<br />
UNCRO, UN AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS<br />
Early in 1992 the internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis brought the UN<br />
peacekeeping forces to Croatia. Th ey were a compromise, and the Republic of<br />
Croatia was not satisfi ed with their performance; neither were the rebel Serbs.<br />
Th e Croats expected the full reintegration of the occupied areas, the demilitarization of<br />
Serbian forces, the return of displaced persons and the establishment of the constitutional<br />
order throughout the territory of the Republic of Croatia. On the other side, the rebel<br />
Serbs experienced the plan as a recognition of their sovereignty over the territory in<br />
which they revolted and which the JNA had conquered for them. In their view the<br />
international forces were to play the role of the JNA, of an armed force separating them<br />
from the Croatian armed forces.<br />
Nothing signifi cant happened even aft er the redefi nition of the role of the peacekeeping<br />
forces in the spring of 1995. UNCRO was as ineffi cient as UNPROFOR had been. In the<br />
second half of July 1995 the Serbs expected a Croatian attack every day, and the view<br />
prevailed among them that UNCRO was pro-Croatian and against the RSK. 488 Some<br />
commanders, e.g., the commander of the 11 th Infantry Brigade of the SVK Kordun Corps,<br />
even ordered, as a precaution, on 1 August the blockade of UN forces: their crossing<br />
into the Republic of Croatia was to be prevented, and the troops disarmed and held as<br />
hostages. Th ey were not to be insulted or mistreated. 489 It can be assumed that the order<br />
was not an isolated event but rather a response to a circular memo.<br />
On the Croatian side, e.g., in the case of the Karlovac Corps District, offi cers in<br />
charge of liaison with UN forces transmitted to the UN personnel the “recommendation<br />
concerning risk of movement in the zone of responsibility of the Corps”. Aft er this notice<br />
“UNCRO, UNMO and ECMM activities ceased and the personnel withdrew to their<br />
bases”. 490 Th e concentration of Croatian forces for Storm did not go unnoticed. On 4<br />
August, at 0200 hours, Hrvoje Šarinić, Chief of Staff of the Republic of Croatia, personally<br />
called the UNCRO commander, the French General Bernard Janvier, and informed him<br />
about the impending action. 491 Furthermore, one hour before the start of the operation<br />
liaison offi cers informed the commanders of the UNCRO sectors about the impending<br />
488 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao uBeogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 44.<br />
489 Command of the 11th Inf. Brig., str. conf. no 230/1, 1 August 1995; Order.<br />
490 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, cl.81/95-01/01, reg. no. 1078-02/2-95.558 of 3 August 1995; Daily operational<br />
report.<br />
491 H. Šarinić, “Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem 1993-95(98)” (All My Secret Negotiations<br />
with Slobodan Milošević 1993-95/98), 262.
start of combat operations by the Croatian armed forces. Th ey were asked to acknowledge<br />
in writing that they had received “from the Government of the Republic of Croatia the<br />
written notice about the start of the assault by our forces”. 492 In this way UNCRO received<br />
the information from two levels, from its commanders and from Croatian army offi cers.<br />
UNCRO offi cers informed the Serbs about the start of the assault. 493<br />
Operation Storm passed in an atmosphere of raised voices in the communication between<br />
the international community and the Croatian armed forces. Reciprocal accusations<br />
ensued from the very start. One Home Guard regiment complained that a UN unit, which<br />
had remained on its position behind it, was illuminating its troops, allowing the Serbs to<br />
open fi re on them. 494 At 0710 hours on 4 August the Split Corps District informed the HV<br />
General Staff that “UNCRO was sending information to its superiors by open line” and<br />
General Gotovina urged his superiors to fi le an offi cial protest. 495 During the operation<br />
UNCRO members frequently objected claiming that Croatian forces were attacking their<br />
observation points. “”As a rule, on the basis of feedback information from the battlefi eld<br />
all these allegations were false”, as fi led by the Head of the MORH UN and EC offi ce in his<br />
daily report for 6 August. 496 Th e MORH UN and EC Offi ce also complained because of<br />
the incorrect conduct of certain UNCRO units (e.g., the Czech battalion), whereas it had<br />
only words of praise for other units. Some UNCRO troops requested withdrawal from the<br />
battlefi eld, which was regularly granted by HV units. 497<br />
International reactions to Storm had a much greater weight. Th e UN Security Council<br />
received the information about the operation on 4 August. Th e Croatian side promised<br />
that it would take due account of civilian life and UN personnel security. On the same day<br />
the Security Council adopted a presidential statement deploring the Croatian off ensive<br />
and requesting the cessation of all military actions. Russia and the nonaligned movement<br />
protested against the operation. Th e EU Presidency deplored on 5 August the Croatian<br />
assault and suspended a number of important agreements with Croatia. Th ere were similar<br />
reactions on the following days. However, aft er 7 August they became irrelevant. Th e SVK<br />
was crushed and the RSK became a matter of the past. On 10 August the Security Council<br />
recognized these facts with its Resolution 1009 which did not question the legitimacy<br />
of Storm. Requests for the safeguarding of human and minority rights moved to the<br />
forefront. 498<br />
492 MORH GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-2/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: GS OS RH War Diary, note 31 of 4 August 1995.<br />
493 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 173.<br />
494 MORH, GSHV: APO 8312 Zadar, cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/12, reg. no. 8312-01-95-03 of 4 August 1995;<br />
Report.<br />
495 MORH, GSHV: GS OS RH War diary, note 88 of 4 August 1995.<br />
496 MORH, GSHV: MORH, UN and EC Offi ce, cl. 018-04/95/151/01, reg. no. 512-01-04/95-183 of 6 August<br />
1995; Daily report.<br />
497 MORH, GSHV: MORH, UN and EC Offi ce, cl. 018-04/95/151/02, reg. no. 512-01-04/95-69 of 6 August<br />
1995; Extraordinary report.<br />
498 M- Nobilo, «<strong>Hrvatski</strong> feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990-1997.» (Th e Croatian Phenix:<br />
Diplomatic Processes behind Closed Doors 1900-1997), 483-487.<br />
151
152<br />
OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION<br />
A<br />
proposal sent to the RSK Supreme Defence Council described the fundamental<br />
tasks of the armed forces of the rebel Croatian Serbs: “Th e strengthening of<br />
the RSK and its assertion are based primarily on the existence and continuous<br />
development of the armed forces, the SVK, whose major task has been defence from<br />
Croatian aggression. Th is task requires the existence of a powerful and well-organized<br />
armed force, which is continuously upgraded and whose combat capability is improving<br />
and does not lag substantially behind the combat capability of the Croatian Army”. 499<br />
According to Serbian assessments, in terms of manpower the ratio was 3:1 to the<br />
advantage of the HV. In terms of heavy weapons (artillery, armour) the ratio was even or<br />
to the favour of the SVK. 500 If the SVK could be expected to put up a fi erce and protracted<br />
resistance, the HV mission would have been a very demanding one. Protracted defence<br />
was exactly what the HV wanted to avoid. Because of the criminal conduct of the VRS<br />
in Bosnia&Herzegovina, Croatia could count on the tacit support of an infl uential part<br />
of the international community. Th erefore, time was the crucial consideration for the<br />
Croatian armed forces. Th e directive of the HV General Staff for the operation - the part<br />
providing for the use of helicopter manoeuvres - suggests the requirement to be met,<br />
that is, gain speed by committing all available armaments and equipment. Th is is also<br />
borne out by the idea about the grouping of Guards and Special Police units. During the<br />
actual operation helicopter assault had a negligible eff ect on the course of the action.<br />
Some corps districts did not get the Special Police units envisioned in the early plans of<br />
the operation. Th e Zagreb Corps District mounted its assault without the 81st Guards<br />
Battalion and assault helicopters. Part of the explanation for the failure of the Zagreb<br />
Corps District may be gained from the examination of the helicopter mission as outlined<br />
in the attack order for the Zagreb Corps District, the idea to commit the 81st Guards<br />
Battalion at Sunja and the Special Police in the rear of Petrinja. 501<br />
In the preparatory phase of the operation the Operations Centre of the HV General<br />
Staff formed two operational teams and two forward command posts (IZMs): IZM Lika<br />
499 HDA, RSK: Condition of the SVK and problems in the competence of the RSK Supreme Defence Council.<br />
Material for the Supreme Defence Council.<br />
500 Boško Todorović, Dušan Vilić, “Gubitnička strategija” (Loser Strategy), Vojska, 24 Aug. 1995, 10-11.<br />
501 MOPRH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 81/95-01/3. reg. no. 1075-12/95-213 of 13 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
Since no corps district had any major helicopter assault forces, the question is how realistic it would have<br />
been to expect the implementation of such a demanding and extremely diffi cult action such as a helicopter<br />
assault.
in Ogulin headed by Major General Marijan Mareković and IZM Slavonia in Đakovo<br />
headed by Lieutenant General Petar Stipetić. Th e Information&Propaganda Headquarters<br />
of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff was also established. At the operational<br />
level, advance command posts were formed by the general corps district commands.<br />
Units and materiel were deployed and echeloned in line with the plans, mobilization<br />
started and units brought up to the planned complement, and the respective measures<br />
were taken with regard to UNCRO members. 502<br />
Th e General Staff also provided assistance by sending offi cers to corps districts and<br />
some lower echelon units. Th eir stationing was mainly received without special comments<br />
and their engagement posed no particular problems, although in one case troops<br />
disobeyed these offi cers. 503 General Stipetić rightfully questioned the purpose of their<br />
engagement considering the existing commands of the corps districts and brigades. 504<br />
Aft er the start of the operation, the General Staff issued new orders on a daily basis in line<br />
with developments on the battleground. 505 Th e Chief of the HV General Staff regularly<br />
informed the President of the Republic about the course of the operation. 506 When the<br />
hitch along the line of attack of the 2 nd Guards Brigade began to aff ect the overall situation<br />
in the Banovina region, the President of the Republic responded. General Petar Stipetić,<br />
Assistant Chief of the HV General Staff for the Combat Sector was pulled back from the<br />
HV General Staff IZM at Đakovo and appointed commander of the sector covered by<br />
the Zagreb and Bjelovar Corps Districts. Th e previous commanding offi cers remained<br />
on their duties and “were subordinated in every respect, together with the units of the<br />
corps districts, to the sector commander”. 507<br />
502 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01502-08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report.<br />
503 MORH, GSHV: IZM GSHV Ogulin, cl. 813-01/95-02/14, reg. no. 512-06-10-95-06 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Extraordinary report.<br />
504 HMDCDR: Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police<br />
operations Storm.<br />
505 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-384 of 5 August 1995; Order.<br />
MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-404 of 6 August 1995; Order. MORH,<br />
GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-409 of 6 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV:<br />
GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-411 of 6 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: GS HV,<br />
cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-420 of 7 August 1995; Order. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-<br />
01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-421 of 7 August 1995; Order.<br />
506 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-373 of 4 August 1995; Report.<br />
MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-400 of 5 August 1995; Report. MORH,<br />
GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-413 of 6 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV:<br />
GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-427 of 7 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: GS HV,<br />
cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-438 of 8 August 1995; Report. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-<br />
01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-438 of 8 August 1995; Additional report at 19.45 hours.<br />
507 MORH, GSHV: President of the RC, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-388 of 5 August 1995;<br />
Order. MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-388 of 4 August 1995; Order.<br />
MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-389 of 5 August 1995; Order. General<br />
Stipetić noted that this did not refer to the previous commander of the Zagreb Corps District. HMDCDR:<br />
Comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about the Zagreb Corps District in the military-police operation<br />
Storm.<br />
153
On 10 August the Chief of the HV General Staff presented to the President of the<br />
Republic a summary report on the execution and course of the operation. Th e report<br />
also referred to certain conduct and command problems. 508 During the operation major<br />
problems were observed in the organization and security of communications systems<br />
and equipment. Th e insuffi cient availability of communications facilities in the units,<br />
particularly in the mobilized brigades and regiments, complicated and hampered the<br />
organization of communications, which directly infl uenced the possibility of having a<br />
timely insight into the situation on the battleground and slowed down decision-making<br />
and command.<br />
On the Serbian side the command system was disrupted by force division into two<br />
groups, one comprising the Lika and North Dalmatian Corps under the command of the<br />
SVK General Staff , and the second the remaining forces under the command of General<br />
Mile Novaković. 509 Th e real threat strategy turned out to be a complete failure, apart<br />
from the fact that the SVK did not have the capability for its implementation. Th e same<br />
applied to the SVK trusted Special Unit Corps, the worst of all SVK corps committed in<br />
Storm.<br />
In the initial part of the operation the main task of the HV was the disruption of the<br />
Serbian communications system and pushing back Serbian artillery and rocket systems<br />
within range of Croatian towns and industrial plants. Th e next step involved control over<br />
the approaches to Knin, the passes on Mount Velebit and at Ljubovo, the penetration of<br />
the 1 st Guards Brigade from Lika towards the Bihać area and of the 2 nd Guards Brigade<br />
across the Banovina region. Th e fi rst day of the operation was not so effi cient, perhaps, in<br />
terms of advance on the ground, but the concurrent pressure along the entire front line<br />
had a bearing on the decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on front “reduction”.<br />
One of the rare accessible SVK documents on events on that particular day states that<br />
the HV attack on the SVK started at 0500 hours “by the shelling of the towns of Knin,<br />
Drniš, Udbina, Benkovac, Karin, Obrovac, Gračac, Korenica, the Udbina airstrip,<br />
Vojnić, Vrginmost and Petrinja ... At about 0600 the ustashi mounted an infantry attack<br />
from Sunja towards Kostajnica involving tank commitment, but the 39 th Corps repulsed<br />
successfully the assault. Th e infantry attack started from Brlog - Drenov Klanac - village<br />
of Glavace, but it was beaten off ”. 510<br />
Th e situation did not change substantially by the end of the day. Th e HV score some<br />
tactical successes, the major one being the forced crossing of the river Sava in Banovina.<br />
At that point it turned out that the weakest link of the RSK (and the SVK) was its<br />
President and Commander-in-chief M. Martić. In the night of 4/5 August he literally<br />
broke down the SVK by his decision to cut down the front in Northern Dalmatia, even<br />
if the SVK had already been dented by the HV operations on Mount Dinara and was not<br />
508 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-456 of 10 August 1995; Summary<br />
report.<br />
509 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 175-176.<br />
510 Command of the 11th Infantry Brigade, str. conf. 23972-95 of 4 August 1995; unit briefi ng.<br />
154
capable of longer resistance. Th e Serbs did not expect a radical HV attack, and that was<br />
the problem. Th ey expected an HV attempt to cut across the Krajina and link up with<br />
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Two days before the start of Storm the Intelligence Department of<br />
the SVK General Staff anticipated that the HV would attempt to attack towards Sunja-<br />
Kostajnica - Dvor na Uni - valley of the river Una, and to break through from Ogulin<br />
via Slunj to Cazinska Krajina. It was believed that the HV objective was intersecting the<br />
Krajina and lift ing the blockade of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, thereby creating a new situation<br />
“which they would off er to the international community as a matter of fact and propose<br />
a decision on its acceptance”. 511<br />
Aft er the decision to “reduce” the front the SVK began to fall apart. Th e process spread<br />
from Dalmatia through Lika to Kordun and Banovina. At the end of the second day of<br />
the operation the Intelligence Directorate of the HV General Staff rightly assessed that<br />
all the planned objectives in the area of Dalmatia and Lika had been accomplished: the<br />
North Dalmatian and Lika Corps were crushed, the liberation of Knin totally disoriented<br />
the “state” and “military” structure, and led to a substantial decline of morale in the<br />
population and military units, the corridor towards Western Bosnia was opened and<br />
the blockade of the ARBiH 5 th Corps lift ed. Th e fi nal conclusion was that the command<br />
system was broken up and that the SVK no longer existed as an organized opponent.<br />
It was acknowledged that during the fi rst two days of the operation no SVK brigade in<br />
Banovina and Kordun was routed, although the defence line was penetrated at several<br />
points. 512<br />
Aft er that the situation in the theatre depended entirely on HV actions. In the second<br />
stage of the operation attack momentum was lost along some lines. Th e already mentioned<br />
halt of the Split Corps District allowed Serbian forces to withdraw from Northern<br />
Dalmatia and Lika, but this helped to avoid civilian casualties because HV units would<br />
have pressed against them along the Knin - Gračac - Srb line. Th e second important<br />
delay occurred in Banovina where the 2 nd Guards Brigade could not be exploited for<br />
breaking through from Petrinja to Dvor na Uni. Because of this the brunt of the fi ghting<br />
for Dvor na Uni was borne by less prepared reserve units. In this way the main body of<br />
the SVK Banija Corps and part of the Kordun Corps managed to pull out.<br />
By eff ecting the linkup of the HV with the ARBiH in Lika on 6 August Storm<br />
accomplished one of its strategic objectives - the lift ing of the blockade of Gospić and<br />
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Since the rebel government had already been brought down by<br />
511 VSA MORH: SVK General Staff , Intelligence Dept., str. conf. no. 2/307-4 of 2 August 1995; Intelligence<br />
information. CIA analysis: Operation Storm started at 0500 with immediate eff ect throughout the Krajina.<br />
One of the HV’s key undertakings was a program of coordinated airstrikes and sabotage missions by ground<br />
forces against the SVK’s command and control facilities across the RSK. It was a stunning success, disrupting<br />
the ability of the SVK General Staff to coordinate the overall defence of the RSK and interfering with<br />
operational communications down to the brigade level. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the<br />
Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995, 370.<br />
512 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Intelligence Directorate, cl. 804-0895-172/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/1-95-1953 of 5 August<br />
1995; Intelligence information.<br />
155
the liberation of Knin, all that remained was the liberation of the entire occupied area<br />
of the Republic of Croatia. Some of the corps districts accomplished this goal already<br />
on 7 August by gaining control of the state border, while others followed suit within a<br />
few days. But those were tactical developments which had no bearing on the strategic<br />
mission. 513<br />
Th e many problems associated with the execution of Storm were superseded by its<br />
success. In practice successful operations are analyzed in a diff erent way as compared<br />
with failures, although that is not correct. Th e major undeniable problem was the<br />
undisciplined conduct of some troops, which aff ected unit combat readiness and tarnished<br />
the overall success of the operation. Th is was most conspicuous in the reserve units.<br />
Th us, according to reports, discipline in some units was mediocre and more diffi cult to<br />
enforce with respect to troops who had taken part in the war in 1991 and claimed greater<br />
rights than just mobilized troops; 514 some were also occasionally found to be drunk, and<br />
posed diffi culties when they had to be prevented from abusing discovered weapons and<br />
wasting ammunition in great quantities. 515 Reports also noted the “selective torching and<br />
devastation of buildings” even aft er combat, with the questionable conclusion that it had<br />
been done by “local inhabitants who had fl ed into the woods” and deliberately “set fi re to<br />
farm buildings in order to discredit the HV” or by “HV troops who had fl ed the chetnik<br />
terror in 1991 and sought revenge”. 516 Furthermore, reports recorded “an invasion of<br />
late liberators” with comments that “plundering and torching had been prevented to a<br />
considerable extent”, at least in part of the liberated area. 517<br />
Th e most serious forms of undisciplined conduct involved incidents, which obviously<br />
could not be avoided in spite of all the emphasis placed on the respect of the Geneva<br />
Conventions, occasioned largely by revenge because of the conduct of the rebel Serbs<br />
and the Serbian paramilitary units in Croatia since early 1990, but also by gain. Th us,<br />
unfortunately, some Croatian soldiers or civilians murdered part of the remaining<br />
Serbs, and torched and destroyed part of the property of Serbs who had fl ed Croatia. 518<br />
513 CIA analysis: the Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak pronounced the operation complete as of 1800<br />
on 7 August. Th ere remained, however, a few pockets of resistance for the HV to stamp out on the next day.<br />
In the south the Gospić and Split Corps Districts, the MUP Special Police and the 1st HGZ coordinated a<br />
drive against the last major SVK pocket of resistance around Donji Lapac - Srb. Th e action was complete by<br />
2000 hours. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1900-1995, 374.<br />
514 MORH, GSHV: APO 1106, cl. 8/95-10/10, reg. no. 1106-140.dp-1/95/137/1 of 12 August 1995; Report.<br />
515 MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81/95-01/01, REF. NO. 2121-92/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Analysis.<br />
516 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-1 Sisak, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 1075-IZpM-1/95-96 of 8 August 1995;<br />
Report.<br />
517 SVA MORH, ZZPS: 6th Home Guard Reg., IZM Gorje, cl. 8/95-01-88, reg. no. 8311.01-01/95-1170 of 12<br />
August 1995; Report.<br />
518 N. Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1900-1995.” (Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1900-1995), 559. Cf.<br />
“Izvještaj vojna operacija “Oluja” i poslije, I. dio: bivši sektor Jug” (Report: Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’<br />
and Its Aft ermath; Part I. Former Sector South); Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Zagreb,<br />
1999.<br />
156
Th erefore, the Croatian forces were not immune either to problems which are practically<br />
part of everyday wartime events during off ensive and especially “fi nal” operations. While<br />
such crimes deserve every condemnation, in past military history serious incidents<br />
and crimes committed by the victors have not so far been prosecuted. In the Banovina<br />
region some of these crimes were committed by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 519 Th e<br />
undisciplined conduct of ARBiH troops was also confi rmed on 8 August by UNCRO. 520<br />
Similarly, during Storm some Serbs were killed by their fellow-countrymen during<br />
withdrawal from Croatia, and some of the Serbian houses were set to fi re before the<br />
arrival of Croatian forces to the area. 521<br />
During the operation the Military Police established in cooperation with the civil<br />
police 80 check-points along the lines of advance of the Croatian armed forces. As the<br />
HV advanced, new points were set up in the liberated area. Th us, as reported, Military<br />
Police units “organized the patrol service in order to take control over the liberated<br />
settlements and towns, controlled military and road traffi c, prevented arson, uncontrolled<br />
misappropriation and collection of war booty, and secured vital facilities in the liberated<br />
area. Aft er deployment the MUP RH regular police assumed responsibility for securing<br />
such facilities and for the patrolling service. Th e check-points established immediately<br />
aft er the liberation of larger settlements were in operation for 3-4 days in order to prevent<br />
civilian entry and uncontrolled misappropriation of war booty. Immediately aft er the<br />
passage of HV troops all the villages, towns and the areas along the main communications<br />
were mopped up and swept by anti-terrorist and military police units in order to create<br />
conditions for normal living in the liberated villages and towns, and secured traffi c safety<br />
in the liberated areas”. 522<br />
By 10 September 1995 the Military Police apprehended and investigated 1,576 persons.<br />
“Aft er duly recorded investigation and in cooperation with SIS and MUP RH, 659 persons<br />
were turned over to the judiciary authorities and charges fi led on suspicion of indictable<br />
off ences against the Republic of Croatia”. 523 In the area reinstated into the constitutional<br />
519 SVA MORH: SIS Directorate, Karlovac Dept.-Sisak Section, reg. no. 512M5-01¸/05-06-99-239; Offi cial<br />
note (undated).<br />
520 MORH, GSHV: UN and EC Offi ce, cl. str. conf. 018-04/95-151/02, reg. no. 512-01-04/95-73 of 8 August<br />
1995 (UNCRO, Zagreb Hq., no. 1000-2(MA) of 8 August 1995, 1447 hours; Activities in Ostojići.<br />
521 Th is is borne out by statements of Serbian refugees from Croatia in the Serbian press aft er Storm: Naša<br />
borba, 12-13 1995; Vreme, 14 Aug. 1995; “Oluja pobjede” (Th e Storm of Victory) - photomonograph, HM-<br />
DCDR, Zagreb, August 2007, 178. Furthermore, according to other statements by Serbian refugees, buildings<br />
and other property were torched “not to leave them to the Croats”. Th us, before leaving Donji Lapac<br />
the Serbs set fi re to the Kamensko Hotel, he police station and “at least 3-4 other buildings”. “Vojna operacija<br />
‘Oluja’ i poslije” (Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath), Croatian Helsinki Committee, Zagreb,<br />
2001, 25 (note 23), 25. Cf. “Žene Krajine - rat, egzodus i izbeglištvo” (Th e Women of the Krajina - War,<br />
Exodus and Exile), Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić, Nataša Mrvić-Petrović,<br />
Ivana Stevanović, Branislava Knežić; Institute for Criminological and Sociological Studies, Belgrade, 1996,<br />
127-128.<br />
522 MORH, GSHV: Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. 512-19-01-95-632of 16 September<br />
1995; Analysis.<br />
523 Ibid.<br />
157
order of the Republic of Croatia the Military Police apprehended 558 HV members for<br />
undisciplined conduct; 262 were detained. It fi led 445 charges for breach of discipline,<br />
searched 1,059 HV members and seized property stolen in the liberated area from 669.<br />
In cooperation with the MUP Crime Police the Military Police investigated 321 off ences<br />
and other cases as follows: 13 murders; 18 cases of accidents involving HV members; 191<br />
cases of arson; 13 cases of blasting; and 86 other off ences (mainly misappropriation of<br />
property). “Among the known perpetrators of these off ences 79 were HV members and<br />
274 civilians”. 524<br />
In many respects Storm was a classic land force operation with air force involvement.<br />
Th e actual execution departed considerably from the original idea. In branch terms, it<br />
was an infantry operation with strong artillery support. Penetration of enemy lines was<br />
followed by enhanced commitment of armoured and mechanized units for pursuit and<br />
exploitation of achieved success. Although all the brigades contributed to the success<br />
of the operation, the brunt was borne by the professional HV units and special MUP<br />
RH forces. Th ey accomplished their mission, breaking through enemy lines along the<br />
most demanding axes and then, relying on armoured and mechanized units, exploited<br />
their initial success very quickly. Th is operation also showed that off ensive combat, as a<br />
more demanding form of action, was mainly too challenging a task for the reserve units,<br />
brigades and Home Guard regiments - with some exceptions, of course. 525<br />
Almost all the corps districts took part in the off ensive actions during Storm except<br />
the Osijek Corps District and the Southern Th eatre, which were responsible for the<br />
defensive part of the operation. Th e units committed in the off ensive part of the operation<br />
included fi ve HV Guards brigades, the 1 st Croatian Guards Corps, one Guards battalion,<br />
23 Home Guard regiments, 18 HV brigades (16 reserve and one conscript brigade), three<br />
Air Defence brigade, 4 electronic surveillance units, parts of an artillery-rocket brigades,<br />
a communications regiment, parts of the Croatian Air Force and Air Defence, parts of<br />
the Croatian Navy (for unit transport) and 2500 members of the MUP RH units. 526 Th e<br />
total number is 127,000. Some of the committed forces had several months of combat<br />
experience on Mount Dinara, in Livanjsko Polje and Glamočko Polje, and in Western<br />
Slavonia.<br />
Th e Serbian side had about 40,000 troops organized in fi ve corps and comprising 21<br />
infantry brigades, 4 motorized brigades, 3 light brigades, 1 armoured brigade, 1 special<br />
brigade, 1 independent infantry battalion, two detachments (1 border detachment and<br />
524 Ibid.<br />
525 CIA analysis (conclusion on execution of Storm): With no reserves the SVK static infantry brigades were<br />
unable to counter the HV high-tempo operations and, in particular, were unable to stop the HV Guards<br />
brigades. However, the attacks by HV Home Guard and reserve formations, which had far less training, less<br />
discipline and lower motivation than the Guards units, were repelled almost routinely by the SVK, and it<br />
probably could have contained an HV off ensive employing only those types of formations. Balkan Battlegrounds:<br />
A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995), 375.<br />
526 According to General Željko Sačić, M.S., ret. 3,100 members of the Special Police took part in Storm.<br />
HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, “Specijalna policija u ‘Oluji’” (Th e Special Police in Storm).<br />
158
one reconnaissance-sabotage detachment), 1 composite artillery battalion, 1 composite<br />
anti-armour artillery regiment, 1 light air defence artillery-rocket regiment, 2 composite<br />
artillery battalions, two composite anti-armour artillery battalions, 1 engineer battalion,<br />
5 rear bases, and air force and air defence units.<br />
Operation Storm liberated 10,400 sq. km. or 18.4 % of the total area of the Republic of<br />
Croatia. Losses totalled 0.12% or 1,314 persons: 196 killed, 1,100 wounded (572 severely<br />
and 528 lightly), 3 taken prisoner, 15 missing in action. By 21 August 1995 fi ve hundred<br />
and seventy SVK members killed in action were duly recovered and buried.<br />
Th e war booty consisted of 54 armoured combat vehicles, 497 military motor vehicles,<br />
6 combat aircraft , 22 engineer machines, 4,112 infantry weapons, 159 bazookas, 120<br />
mortars of diff erent calibre, 98 fi eld 76 to 152 mm guns, 6 multiple 128 rocket launchers,<br />
59 anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons. 527<br />
War booty<br />
527 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-505 of 21 August 1995; Report. On<br />
29 August 1995 Dr. Ivica Kostović stated that 211 Croatian soldiers and policemen had been killed in Storm.<br />
«Vojna operacija ‘Oluja’ i poslije» (Military Operation ‘Storm’ and Its Aft ermath), Croatian Helsinki Committee,<br />
Zagreb 2001, 17 (note 14).<br />
159
160<br />
“ETHNIC CLEANSING” OR SELF-WILLED DEPARTURE<br />
The most intriguing part of Operation Storm and one that still causes most<br />
controversies is the following question: did the rebel Serbs abandon the occupied<br />
area of the Republic of Croatia (UNPA Sectors North and South) of their own<br />
free will or were they expelled, i.e., did Croatia carry out ethnic cleansing of the rebel<br />
Serbs with its Operation Storm? Some people blame Croatia on the basis of the “Brijuni<br />
transcript”, which is interpreted in diff erent ways. Some interpretations are so radical that<br />
they actually demonstrate total ignorance of the issue; thus, some individuals lay stress<br />
on the “conspiracy theory” and experience war as a deal between Croatia’s and Serbia’s<br />
leaders. 528 Actually, the issue cannot be reduced to the year 1995, but regarded instead<br />
in the context of the historical process since the start of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia<br />
up to the end of the war. Th e very fi rst statements of the rebel Serbs’ representatives<br />
clearly expressed their position and refusal to recognize the lawfully elected Croatian<br />
authorities, which soon spilled over into the position that coexistence with the Croats<br />
would be impossible. Th e claim that life with the Croats was impossible dominated,<br />
fi ve years aft er the breakout of the rebellion, in the RSK and in the public appearances<br />
of its inhabitants, known and unknown alike. 529 Considering their mass turnout at the<br />
plebiscite on the “autonomy of the Krajina” and their mass participation in the armed<br />
rebellion, the massive departure of ethnic Serbs from Croatia was logical.<br />
Th e departure of the Serbs from Croatia in large numbers was announced in the early<br />
and in the fi nal phase of the war. Th us, in late September 1991 the JNA 169 th Motorized<br />
Brigade from Loznica was transferred to Kordun within the scope of the off ensive of the<br />
main body of the SFRY armed forces against Croatia. Th e brigade soon fell apart, and<br />
it was decided to pull it back to Serbia. Th e decision provoked the response of the local<br />
rebel Serb leadership: Th e news that you are withdrawing the 169 th Motorized Brigade<br />
from the Karlovac position has spread across Kordun like wildfi re. People have started to<br />
evacuate spontaneously, and there was anxiety, confusion and desertion among the troops.<br />
If you let the 169 th mtbr leave its position before being replaced by another JNA unit, you<br />
will be responsible for the disastrous consequences. Because of this, before you pull back the<br />
528 Th us, the ease with which journalist A. Dragojević identifi es the Brijuni meeting with the Nazi plan for the<br />
extermination of Jews in the Second World War demonstrates her total ignorance of the issue and concepts<br />
at stake. Andrea Dragojević, “Brijunski protokol” (Th e Brijuni Protocol), Zarez, Zagreb 21, Oct. 204, 9.<br />
529 For more see Nikica Barić, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etničko čišćenje’ Srba?” (Did Croatia<br />
Carry out ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of the Serbs in 1995?), Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 36/2, 2004, 441-446.
169 th mtbr we are again asking you to bring in another unit which will protect this people<br />
together with our TO units. 530 Th ere was no justifi cation for such a view, because Croatian<br />
forces were on the defensive and the JNA in one of the better phases of its war against<br />
Croatia.<br />
Similarly, the combat readiness report of the Knin Corps Command of January 1992<br />
stated that the people of the Krajina were absolutely against the JNA leaving the area: Th e<br />
Serbian people would leave together with the Corps units because they did not trust the UN<br />
peacekeeping force without the JNA in Krajina. 531<br />
A similar case refers to the response of the RSK population and political parties aft er<br />
Operation Flash, as reported by the Security Department of the General Staff of the<br />
Serb Krajina Army to the SVK commander: Th e view prevails among the people that<br />
Western Slavonia was sold out by Serbia and Slobodan Milošević, and that the consequence<br />
of this new situation is a more intensive exodus of the population of this part of Krajina<br />
mainly to the SRJ, that is, Serbia. 532 Aft er that the president of the Krajina Serbs wrote,<br />
in his letter to the President of the Republic of Serbia: Mr. President, the tragedy which<br />
struck the Serbian people by the latest Croatian aggression against Western Slavonia has<br />
grave and incalculable consequences for the solution of the overall Serbian issue. Not only<br />
has territory been lost, not only have hundreds of civilians come to grief; what enhances<br />
anxiety even more in this terrible moment is the widespread popular belief that the Serbian<br />
issue has been betrayed by the very Serbs. Rumours about its surrender are spreading<br />
across the Krajina; people claim in disbelief that we have been forgotten both by Serbia<br />
and by Republika Srpska. In many villages and towns people are packing and preparing to<br />
leave. 533<br />
At the time Milošević was requested to send, on a temporary basis, about two thousand<br />
troops of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to garrisons in the<br />
Krajina in order to restore the psychological stability of the population with their presence<br />
and give the rebel Serbs in the RSK time to improve and stabilize the situation. 534 Because<br />
of Operation Flash the RSK Republican Civil Defence Staff ordered the mobilization of<br />
all regional and municipal civil defence units with the following tasks: continuous duty<br />
service; “organized and preparatory measures and actions for the implementation of all<br />
protection and rescue steps with particular focus on securing shelter, evacuation and<br />
relief of the population”; determination of the condition and capability of enterprises<br />
and organizations of interest for protection and rescue. 535<br />
530 VSA MORH: OpŠTO Vojnić, 11 Oct. 1991; Request.<br />
531 HDA, RSK: 9th Corps Command, str. conf. no. 23-34 of 22 Jan. 11992; Report on the Corps’ combat<br />
readiness for 1991.<br />
532 POA: SVK General Staff , Security Dept., str. conf. 33-136 of 5 May 1995; Reactions of the population and<br />
of the political parties to the loss of Western Slavonia.<br />
533 POA: RSK, President of the Republic, 6 April 1995; Request. Th e context obviously demonstrates that the<br />
date is wrong. A letter with the identical contents was also delivered to the SRJ President Zoran Lilić.<br />
534 Ibid.<br />
535 POA: RSK, Republican Civil Defence Staff , no. str. conf. 01-44/95 of 1 May 1995; Order.<br />
161
On the fi rst day of Storm the decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council led to the<br />
exodus of the majority of the Serbian population from the occupied part of Croatia. It<br />
was made public on 4 August at 2000 hours. According to the Decision, the evacuation<br />
of the civil population of Northern Dalmatia and the southern part of Lika was being<br />
organized for preventive and security reasons... Th e Supreme Council has chosen this<br />
option in order to protect the civil population from possible further attacks by the Croatian<br />
artillery and to relieve the Serbian fi ghters holding the defence lines of the burden of care for<br />
their families. 536 One hour later the electronic surveillance platoon of the HV 1 st Guards<br />
Brigade intercepted the information that ... the organized evacuation of women, children<br />
and old people had started at the order of Milan Martić. 537 Th e events that followed are<br />
well described by Jagoda, a 45-year-old mother of two minor children, in her account<br />
of the suff ering of the people led by its leaders into exile: On that day, when Krajina fell,<br />
on 4 August, I was still working. We were then in a barracks, in the shelter. I just heard<br />
people talking about who had died. When things calmed down, I went home. We asked our<br />
commander whether we would run, retreat? He said we were not going anywhere. I came<br />
home, put the children to bed. We had three blankets in the cellar. Th ere were also some<br />
neighbours. Th en a man came and told us to get going. Out of fear and panic we forgot to<br />
take some clothes. We just cared the children, because they said that bombing was expected<br />
in the morning. I just took those blankets to tuck in the children. Th e countryside was<br />
desolate, and houses were burning by the road. My cousin was left behind. Th e column was<br />
intersected, and he walked on corpses, for 9 kilometres, from Topusko to Dvor na Uni. Th e<br />
Muslims had cut the column and slaughtered everyone. My children were terribly afraid...<br />
As we approached Topusko we heard shelling. We passed a bend, and there was a nice small<br />
house by the road. Th e shell struck it. It was horrible. Th e house was burning, with people<br />
in it. Before that we had still been able to see children playing outside... Th ere were pieces<br />
of sheet metal all over the road. We heard moans, cries... Th ey formed columns. Some went<br />
faster, others lagged behind. But nobody paid any attention to others, to the sick and the<br />
dying. One of my neighbours, a cousin of mine, died on the road. Her son drove her, dead,<br />
for a while. But then he had to stop, because the children panicked, and just tipped her into<br />
the roadside ditch, covered her with some branches and went on. You can imagine how that<br />
man has felt since. And he had no opportunity to do anything. To bury her. Children were<br />
also dying. Th e heat was terrible. 538<br />
When Storm started, Croatian media published on 4 August in the morning the<br />
message of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, to ethnic Serbs,<br />
Croatian citizens. He called upon members of the Serbian paramilitary to surrender<br />
536 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (KninFell in Belgrade), 179.<br />
537 MORH, GSHV: 1st Guards Br., Electronic Surv. Platoon, cl. 804-08/95-022, reg. no. 1111-11-95-215, 4<br />
Aug. 1995; Daily report.<br />
538 «Žene Krajine - rat. exodus i izbeglištvo» (Th e Women of the Krajina - War, Exodus and Exile), Vesna<br />
Nikolić-Ristanović, Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić, Nataša Mrvić-Petrović, Ivana Stevanović, Branislava<br />
Knežić: Institute for criminological and sociological studies, Belgrade, 1996, 127-128.<br />
162
weapons and guaranteed amnesty pursuant to Croatian laws. All persons who had not<br />
committed any war crimes during the rebellion were urged to remain at home and<br />
expect Croatian authorities without any fear. 539 Some people believe that the message<br />
was not sincere 540 , and refer in most cases to the Brijuni transcript as proof. However,<br />
that particular transcript, as well as others occasionally released in public, can be refuted<br />
with other transcripts - which, of course, have not been published. Th us, in one of the<br />
transcripts, recorded in November 1991, a few days before the fall and the occupation<br />
of Vukovar, in a serious and agonizing stage of the war, with no end in sight, Franjo<br />
Tuđman said, in a discussion on extremist behaviour in Croatia, that he opposed all<br />
ideas according to which “no Serb should remain in Croatia”. 541 Why should he have<br />
changed his mind on the eve of victory? Aft er all, available sources also demonstrate that<br />
the Croatian side did not plan and implement the banishment of the rebel Serbs. 542<br />
Serbian refugee column<br />
539 “Kronologija rata 1989.-1998.” (Chronology of the War 1989-1998), <strong>Hrvatski</strong> informativni <strong>centar</strong>, Zagreb, 1998, 504.<br />
540 Cf. N. Barić, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etničko čišćenje’ Srba?” (Did Croatia Carry out ‘Ethnic Cleansing’<br />
of the Serbs in 1995?), 442-443.<br />
541 Minutes of the meeting held in the Offi ce of the President of the Republic on Th ursday, 14 November 1991.<br />
542 N. Barić, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etničko čišćenje’ Srba?” (Did Croatia Carry out ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of<br />
the Serbs in 1995?), 461.<br />
163
164<br />
To Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality from the occupied areas<br />
of Knin, Gračac, Lapac, Korenica, Slunj,<br />
Glina, Dvor and Petrinja,<br />
Whereas all past attempts, including yesterday’s negotiations in Geneva, between the<br />
Croatian authorities and the international communities concerning the peaceful reintegration of<br />
the occupied Croatian areas have failed;<br />
Whereas the instigators of the rebellion in Croatia, Martić and others, instead of<br />
responding to the call for peaceful reintegration, continue to wage war against the Croatian State<br />
and, together with the leaders of the rebellion in Bosnia, Karadžić and others, devise new plans for<br />
the joint conquest of the Bihać safe area, which Croatia cannot tolerate;<br />
Whereas the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs not only prevent the return of refugees but also continue<br />
to persecute the non-Serbian population;<br />
Whereas the Serbian extremists, from the very beginnings of the rebellion to this very<br />
day, appeal for help to the remnants of Italian fascism, off ering a division of Croatian territory<br />
between Italian and Serbian imperialism;<br />
Whereas unrestrained paramilitary Serbian units still engage in terrorist attacks on the<br />
civil population from Slavonia to Dalmatia, shell Croatian regions and the towns of Otočac, Gospić<br />
and Karlovac, and even while conducting in Geneva political talks about peaceful reintegration<br />
continue to shell Dubrovnik causing new casualties;<br />
And whereas all the attempts of the Croatian State and of the international community<br />
to restore in a peaceful way the seized parts of Croatian territory under Croatian sovereignty<br />
have been rejected and thwarted, the Croatian State is forced to take military-police steps for the<br />
reintegration of these occupied areas into its constitutional and legal system.<br />
We are forced to such a decision in order to put an end, aft er four years of futile<br />
negotiations, to the outmanoeuvring of the Croatian and international public, and in order to<br />
ensure the start of displaced person return to their homes.
Th erefore, on behalf of the democratic government of Croatia:<br />
I call upon all members of the Serbian paramilitary units, whether mobilized into<br />
such units of their own free will or by force, to hand in their weapons to the Croatian authorities<br />
with the guarantee that they will be granted amnesty pursuant to Croatian laws.<br />
I urge the initiators of the rebellion to grasp the futility of their enterprise and its<br />
detrimental eff ect on the Serbian community in Croatia if they should persist in their rebellion, to<br />
surrender to Croatian authorities and accept pardon or a fair trial for their off ences.<br />
I call upon Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality who have not taken active part<br />
in the rebellion to remain at home and, without any fear for their life and their property, wait<br />
for the arrival of Croatian authorities, with the guarantee that they will be granted all civil rights<br />
and the possibility of holding elections for local self-government, in accordance with the Croatian<br />
Constution and the Constitutional Law. and in the presence of international observers.<br />
I urge the representatives of Serbia and Montenegro (and their Yugoslavia) to<br />
stop providing support to the extremists in the occupied Croatian areas, manifested also during<br />
yesterday’s negotiations in Geneva, at which the Yugoslav chargé d’aff aires was also present, when<br />
the Croatian Serbs refused to accept the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas. Th at would<br />
have been the fi rst step towards the overall solution of Croatian-Serbian relations throughout the<br />
area of interest of the two neighbouring peoples and towards the normalization of relations based<br />
on mutual recognition.<br />
We are determined to put an end to the suff ering and uncertainty of Croatian displaced<br />
persons from the occupied areas, and to guarantee to the Croatian Serbs human and ethnic rights<br />
in the constitutional and legal order of democratic Croatia.<br />
Zagreb, 4 August 1995<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HDA-1741, National minorities, fi le 902/17.<br />
Th e President of the Republic of Croatia<br />
Dr Franjo Tuđman<br />
165
166<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
There have been quite a few speculations about the political background of Operation Storm.<br />
Th e criminal conduct of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serb army in the Srebrenica safe area<br />
followed by their joint assault on Bihać together with the Croatian rebel Serbs had a bearing<br />
on Croatia’s position. It became a factor which could help to resolve the Bosnian-Herzegovinian<br />
crisis with, of course, a price - understanding for Croatia’s interests in the area not controlled by the<br />
legal government. Th ere was obviously a tacit agreement of an infl uential part of the international<br />
community to a quick liberating operation. In addition to liberation, Operation Storm also had a no<br />
less important humanitarian feature, the lift ing of the blockade of the Bihać area, and this point must<br />
not be forgotten.<br />
Th e SVK was on the defence and in this respect compensated for the numerical superiority of<br />
the Croatian forces. In terms of armaments and military equipment it was a match for the HV, and<br />
it was even superior in armour. Its weakness lay in the fact that it was the military force of a system<br />
which no grounds for independent existence. Th e RSK was a creation emerged from the unrealized<br />
pan-Serbian plans about a similar state. Th e political and territorial entity which gave birth to SAO<br />
Krajina was only a tactical step supposed to give the Serbs in Croatia legality and legitimacy as<br />
the SFRY broke apart and to get them the international “green light” for remaining in the rump<br />
Yugoslavia. However, the project failed, i.e., the JNA did not defeat the Croatian army - that being the<br />
only way in which Croatia could be forced to accept the Serbian diktat concerning borders. Th erefore,<br />
SAO Krajina became the RSK, an attempt to create a state, aft er the autonomy project failed, which<br />
would join up with the Serbian-Montenegrin part of Yugoslavia. Aft er that it tried to maintain a<br />
kind of political-territorial organization through UNPROFOR and UNCRO, and succeeded in the<br />
eff ort for several years although the rebel Serbs harboured doubts about the international forces. But<br />
time worked against the RSK and its position and internal political conditions deteriorated because<br />
it had no material base, just as it did have the human and in particular the intellectual potential to<br />
create something more organized than a region with few laws, a lot of autocracy and, perhaps most<br />
accurately, rule of the stronger. An illustrative assessment was provided in mid-July 1995, on the<br />
eve of Storm, by a Yugoslav Army colonel engaged in the SVK Air force and Air Defence: As you<br />
travel across the RSK and visit its towns, you can easily note that nothing has been done in terms of<br />
development. Th e existing resources are being exploited and the outcome is sought from some other side.<br />
Th ere is no normal objective such as required for every organized society. All social wealth is stagnating.<br />
Popular culture has taken a wrong turn. All sense of reality in time and space has been lost... Th e<br />
people of the RSK are exhausted by the condition which stifl es every initiative. Fear from the ustashi<br />
killers has gradually and systematically prevailed. Because of “destroy everything Croatian” people live<br />
in fear of the ustashi doctrine of “kill everything Serbian”. And when the self-preservation instinct is not<br />
channelled, it is clear what manifestations are possible. 543<br />
543 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 232.
Todorović and Vilić, well-known experts of the JNA and, later, the Yugoslav Army,<br />
“found” the roots of the SVK defeat in the anticommunism of the SDS, which rejected the<br />
partisan strategy and imposed on the population the “loser chetnik strategy and tactics of<br />
Pop Đujić”. 544 Th is interpretation is valuable merely as an example of a line of thought which<br />
expired with the disappearance of the SFRY.<br />
Krajina disappeared because it was a delusion eventually abandoned even by those who<br />
had contributed to its creation. Th e last days of the RSK showed that its weakest point was its<br />
political and military leadership. On 4 August in the evening, the Supreme Defence Council<br />
dominated by Martić decided to reduce the front in Northern Dalmatia. In the night of 4/5<br />
August this led to the breakdown and withdrawal of the North Dalmatian Corps towards<br />
Bosanska Krajina. As if by a domino eff ect the same fate befell the other SVK corps. Krajina<br />
disappeared much more quickly than expected considering the strength of its armed forces.<br />
Aft er fi ve years Croatia reincorporated more than 18% of the rebel-controlled and occupied<br />
area into its constitutional and legal order. Eastern Slavonia still remained out of Croatian<br />
control. Time soon showed that these areas and Serbian policy did not want a rerun of<br />
Storm on the western borders of SR Yugoslavia. With the good offi ces of the international<br />
community the representatives of the rebel Serbs from Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and<br />
Western Sirmium agreed to peaceful and gradual reintegration, and signed in Erdut the<br />
“Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium”. 545<br />
Photograph by Davor Višnjić, 7 August 1995<br />
544 Boško Todorović, Dušan Vilić, «Gubitnička strategija» (Loser Strategy), Vojska, 24 Aug. 1995, 10-11.<br />
545 “Kronologija rata” (War Chronology), 536.<br />
167
168<br />
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Sarajevo, 1999.<br />
NOBILO, Mario, “<strong>Hrvatski</strong> feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata, 1990-1997” (Th e Croatian<br />
Phoenix: Diplomatic Processes Behind Closed Doors, 1990-1997), Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb, 2000.<br />
“Oluja” (Storm), Hrvatska vojna glasila, 1-3, Zagreb, October-December 1995.<br />
“Otkaz mandata UNPROFOR-u: Treća obljetnica međunarodnog priznanja Republike Hrvatske”<br />
(Cancellation of the UNPROFOR Mandate: Th ird Anniversary of the International Recognition of the Republic<br />
of Croatia) MORH, Politička uprava, Zagreb, 1995.
OWEN, David, “Balkanska odiseja” (Balkan Odyssey), (trans.), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada: <strong>Hrvatski</strong><br />
institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998.<br />
RADELIĆ, Zdenko, MARIJAN, Davor, BARIĆ, Nikica, BING, Albert, ŽIVIĆ, Dražen; “Stvaranje<br />
hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War), Školska knjiga,<br />
<strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2006.<br />
RADINOVIĆ, Radovan, “Realna pretnja na delu” (Real Th reat at Work), Vojska Krajine, 4-5, July-August<br />
1993.<br />
RADIŠIĆ, Dragan, “Hronologija događaja na prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije 1990-1995” (Chronology of<br />
Events in the Space of the Previous Yugoslavia), Glas srpski - Centar za geostrateška istraživanja Univerziteta<br />
u Banjoj Luci, Banja Luka, 2002.<br />
SEKULIĆ, Milisav, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), NIDDA Verlag GmbH, Bad Vilbel,<br />
2001.<br />
Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne (Shorthand transcripts on the partition of Bosnia), Kultura&Rasvjeta-Civitas,<br />
Split - Sarajevo, 2005.<br />
ŠARINIĆ, Hrvoje, Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem 1993-1995(98)” (All My Secret<br />
Negotiations with Slobodan Milošević 1993-95/98/), Globus, International, Zagreb, 1999.<br />
TODOROVIĆ, Boško/VILIĆ, Dušan, “Izdaja i odbrana Jugoslavije” (Betrayal and Defence of Yugoslavia),<br />
Privredapublik, Belgrade, 1990.<br />
TUĐMAN, Franjo, “Hrvatska riječ u svijetu: razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima” (Croatian Word in<br />
the World: Talks with Foreign Representatives), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest,<br />
Zagreb, 1999.<br />
TUĐMAN, Franjo, “Pet godina hrvatske pobjede” (Five Years of Croatian Victory), Ministarstvo obrane,<br />
Politička uprava, Zagreb, 1996.<br />
TUĐMAN, Franjo, “Stanje hrvatske države i nacije” (Th e State of the Croatian State and Nation),<br />
Ministarstvo obrane, Politička uprava, Zagreb, 1995.<br />
TUĐMAN, Miroslav, “Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: dokumenti 1991-1995” (Th e Truth About Bosnia and<br />
Herzegovina: Documents 1991-1995), Slovo M, Zagreb, 2005.<br />
UNITED NATIONS, Resolutions on the Republic of Croatia, UNPROFOR; transl.: “UN, rezolucije o<br />
Republici Hrvatskoj, UNPROFOR, Pan liber, Osijek, 1995.<br />
VRCELJ, Marko, “Rat za Srpsku Krajinu: 1991-1995” (War for the Serbian Krajina: 1991-1995), Srpsko<br />
kulturno društvo “Zora”, Belgrade, 2002.<br />
«Žene Krajine - rat. exodus i izbeglištvo» (Th e Women of Krajina - War, Exodus and Exile), Vesna Nikolić-<br />
Ristanović, Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić, Nataša Mrvić-Petrović, Ivana Stevanović, Branislava Knežić:<br />
Institute for criminological and sociological studies, Belgrade, 1996, 127-128.<br />
ŽUNEC, Ozren, “Operacije Bljesak i Oluja, Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995” (Operations<br />
Flash and Storm; War in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina 1991-1995), Naklada Jesenski i Turk: Dani,<br />
Zagreb: Sarajevo, 1999.<br />
PHOTOGRAPHS:<br />
- HMDCDR<br />
- Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (MORH),<br />
Central Military Archives<br />
- MORH Military Museum<br />
- MORH, Croatian Military Press Dept.<br />
- Večernji list daily, Zagreb - photodocumentation<br />
- photographic fi les of the HV 1 st , 2 nd , 4 th and 9 th Guards<br />
Brigades, the 81 st Guards Battalion, the 1 st HGZ<br />
- Association of Homeland War Special Police<br />
169
170<br />
Books:<br />
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY<br />
Davor MARIJAN (1966) completed his education in Livno and<br />
in Zagreb where he graduated from the Faculty of Arts and Letters<br />
(history and archaeology) in 1994. In 2005 he also won at the<br />
same Faculty his MS degree in 2005, and in 2006 his Ph.D. degree<br />
on the theme Th e Yugoslav National Army and the Disintegration<br />
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia 1987-1992. Since 2001 he has<br />
been engaged, in the Croatian Institute of History, in the project<br />
“Th e Creation of the Republic of Croatia and the Homeland War<br />
1991-1995-1998”. He studies the military history of Croatia and<br />
Yugoslavia in the period between 1941 and 1995. He has published<br />
four books and more than twenty papers and articles.<br />
“Borbe za Kupres” (Th e Battles for Kupres), AGM, Zagreb, 1999<br />
“Smrt oklopne brigade” (Th e Death of the Armoured Brigade), Naklada Zoro, Zagreb-<br />
Sarajevo, 2002<br />
“Bitka za Vukovar” (Th e Battle for Vukovar), <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest: Podružnica<br />
za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, Zagreb - Slavonski Brod, 2004<br />
“Graničari: Prilog za ratni put 108. brigade Zbora narodne garde Republike Hrvatske”<br />
(Th e Frontiersmen: History of the War Path of the 108 th Croatian National Guards<br />
Brigade), <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest: Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i<br />
Baranje, Zagreb - Slavonski Brod, 2006<br />
... Th e key point is that Storm could not be avoided. Storm cannot be regarded outside the<br />
context of developments in 1990-1991. Th e purpose of SAO Krajina emerged in 1990, and<br />
the self-proclaimed Republic of the Serbian Krajina in late 1991 was not the creation of an<br />
independent state in Croatia, and that is the issue. Th e goal of the rebel Serbs was integration<br />
with Serbia... Some call it Yugoslavia, others Greater Serbia, ultimately it boils down to a state<br />
in which all the Serbs live. When the project failed in 1991, the RSK was created in order to save<br />
the day. Negotiations with the leadership of the rebel Serbs went on for three-four years... Th ey<br />
were really off ered everything that could be off ered, and they turned down the lot. All that was<br />
left was the military option, which dealt with the issue...<br />
... However, when a war starts, it has to be won. What is essential in the whole story, and<br />
documents are truly convincing in this regard... is that Croatia endeavoured to avoid war in<br />
every possible way. Even in the context of war within its borders Croatia did not attack. It was<br />
attacked, and that should be borne in mind.<br />
Matters came to a head with the fi rst Bihać crisis in late 1994, which marked the start of the<br />
Croatian cycle of operations from Livanjsko Polje up to assuming control on Mount Dinara. It<br />
was a long process, and a chapter which needs to be taken into account in the story about the<br />
crushing of the RSK... Th ere are myths also about this war. Everybody has his own myths...<br />
Th ere is a famous myth about Serbian invincibility... In this context due consideration needs to<br />
be taken of the fact that the Krajina Serbs were watching for seven months how the Croatian
army was taking over Dinara. I was born in the area, and I know how harsh winters can be<br />
there. Practically, the entire Dinara range was slowly taken away from the Serbs by two units<br />
which were not from that area, with the help of reserve units. One of them, the 7 th Guards<br />
Brigade, originated from north-western Croatia, where the climate and the confi guration of the<br />
ground are totally diff erent; the second, the 4 th Guards Brigade, came from the southern part<br />
from Croatia... its headquarters was in Split... therefore, a warm-bloodied brigade faced with<br />
brutal winter. Th ey froze up there, but accomplished their mission. And that had an eff ect on<br />
morale... Th us, practically speaking, the Split Corps District appears to have had the easier part<br />
of the mission - Winter ’94, which was very tough, then two brief operations, Leap l and Leap<br />
2, followed by the great Summer ’95 - the taking of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč.<br />
... Th e degree of discrepancy between idea and execution will certainly be determined over a<br />
longer term. One of the issues is the reason why attacks ground to a halt. Th e best known case<br />
refers to the assault on Petrinja, and there are still some loose ends in that respect, related more<br />
to the professional, military aspect rather than to reasons aired in the public, although that is<br />
not particularly important because the operation was successful. And when the operation is<br />
successful, all the other shortcomings become secondary. Th e saddest part of the story involves<br />
the loss of several well-known and popular offi cers of the 2 nd Guards Brigade (also known as<br />
Gromovi, Th unders), e.g., Predrag Matanović, battalion commander, one of the symbols of<br />
the Brigade. All the soldiers who fought with them and knew them mourned their loss. Th e<br />
question which is eventually raised is a matter of pure tactics: why a frontal assault and not<br />
encirclement? Th e question will be debated for quite some time. General Basarac, in charge of<br />
the Zagreb Corps District, died recently, and we shall never hear certain things from that side.<br />
He had his own vision, others had their own...<br />
... Reporters have now focused on Gotovina’s alleged two-day celebration in Knin. Whatever<br />
may have happened, it is a fact that the Split Corps District ceased all off ensive operations<br />
during those two days. Accordingly, it appears that the mission in the area under consideration<br />
could have been accomplished earlier. Yet, whoever has ever visited the area and observed its<br />
geographical features knows what would have happened if the two Guards brigades had pushed<br />
on to Pađene and to Srb. Whatever anyone may think, the casualty toll would have been very<br />
high. When the case is considered dispassionately and comprehensively, there are no major<br />
objections. Th e brigades may have captured some more weapons, but a dozen old tanks possibly<br />
won by the HV were not worth the cost in human lives. And there is no doubt that the casualty<br />
list would have been high, because that was a bottleneck in which the two brigades would have<br />
been trapped.<br />
... Th e major issue about Storm relates to what happened later. Th is is a vast area, and a<br />
more detailed analysis will certainly be required. MUP documents will facilitate the task, but, I<br />
must admit, I had no access to them... Some 550 or 600 people are being mentioned, but, when<br />
you remember what other armies did when they seized an area and how they behaved.... Th en,<br />
all kinds of people came in, others returned to their destroyed homes, some thirsting for revenge.<br />
But, and that is the essential point, there are no indications that this was the plan of the state.<br />
Unlike the planned Greater Serbian project which caused the war. Th at is essential. Th ere was<br />
no state plan, at the highest level of government in Croatia, to burn, destroy and kill, as is being<br />
continuously imputed, now also in Th e Hague, there was no criminal enterprise. Th ere are no<br />
indications for such claims...<br />
From Marijan Davor’ interview for Radio Zagreb<br />
(2 nd Programme, 4 October 2007),<br />
aft er the publication of his book Storm.<br />
171
172
APPENDICES<br />
(edited by Mate Rupić)<br />
173
174
FOREWORD TO THE APPENDICES<br />
In addition to Dr. Davor Marijan’s scholarly study, the book Storm is enriched by<br />
Appendices, documents selected and edited by Mate Rupić, Senior Archivist at the<br />
Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre of the Homeland War. Th ese documents<br />
refer to major political and military events which infl uenced the decision to mount<br />
Operation Storm (the process of annexation to Serbia and of unifi cation of the so-called<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, i.e., of the Serbs from Croatia and<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina into a single state, and the Bihać crisis), and to its aft ermath (the<br />
exodus of the Serbs from the occupied area). Th ese developments, and the respective<br />
selected and chronologically ordered documents, show why the issue of the occupied<br />
territory of the Republic of Croatia could not be solved by diplomatic and peaceful<br />
means, why Storm could no longer be delayed, and why the claims that the Croatian<br />
leadership had banished the Serbs from the so-called Krajina are historically unfounded.<br />
Th e documents in the Appendices to this book span the time from 1991 to 1995 in<br />
order to draw attention to the fact that mounting Storm was not a sudden whim of the<br />
Croatian leadership but rather the consequence of a long process of futile negotiations<br />
with the leadership of the rebel Serbs on the peaceful reintegration of occupied Croatian<br />
territory and of ineffi cient moves by the international community, and to emphasize that<br />
the operation in question cannot be considered only in terms of the events in July and<br />
August 1995. In the English translation of the documents in the Appendices some parts<br />
have been considerably abridged and others omitted [the omitted parts are marked by<br />
three points in brackets (...)] in order to facilitate the understanding of the documents by<br />
the foreign readers and focus on parts important for the appreciation of the circumstances<br />
which led to Storm. However, in order to provide the readers of the English translation<br />
an overview of all the documents published in the Croatian edition, the description of<br />
their contents is given at the beginning of the Appendices.<br />
Th e fi rst chapter of the Appendices comprises 30 documents testifying to the intensive<br />
eff orts of Serbian politicians focused on preparing the unifi cation of Serbs from the<br />
Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina (that is, the so-called Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina and Republika Srpska) in a single Serbian state. Th us, the Appendices list in<br />
chronological sequence documents showing that the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia<br />
and Herzegovina continued to draft bills for the proclamation of the “United Serbian<br />
Republic” even aft er their defeat in Operation Flash in which the Croatian armed<br />
forces liberated part of Croatia (in early May 1995), and that the process, a step away<br />
from becoming reality, was interrupted by the victory of the Croatian armed forces in<br />
Operation Storm.<br />
175
Th e documents in the second chapter of the Appendices cover the Bihać crisis, caused<br />
by the assault of the Serbs from Bosnia&Herzegovina and Croatia on the UN safe area<br />
of Bihać. Th ey start with a memoir piece - the memories of Lieutenant General Krešimir<br />
Ćosić, Ph.D. on the negotiations in the United States with American political and military<br />
offi cials, which resulted in Operation Winter ’94 mounted by the Croatian armed forces<br />
and the resolution of the fi rst Bihać crisis. Th ere follow 44 documents, largely of Serbian<br />
origin, on the events at Bihać from 27 October 1994 until 3 August 1995, showing that<br />
Bihać was an extraordinarily important objective in the Serbian plans. However, it could<br />
not be achieved because of the tough resistance of the 5 th Corps of the Army of B&H<br />
and the 101 st Regiment of the Croatian Defence Council (unit composed of Croats from<br />
the Bihać area), supported by assistance from Croatia. Documents testify that Serbian<br />
strategists shrunk from no means in their attempts to take Bihać, and even mounted a<br />
covert operation involving the use of biological agents in poisoning food smuggled into<br />
Bihać and intended to cause widespread disease among the troops of the ARBiH 5 th<br />
Corps but also among the population of Bihać.<br />
Th e third chapter of the Appendices includes 22 documents showing that plans of<br />
the rebel Serbs concerning evacuation of the population form the occupied territory of<br />
Croatia in case of any assault by Croatian armed forces such as Storm existed already in<br />
1993. Th ey include the “Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on the evacuation<br />
of the population from the municipalities of Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, Gračac and<br />
Knin towards Srb and Lapac” issued in the aft ernoon hours in Knin on 4 August 1995.<br />
At the end, the Appendices present in a separate section the contents of the socalled<br />
Plan Z-4, which the rebel Serbs in Croatia did not even want to consider, and the<br />
memories of the representatives of the international community involved in the attempts<br />
to implement the plan. Th eir statements describing the way in which the representatives<br />
of the Serbs in Croatia refused to accept the off ered Plan as a platform for talks clearly<br />
confi rm that any attempt to achieve a peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas into<br />
the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia was doomed to failure<br />
because of the intolerant position of the Serbian leaders.<br />
Th e documents presented in the Appendices can be said to be a direct and argumentsupported<br />
response to questions why, unfortunately, there was no alternative to the<br />
military option, why the Croatian leadership could no longer delay Storm, and who was<br />
responsible for the exile of Croatia’s ethnic Serbs on the eve of and aft er Storm. Th e<br />
following facts also show how unconvincing are the claims that Croatia was hasty in<br />
mounting a military solution, and that more time should have been left for negotiations<br />
- the condition of Bihać’s defences was dramatic and the fall of Bihać would<br />
considerably, even decisively improve the position of the Serbian armed forces;<br />
- the leadership of the rebel Serbs turned down all peace initiatives - by the Government<br />
of the Republic of Croatia and by the international community - and even Plan Z-4<br />
which envisioned an extremely broad autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, almost “a state<br />
within the state”;<br />
- the continuous endeavours of the Serbs from Croatia and from Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
focused since 1991 on the creation of a single Serbian state in the occupied parts of<br />
176
the Republic of Croatia and of Bosnia&Herzegovina - the “United Serbian Republic” -<br />
entered the fi nal stage, the adoption of the joint constitution, just on the eve of Storm.<br />
Considering the experience, the course of the negotiations on the peaceful reintegration<br />
of the occupied Croatian territory into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic<br />
of Croatia, it would really be diffi cult to argue that the rebel Serbs, had they succeeded in<br />
taking Bihać and signifi cantly improving their strategic position with respect to Croatia,<br />
would have agreed to negotiate peaceful reintegration.<br />
177
178<br />
CONTENTS<br />
APPENDIX 1 - PLANS OF THE REBEL SERBS FROM CROATIA REGARDING THE SECESSION<br />
OF TERRITORY FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND UNIFICATION WITH THE SERBS IN<br />
BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA AND SERBIA<br />
1 1991, 1 April, Titova Korenica: Decision of the Executive Council of the Serbian Autonomous Region of<br />
Krajina on the annexation of part of the territory of Croatia to the Republic of Serbia .............185<br />
2 1991, 30 April, Knin: Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on the<br />
appointment of the central commission for the referendum on unifi cation with the Republic of<br />
Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia .........................................................................................................186<br />
3 1991, 16 May, Knin: Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on<br />
annexation to the Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro and<br />
others willing to preserve Yugoslavia .................................................................................................188<br />
4 1991, 27 June, Knin: Declaration on the unifi cation of the Association of Municipalities of Bosnian<br />
Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina ............................................................... 189<br />
5 1992, 1 May, Knin: Declaration of the Assembly on the political goals of the Republic of Serbian Krajina ........ 190<br />
6 1992, 22 September, Banja Luka: Protocol on Cooperation between the governments of Republika Srpska<br />
and the Republic of Serbian Krajina .................................................................................................. 194<br />
7 1991, September, Knin: basic programmatic principles and goals of the Serbian Democratic Party .. 197<br />
8 1992, 31 October, Prijedor: Declaration on the Unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and<br />
Republika Srpska ................................................................................................................................. 198<br />
9 1993, 24 April, Banja Luka: Decision on the constitution of the joint national assembly of the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska .............................................................................................. 200<br />
10 1993, 19 July, Knin: Minutes of the session of the governments of Republika Srpska and the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina, which agreed on unifi cation in one state and appointed a commission for the<br />
draft ing of the constitution and other legal documents related to unifi cation ............................ 201<br />
11 1993, 10 August, Belgrade: Proposal of the foreign minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina on the<br />
selection of current war objectives related to the confl ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina .............. 203<br />
12 1994, 1 February, Knin: Press release of the Serbian Democratic Party of the Krajina on its coalition<br />
agreement with the Serbian Radical Party and on the common goal - the unifi cation of all Serbian<br />
lands and foundation of a single Serbian state ................................................................................. 204<br />
13 1994, 5 July, Belgrade: Congratulatory message of Jovica Stanišić, head of the State Security Service of<br />
the Republic of Serbia, to the minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbian Krajina on the<br />
occasion of the “Security Day”<br />
14 1994, 4 August, Plitvice Lakes: Minutes of the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina which adopted the proposal on unifi cation with Republika Srpska as the fi rst step<br />
towards a single Serbian state ............................................................................................................. 205<br />
15 1994, 4 August, Knin: Press release of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina concerning the motion<br />
to include unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska with Serbia and<br />
Montenegro in the agenda of the extraordinary session of the Assembly ................................... 206<br />
16 1994, 15 August, Knin: Statement of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina aft er the talks of the party<br />
delegation with the leadership of Republika Srpska ....................................................................... 207<br />
17 1994, 18 August: Proposal of the Assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina to<br />
the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro concerning unifi cation in a single state .................. 208<br />
18 early 1995, [Knin]: Proposed plan for the commitment of the Serbian Army of Krajina in the confl ict<br />
with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia ......................................................................... 209
19 1995, 8 February (Knin): Speeches by Milan Martić, Borislav Mikelić and Milan Babić at the session of<br />
the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which discussed the process of negotiation with<br />
the Republic of Croatia and Plan Z-4 ............................................................................................... 221<br />
20 1995, 10 February [Knin]: Th e General Staff forwards to the corps commands and senior offi cers the<br />
summary of President Milan Martić’s speech on combat readiness ............................................ 223<br />
21 1995, 30 March, Knin: Conclusions of the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina following the<br />
amended mandate of the United Nations Protective Force in the occupied area of the Republic of<br />
Croatia ................................................................................................................................................... 227<br />
22 1995, 6 May [Knin]: Letter of RSK President Milan Martić to Slobodan Milošević, President of the<br />
Republic of Serbia, aft er the liberation of Western Slavonia by the armed forces of the Republic of<br />
Croatia ................................................................................................................................................... 228<br />
23 1995, 18 May, Borovo Selo: part of speech of the RSK President Milan Martić on the state crisis aft er the<br />
Croatian Army liberated Western Slavonia, and plans of unifi cation with Republika Srpska as the<br />
fi rst step towards the unifi cation of all Serbian lands ..................................................................... 230<br />
24 1995, 20 May, Borovo Selo: Decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina on starting the<br />
implementation of unifi cation with Republika Srpska ................................................................... 233<br />
25 1995, 29 May, Knin: Minutes of the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which<br />
approved the decision on state unifi cation with Republika Srpska ............................................... 234<br />
26 1995, 29 May, Knin: Decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina concerning the<br />
preliminary agreement to the decision of state unifi cation with Republika Srpska<br />
27 1995, 29 May, Knin: Decision of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska concerning agreement to the<br />
constitutional law on the interim constitutional arrangement of the United Republika Srpska<br />
28 1995, 2 June, Knin: Press release of the Serbian Democratic Party of the Krajina concerning the<br />
appointment of the new government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
29 1995, 29 June, Knin: Opinion of the cabinet of the RSK president concerning the preliminary draft of the<br />
law package for the preparation of the legislation of the United Republika Srpska ................... 235<br />
30 1995, 30 July: from the decisions of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on the proclamation of the state<br />
of war ..................................................................................................................................................... 236<br />
APPENDIX 2 - ASSAULT OF THE REBEL SERBS FROM BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA AND FROM THE<br />
OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF CROATIA ON THE UN SAFE AREA OF BIHAĆ<br />
Ćosić, Krešimir: How we changed the course of the war; Operation Winter 94 (memoir notes) .............. 239<br />
1 1994, 27 October: Th e General Staff of Republika Srpska requests from the Supreme Command of the<br />
Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina help in the Western Bosnian Th eatre - the<br />
Drvar Krajina - and against the ARBiH 5 th Corps ........................................................................... 249<br />
2 1994, 30 October - 23 December, Knin: from the war diary of the General Staff of the Serbian Krajina<br />
Army on assault on the Bihać safe area<br />
3 1994, 7 November, Nebljusi: Order of the Command of Tactical Group 1 to subordinate units for attack<br />
on HVO forces and the ARBiH 5 th Corps defending Bihać<br />
4 1994, 10 November, Knin: Letter of the SVK General Staff to the UNPROFOR Command in Zagreb<br />
denying charges of attacks on and shelling of the Bihać safe area<br />
5 1994, 13 November, Grahovo: Daily report of the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps on fi ghting in the Krupa and<br />
Kupres battlefi elds, and attack on the Bihać safe area ..................................................................... 250<br />
6 1994, 18 November: Combat report of the 21 st Corps Command to the GŠ SVK Forward Command Post<br />
in Korenica on the pressure of Croatian armed forces along the line of disengagement and the<br />
commitment of forces to the attack on the Bihać safe area<br />
7 1994, 20 November: Report of the VRS Security&Intelligence Sector to General Milovanović concerning<br />
the letter of the International Red Cross on the situation in Bihać aft er the assault of Serbian<br />
forces ...................................................................................................................................................... 252<br />
8 1994, 20 November, Petrova Gora: Report of the 21 st Corps to the GŠ SVK on the blocking of UNPROFOR as<br />
a response to possible NATO air strikes because of the assault of Serbian forces on the Bihać safe area<br />
179
9 1994, 20 November: Regular combat report of the 2 nd Krajina Corps to the VRS General Staff concerning<br />
fi ghting at the routes of access to Bihać<br />
10 1994, 21 November, Knin: Notice of the MUP Public Security Directorate to the RSK MUP Brigade on<br />
the dispatching of additional reinforcements of 100 troops, and on the fi nal attack on Bihać being<br />
prepared by the forces of Republika Srpska<br />
11 1994, 27 November, Oštrelj-Petrovac: Daily report of the Command of the VRS 2 nd Corps to units<br />
involved in the assault on the Bihać safe area concerning the fi ghting and the refusal of the ARBiH<br />
5 th Corps to surrender, and the lack of materiel for sustaining the assault .................................. 254<br />
12 1994, 28 November, Petrova Gora: Report of the 21 st Corps Command to GŠ SVK IKOM Korenica on the<br />
commitment of troops and materiel in the assault on the Bihać Safe Haven<br />
13 1994, 2 December: Report of the VRS 2 nd Corps Command to the SVK General Staff on the advance of<br />
Croatian forces in Livanjsko Polje and Glamočko Polje, and of Serbian forces towards Krupa -<br />
Bihać<br />
14 1994, 5 December: Report of the 2 nd Corps Command to the VSK General Staff on the breakthrough of<br />
Croatian forces in the Kupres battlefi eld .......................................................................................... 254<br />
15 1994, 6 December: Report of the 2 nd Corps Command to the SVK General Staff on assault actions in the<br />
Bihać - Krupa battlefi eld and on the pressure of Croatian forces in the Livno - Glamoč battlefi eld<br />
16 1994, 15 December: Report of the 15 th Corps to the SVK General Staff on the troops and materiel<br />
committed to the assault on the Bihać safe area<br />
17 1994, 16 December [Knin]: Analysis of SVK material consumption in Operation Spider, and plan of<br />
material procurement for continued assault on the Bihać safe area ............................................. 255<br />
18 1994, 18 December: Progress report of the Spider Command to the SVK General Staff on the assault on<br />
the Bihać safe area and new off ensive lines<br />
19 1995, 6 January: Communication of the Command of the SVK 15 th Infantry Brigade to subordinate units<br />
on the current situation in the battlefi eld and the reasons underlying the gridlock in the assault on<br />
the Bihać safe area ................................................................................................................................ 257<br />
20 1995, 17 February: Oštrelj-Petrovac: Summons requesting corps commanders and representatives of the<br />
VRS and SVK General Staff to attend the meeting of the Spider Command in order to analyze the<br />
gridlock in the assault on the Bihać safe area ................................................................................... 258<br />
21 1995, 1 March, Petrinja: Letter of SO Petrinja to the RSK Ministry of Defence requesting an analysis<br />
of developments in the battlefi eld in Western Bosnia, where the Petrinja Brigade suff ered great<br />
losses, and answers to questions concerning loss of territory between 1992 and 1994 .............. 258<br />
22 1995, 10 April: Report of the SVK General Staff to Slobodan Milošević, Milan Martić and Momčilo Perišić<br />
on Croatian force activities, the situation in Western Bosnia, unit morale, personnel problems and<br />
relations with UNPROFOR in the fi rst quarter of 1995 ................................................................. 259<br />
23 1995, 5 May, Oštrelj-Petrovac: Report of the 2 nd Corps Command to the VRS General Staff on the<br />
meeting in Knin which considered the situation at Bihać and decided to commit RS MUP units in<br />
the assault on Bihać instead of the SVK Lika Corps because the latter lacked the required forces<br />
24 1995, 27 May, Oštrelj-Petrovac: Report of the 2 nd Corps Command to the VRS General Staff concerning<br />
the meeting with Mile Mrkšić, commander of the Spider Operational Group, which considered<br />
operations against the ARBiH 5 th Corps and Croatian forces on Mount Dinara and in Livanjsko<br />
Polje ........................................................................................................................................................ 263<br />
25 1995, 9 June, Knin: Information of the SVK General Staff Intelligence Department on the breakthrough<br />
of Croatian forces towards Mount Šator, the situation in the Bihać theatre and overfl ights of aircraft<br />
supplying the Bihać safe area and the ARBiH 5 th Corps from Croatia<br />
26 1995, 11 June, Knin: Extraordinary operational report of the SVK General Staff to S. Milošević, M. Martić<br />
and M. Perišić on the situation in the Bihać theatre, in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount Dinara, SVK<br />
restructuring and anticipated offi cer reinforcements from the VJ ................................................ 264<br />
27 1995, July, Knin: Plan of counterintelligence security for Operation Sword-1 staged by the Serbian Army<br />
of the Krajina and the Yugoslav Army: the use of biological warfare (poisoning) against the troops<br />
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps ....................................................................................................................... 267<br />
28 1995, 23 July, Bihać: Report of the ARBiH 5 th Corps and the GS HVO Bihać to the RBiH Embassy in<br />
Zagreb on the powerful breakthrough of SVK forces threatening to rout the defences of Bihać ..... 268<br />
180
29 1995, 23 July: Report of the GŠ SVK Intelligence Dept. on the mobilization and movements of Croatian<br />
forces along the confrontation line and the humanitarian disaster in the Bihać safe area<br />
30 1995, 24 July, Petrinja: Communication of the SVK 39 th Corps Command to subordinate unit commands on<br />
the possible aggression by Croatian forces intended to relieve the threatened ARBiH 5 th Corps ..... 269<br />
31 1995, 25 July, Petrinja: Communication of the SVK 39 th Corps Intelligence Dept. to subordinate units on<br />
the possible Croatian airborne assault at Bihać ................................................................................ 270<br />
32 1995, 25 July, Knin: Report of the SVK General Staff to the RSK president on Croatian Army pressures at<br />
Grahovo and along the confrontation lines in Croatia<br />
33 1995, 26 July, Bihać: Report of the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps to the R BiH Embassy in Zagreb<br />
on the diffi cult situation in the fi eld and linkup with Croatian forces as the only solution ....... 271<br />
34 1995, 26 July, Knin: Report of the SVK General Staff to the RSK president on the breakthrough of<br />
Croatian forces on Mount Dinara, fi ghting at Bihać and the situation in the zones of other corps<br />
35 1995, 26 July, Knin: Report of the Intelligence Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security Directorate<br />
of the VJ General Staff on the implementation of the covert operation Sword-1 - the use of<br />
biological agents to be added to foodstuff s delivered under cover to the ARBiH 5 th Corps and<br />
intended to cause mass poisoning of the troops and knocking them out of action ................... 272<br />
36 1995, 26 July, Knin: Communication of the RSK MUP to the special unit commander on the advance of<br />
Croatian forces which broke the defence line at Grahovo and its imminent fall ....................... 276<br />
37 1995, 26 July: Report of Operational Group 1 Command to the Advance Command Post of the VRS<br />
General Staff on the advance of Croatian forces in the action at Grahovo ................................. 276<br />
38 1995, 28 July, Bihać: Report of the ARBiH 5 th Corps to the BiH Embassy in Zagreb on chetnik breakthrough<br />
at Bugari and heavy attacks from mounts Plješivica and Grmeč ................................................. 277<br />
39 1995, 29 July, Korenica: Report of SUP Korenica to RSK MUP on the deployment of a unit at Resanovo<br />
in Republika Srpska aft er the Croatian forces took Grahovo ....................................................... 278<br />
40 1995, 30 July, Knin: Communication of the RSK State Information Agency Iskra on the visit of Ratko<br />
Mladić, VRS commander, to Knin and on his statement concerning the assault on Bihać ..... 279<br />
41 1995, 31 July, Vrhovine: Th e command of the 50 th infantry brigade forwarded to all subordinate units the<br />
information received from the SVK 15 th Corps on the situation aft er the breakthrough of Croatian<br />
forces and the taking of Grahovo and Glamoč, the deployment of HV forces along possible attack<br />
positions and proclamation of the state of war .............................................................................. 280<br />
42 1995, 1 August: Order of the command of the 11 th infantry brigade to subordinate units to block<br />
UNPROFOR units, in case of a Croatian attack, disarm them and keep them as hostages .... 281<br />
43 1995, 3 August: Report of the Security Department of the 15 th Corps Command to the GŠ SVK Security<br />
Department on the increased pressure by Croatian forces which hampers the deployment of fresh<br />
forces for the Grahovo operation, and daily exodus of non-combatant population to the Federal<br />
Republic of Yugoslavia ...................................................................................................................... 282<br />
APPENDIX 3 - EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF CROATIA<br />
BEFORE AND DURING “STORM”<br />
1 1993, 27 January, Benkovac: Report of Autotransport Benkovac to the Benkovac Municipal Crisis Centre<br />
on the participation of the company in the plan for the evacuation of the civil population<br />
2 1993, 18 February, Petrinja: Evacuation plan of the Petrinja Civil Defence Centre forwarded by the<br />
command of the SVK 31 st Brigade to subordinate unit commands<br />
3 1993, 4 March, Jasenovac: Evacuation plan for the civil population of Jasenovac<br />
4 [1993, 23 March]: Report on civil defence inspection in the municipalities of Vrginmost and Vojnić ...... 287<br />
5 [1993, July; Okučani]: Letter of the Western Slavonia Directorate of the RSK Ministry of Defence to the<br />
command of the SVK 18th Corps requesting, in line with the plan for the evacuation of the population<br />
to Republika Srpska, the specifi cations of the routes and crossings on the river Sava .................. 290<br />
6 1993, 5 August, Pakrac: Report of the Pakrac municipal civil defence centre to the district civil defence<br />
headquarters in Okučani concerning the population evacuation plan in the event of a Croatian<br />
off ensive<br />
181
7 1994, 1 February: Report of the Okučani police station to the Okučani Secretariat for Internal Aff airs on<br />
the plan of evacuation of the population from Western Slavonia ................................................. 291<br />
8 1994, 26 March, Knin: Response of the Ministry of Defence to the RSK Assembly to the member’s question<br />
concerning the provision of suffi cient quantities of fuel for the evacuation of the population .... 294<br />
9 1995, 7 February, Krnjak: Plan for the evaluation of the population from the local communities of Donji<br />
Skrad, Tušilovićki Cerovac, Tušilović and Brezova Glava<br />
10 1995, April, Knin: RSK Civil Defence Headquarters - assessment of threat and protection and rescue<br />
possibilities ............................................................................................................................................ 295<br />
11 1995, 11 May, Knin: Report of the Security Department of the SVK General Staff to the Security<br />
Directorate of the VJ General Staff on enhanced HV propaganda activities, losses sustained in the<br />
assault on the Bihać safe area and civilian exodus from Benkovac ............................................... 308<br />
12 1995, 30 May, Knin: Order of the SVK General Staff concerning measures for the elimination of<br />
weaknesses in the armed forces and other developments underlying the loss of territory ....... 310<br />
13 1995, 6 June, Knin: Communication of the military cabinet of the RSK president to the SVK General Staff<br />
concerning the visit of the delegation from Obrovac which reported an alarming military&security<br />
situation threatening to develop into spontaneous or organized exodus of the population ..... 312<br />
14 1995, 29 July, Knin: Order of the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence centres<br />
concerning the implementation of evacuation, relief and care plans ........................................... 313<br />
15 1995, 31 July, Knin: Order of the RSK Ministry of the Interior to the secretariats of internal aff airs to<br />
prepare for speedy evacuation of fi les and records because of the proclaimed state of war<br />
16 1995, 31 July, Drniš: Report of the Drniš dept. of the Ministry of Defence to the Northern Dalmatia<br />
Directorate on measures for the preparation of the evacuation ................................................... 315<br />
17 1995, 31 July, Knin: Report of the Military and Civil Aff airs Sector of the RSK Ministry of Defence<br />
concerning mobilization and bringing of the units to full wartime complement, and spontaneous<br />
evacuation of the population aft er the news that Croatian forces had broken through the defence<br />
lines at Strmica .................................................................................................................................... 316<br />
18 1995, 2 August, Knin: Th e RSK Civil Defence Headquarters requests from the regional centres reports on<br />
the implementation of civil defence plans, evacuation and relief ................................................ 318<br />
19 1995, 2 August, Knin: Order of the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters instructing all regional civil defence<br />
centres to proceed immediately to the implementation of evacuation plans ............................ 319<br />
20 1995, 3 August, Korenica: Instructions of the regional civil defence centre in Korenica to municipal civil<br />
defence departments concerning preparations for the evacuation of material and cultural assets,<br />
and evacuation of the population<br />
21 1995, 3 August, Knin: Daily report of the Security Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security<br />
Directorate of the VJ General Staff concerning the request of the General Staff to have the SVK air<br />
force bombard Split because of the attack on Drvar, the spreading of rumours about the HV attack<br />
on RSK, situation in SVK units, situation in the Grahovo - Glamoč theatre, and prevailing public<br />
opinion that the SVK could not defend itself, and that it would be better for the people to move<br />
out than to become encircled and perish ....................................................................................... 321<br />
22 1995, 4 August, Knin: Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on the evacuation of the population<br />
from the municipalities of Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, Gračac and Knin towards Srb and Lapac .... 325<br />
APPENDIX 4 - PLAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE<br />
PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF OCCUPIED CROATIAN TERRITORIES INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL<br />
AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, EARLY 1995<br />
182
APPENDIX 1<br />
PLANS OF THE REBEL SERBS FROM CROATIA<br />
ON THE SECESSION OF TERRITORY FROM THE REPUBLIC<br />
OF CROATIA AND UNIFICATION WITH THE SERBS IN<br />
BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA AND SERBIA<br />
183
184
APPENDIX I<br />
1<br />
1991, 1 April<br />
Titova Korenica<br />
Decision of the Executive Council of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on the<br />
annexation of part of the territory of Croatia to the Republic of Serbia<br />
____________________<br />
On the basis of the previous Decision on the Secession of the Serbian Autonomous<br />
Province of the Krajina 1 from the Republic of Croatia, at its meeting held on 10 April<br />
1991 the Executive Council of the Serbian Autonomous Province of the Krajina has<br />
adopted the following<br />
D E C I S I O N<br />
on the annexation of the<br />
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina to the Republic of Serbia<br />
Article 1<br />
Th e Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina is herewith annexed to the Republic of<br />
Serbia. 2<br />
1 Th e “Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina” (“SAO Krajina”) was founded by the rebel Serbs in Croatia on 21<br />
December 1990. Th e so-called “Serbian National Council” and the “Executive Council of SAO Krajina enacted<br />
on 28 February the “Resolution of Disassociation of the Republic of Croatia and SAO Krajina”. Th e Constitutional<br />
Court of the Republic of Croatia annulled the decision of the self-styled leadership of the rebel Serbs. See:<br />
Davor Pauković, Uspon i pad “Republike Srpske Krajine”, dokumenti (Rise and fall of the “Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina”, documents), CPI, Zagreb, 2005, pp. 38-40.<br />
2 At the time the decision did not suit S. Milošević’s plans or R. Karadžić’s schemes to keep Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
within Yugoslavia. Th is is how Karadžić commented on the decision: “Milan (Babić) is lying. He wouldn’t listen<br />
to anyone. His moves destroy him and aggravate the position of Serbia. He should have held a referendum on<br />
staying in Yugoslavia rather than a referendum on annexation to Serbia. And he has been told so. I told him, and<br />
so did Milošević and Rašković. He ignores everybody, thinks he is a genius and just carries on”. See Milošević<br />
vs Yugoslavia; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade, 2004, pp. 503-504. In order to correct<br />
the political mistake the Krajina leadership held on 12 May 1992 a referendum and “plebiscite” at which<br />
the Serbs from Croatia were to decide on annexation to the Republic of Serbia and “staying in Yugoslavia”. See<br />
Appendix I, doc. nos 2 and 3, Republic of Croatia and the Homeland War; documents, vol. 2, Documents of the<br />
institutions of the rebel Serbs (1990-1991), Zagreb - Slavonski Brod 2007, doc. nos. 79,81 82, 89 and 100.<br />
185
Article 2<br />
As of the date of entry into force of the present Decision the territory of the Serbian<br />
Autonomous Region of Krajina shall become an integral part of the integral state territory<br />
of the Republic of Serbia.<br />
In accordance with the previous paragraph hereof, the Constitution of the Republic<br />
of Serbia, the laws of the Republic of Serbia and the constitutional and legal system of<br />
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall apply throughout the territory of the<br />
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina.<br />
Article 3<br />
Th e Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and other legal regulations in<br />
force on its territory shall be harmonized pursuant to this Decision with the Constitution<br />
of the Republic of Serbia within 30 days of the adoption of this Decision.<br />
Article 4<br />
Th e territories of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina which become pursuant<br />
to this Decision part of the integral state territory of the Republic of Serbia comprise<br />
the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Gračac, Donji Lapac, Korenica, Vojnić,<br />
Vrginmost, Glina, Dvor na Uni, Kostajnica, Petrinja and Pakrac.<br />
Article 5<br />
Th is Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.<br />
186<br />
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL<br />
OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA<br />
No. 32/91-1<br />
Korenica, 1 April 1991 PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL<br />
OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA<br />
Dr. Milan Babić 3<br />
____________________<br />
Copy; typewritten; Latin alphabet<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 232<br />
2<br />
1991, 30 April<br />
Knin<br />
Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on the<br />
appointment of the central commission for the referendum on unifi cation with the<br />
Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia<br />
3 From August 1991 until February 1992 prime minister of the self-proclaimed “SAO Krajina” and fi rst president of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina, later minister of foreign aff airs and prime minister of the RSK (1995). On 29 June 2004 he<br />
was sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to 13 years in prison for crimes against<br />
humanity (political, racial and religious persecution). He committed suicide in prison on 5 March 2005.
___________________<br />
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Law on the Referendum and other Forms of Public Decision,<br />
and to the Decision on the Referendum on Unifi cation of SAO Krajina to the Republic<br />
of Serbia, at its fi rst meeting held on 30 April 1991 the Assembly of SAO Krajina has<br />
adopted the following<br />
D E C I S I O N<br />
on the appointment of the Central Commission for the holding<br />
of the referendum in SAO Krajina on annexation of SAO Krajina<br />
to the Republic of Serbia, and<br />
on Krajina staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro<br />
and others willing to preserve<br />
Yugoslavia<br />
1. Th e Central Commission is appointed herewith for the holding of the referendum<br />
in SAO Krajina on annexation of SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, and on Krajina<br />
staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others willing to preserve Yugoslavia,<br />
consisting of;<br />
1. Ljubica Vujanić chairperson<br />
2. Borka Lalić member<br />
3. Dušan Vještica member<br />
1. Risto Matković deputy chairperson<br />
2. Nikica Šaškić deputy member<br />
3. Zdravko Zečević deputy member<br />
2. Secretary of the commission: Borka Lalić<br />
3. Th e Central Commission for the holding of the referendum will appoint municipal<br />
commissions for the implementation of the referendum.<br />
Th e municipal commissions will appoint electoral committees.<br />
4. Th is Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.<br />
No. 54791-2 PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY<br />
(signed) Velibor Metijašević<br />
(stamp) 4<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin alphabet<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 480<br />
4 Round stamp with the inscription: SFRY, SAO Krajina, Assembly of the Krajina<br />
187
188<br />
3<br />
1991, 16 May<br />
Knin<br />
Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on annexation<br />
to the Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro and<br />
others willing to preserve Yugoslavia<br />
____________________<br />
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Offi cial<br />
Gazette of the Municipality of Knin, 1, 1991) and to the referendum held on 12 May 1991,<br />
at its meting on 16 May 1991 has adopted the following<br />
D E C I S I O N<br />
on the annexation of SAO Krajina to the Republic<br />
of Serbia, and on its staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro<br />
and others willing to preserve Yugoslavia<br />
Article 1<br />
It is herewith being established that the citizens in the territory of SAO Krajina have<br />
declared themselves, at the referendum held on 12 May 1991, in favour of annexation<br />
of SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, and of staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia,<br />
Montenegro and others willing to preserve Yugoslavia.<br />
Article 2<br />
Th e territory of SAO Krajina comprises the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac,<br />
Obrovac, Gračac, Donji Lapac, Korenica, Kostajnica, Vojnić, Vrginmost, Glina, Dvor na<br />
Uni, the Association of Local Communities with a majority Serbian population in the<br />
municipalities of Petrinja and Sisak, and all Serbian settlements which have chosen to<br />
unite with one of these municipalities and intend to do so in the future.<br />
Article 3<br />
Th e territory of SAO Krajina is an integral part of the state territory of the Republic of<br />
Serbia.<br />
Article 4<br />
Th e Constitution and the law of the Republic of Serbia shall apply in the territory of<br />
SAO Krajina.<br />
Article 5<br />
Th e Statute of SAO Krajina and other legal provisions applied in its territory shall be<br />
harmonized with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.<br />
Article 6<br />
Th is Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and it shall be published<br />
in the Krajina Gazette.<br />
No. 70/2-91
PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY<br />
(signed) Velibor Matijašević<br />
____________________<br />
Krajina Gazette: Offi cial Gazette of SAO Krajina and of the municipalities of Benkovac,<br />
Donji Lapac, Gračac, Knin, Korenica and Obrovac. Knin, 17 May 1991, No.2.<br />
4<br />
1991, 27 June<br />
Knin<br />
Declaration on the unifi cation of the Association of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina<br />
and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina<br />
____________________<br />
Th e unifi cation of the Serbian people is an imperative of our times. Aft er all the ordeals<br />
suff ered in their history by the Serbian people in their struggle for freedom, for life in<br />
the independent Serbian state and life in Yugoslavia together with other peoples, today,<br />
aft er the dissociation of Yugoslavia through the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the<br />
Serbian people are faced by a new historic challenge in the quest for their state unity and<br />
constitution.<br />
Th e substance of that state is expressed by the principle of “all Serbs living in one state”,<br />
and it accepts two options regarding its future form: Yugoslavia as a federation of Serbia<br />
and Montenegro and others willing to live in it, or an independent Serbian state.<br />
An important step in the process of Serbian state unifi cation aft er the dissociation of<br />
Yugoslavia is the uniting of the two Serbian Krajinas, the Association of Municipalities<br />
of Bosnian Krajina5 and of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina. Accordingly, the<br />
ASSEMBLY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPALITIES OF BOSNIAN KRAJINA<br />
and the ASSEMBLY OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA have<br />
adopted, at their joint session held in Bosansko Grahovo on the eve of St. Vitus’ Day,<br />
1991, the following<br />
DECLARATION ON THE UNIFICATION<br />
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPALITIES OF BOSNIAN KRAJINA<br />
AND THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA<br />
1. By virtue of the Declaration on Unifi cation the Association of Municipalities of<br />
Bosnian Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina are constituted as<br />
5 Following the example of the rebel Serbs in Croatia, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina also founded their<br />
autonomous regions in order to annex the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Republic<br />
of Serbia. Th us, on 26 April 1991 they founded the “Association of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina”.<br />
189
a single political and territorial entity. Th e unifi cation of Krajina will involve a fuller<br />
political&legal subjectivity and a fuller sovereignty in decisions regarding the character<br />
of ties with other nations in Yugoslavia whatever the name may imply.<br />
2. Th e Declaration on Unifi cation is a political act because it represents the expression of<br />
the will of the Serbian people of the Association of Municipalities of Bosnia Krajina and<br />
of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina to live together. It also represents a legal<br />
act binding all subjects in accordance with its tenor and essence.<br />
4. Th e Declaration on Unifi cation makes up the legal and political foundation of<br />
integrative cooperation in the spheres of the economy, politics, culture, education, health<br />
care and welfare, transport and communications, information, police, defence and other<br />
sectors of life and work presenting the need for such cooperation as anticipated by the<br />
Agreement on Cooperation.<br />
5. In its relations with other subjects the United Krajina will appear as a single entity and<br />
will focus its political activity on its own integration and the integration of the Serbian<br />
people as a whole, all with the goal of achieving a single state in which all the Serbs in<br />
the Balkans will live.<br />
No. 139/91-2<br />
Knin. 27 June 1991<br />
190<br />
ASSEMBLY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPALITIES<br />
BOSANSKA KRAJINA<br />
PRESIDENT<br />
(signed) Vojo Kuprešanin<br />
ASSEMBLY OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMUS<br />
REGION OF KRAJINA<br />
PRESIDENT<br />
(signed) Velibor Matijašević<br />
____________________<br />
Krajina Gazette: Offi cial Gazette of SAO Krajina and of the municipalities of Benkovac,<br />
Donji Lapac, Gračac, Knin, Korenica and Obrovac. Knin, 2 July 1991, No.6.<br />
1992, 18 May<br />
Knin<br />
Declaration of the Assembly on the political goals of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
____________________<br />
5
104.<br />
Pursuant to Article 68, par. 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
(Offi cial Gazette of the RSK; 1, 1992; 2, 1992), at its meeting held on 18 May 1992<br />
the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has adopted and promulgated the<br />
following<br />
D E C L A R A T I O N<br />
ON THE POLITICAL GOALS<br />
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
I<br />
Having assembled at this regular session, we, the members of this assembly, representing<br />
the will of the people of all the Serbian regions of our Republic, having considered current<br />
issues and bearing in mind the developments and changes in the area of the former<br />
SFRY, and the international position and security of the Republic, remaining committed<br />
to a peaceful and just resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and proceeding from the right of<br />
every people to self-determination, have concluded to proclaim in his Declaration our<br />
views on the present and future goals of the Republic and its relations with the renewed<br />
Yugoslavia and neighbouring states.<br />
II<br />
Th e Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, expressing their respect to the<br />
victims fallen for the cause of freedom and independence, will defend their acquired<br />
freedom with all means.<br />
III<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina welcomes the formation of the Federal Republic of<br />
Yugoslavia and will do everything in its power, together with the Serbian people in other<br />
republics, to realize with them their right to live united by common interests and goals<br />
regardless of current diffi culties.<br />
IV<br />
In this regard the Republic of Serbian Krajina, aft er the regulations of the Republic<br />
of Croatia have become invalid following the armed confl ict, will continue to respect its<br />
obligations and rights as related to Yugoslavia, to which it remains committed and from<br />
which it expects the fulfi lment of its obligations assumed with regard to the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina, that is, to the area under the protection of the United Nations within the<br />
scope of the peacekeeping operation.<br />
V<br />
In accepting the peace plan aft er the arrival of the United Nations forces in the Krajina<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina has also expressed its commitment to pursuing its internal<br />
development and external relations on the basis of equality of nations, parliamentary<br />
democracy, market economy development and the respect of human and minority rights<br />
as envisioned by the UN Charter, the Paris Charter and the Helsinki documents.<br />
191
VI<br />
Th erefore, aft er the failed attempts of the neo-ustashi authorities under the aegis of<br />
the HDZ to deprive the Serbian people of their constitutional rights, the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina is not prepared to accept any proposals, from whatever quarter, which<br />
would impose upon the Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina a minority<br />
position, because they were compelled to oppose such attempts by force of arms in order<br />
to preserve their independence. Th erefore, the Republic of Serbian Krajina hopes that<br />
in future negotiations solutions will be sought only with its legitimate representatives<br />
on the basis of the principles embodied in the UN Charter and the Helsinki documents,<br />
and on the basis of equality and full appreciation of the legitimate interests of the Serbian<br />
people.<br />
VII<br />
Th erefore, the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian people are not prepared to<br />
accept any ready-made solutions or any status which would deprive them of their acquired<br />
independence. However, the Republic will be ready, once the conditions for that are<br />
mature, to engage in negotiations concerning conditions of good-neighbourly relations<br />
and cooperation with the republics along its borders, guided by its own aspirations and<br />
the aspirations of the Serbian people concerning the integration of interests but also the<br />
respect of the personality of each people, and their historic, political, cultural and other<br />
traditions, rights and interests.<br />
VIII<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina wants the United Nations, and it stresses its interest<br />
in this regard, to complete as soon as possible and in accordance with it obligations the<br />
process of deployment of the peacekeeping forces both in the zone under their protection<br />
and other areas with Serbian population, so that it does not remain unprotected, because<br />
the Serbian people in the other parts of the Republic could not permit the persecution<br />
of their compatriots such as the Serbs in the region of Gorski Kotar.<br />
IX<br />
Th erefore, the Republic of Serbian Krajina welcomes the recommendation of the<br />
Security Council of 13 May concerning continued negotiations in order to arrive at<br />
a satisfactory solution of the issue. Until then, the Republic will be forced to stop the<br />
process of unit demobilization and withdrawal of military equipment from its territory,<br />
a move nobody can dispute, among other things also because of earlier commitments<br />
related to the defence of the Republic in the event of any possible surprises due to the<br />
development of the situation in Yugoslavia or to the failure to implement or respect the<br />
agreed international commitments of Yugoslavia and of the United Nations.<br />
X<br />
Because of the current uncertainty regarding the changes within Yugoslavia, and<br />
particularly the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in view of the impact of these<br />
developments on the security of the Republic, the Republic of Serbian Krajina calls on all<br />
its citizens hitherto on duty in the units of the Yugoslav Army to return to the Republic<br />
192
and report to the authorities. Th e Republic also calls on all its other citizens to return to<br />
their homeland and share with their fellow citizens the burden of the diffi culties facing<br />
the Republic and of its defence, which is also the legal obligation of all citizens fi t for<br />
military service. Th e humanitarian and other aid they are now receiving outside the<br />
Republic will be forwarded to the places to which they are returning, i.e., to all free<br />
towns, villages and settlements in the Republic.<br />
XI<br />
In particular, the Republic of Serbian Krajina calls on all professionals to place<br />
themselves at the disposal of their municipalities in order to provide assistance in the<br />
reconstruction project plans to be presented to international organizations, friendly<br />
states and others willing and interested to provide help.<br />
XII<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina calls on all authorities to establish order, support the<br />
functioning of the administration and rule of law, because current conditions in certain<br />
places will no longer be tolerated.<br />
XIII<br />
All legitimate representatives of the authorities are also called upon to put an end to<br />
the practices of irresponsible individuals who are harassing the innocent population, and<br />
to fully cooperate with UNPROFOR representatives and the representatives of UNHCR<br />
and the International Red Cross in all zones in which the peacekeeping forces have taken<br />
over responsibility for the functioning of local authorities and citizen security.<br />
XIV<br />
Th e Republic calls on all chairmen of municipal assemblies to set up offi ces of<br />
commissioners for the reception of refugees, distribution of aid and liaison with the<br />
representatives of the aforementioned international organizations.<br />
XV<br />
Municipal authorities shall report to the Government and to the Assembly all<br />
irregularities related to the presence of international bodies for the purpose of eliminating<br />
in due time any misunderstandings because the future of the Republic also depends<br />
on our capacity to accept the principles of well-intentioned international factors and<br />
develop relations based on mutual understanding.<br />
XVI<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina wants to stress once again that only its legitimate<br />
representatives may negotiate questions regarding the interests of the Republic with<br />
international factors. Th e responsibility of Yugoslavia and of its bodies refers only to<br />
mutual commitments, but no future new commitments may be assumed in the name of<br />
the Republic regarding its future without the prior agreement of its bodies.<br />
XVII<br />
Th e representatives of local authorities may not assume obligations concerning the<br />
international commitments of the Republic, and affi liation with diff erent political parties<br />
193
should not give cause to confl icts detrimental to the general interests of the Republic as<br />
a whole.<br />
XVIII<br />
All citizens and friends of the Republic are called upon to exert through their personal<br />
involvement every eff ort in order to strengthen its defence capability and to maintain its<br />
independence and acquired freedom.<br />
XIX<br />
Th is Declaration will be published in the Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina.<br />
Knin<br />
18 May 1992<br />
194<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
____________________<br />
Th e President<br />
Mile Paspalj<br />
Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Serbian Krajina; Knin, 19 May 1992; No. 9.<br />
1992, 22 September<br />
Banja Luka<br />
6<br />
____________________<br />
P R O T O C O L<br />
ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS<br />
OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 6 AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
Th e joint session of the Governments of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina, with Branko Đerić and Zdravko Zečević, Prime Ministers, resp., attending, was<br />
held in Banja Luka on 22 September 1992.<br />
Th e subject of the talks was cooperation of the two Republics in all areas of economic<br />
and social life. Agreement was achieved on all the subjects discussed.<br />
(...)<br />
6 As a response to the recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Union (6<br />
April 1992) the Bosnian Serbs, aft er proclaiming secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina in early March<br />
1992, proclaimed on 7 April 1992 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radovan Karadžić was<br />
elected president.
III<br />
Both parties have agreed that there would be no borders or border crossings between<br />
the Republics. Commodity trade between business partners will not be encumbered by<br />
customs duties.<br />
Customs records and formalities in commodity trade with SR Yugoslavia and other<br />
countries will be discharged for both parties by the customs authorities of Republika<br />
Srpska.<br />
IV<br />
Th e payments agreement will regulate all details concerning fi nancial operations, and<br />
the relations of the two national banks and the relations of both with the National Bank<br />
of Yugoslavia.<br />
V<br />
Both Governments have charged the respective line ministries with draft ing a detailed<br />
analysis of existing industrial facilities, assessing the conditions, possibilities and terms of<br />
their rehabilitation, and the procurement of production materials and fi nished product<br />
marketing.<br />
As priority objectives, sections of the Benkovac - Bijeljina highway and the railway will<br />
be rehabilitated for traffi c, a single electric power transmission system will be developed,<br />
and a joint public company established for oil and oil derivative supply.<br />
Th e joint concept of future economic development will be developed bearing also<br />
in mind privatization and methods of its implementation, and demographic, physical,<br />
regional-urban and other forms of development.<br />
VI<br />
In war and all other cases in which the interest of the Serbian people would<br />
be jeopardized both Republics will jointly organize and defend their sovereignty,<br />
independence, territory and constitutional order through integrated organization and<br />
development of the air force, anti-aircraft defence, formation of joint forces for the<br />
protection of state borders and establishment of a joint command.<br />
Th e measures and solutions embodied in development plans, defence plans and<br />
other documents shall be harmonized in order to create conditions for effi cient defence.<br />
Immediate consideration will be given to the requirements and possible relocation of<br />
special industries to safe sites and to starting their production.<br />
Th e ministries of the interior shall cooperate in matters of state and public security,<br />
exchange of information and provision of legal assistance. Th e education, manning and<br />
deployment of police units shall be planned jointly.<br />
VII<br />
Th e cooperation between the two Republics in education, science and culture must be<br />
the fundamental factor in the spiritual bond of the people now living in two states.<br />
Th is implies fi rst and foremost the establishment of a joint educational system,<br />
the planning of networks of schools of higher learning and university departments,<br />
cooperation in publishing, fi lm and theatre production, art galleries, art associations,<br />
scientifi c institutions and archives, sports and physical culture.<br />
195
VIII<br />
Cooperation in health and welfare implies fi rst and foremost the development of a<br />
system of health care and health insurance based on identical principles, providing for<br />
system compatibility, possibility of accommodation and closer ties in the provision of<br />
health care and welfare, and validity of health records and personal health documents in<br />
both Republics.<br />
Both Republics shall help each other in caring for injured and ill people in war zones,<br />
in organizing joint medical care, collection and distribution of drugs and medical<br />
supplies through humanitarian organizations, the organization and implementation of<br />
preventive medical measures, etc.<br />
IX<br />
Both Governments emphasize the establishment of an integral information system with<br />
well-developed soft ware providing for free fl ow of information. Technical assistance<br />
shall be provided for the development of a technologically integrated radio and TV<br />
broadcasting system. Th e paper Srpski glas (Serbian voice) from Banja Luka and the<br />
Sunday paper Javnost (Th e public) will become joint media. Conditions will be provided<br />
for combining the news agencies of the two Republics into a single agency.<br />
X<br />
Th e implementation of cooperation in all areas defi ned by this Protocol shall be the<br />
responsibility of the line ministries, public companies, national banks and the social<br />
accounting service.<br />
XI<br />
Th is Protocol shall enter into force immediately.<br />
GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT<br />
OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA OF THE REPUBLIC OF<br />
SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
(...)<br />
Prime Minister Prime Minister<br />
Branko Đerić Zdravko Zečević<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
Croatian Information Centre, A-173/101<br />
196
1992, September<br />
Knin<br />
Basic programmatic principles and goals of the Serbian Democratic Party<br />
____________________<br />
SERBIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAAJINA<br />
Executive Committee<br />
7<br />
BASIC PROGRAMMATIC PRINCIPLES AND GOALS OF THE PARTY<br />
Th e Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) of Krajina, 7 as the<br />
political organization of the Serbian people which rallies members and fellow-travellers in<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina, has particularly ... (...)<br />
... and always advocated the unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina with other<br />
Serbian lands, primarily Republika Srpska, from which it was separated in the recent past<br />
by unnatural administrative boundaries.<br />
Since the Serbian people also took part, as a constitutive nation, in the establishment<br />
of Yugoslavia in 1918 as well as in the creation of Federal Yugoslavia and, as a people<br />
fully equal with the Croatian people, in the creation of the federal unit of the Republic of<br />
Croatia (Art., 1 of the ZAVNOH Declaration, Art. 1 of the Constitution of Croatia of 1947,<br />
1963, 1974), 8 the current international conferences on the former Yugoslavia without the<br />
equal participation of the Serbian people are a violation of international conventions.<br />
7 Th e Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Knin on 17 February 1990. Jovan Rašković was elected<br />
president. At the fi rst democratic multi-party elections in Croatia the party won 5 seats in the Parliament of<br />
the Republic of Croatia. At the same time it seized power at the local level in Knin, Gračac and Donji Lapac,<br />
the very places where armed rebellion of the Serbs started in August 1990.<br />
8 Th e Historical Foundations of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 22 December 1990 state that<br />
“the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of<br />
members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks,<br />
Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and<br />
the realization of ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations Organization<br />
and the free world countries”. In commenting the claims of some authors that the Constitution in question<br />
was the fi rst “to remove overtones of dual sovereignty and unequivocally proclaimed the Croatian nation as<br />
the holder of the sovereignty of Croatia”. Z. Radelić notes that already the wording of the 1974 Constitution<br />
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia - “the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian<br />
nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia and the state of other nations and minorities living in it”<br />
does not permit the unequivocal interpretation that the Serbs were elevated to the status of a constituent<br />
nation in Croatia, and that it is obvious “only that they were recognized a special status in relation to other<br />
nations and minorities”. Cf. Zdenko Radelić, Davor Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing and Dražen Živić,<br />
“Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Th e Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War),<br />
Školska knjiga, <strong>Hrvatski</strong> institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2006, 94.<br />
197
Such an act violates the basic internationally accepted principle whereby peoples and<br />
not administrative units are entitled to self-determination. Because of this the SDS opposes<br />
the participation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in all international conferences at<br />
which the Serbian people of the RSK is treated as a national minority.<br />
As a democratically oriented party the SDS will continue to advocate the promotion<br />
of democratic relations and a multi-party parliamentary system, and develop in line with<br />
these democratic principles its relations with other parties in the RSK and with similar<br />
democratic oriented parties in other Serbian lands and worldwide. In particular, it will<br />
focus together with democratic parties in Serbian lands on the union of the Serbian people<br />
and on the creation of a single Serbian state or a federation of Serbian states.<br />
One of the basic goals of the Krajina SDS involves eff orts focused on establishing ties<br />
and reconciliation with the Serbian people outside Serbian lands. Th is implies primarily<br />
expatriate Serbs regardless of their ideological commitment or past. It is the position of the<br />
Krajina SDS that all expatriate Serbs, regardless of their possible participation in military<br />
formations condemned by the past communist regime, are welcome in the RSK. (...)<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 442<br />
198<br />
8<br />
1992, 31 October<br />
Prijedor<br />
Declaration on the unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika<br />
Srpska<br />
____________________<br />
(...)<br />
Th e Assembly of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the Assembly of Republika<br />
Srpska, at their joint session held in Prijedor on 31 October 1992, have adopted the<br />
following<br />
D E C L A R A T I O N<br />
1) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce that the legal systems in the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska will be identical.<br />
2) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce that the citizens of Republika Srpska and of<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina will have Serbian citizenship, and that their state symbols<br />
are the same and in accordance with the historic continuity of the Serbian people and the<br />
existing Constitution and laws.<br />
Th e coat of arms is the traditional coat of arms of the Nemanjić dynasty with the<br />
crown; the fl ag is the red-blue-white Serbian fl ag, and the anthem “Lord of Justice”.
3) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce that any attack on one of the Republics shall<br />
concurrently be considered as an attack on the other Republic, because of which they<br />
will enter a defensive alliance the task of which is the mutual protection of the achieved<br />
freedom and integrity of both Republics.<br />
4) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce that the respective bodies and institutions<br />
need to insure a single educational system, including a single spelling, language and the<br />
Cyrillic script.<br />
5) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce their readiness to implement all forms of ties<br />
between the two Republics in foreign aff airs, information, communications, transport,<br />
culture, welfare and health care, economic activities, domestic and foreign trade, energy,<br />
ecology etc.<br />
6) Th e two Assemblies hereby announce that Republika Srpska and the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina will regulate their common customs, credit-monetary, fi scal and<br />
payments regulations.<br />
7) Th e Assembly of Republika Srpska and the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of<br />
Krajina will decide to hold elections for their common constituent assembly as soon as<br />
possible, but not later than 90 days aft er the end of the war.<br />
8) Th e Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Assembly of Republika<br />
Srpska have charged the respective authorities of the two Republics to establish<br />
immediately the agencies required for the accomplishment of the goals of the present<br />
Declaration. All forms of cooperation and association will be initiated and integrated by<br />
the coordinating committee consisting of the presidents of the Republics, the presidents<br />
of the Assemblies of the Republics, and the prime ministers of the Republics.<br />
9) Th e Assemblies of both Republics will hold joint sessions in order to develop and<br />
coordinate the mentioned forms of cooperation.<br />
10) All the forms of cooperation from this Declaration will also be off ered to other<br />
Serbian states.<br />
11) Th e initiative will be set in motion for convening all Serbian assemblies (of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina, Republika Srpska, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic<br />
of Montenegro) in order to discuss political, economic, cultural and other issues of<br />
general interest for the Serbian people.<br />
12) Th e Assembly of Republika Srpska and of the Republic of Serbian Krajina are<br />
committed to the unifi cation of the two states. Th is commitment will be tested by a<br />
plebiscite to be held in these Republics within the shortest possible time.<br />
Unifi cation will be postponed until the expiration of the UN plan for the protection of<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina (the Vance Plan) and will be implemented on the basis<br />
of the results of the plebiscite.<br />
13) Th is Declaration will be published in the offi cial gazettes of the two Republics.<br />
President of the Assembly President of the Assembly<br />
of the Republic of Serbian of Republika Srpska<br />
Krajina Momčilo Krajišnik<br />
Mile Paspalj<br />
199
200<br />
____________________<br />
Offi cial Gazette of the Republic Serbian Krajina, 2 November 1992, No. 17.<br />
9<br />
1993, 24 April<br />
Banja Luka<br />
Decision on the constitution of the joint assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
and Republika Srpska<br />
____________________<br />
Pursuant to the Declaration (Offi cial Gazette of Republika Srpska, No. 17, 1992),<br />
the Assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska as legitimate<br />
representatives of the Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika<br />
Srpska, at their joint session held on 24 April 1993, have adopted the<br />
D E C I S I O N<br />
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY<br />
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA AND REPUBLIKA SRPSKA<br />
I<br />
Th e National Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska<br />
(hereinaft er: National Assembly) is hereby constituted as the joint body of the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.<br />
Th e National Assembly will meet in Banja Luka.<br />
II<br />
Th e National Assembly is being constituted on parity basis from deputies of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.<br />
Th e National Assembly in the foregoing paragraph will be constituted with 82 deputies<br />
from the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and 82 deputies from the National<br />
Assembly of Republika Srpska.<br />
III<br />
Th e National Assembly will harmonize and enact the constitution, laws and other<br />
legislative provisions concerning areas pursuant to the authority granted it by the<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the National Assembly of Republika<br />
Srpska.<br />
Th e National Assembly shall harmonize legislative provisions in the fi elds of foreign<br />
policy, defence and security, justice, regional and population planning, the rights and<br />
status of companies and other organizations, the fi nancial system, credit-monetary
policy, customs and payments system, veterans’ and disabled persons welfare, education,<br />
science, culture and the protection of cultural assets, information systems and other<br />
areas of activity pursuant to the authority granted it by the assemblies of the Republics.<br />
(...)<br />
Chairman of the National Assembly<br />
Prof. Milovan Milovanović, Ph.D.<br />
____________________<br />
Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, 28 April 1993,<br />
No. 1<br />
10<br />
1993, 19 July<br />
Knin<br />
Minutes of the session of the governments of Republika Srpska and the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina, which agreed on unifi cation in one state and appointed a commission<br />
for the draft ing of the constitution and other legal documents related to unifi cation<br />
(...)<br />
M I N U T E S<br />
of the joint session of the Governments of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina, held in Knin on 19 July 1993. (...) Th e sesssion was chaired by the Prime Minister<br />
of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Mr. Đorđe Bjegović.<br />
P r o p o s e d a g e n d a:<br />
1. Agreement on unifi cation - appointment of the commission for the draft ing of the<br />
Constitution and discharge of all other activities related to unifi cation.<br />
2. Agreement on the creation of a single legal system and preparation of legislative<br />
provisions in accordance with the decision on the establishment of a joint assembly.<br />
3. Agreement related to the constitution of common credit-monetary, fi scal, tax,<br />
foreign exchange and customs policies.<br />
4. Agreement on joint appearances before third states. (...)<br />
6. Agreement on the realization of common objectives and tasks in the fi eld of defence<br />
and internal aff airs. (...)<br />
7. Assessment of natural resources and agreement on the draft ing of the physical plan<br />
of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
8. Agreement on the joint provision, linking and utilization of energy-related activities<br />
in trade and supply, and on the provision of strategic stockpiles.<br />
9. Agreement on the joint solution of problems aff ecting veterans and war victims,<br />
and problems related to migration of the population.<br />
201
10. Agreement on the realization of a single system of education, and integration in the<br />
fi eld of science, culture and physical culture. (...)<br />
Th e agenda was approved unanimously.<br />
Before turning to the agenda, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
Đorđe Bjegović welcomed the participants. Aft er his speech the fl oor was given to the<br />
President of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadžić, the President of the Assembly of<br />
Republika Srpska Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
Goran Hadžić, the President of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Mile<br />
Paspalj, the Vladika 9 of Dalmatia Longin, the President of the Municipal Assembly of Knin<br />
Milan Babić, and the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska Vladimir Lukić.<br />
All the participants expressed their satisfaction over the presence of the highest offi cials<br />
of the two states, expressed the wish and hope for early unifi cation, and wished successful<br />
work to the Governments of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. (...)<br />
Minister Slobodan Jarčević: 10 At present only Republika Srpska can appear before third<br />
states because of its status as a constituent entity. Unfortunately, we lack that, but the RSK<br />
is being accepted worldwide as a reality at an ever increasing rate. Our place is among<br />
the group of successors to the SFRY. Joint appearance with Republika Srpska would help<br />
us because of the constituent nation status enjoyed by the Serbian people in Republika<br />
Srpska. I think the seat of our ministry should still be in Belgrade, and needs to remain<br />
there aft er our unifi cation, with departments in Banja Luka and Knin. For the next session<br />
I and Mr. Buha will propose a platform for our joint international appearance.<br />
Minister Aleksa Buha: 11 Over the next month or two, while negotiations are under way<br />
on the BiH confederation, we must make no false move that would give an alibi to the<br />
other side. We shall prepare a platform, but we shall not fl aunt it. (...)<br />
Minister Dušan Kovačević: 12 I think the time has come for the Serbs to realize their<br />
goal, because there will never be another chance if we don’t do it now. We must act fast<br />
regardless of what the world will say. We have been given a task by the people at the<br />
referendum, and we must not let them down. We must set up a supreme command and<br />
choose its members, and determine the basic organization and formation of our common<br />
army. (...) We must draw up one law on defence and the armed forces, the military judiciary<br />
and prosecution authorities, and all other matters related to the army and defence. At the<br />
same time we must develop an integrated system for the production of ammunition and<br />
weapons. Th is is already under way, and weapons are being distributed from factories in<br />
Republika Srpska.<br />
Minister Milan Martić: 13 We have very good cooperation with the internal aff airs<br />
authorities in Republika Srpska, we have laws, but they must be integrated. We need a<br />
group to do that, including one representative from Republika Srpska.<br />
9 Th e highest dignitary of the Serbian Orthodox church in Dalmatia.<br />
10 Minister of foreign aff airs of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
11 Minister of foreign aff airs of Republika Srpska.<br />
12 General, minister of defence in the Government of Republika Srpska.<br />
13 Minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
202
Deputy prime minister Stojan Španović: Th ings are not so simple as they look. In terms<br />
of the legislation of the SRY, the SVK is part of the Army of Yugoslavia. Th e position of<br />
Republika Srpska is diff erent. I agree we need to do something immediately regarding<br />
the commander-in-chief. In this regard we have to cooperate with the armed forces of<br />
the SRY. (...)<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
Croatian Information Centre, A-156/3<br />
11<br />
1993, 10 August<br />
Belgrade<br />
Proposal of the foreign minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina on the selection of<br />
current war objectives related to the confl ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
____________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs<br />
______________________________________________________<br />
Knin, Kralja Petra I oslobodioca 27 Belgrade Offi ce<br />
Terazije 3/1<br />
(...)<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
STATE SECRET<br />
SELECTION OF CURRENT WAR OBJECTIVES<br />
OF THE RSK AND THE RS<br />
One of the options<br />
Th e war is now in its third year. Today many things are clearer than they were in 1991<br />
and 1992. Th e world is getting used to the statehood of the Serbs west of the Drina. Th e<br />
alliance of the Muslims and the Croats can no longer be restored. Th e Muslims have<br />
no corridor to the world. Th eir objective is obviously gaining access to the sea, along a<br />
stretch broader than the one they are being off ered at present. In their stride they want<br />
to take Mostar and control the valley of the Neretva. If they succeed, this would deal a<br />
death blow to Croatia. It would also get the most dangerous enemy off the Serbs’ back.<br />
Th erefore, the Muslims should be helped to achieve this strategic idea. Th e Croatian<br />
obstinacy and their assault on the RSK need to be exploited, and as many of their units<br />
in the fi eld as possible tied up at Maslenica, Gospić, Drniš and Peruča. As a sign of<br />
solidarity, the RS could revive the action at Grahovo, Glamoč and Kupres. In that case<br />
the Muslims could easily break down the last line of Croatian defence in Bosnia along<br />
203
the Gornji Vakuf - Konjic axis, and threaten Croatian positions at Trebinje. Th is would<br />
help the Serbian Herzegovinian Corps to free the Serbian parts of Herzegovina and<br />
reach the AVNOJ boundary of Croatia. As the Muslims reach the Adriatic coast, all<br />
the Croats south of the Neretva would seek rescue in escaping to Montenegro or seek<br />
protection from the Serbian forces. Th e Serbian forces would then stop the Muslim<br />
advance along the coast and leave them about 50 km of coastline. In political terms, one<br />
could immediately allow Dubrovnik to proclaim its independence provided it partly<br />
denies hospitality to newcomers from ustashi areas, e.g., Imotski, Livno, Duvno etc.<br />
Th e Muslim capture of the coast will alarm Europe which will oppose that. Of course,<br />
it will be opposed in turn by Arab capital and the United States. Th at would provide an<br />
extraordinary opportunity for the Serbs. In that case, we could bring up our historic title<br />
to the Adriatic by invoking the medieval Serbian states in Dalmatia. Russia would fi nally<br />
have to side with the Serbs because it could not side with either Europe or the United<br />
States.<br />
It is diffi cult to forecast events, particularly in war conditions, and I therefore put<br />
forward this idea for consideration of the RSK and RS leaders and offi cers.<br />
Belgrade, 10 August 1993<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 5010<br />
204<br />
(stamp) 14<br />
____________________<br />
12<br />
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs<br />
Slobodan Jarčević<br />
1994, 1 February<br />
Knin<br />
Press release of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina on its coalition agreement<br />
with the Serbian Radical Party and on the common goal - the unifi cation of all Serbian<br />
lands and foundation of a single Serbian state.<br />
(...)<br />
P R E S S R E L E A S E<br />
Today, 1 February 1994, the Coalition Agreement between the Serbian Democratic<br />
Party of Krajina and the Serbian Radical Party was signed in Belgrade.<br />
Th e Agreement was signed for the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina by its President,<br />
Dr. Milan Babić, and for the Serbian Radical Party by its President Dr. Vojislav Šešelj and<br />
14 Text on the stamp: RSK - Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Knin
the President of the executive committee of the Serbian Radical Party for the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina Mr. Rade Leskovac.<br />
Th e text of the Agreement reads as follows:<br />
1. On the basis of their freely expressed political will, the Serbian Democratic Party<br />
of Krajina and the Serbian Radical Party have entered into a coalition of political parties<br />
for the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
2. Th e coalition is being formed in order to achieve the common political goals<br />
asserting the priority national, state and political interests of the Serbian people in<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and provide stable and democratic conditions for the<br />
functioning of its authorities. Th e basic goal of the coalition partners is the unifi cation of<br />
all Serbian lands and the founding of a single Serbian state.<br />
3. In political terms the coalition will be jointly active in the National Assembly of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina as a parliamentary coalition, it will form the government<br />
and take jointly part in the constitution of other authorities. (...)<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 442<br />
Information service<br />
(stamp) 15 Drago Kovačević<br />
____________________<br />
14<br />
1994, 4 August<br />
Plitvice lakes<br />
Minutes of the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
which adopted the proposal on unifi cation with Republika Srpska as the fi rst step<br />
towards a single Serbian state<br />
____________________<br />
(...) Parts of the welcoming address of Branko Simić, vice-president of the Assembly<br />
of Republika Srpska: “Mr. President of the National Assembly, Mr. President of the<br />
Republic, Prime Minister, brothers, Serbian deputies, let me welcome you in my own<br />
name and on behalf of the delegation of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska. I<br />
also bring you the warm and brotherly greetings of the President of Republika Srpska,<br />
Dr. Radovan Karadžić, and of the President of the National Assembly Mr. Krajišnik. (...)<br />
We certainly understand the diffi culties aff ecting our brothers in Serbia. We understand<br />
the disastrous consequences of the sanctions imposed on Serbia. (...) Are we guilty for<br />
the imposition of those sanction? We are not angry, but we feel hurt when we expect the<br />
15 Text on the stamp: Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, Knin<br />
205
est from our brothers and not what we got now. I hope that this is only a moment of<br />
weakness aff ecting our brothers and that we shall soon overcome it, carry on as brothers<br />
and realize our basic and main goal - a single Serbian state. We convened the National<br />
Assembly and adopted the following decisions. We stand by the declaration. I hope you<br />
are all fully familiar with its contents. Nevertheless, let me present here some of the<br />
positions included in the declaration. Th us, we seek minimum corrections on the maps<br />
off ered by the Contact Group. We demand, with every right, access of Republika Srpska<br />
to the sea; we demand the partitioning of Sarajevo and we demand convincing guarantees<br />
for the lift ing of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (...) Brothers, the<br />
third decision of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska... please, take into account<br />
the seriousness of the moment, the seriousness of our common destiny... states that the<br />
assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska ought to sent a<br />
joint proposal to the national assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro on unifi cation into<br />
a common, single Serbian state. Please... [applause in the hall]... Please, let us include<br />
this motion into our agenda and let the National Assembly of Republika Srpska speak its<br />
mind. Th ank you very much, and all the best.” 16 (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 491<br />
206<br />
15<br />
1994, 4 August<br />
Knin<br />
Press release of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina concerning the motion to<br />
include the unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska with<br />
Serbia and Montenegro in the agenda of the extraordinary session of the Assembly<br />
____________________<br />
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, today the<br />
deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party requested that the unifi cation of the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska with Serbia and Montenegro be included in the<br />
agenda of the extraordinary session of the Assembly.<br />
Th is request is in accordance with the basic political commitment of the Serbian<br />
Democratic Party of Krajina and of the whole Serbian people as declared at the two<br />
referendums.<br />
Accordingly, it has also been decided to accept the proposal of Republika Srpska to<br />
forward, through the joint request of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
and Republika Srpska, the motion for unifi cation to the assemblies of Serbia and<br />
Montenegro for their consideration.<br />
16 HR-HMDCDR, Video-record collection, no. 26.
Th e Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina also sent its delegation to Pale. 17<br />
(...)<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 422<br />
16<br />
1994, 15 August<br />
Knin<br />
Statement of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina aft er the talks of the party<br />
delegation with the leadership of Republika Srpska<br />
____________________<br />
(...)<br />
S T A T E M E N T<br />
Th e Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina expresses its full understanding for the<br />
complex and diffi cult situation of Republika Srpska aft er the National Assembly of<br />
Republika Srpska rejected the plan of the Contact Group, and aft er the manifest<br />
misunderstandings in the relations between the leadership of the Federal Republic of<br />
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the leadership of Republika Srpska.<br />
Th e Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina supports the initiative of the National<br />
Assembly of Republika Srpska on the unifi cation of all Serbian lands in a single Serbian<br />
state.<br />
Over the past four years the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina has initiated and<br />
sponsored a number of declarations, assembly decisions and two referendums focused<br />
on bringing the Republic of Serbian Krajina into the fold of a single Serbian state;<br />
unfortunately, and against the will of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina there was<br />
no unifi cation. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 422<br />
17 Seat of the «Republika Srpska» (Serbian parastate in Bosnia and Herzegovina).<br />
207
208<br />
17<br />
1994, 18 August<br />
Proposal of the Assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina to<br />
the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro concerning unifi cation in a single state<br />
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY<br />
(...)<br />
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA<br />
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MONTENEGRO<br />
Having established that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska are<br />
state entities emerged aft er the secessionistic fragmentation of the SFRY through the<br />
materialization of the right to self-determination and of the principle of permanent<br />
sovereignty of the people and the nation, and that they are entitled to take decisions on<br />
their own state, the assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
have decided to send the following<br />
P R O P O S A L<br />
ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, THE REPUBLIC OF<br />
MONTENEGRO, REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN<br />
KRAJINA INTO ONE STATE<br />
1. Th e assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and of the Republic of Montenegro are<br />
hereby invited to accept the Proposal on Unifi cation into One State, and to consider the<br />
procedure and the conditions under which unifi cation could be eff ected.<br />
2. Th e joint delegation of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika<br />
Srpska is entrusted with starting, as soon as possible, talks with the representatives of the<br />
assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro in order to prepare<br />
the declaration on unifi cation and the draft s of other relevant documents. (...)<br />
President of the National Assembly President of the Assembly<br />
Momčilo Krajišnik Branko Vojnica<br />
(stamp) 18 (stamp) 19<br />
__________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 5006<br />
18 Text: Republika Srpska, National Assembly – Sarajevo<br />
19 Text: Republic of Serbian Krajina, Assembly of the Republic – Knin
18<br />
early 1995<br />
[Knin]<br />
Proposed plan for the commitment of the “Serbian Army of Krajina” in the confl ict<br />
with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia<br />
____________________<br />
REPORT TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF<br />
ON THE PLAN OF SVK COMMITMENT<br />
Introduction<br />
Th e current plan for the commitment of the Serbian Army of Krajina (Srpska vojska<br />
Krajine, SVK) became eff ective in late 1993. Th e plan was drawn up in accordance<br />
with conditions in 1992 and 1993, and on the basis of the expected development of<br />
the military and political situation in 1994. Owing to developments in the former<br />
Republic of Bosnia&Herzegovina and in the Republic of Croatia, certain solutions in the<br />
Commitment Plan are no longer adequate. Th e experience acquired in combat actions<br />
in 1994 and the problems encountered also suggest the need to amend the Commitment<br />
Plan on a more realistic basis, and to draft several variants of the Plan. Particular attention<br />
needs to be devoted to relatively fast changes occurring or likely to occur in the overall<br />
environment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), which may aff ect the security of<br />
RSK and thereby SVK commitment.<br />
Our analyses have highlighted the extremely important need to focus on the variant of<br />
the Plan based on our own potential without greater reliance on the help of the Army of<br />
Yugoslavia (Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ) and the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike<br />
Srpska, VRS).<br />
Th is does not exclude variants according to which defence of the RSK would also<br />
be organized in cooperation and through joint combat operations with the VJ and the<br />
VRS.<br />
We proceed from the following fact: if the plan of SVK commitment were to be<br />
based predominantly on the assistance and engagement of the VRS and the VJ, and if<br />
for any reason such planned assistance and engagement should fail to take place, the<br />
consequences would be grave, especially at the start of aggression.<br />
Proceeding from the foregoing we decided to draw up the Commitment Plan in<br />
three variants. Th e fi rst variant is the existing Plan, which recognizes the VJ obligations<br />
under the Vance Plan and foresees the involvement of VRS units in the RSK. Th e second<br />
variant, the most important one in our view, involves the Commitment Plan without<br />
major reliance on the VJ and the VRS. Th e third variant should anticipate the possibility<br />
of real commitment of VJ and VRS forces in terms of supporting the SVK in case of a<br />
radical Croatian aggression.<br />
209
210<br />
1. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EXISTING SVK COMMITMENT PLAN<br />
Th e existing Commitment Plan has been drawn up as a plan for the defence of Serbian<br />
lands - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ), Republika Srpska (RS) and the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina (RSK). It anticipates considerable involvement of VJ and VRS forces.<br />
In present conditions the commitment of VJ and VRS forces in case of aggression against<br />
the RSK cannot realistically be planned. Th us, for illustration sake, the existing Plan<br />
foresees the commitment of eight VRS brigades to the defence of the RSK, which is truly<br />
impossible in current conditions.<br />
According to the existing plan, the deployment and grouping of SVK forces are linear,<br />
with available forces in position in contact with the enemy. Th e SVK brigades, corps<br />
and General Staff do not have forces for holding territory in depth. Such a shortage<br />
of forces calls into question the possibility of combat against air-borne and helicopterborne<br />
assault, and infi ltrated groups. Th e major weakness of the existing deployment<br />
and grouping is the low active operation capacity.<br />
If the existing Commitment Plan were to be realized, the General Staff and the corps<br />
commands would need at least minimum reserves capable of having a bearing on the<br />
course of operations. Along with all this, there is a manifest lack of physical connection<br />
between our units (separation of the 11 th and 18 th corps).<br />
2. VARIANT INVOLVING NO MAJOR VJ AND VRS INVOLVEMENT<br />
Th is variant of the Commitment Plan has been developed as the basic option, but<br />
also as the mainstay of the plan for the possible involvement of parts of the VJ and the<br />
VRS. Proceeding from the estimated action of the Croatian armed forces for the variant<br />
according to which the SVK would defend the Republic of Serbian Krajina relatively<br />
independently, the General Staff has formulated the following tasks of the SVK as follows<br />
below.<br />
Eff ect grouping along lines of action and installations in the territory of the RSK<br />
with the following mission: prevent sudden aggression; thwart by persistent defence the<br />
seizure of vital installations in the territory; prevent deeper penetration along the lines<br />
of attack of Croatian armed forces; free occupied territories by energetic counterstrikes<br />
along specifi c lines of action, and seize the largest possible part of the territory of Croatia<br />
inhabited by Serbian population. Defence operations and counterstrikes would also<br />
involve VJ and VRS elements, and volunteer units.<br />
Operational implementation of the mission:<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
Decisive defence of front lines and installations by SVK forces along the axes of enemy<br />
assault; attack along selected lines with main forces and seize areas and installations of<br />
particular importance for the enemy in order to capture as much space as possible and<br />
recover territories seized earlier.
CP 20 in the Knin area<br />
ACP 21 in the Petrova Gora area<br />
b) in case of radical aggression:<br />
Th e Serbian Army of Krajina, with the maximum involvement of all the resources of<br />
the state and by decisive defence along with active operations, in cooperation with VRS<br />
and VJ elements, must prevent the occupation of territory and defend the integrity of<br />
the RSK.<br />
Prepare and execute active operations in central Dalmatia, in the area between the<br />
rivers Kupa and Mrežnica, and eastern Slavonia. Focus on severing communications in<br />
Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia.<br />
CP in the area of Petrova Gora<br />
ACP in the Knin area<br />
On the basis of the foregoing mission, I put forward the following decision for the<br />
commitment of the SVK:<br />
In coordination with offi cial authorities and organizations, and in cooperation with<br />
MUP RSK units and elements of the VRS and the VJ, prevent by decisive defence and<br />
application of various forms of armed combat the splitting of the SVK, the carving up or<br />
occupation of RSK territory, in order to preserve territorial integrity.<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
In case of HV aggression against the RSK, resort to decisive defence along the lines of<br />
enemy assault and, through active operations along other lines, with focus on eastern<br />
Slavonia, Kordun and Dalmatia, restore the territory lost earlier, prevent the cutoff<br />
of smaller parts of the RSK, infl ict losses, spread hostile forces and, through artillery<br />
and rocket strikes on selected targets in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, deter<br />
radical RH aggression, thus preserving the territorial integrity of the state and creating<br />
conditions for continued negotiation in terms of RSK recognition.<br />
b) in case of radical aggression:<br />
During initial operations prevent by decisive defence deeper enemy penetrations along<br />
the lines of attack and the carving up of RSK territory and, with the concurrent VJ<br />
commitment in eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, infl ict appreciable losses, break<br />
down the assault and create conditions for off ensive action.<br />
Aft er taking over the initiative, turn to off ensive action in eastern Slavonia, Kordun<br />
and central Dalmatia, cut off parts of RH territory in eastern Slavonia, Gorski Kotar<br />
and central Dalmatia and thereby link up SVK and RS forces, prevent communications<br />
with the central part of RH and the regular supply of Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia, and<br />
thus disrupt the planned commitment and deployment of Croatian armed forces. Mount<br />
active defence operations in other areas.<br />
20 Command post (CP)<br />
21 Advance command post (ACP)<br />
211
Th is will create favourable conditions for the continued and defi nitive solution of<br />
the position of the Serbian people. In case of extremely unfavourable developments<br />
on the battlefi eld, sustain operations and turn to specifi c forms of armed struggle and<br />
resistance.<br />
Carry out the operation in two stages:<br />
Stage one: maintain by decisive defence the territorial integrity of the RSK, prevent<br />
surprise actions and cutting off of parts of RSK territory, spread out enemy forces, infl ict<br />
losses and create conditions for off ensive action. Duration 15-20 days.<br />
Stage two: aft er taking the initiative, rout by off ensive action and in cooperation with VJ<br />
and VRS forces the ustashi forces along the lines of attack in eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia<br />
and Gorski Kotar, and create conditions for continued off ensive action in order to<br />
establish control and prevent communications and the supply of RH armed forces and<br />
the population in Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia. Duration 10-15 days.<br />
Readiness for the fi rst stage immediately, and for the second one aft er the detection of<br />
certain indications for a radical HV aggression against the RSK.<br />
In terms of operational deployment group the forces as follows:<br />
- defence forces;<br />
- active operation and infi ltration forces;<br />
- PDB 22 forces;<br />
- forces for strikes against selected targets;<br />
- support and PVO 23 forces;<br />
- forces for the control of territory, protection of installations and anti-DTG 24 action,<br />
and forces for the protection of settlements;<br />
- rapid intervention forces and forces for the prevention of desertion.<br />
Main CP in the Knin area, ACP in the area of Petrova Gora<br />
212<br />
FEATURES OF THE DECISION AND ARGUMENTATION<br />
Th e proposed decision calls for concurrent defence and off ensive action in case of<br />
aggression. Defence operations would be waged at points of assault by Croatian armed<br />
forces (in a limited aggression, at Vrlika and western Slavonia; in radical aggression, at<br />
Slunj). Off ensive operations would be mounted along specially selected lines of action<br />
threatening vital RH interests (off ensive action by the 11 th Corps towards Mirkovci-<br />
Županja; attack of the Operative Group from Kordun across the river Korana towards<br />
Croatia’s border with Slovenia; attack in Dalmatia towards Kakma - Biograd-na-Moru<br />
and Čista Mala - Vodice).<br />
22 antisabotage action<br />
23 antiaircraft defence<br />
24 sabotage-terrorist group
Free forces would become available by regrouping existing forces and their in-depth<br />
deployment; this would also deal with the problem of hostile air-borne assault and<br />
infi ltrated reconnaissance-sabotage groups, and allow active operations at General Staff ,<br />
corps and brigade levels.<br />
Th e proposed Decision calls for the defence of towns and larger settlements. Th e<br />
brigades will start preparing for defence immediately and, aft er fortifi cation and<br />
obstruction, designate the forces for the defence of settlements.<br />
Th is Decision envisions the training of forces for rapid intervention and prevention<br />
of desertion. Th is is a must particularly in view of the 1994 experience. Initial grouping<br />
must provide the basis for off ensive action. Major redeployment from one area to<br />
another at the start of aggression has proved to be a poor solution. Any plan involving<br />
the redeployment of major forces from the 11 th Corps area to the areas of other SVK<br />
corps would pose particularly great diffi culties.<br />
Th e directive for SVK commitment specifi cally regulates the assembly, preparation<br />
and engagement of volunteers and volunteer units in the fi ght against the Croatian<br />
armed forces. Volunteer preparation needs to be dealt with before aggression. Th e<br />
Yugoslav Army has designated a reception centre for volunteers from the SRJ (Federal<br />
Republic of Yugoslavia); in the RSK Erdut and Bruška have been designated as points<br />
for the reception of volunteers and their preparation for integration in the SVK system.<br />
According to our estimate, in the fi rst ten days of the war we could accept and train for<br />
combat a number of volunteers equivalent to 3 or 4 brigades.<br />
Let me draw attention to the main features of the force ratio for the variant according<br />
to which SVK would engage in defence without substantial reliance on the Army of<br />
Yugoslavia and the Army of Republika Srpska.<br />
Th e total manpower ratio would be 1.4 to 1 to the advantage of the HV (100,000 to<br />
69,000). Th e tank ratio also amounts to 1.4 to 1 (425 to 301), the ratio for armoured<br />
personnel carriers 2 to 1 (223 to 111), while the 60 to 120 mm mortar ratio is to our<br />
advantage, 1 to 0.3. Th e HV enjoys the greatest advantage in antiaircraft rockets, 6.5 to 1,<br />
and 155 mm howitzers, 5.5 to 1. Th e HV also enjoys a signifi cant advantage in multiple<br />
rocket launchers and 130 mm fi eld guns, 2.6 to 1.<br />
In terms of these ratios, the proposed Decision can be realized provided we have the<br />
required ammunition.<br />
Th e commitment plan according to the variant involving RSK defence by reliance on<br />
our own forces implies struggle for survival and the highest casualty toll.<br />
Success calls for the preparation of all other forces of the state and society for war. And<br />
that cannot be achieved if the Plan of RSK Defence is not prepared immediately. Th e<br />
commitment plan is a part of that plan.<br />
Th e defence plan must provide for the changeover of all state organizations and<br />
businesses to a wartime regime.<br />
Th e RSK defence plan must regulate the obligations of all persons responsible for<br />
specifi c missions and specify their mandatory preparations for defence mission<br />
accomplishment. Immediate steps are required in order to improve the conscripts’<br />
attitude towards their military obligations.<br />
213
Th e commitment of SVK forces under the proposed Plan depends essentially on the<br />
provision of ammunition and fuel. According to the plan, the fi rst stage would last 15-<br />
20 days and the second 10-15 days. Th erefore, war with the HV could last 25-35 days.<br />
Calculations have turned up the following basic load requirements for a 30-day war:<br />
a) Armoured-mechanized units: basic combat load (b/l) 4.5; available 2.5 b/l; shortage 2<br />
b/l. Fuel requirement: 8 full charges (f/c); available 0.2 f/c; shortage 7.8 f/c or 2,400 tons<br />
of fuel.<br />
b) Artillery: the situation for artillery ammunition varies depending on the type of the<br />
weapon. Availability is the best for B-176 mm fi eld guns (7.05 b/l), 152 mm fi eld guns<br />
(8.73 b/l), D-20 122 mm howitzers (4.05 b/l) and 130 mm fi eld guns (5.32 b/l). Supply<br />
is the lowest in the company and battalion fi re groups, brigade artillery groups and the<br />
corps artillery group (128 mm Oganj).<br />
Reserves for a 30-day war call for the following supplies: 82 mm mortars, 3 b/l; 120<br />
mm mortars, 2.88 b/l: 128 mm Oganj, 2.13 b/l; 105 mm howitzers, 1.16 b/l; 9M 14 antitank<br />
guided missiles, 0.74 b/l. Th e calculations are based on target estimates and actual<br />
available ammunition supplies.<br />
c) Infantry weapons: with respect to issue requirements (4.5 b/l), the shortages are the<br />
following: automatic rifl e, 3.336 b/l; semiautomatic rifl e, 2.95 b/l; M-84 machine gun,<br />
3.82 b/l; 7.9 mm machine gun, 3.75 b/l; sniper rifl e, 2.27 b/l; 12.7 mm Browning machine<br />
gun, 2.59 b/l; hand grenades, 2.20 b/l.<br />
Conclusion:<br />
In case of aggression aft er the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and in conditions<br />
where the RSK would only be defended by the SVK without the help of the VJ and VRS,<br />
success is possible only with a total involvement of all state resources and readiness to<br />
accept a high casualty toll and accommodation to the most rigorous conditions of a<br />
struggle for survival. Moreover, due attention should be paid to the fact that the SVK<br />
cannot deal on its own with problems such as the readiness of the troops and offi cers to<br />
withstand all the hardships imposed by the war, and the provision of required materiel,<br />
primarily ammunition, weapons, equipment etc. Th e current military and political<br />
situation and the actions of the Croatian army require a high degree of combat readiness,<br />
and that in its turn implies the recruitment of a high number of conscripts for SVK units.<br />
On the other hand, this does not match the requirements of the economy and its eff orts<br />
to revive production. Th is contradiction must be resolved jointly in a way which will not<br />
disrupt SVK combat readiness.<br />
214<br />
3. VJ INVOLVEMENT<br />
Th e third variant of the Plan considers defence by the SVK with some commitment of<br />
the Army of Yugoslavia, primarily in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. It has<br />
been developed in a special Appendix which will be fi led along with the Plan of SVK<br />
Commitment.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS<br />
1. At present and in the immediate future there are no imperative conditions allowing<br />
for a major involvement of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and the Army of Republika<br />
Srpska (VRS) in this area in case of an aggression of the Croatian Army (HV) on the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).<br />
2. Th e current situation calls for a commitment plan according to which the Serbian<br />
Army of Krajina (SVK) will only defend the RSK without direct help from the VJ and<br />
the SVK 25 . Because of this, preparations for defence need to be focused primarily on<br />
enhancing SVK capability and on preparing the state and its bodies for total war.<br />
3. Urgent resupply of key materiel, weapons and ammunition should be requested from<br />
the VJ. Th e situation must be considered jointly with the VRS, and cooperation and<br />
possible joint action agreed.<br />
MISSION PROPOSAL<br />
1. Proceed immediately to the draft ing of the RSK Defence Plan and its harmonization<br />
with the requirements of the SVK Commitment Plan.<br />
2. Rely on our own potential in resisting HV aggression and preparing for the successful<br />
waging of war for a minimum period of 30 days.<br />
3. Start recruiting and training volunteers immediately in accordance with the mission<br />
laid down in the SVK Commitment Directive.<br />
* * *<br />
2. OUR FORCES<br />
Th e actions and activities of the advocates of the war option in dealing with the problems<br />
arising from the collapse of the former SFRY both in the territory of the former B&H<br />
and in the relations between the RSK and the RH demand the maximum readiness of<br />
all state bodies and organizations, and particularly of the Serbian Army of Krajina, in<br />
countering any threat to the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Bearing this<br />
in mind, the mission of the Serbian Army of Krajina is the following:<br />
Carry out grouping along the main defence axes and structures in the territory of the RSK<br />
in order to prevent sudden aggression, thwart by determined defence the seizure of vital<br />
installations, prevent deeper penetration along the lines of attack of the Croatian army,<br />
and be prepared, by vigorous counterattacks along specifi c lines, to free occupied territory<br />
and capture, as much as possible, Croatian territories with a Serbian population.<br />
Defence actions and counterattacks will include the involvement of VJ and VRS<br />
elements, and volunteer units.<br />
25 What is probably meant is the VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska.<br />
215
Operational implementation of the mission:<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
Decisive defence of all points and installations by SVK forces along the lines of enemy<br />
assault; attack along selected lines with main forces and seize areas and installations of<br />
particular importance for the enemy in order to capture as much space as possible and<br />
recover territories seized earlier.<br />
CP in the Knin area<br />
ACP in the Petrova Gora area<br />
b) in case of radical aggression:<br />
Th e Serbian Army of Krajina, with the maximum involvement of all the resources of the<br />
state and by persistent defence along with active operations, in cooperation with VRS<br />
and VJ elements, must prevent the occupation of territory and defend the integrity of<br />
the RSK.<br />
Prepare and execute active operations in central Dalmatia, in the area between the<br />
rivers Kupa and Mrežnica, and eastern Slavonia. Focus on severing communications in<br />
Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia.<br />
CP in the area of Petrova Gora<br />
ACP in the Knin area<br />
3. In case of a general attack of the Croatian army on the RSK, the VJ will discharge<br />
its obligations under the Vance Plan by engaging units and recruiting volunteers from<br />
the SRY. Th e main reception centre (Bubanj Potok) in Belgrade (Serbia) will be the<br />
responsibility of the First Army, and all liaison shall be eff ected through it.<br />
Th e VRS will engage in defence and active action with respect to the Corridor, 26 the<br />
Cazin Krajina and Livanjsko Polje, and thereby tie up elements of the HVO 27 and the<br />
Muslim army and prevent their engagement against the RSK.<br />
4. I HAVE DECIDED, in coordination with offi cial authorities and organizations, and<br />
in cooperation with MUP RSK units and elements of the VRS and the VJ, to prevent by<br />
decisive defence and resorting to various forms of armed combat the routing of the SVK,<br />
the carving up or occupation of RSK territory, in order to preserve territorial integrity.<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
In case of HV aggression against the RSK, resort to determined defence along the lines<br />
of enemy assault and, through active operations along other lines, with focus on Eastern<br />
Slavonia, Kordun and Dalmatia, restore the territory lost earlier, prevent the cutoff<br />
of smaller parts of the RSK, infl ict losses, spread hostile forces and, through artillery<br />
and rocket strikes on selected targets in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, deter<br />
26 A thin line of territory in Bosnian Posavina which connected the occupied parts of Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
(western area) and of Croatia (the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina) with Serbia.<br />
27 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) - armed forces of the Croats in Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
216
adical RH aggression, thus preserving the territorial integrity of the state and creating<br />
conditions for continued negotiation in terms of RSK recognition.<br />
b) in case of radical aggression:<br />
During initial operations prevent by decisive defence deeper enemy penetrations in<br />
the lines of attack and the carving up of RSK territory and, with the concurrent VJ<br />
commitment in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, infl ict appreciable losses, break<br />
down the assault and create conditions for off ensive action.<br />
Aft er taking over the initiative, turn to off ensive action in Eastern Slavonia, Kordun<br />
and central Dalmatia, cut off parts of RH territory in Eastern Slavonia, Gorski Kotar<br />
and central Dalmatia and thereby link up SVK and RS forces, prevent communications<br />
with the central part of RH and the regular supply of Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia, and<br />
thus disrupt the planned commitment and deployment of Croatian armed forces. Mount<br />
active defence operations in other areas.<br />
Th is will create favourable conditions for the continued and defi nitive solution of<br />
the position of the Serbian people. In case of extremely unfavourable developments<br />
on the battlefi eld, sustain operations and turn to specifi c forms of armed struggle and<br />
resistance.<br />
Carry out the operation in two stages:<br />
Stage one: maintain by determined defence the territorial integrity of the RSK, prevent<br />
surprise actions and cutting off of parts of RSK territory, spread out enemy forces, infl ict<br />
losses and create conditions for off ensive action. Duration 15-20 days.<br />
Stage two: aft er taking the initiative, rout by off ensive action and in cooperation with VJ<br />
and VRS forces the ustashi forces along the lines of attack in Eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia<br />
and Gorski Kotar, and create conditions for continued off ensive action in order to<br />
establish control and prevent communications and the supply of RH armed forces and<br />
the population in Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia. Duration 10-15 days.<br />
Readiness for the fi rst stage immediately, and for the second one aft er the detection of<br />
certain indications for a radical HV aggression against the RSK. (...)<br />
Main CP in the Knin area<br />
ACP in the area of Petrova Gora<br />
UNIT MISSION<br />
1) 11 th Corps: in limited aggression and in the fi rst stage of the operation prevent by<br />
decisive defence the breakthrough of ustashi forces in Baranja; in Eastern Slavonia and<br />
Western Srem turn to off ensive action, block Osijek and Vinkovci and create towards<br />
Mirkovci-Županja a bridgehead at Andrijaševci - Pritoka - Otoka.<br />
In the second stage of the operation, together with Operational Group 2 (18 th and<br />
138 th motorized brigades, 453 rd and 1 st armoured battalions, 51 st mechanized brigade,<br />
16 th motorized artillery brigade, 12 th composite anti-armoured artillery battalion, 1/240 th<br />
self-propelled PVO rocket regiment and 155 th light infantry brigade), turn from the<br />
217
idgehead created earlier to off ensive action - towards Privlaka-Županja with its main<br />
forces and towards Babina Greda - Nijemci-Posavski Podgajci with auxiliary forces -<br />
in order to rout ustashi forces along the lines of assault; cooperate with VRS forces in<br />
routing and destroying ustashi forces in the greater area of Orašje, advance to the river<br />
Sava and secure the Corridor from the north. Follow up by routing the cut-off forces in<br />
the greater area of Spačvanske Šume and set up defence positions at Gradište - Štitor.<br />
Be prepared to repulse counter-attacks by ustashi forces.<br />
Support provided by RV (air force) and PVO (anti-aircraft defence).<br />
Command post: Vukovar.<br />
2) 18 th Corps: in all conditions prevent by decisive defence the breakthrough of ustashi<br />
forces into the corps defence zone, particularly at Novska - Okučani, Nova Gradiška -<br />
Okučani and Pakrac - Okučani.<br />
Support provided by the VRS air force and anti-aircraft defence.<br />
CP at Okučani.<br />
3) 39 th Corps: In all conditions, prevent by persistent defence in cooperation with the 21 st<br />
and 18 th Corps the breakthrough of ustashi forces along the lines Glinska Poljana - Glina,<br />
Farkašić - Petrinja - Dvor and Sunja - Kostajnica - Dvor, rout and destroy enemy forces,<br />
advance to the line Dvorište - Hrastovica (hill 415) - <strong>Hrvatski</strong> Čuntić - Dejanović - hill<br />
262 - Šamarice, break the enemy assault and create conditions for off ensive action.<br />
Regroup and counter-attack, rout ustashi forces at the lines of action on the rivers Kupa<br />
and Sava, and turn to defence.<br />
CP in the Šamarica Area.<br />
4) 21 st Corps: in limited aggression and in the fi rst stage of the operation, in cooperation<br />
with the 39 th and 15 th Corps prevent the breakthrough of ustashi forces along the axes<br />
Gradac - Lasinja - Vrginmost, Karlovac - Vojnić and Generalski Stol - Slunj, spread by<br />
persistent defence and destroy enemy forces, and prevent deeper penetration along the<br />
main lines.<br />
Part of the forces must be ready for anti-sabotage action, and persistent and active<br />
defence along the line of contact with the 5 th Corps.<br />
In the second stage of the operation be ready with noncommitted forces for off ensive<br />
action towards Vojnić - Banjsko Selo, advance to the river Mrežnica and turn to active<br />
defence.<br />
Defence focus on the Generalski Stol - Slunj - Rakovica line.<br />
Support provided by the ORKAN rocket system, the air force and SVK anti-aircraft<br />
defence.<br />
CP in Vojnić, ACP in Slunj.<br />
5) 15 th Corps: by persistent defence and in cooperation with the 21 st and 7 th Corps prevent<br />
the breakthrough of ustashi forces along the axes Ogulin- Plaški - Plitvice Lakes, Otočac<br />
- Vrhovine - Korenica, Perušić - Bunić - Udbina and Gospić - Medak - Gračac in order to<br />
218
prevent fl ank action, challenge control over Mount Kapela, Mount Velebit and T. Grad. 28 ,<br />
and forestall deeper penetrations along the foregoing lines by spreading enemy forces<br />
and infl icting substantial manpower and materiel losses.<br />
Use uncommitted forces to counterattack and destroy the ustashi wedge.<br />
Part of the forces must remain ready for anti-sabotage action and defence along the line<br />
of contact with the 5 th Corps.<br />
Support provided by the 75 th composite anti-armour artillery brigade, the ORKAN rocket<br />
system, and the SVK air force and anti-aircraft defence.<br />
CP in Korenica.<br />
6) 7 th Corps: in limited aggression and in the fi rst stage of the operation prevent the<br />
breakthrough of ustashi forces along the axes Zadar - Bankovac - Knin, Šibenik - Drniš<br />
- Knin, Sinj - Vrlika - Knin and on Mount Velebit; commit part of the forces to off ensive<br />
action and recover territory lost earlier.<br />
In the second stage, sustain defence, regroup forces and recover by off ensive action the<br />
territory lost earlier along the Šibenik - Biograd-na-Moru - Zadar line, advance to the<br />
sea and fortify the attained line. Sustain readiness for off ensive action.<br />
Support provided by the 105 th air brigade, and the VRS air force and anti-aircraft<br />
defence.<br />
CP Knin.<br />
7) Mission of the SVK air force and anti-aircraft defence<br />
In an HV aggression against the RSK, commit all SVK air force and anti-aircraft defence<br />
units, in cooperation with the VRS and VJ air force and anti-aircraft defence, to antiaircraft<br />
defence of major targets in the territory and SVK groups, and provide air support<br />
to SVK forces in the defence of major lines and areas of action in the RSK.<br />
(1) 45 th aerial reconnaissance, reporting and guidance battalion:<br />
Observe from its basic radar positions the air space and deliver enemy information to<br />
the users via operational main staff and corps centre lines, conventional channels and<br />
EDP systems.<br />
Be ready for relocation to reserve radar positions.<br />
(2) 44 th rocket brigade:<br />
1 st rocket battalion: anti-aircraft fi re action in the area of deployment of the 39th Corps<br />
CP; aft er HV aggression against the RSK and securing specifi c conditions, eff ect strikes<br />
on major enemy ground facilities and troops.<br />
Fire action by fi eld batteries against enemy combat aircraft along the most probable air raid<br />
and attack lines against the Udbina air base and the surface-to-surface artillery&rocket<br />
unit.<br />
CP: Petrova Gora<br />
28 Teslingrad, as the rebel Serbs renamed Lički Osik in 1991.<br />
219
(3) 105 th air brigade:<br />
Collect by air reconnaissance information on enemy grouping and forces along the<br />
communication routes, and enemy reserves beyond the border.<br />
- Provide fi re support to SVK defence eff orts by fi ghter and bomber aircraft along the<br />
main lines of enemy attack.<br />
Aft er enemy action and the knocking of the Udbina air base out of commission, transfer<br />
the aircraft to the airfi elds Petrovac, Banja Luka and Glamoč.<br />
- Engage enemy armoured and mechanized forces along the most critical lines of action<br />
by attack helicopters in the corps zones.<br />
- Transport and evacuate the wounded, reinforcements and materiel in the theatre by<br />
transport helicopters.<br />
Mission load: - 2-4 sorties by reconnaissance and light combat aircraft<br />
- 4-6 sorties for nuclear&chemical weapons<br />
- 4-6 hours for transport helicopters<br />
CP: Udbina air base<br />
(4) In case of a helicopter-borne assault, engage all air and ground forces in order to<br />
rout and destroy the enemy.<br />
(5) Th e air fi re support of the 18 th corps is provided by the VRS air force and antiaircraft<br />
defence. Th e VJ air force and anti-aircraft defence will provide fi re support to the<br />
11 th corps according to a separate plan.<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, no number/1995<br />
220
19<br />
1995, 8 February<br />
Knin<br />
Speeches by Milan Martić, Borislav Mikelić and Milan Babić at the session of the<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which discussed the process of negotiation<br />
with the Republic of Croatia and Plan Z-4<br />
____________________<br />
(...)<br />
Th e fi rst and the only item on the agenda:<br />
THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WITH CROATIA<br />
IN THE LIGHT OF THE CROATIAN DEMAND FOR THE CANCELLATION OF<br />
THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE POLITICAL&SECURITY CONDITIONS<br />
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
(...)<br />
MILAN MARTIĆ (RSK president):<br />
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the assembly,<br />
Just as many times so far, and that will also frequently be the case in the future, the<br />
Serbian people and the Republic of Serbian Krajina are fi nding themselves in the position,<br />
against their will and wish, to say a determined “no” to the international mediators and<br />
to their attempts to force us to accept an international peace plan which does not meet<br />
even a minimum of our national and human rights and interests. As you know quite<br />
well, the Republic of Serbian Krajina did not even consider the plan of the Z-4 group 29<br />
(...)<br />
Th e possible estimate of certain international subjects and of Croatia according to<br />
which the threat of cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate is an ideal situation for<br />
deceiving the scared Serbs is just a mistaken estimate and nothing else. Th e Serbs are not<br />
scared by the possible departure of the peacekeeping force and they cannot be tricked.<br />
(...)<br />
As for accepting the concept of so-called peaceful reintegration of Krajina into Croatia,<br />
can we accept that? Can we defame all the victims of this war? Can we agree to our own<br />
death? Life in Croatia would be worse than any death. Life in Croatia - would that be any<br />
life?<br />
[...]<br />
BORISLAV MIKELIĆ ((RSK prime minister)<br />
29 See Appendix IV, doc. no. 1.<br />
221
[...] To put it simply, the peacekeeping force arrived in this area which was proclaimed a<br />
protected zone until a solution is found between the two warring sides. We have not yet<br />
come up with a solution or initiated talks about possible political solutions with which<br />
we can also disagree, but we can start talking. Th erefore, to say the least, the decision<br />
of the Z-4 group, which was also involved in the cease-fi re agreement and economic<br />
negotiations, is provocative for our side, for the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Th eir<br />
decision to deliver this offi cially to us prompted consultations of our leadership at all<br />
levels; thus, the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina offi cially informed them<br />
that we cannot even consider such a document before the defi nition of the position of<br />
the United Nations and the Security Council, that is, before their decision whether or<br />
not UNPROFOR, the peacekeeping force, will remain in the territory of the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina, and whether Krajina will remain a protected zone [...]<br />
MILAN BABIĆ (foreign minister in the RSK government)<br />
[...] As regards Republika Srpska, I had the opportunity to visit Pale [seat of the Serbian<br />
para-state in Bosnia&Herzegovina] with the state delegation, and they promised us that<br />
the plans which have been agreed will be realized if we are militarily threatened. As<br />
regards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I did not get any guarantees of that kind -<br />
maybe some other people in the state leadership have some information - other than<br />
the promise that we shall get I don’t know how many tons of food and ammunition.<br />
What other intervention is possible? In our public appearances we even tried, gently,<br />
in this period of crisis set off by UNPROFOR, to draw attention to our situation, and<br />
to prompt a greater response of the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Th e refusal of<br />
the president of Serbia [Slobodan Milošević] to accept the Z-4 plan of the mini-contact<br />
group was a great encouragement for everyone. However, I would also like to see a real<br />
relation and not just a political possibility. [...]<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 3, box 2.<br />
222
20<br />
1995, 10 February<br />
[Knin]<br />
Th e general staff of the “Serbian Army of Krajina” forwards to the corps commands and<br />
senior offi cers the summary of president Milan Martić’s speech on combat readiness<br />
____________________<br />
MILITARY SECRET<br />
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<br />
EXCERPT FROM THE PRESENTATION OF THE<br />
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC MR. MILAN MARTIĆ<br />
DURING THE BRIEFING ON THE<br />
COMBAT READINESS OF THE SVK<br />
(...)<br />
In addressing the offi cers the President clearly and unequivocally pointed out the<br />
characteristics of the current conditions in the country and the seriousness of the<br />
imminent ustashi aggression.<br />
Particular stress was laid upon the role and mission of the SVK, and its preparations<br />
to meet the aggression well-prepared, and upon the importance of combat morale and<br />
the bond between the army and the people. Bearing in mind the importance of the<br />
questions, evaluations and positions presented by the President of the state, the General<br />
Staff has decided to forward to corps commands and most responsible offi cers an excerpt<br />
from the President’s presentation. Th e excerpt is enclosed to the SVK Combat Readiness<br />
Conclusions and Mission Statement.<br />
*<br />
Th e destiny of the Serbian people and of our state is in the hands of the SVK. Th e<br />
command cadre is particularly responsible. An organized and effi cient army cannot exist<br />
without good command. Without good command the SVK would be doomed to failure<br />
in advance.<br />
Th e people and the SVK: the eyes and ears of the people are on the SVK.<br />
Th e development of the army is a process. A less trained and weaker army can deliver<br />
a lot with capable command. Commanding means dealing with problems. Today the<br />
people of Krajina have their own army, a Serbian army, with its own offi cer corps. I<br />
am against any mud-slinging at the SVK and its offi cers. Our goal is to strengthen the<br />
people’s confi dence in its offi cer’s corps.<br />
A question is circulating in public: the JNA left us in 1991, will the army [i.e., the SRY<br />
offi cers] run away again? All the offi cers who did not run away in 1991 are here, and will<br />
certainly not run away now - that is the answer of your commander, general Čeleketić. 30<br />
30 Milan.<br />
223
(...)<br />
Th e SVK is expected to inspire trust among the people continuously, trust that the<br />
territory of the RSK is secure and safe. Without a well-organized and strong SVK<br />
everything else in our state will collapse. Th ere will be no legal system or welfare system.<br />
And defence is the condition for that. Defence is the number one priority for our present<br />
and future. It must be. (...)<br />
Any doubt in the good intentions with negative consequences is human and needs<br />
to be understood. Th at should have been avoided. Inertia and the evasion of defence<br />
commitments are also confi rmed by the fact that state assets are used for other purposes,<br />
primarily personal gain, rather than for defence. Th e example of forest exploitation is<br />
more than convincing. Th e “Timber” programme of planned logging could have provided<br />
for the SVK and defence. Unfortunately, that has not been the case, and individuals and<br />
profi teers have relentlessly usurped a national resource. Th e parliament must oppose<br />
such policies more resolutely.<br />
We expect the aggression of the Croatian army in 1995. We must be ready for it. Th at<br />
will be the decisive battle, not only for the RSK but also for the entire Serbian people. Th e<br />
existing military intelligence and state security bodies must provide information on the<br />
start of aggression at least 10 or 15 days in advance. We are certain that the aggression<br />
will take place, but it is diffi cult to determine its start, which will occur between April<br />
and July 1995.<br />
Th e war between the RH and the RSK must end with the victory of one side and the<br />
defeat of the other. Until that takes place, the war will not and cannot end. (...)<br />
We have accepted negotiations with the Croatian side brokered by the international<br />
community, but nothing much can be expected from them. Nevertheless, negotiations<br />
are useful for us because they give us more time for preparing defence from the Croatian<br />
aggression. We must be prepared for the fi nal showdown with Croatia. In his policy<br />
Tuđman 31 does not make his moves by heart. Th e statements of Kohl 32 and Kinkel 33<br />
urging Tuđman to withdraw his decision on denying hospitality to UNPROFOR are<br />
just a cover calculated to achieve specifi c goals, through pressure on the Serbs and<br />
the Security Council, and infl uence the SRY to recognize the Republic of Croatia and<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina within their AVNOJ frontiers. Th e pressure on Serbia and the SRJ<br />
was meant to force the SRJ into renouncing the obligations it had accepted under the<br />
Vance Plan, and isolating the RSK people and leaving it helpless. In the evaluation of<br />
Croatia and Germany that should have led to the defeat of the Krajina Serbs. (...)<br />
All the parties [in Croatia] are united where the RSK is concerned. Th e armed option is<br />
also present in the programmes of all the opposition leaders. (...) Th e Croatian Parliament<br />
is completely in agreement with the policy towards the RSK, which is no particular<br />
surprise. Th ere is also in Croatia an increasing fear from UNPROFOR withdrawal.<br />
31 Franjo, President of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
32 Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor.<br />
33 Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister.<br />
224
Even Tuđman fi nds it hard to conceal it. With great pomp and at the request of the<br />
international community Tuđman might withdraw his demand on UNPROFOR leaving<br />
Croatia, and that possibility is not to be excluded. Of course, that could only occur with<br />
certain concessions at the expense of the RSK and the SRJ. Croatia will not and may not<br />
wage war against all Serbs, and that is a realistic option if UNPROFOR leaves.<br />
In case of Croatia’s aggression on the RSK, we must be prepared to wage war, for a shorter<br />
or longer time, without the direct help of the VJ and the VRS. Th is is why we must be<br />
prepared to the utmost. Th is is also important because it makes Croatia’s position easier<br />
with respect to the RSK. Should the situation require it, all the Serbian people will defend<br />
Krajina. We are brothers, and mutual help in the life-and-death struggle will be up to the<br />
task of our time. Food, ammunition and manpower are guaranteed as help for the SVK.<br />
Help will be provided without the SRJ being directly involved in the war.<br />
Independently of the help and involvement of the SRJ and the RS, we must be totally<br />
prepared for opposing Croatian aggression. We must be able to wage war independently<br />
for a longer period. Th e degree of our readiness must allow us to deter Croatia from<br />
aggression on our own, or, should aggression take place, to break it down even in its<br />
worst variant even without any help... (...)<br />
We must make use of all the information gained from knowledge on the combat action of<br />
the 5 th Corps [of the ARBiH] and the Croatian army, and particularly on the commitment<br />
of HV forces in the Livno - Grahovo theatre. We can expect a tough and a long battle. We<br />
must meet the start of aggression with an organized defence and fi re system for breaking<br />
down the attack and survival, and protection from murderous artillery fi re. Blocking and<br />
fortifi cation must be completely coordinated with the defence and fi re system plans. Th e<br />
defence areas of lower echelon units must allow every soldier and squad to oppose the<br />
enemy with at least three lines of defence. Along every line the soldier must have a full<br />
profi le shelter, reserve positions for all weapons, observation posts etc. In places where<br />
the terrain does not allow for concealing troop or weapons movement, communication<br />
trenches must be provided between the defence lines. It would be unrealistic to expect<br />
successful defence if it is based on a single line, however well-prepared it may be. A<br />
combat ready corps must have a reserve, however small it may be. An available reserve<br />
allows a fast response to sudden changes of the situation.<br />
Command practices must avoid repeating the mistakes of 1993. Maslenica, the Medak<br />
pocket, Divoselo must not happen again. Th e loss of these points is the result of singleline<br />
defence and lack of proper action. We cannot give combat only at points of ustashi<br />
assault. In addition to defending the area in which we are attacked, we must turn to<br />
assault in places where the enemy is the weakest and where he does not expect our<br />
counter-attack. We must be ready for attack. We must attack with our reserves, and carry<br />
our determined strikes with new forces (volunteers etc.). We must not attack at points<br />
where the ustashi outnumber us, but there where they are “the thinnest”.<br />
Our combat actions must not be reduced merely to restoring what the Croatian army<br />
has captured. Th at would be a utopia which would not have a favourable impact on the<br />
ultimate outcome of the war. We must resort to defence in order to stop Croatian forces<br />
at the points of their attack, and attack ourselves where the ustashi are the weakest. We<br />
225
shall operate throughout Croatia. We have the initiative in our strikes. We choose the<br />
place, time and way of the strike. Nobody can stop us from shelling Zagreb, Osijek,<br />
Vinkovci, Zadar, Karlovac, Split... We must have an action plan and prepare for its<br />
thorough implementation. Croatia can be carved up and that would settle our fi ght<br />
against them for all time. Th e carving up and cutoff of parts of Croatia at several points<br />
would have a devastating eff ect on the ustashi and they would never recover from it. We<br />
must seek ways to link up with the part of the RSK made up by Eastern Slavonia, Western<br />
Srem and Baranja. In case of our victory Croatia would be fi nished. Nobody could ever<br />
again back Croatia. Not offi cially, anyway. Th at would also be for us the shortest route to<br />
international recognition and unifi cation in a single Serbian state.<br />
We must win the battle against Croatia. We cannot aff ord to lose it. We are not even<br />
entitled to that. Th is is a battle which will require the last atom of our strength. We must<br />
mobilize all healthy and able-bodied persons, eliminate everything negative, thwart<br />
defeatism. We must enhance battle morale to the highest point.<br />
Th e commander-in-chief is in command of the entire armed forces. Nobody shall be<br />
allowed to interfere in the command. Attempts by profi teers to relieve commanders have<br />
been prevented. As a whole the command eff ort must focus on preparations of the SVK<br />
units and commands for defence. Th e army and its command are always expected to be<br />
up to their mission. Decisive battles must not be lost. And our army faces the decisive<br />
battle. I was personally very dissatisfi ed when I saw how little attention was devoted to<br />
preparing for defence, and how casually and reluctantly people go about doing everything<br />
that can and has to be done for adequate defence. I even thought of introducing military<br />
rule. But results can also be achieved by relying on our parliament and its members. We<br />
strive to put an end to the practice of everybody going his way. I am aware of intentions<br />
and moves that are not at all benevolent towards the SVK. Th e army cannot and shall<br />
not take dirt from anybody. I will do everything granted me by the constitution and<br />
the law to save this people. I count on the readiness and high combat readiness of our<br />
armed forces. Th e army must look aft er the interests of the people. Obviously, we cannot<br />
wage war and win without the economy, and we must all bear this in mind and help the<br />
economy to get professional and qualifi ed people without whom there is no production.<br />
In the economy the state must open the door to women and all those who can work and<br />
who cannot fi ght in the war. Quite illogically, in kitchens and near the kitchens, on the<br />
factory grounds you fi nd young and healthy men, whereas are positions are manned by<br />
elderly or sickly people. Retired and disabled persons, women and others not fi t to bear<br />
arms must take up all the jobs held by young people capable of bearing arms and fi ghting<br />
in the war.<br />
Our judiciary is stating to deal with matters in its competence. Military justice bodies<br />
have been formed, but do not operate. For all practical purposes civil justice does<br />
not discharge its functions. All illegal gains will be seized from the persons operating<br />
beyond the law. Seized property must be used for the requirements of the SVK: trucks,<br />
vehicles, cigarettes, goods... All surpluses are to be handed over to the fi nancial police.<br />
All operations of this kind are focused on saving our state, the RSK. Crime and blackmarketeering<br />
destroy the combat morale of our troops and offi cers in the front lines.<br />
226
Honest people cannot accept any protection of black-marketeers and criminals. If blackmarketeers<br />
get back their goods on the basis of court rulings, then something is wrong<br />
with the honesty and intentions of the courts.<br />
Th is is a crucial moment for the entire Serbian people. We must not lose the battle we<br />
are waging. (...) It is being assumed, and certain information also suggest the same,<br />
that aggression could possibly start about 31 March 2009. We must achieve full combat<br />
readiness for aggression if we fi nd out that it is going to take place in fi ve days or even<br />
before. We must not be caught off -guard. We must use every day and hour before<br />
aggression for preparation, particularly with regard to the boosting of combat morale and<br />
getting our positions ready. We must enhance propaganda, win even better recognition<br />
of the armed forces and their bond with the people. In addition to the “Liberty Front”<br />
broadcast we also need to organize round tables with the participation of our soldiers<br />
and offi cers, and increase TV coverage of the trenches. Psychological preparations must<br />
improve the willingness and morale of the army and of the people. When I visit your<br />
corps I would like to see much better conditions as compared with what I saw recently.<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265<br />
21<br />
1995, 30 March<br />
Knin<br />
Conclusions of the Government of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” regarding the<br />
negotiations on the amendment of the mandate of the United Nations Protective Force<br />
in the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia<br />
____________________<br />
In accordance with its constitutional powers, the Government of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina, at its extraordinary session held on 30 March 1995, has considered the draft of<br />
the UN Security Council Resolution suggested to the Security Council by the Contact<br />
Group, and adopted the following positions: (...)<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina estimates that there is no reason to<br />
terminate the current mandate of the United Nations Protective Force laid down by the<br />
UN Security Council in Resolution No. 743 of 21 February 1992, and expects the UN<br />
Security Council to extend the current mandate of the protective force.<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina considers that the newly proposed<br />
UN operation (UNCRO) can contribute to the stabilization of peace if it is determined<br />
as the continuation and extension of the UN peacekeeping operation as established by<br />
Resolution 743 of the UN Security Council, i.e., in line with the principles and basic<br />
terms of the current protective force mandate in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and<br />
zones under UN protection.<br />
227
Th e proposal according to which the UN operation, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the<br />
proposed draft of the Resolution, ought to be “a provisional arrangement for the creation<br />
of conditions leading to an agreed solution which will be in accordance with the territorial<br />
integrity of the Republic of Croatia” is absolutely unacceptable if it refers to the territory<br />
of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina, the sovereign state of the Serbian people and of all its<br />
citizens, is not part of any Croatian state, and it will not accept any UN arrangement<br />
which would bring it into such a position against its will.<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina considers the engagement of UN<br />
peacekeeping forces in its territory unacceptable if their name implies prejudiced<br />
political solutions to the disadvantage of the Serbian people and the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina.<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina cannot permit the blockade of the<br />
borders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina by any armed forces which would be contrary<br />
to the principles of the current mandate of the UN protective force.<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has decided to inform the UN<br />
Security Council about its foregoing conclusions. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR- HMDCDR, 4, 06-5-340/95<br />
1995, [6 May] 34<br />
228<br />
22<br />
Letter of the President of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” Milan Martić to Slobodan<br />
Milošević, President of the Republic of Serbia, aft er the liberation of Western Slavonia<br />
by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia<br />
____________________<br />
From:<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
To:<br />
Mr. SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ<br />
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA<br />
34 Th e date on the original letter is wrong, because its contents shows that it was written in early May, aft er<br />
the liberation of Western Slavonia by Croatian forces.
6 April 1995<br />
Mr. President,<br />
Th e tragedy which has befallen the Serbian people through the latest aggression of<br />
Croatia against Western Slavonia has grave and immeasurable consequences for the<br />
overall Serbian cause. Territory was lost, hundreds of civilians were killed 35 , but what at<br />
the present terrible moment gives rise to even greater anxiety is the widespread belief<br />
of the people that the Serbian cause has been betrayed, betrayed moreover by the very<br />
Serbs. Rumours are spreading throughout Krajina that it was sold down the river, and<br />
people conclude with disbelief that we have been forgotten by both Serbia and Republika<br />
Srpska. In many villages and towns people are packing and preparing to leave.<br />
In view of this newly arisen disbelief in the possibility of survival in the RSK, caused by<br />
the manifested doubt that we have been left to our own resources, this doubt must be<br />
urgently dispelled. Th e only way to achieve this in an effi cient way would be the prompt<br />
interim deployment of about two thousand troops of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian<br />
MUP police in the Krajina garrisons. Th ey would not be deployed along the front line<br />
but would rather, with their presence in Gračac, Petrinja, Benkovac, Slunj and Knin,<br />
restore the psychological stability of the population and give the RSK authorities time to<br />
improve and stabilize the situation. Unless this step is taken right away, I believe it will<br />
be late for anything else. All the representatives of the RSK authorities are in agreement<br />
with this matter. Mr. President. I am convinced you fully understand the situation<br />
and our diffi culties, and would therefore kindly ask you to take immediately the steps<br />
required for the realization of our demand. I look forward to discussing all other forms<br />
of assistance with you personally before long.<br />
Th e Krajina needs you.<br />
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
Milan Martić<br />
(stamp) 36<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 229<br />
35 Untrue, usual Serbian propaganda.<br />
36 Round stamp with the text: RSK, President of the Republic, Knin<br />
229
230<br />
23<br />
1995, 18 May<br />
Borovo Selo<br />
Part of the speech of the RSK President Milan Martić on the state of the crisis aft er the<br />
Croatian Army liberated Western Slavonia, and on plans of unifi cation with Republika<br />
Srpska as the fi rst step towards the unifi cation of all Serbian lands<br />
___________________<br />
TAPE RECORDING<br />
OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE REGULAR SESSION<br />
OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA,<br />
HELD IN BOROVO SELO ON 18 MAY 1995<br />
[...]<br />
Distinguished assemblymen,<br />
I shall obviously have to present once again the causes and the scope of the crisis which<br />
has befallen us, and to off er ways and means to overcome it.<br />
Before I speak up directly and concretely about certain segments of the events in and<br />
around Western Slavonia, I must briefl y review the following problems and dilemmas,<br />
and raise the following question: what is the Serbian national goal, and has it changed?<br />
What is our position with respect to war and peace, to Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika<br />
Srpska? How do authorities function in Krajina? What is our position with respect to UN<br />
and Croatia? Let me reiterate once again: Western Slavonia fell because of inadequate<br />
responses to all these questions, and military defeat is the logical aft ermath.<br />
On the national goal and its implications for the state crisis<br />
(...) Tragically enough it [the creation of a single common state of Serbs in the area of<br />
the former Yugoslavia] has not happened yet. Western Slavonia would not have fallen,<br />
probably, had there been a single state. However, to make misery and tragedy even worse,<br />
unifi cation has not been accomplished owing primarily to internal Serbian quarrels and<br />
lack of understanding.<br />
Without entering into the underlying reasons of the diff erences, their dual consequences<br />
are noticeable: fi rst, the national cause is being treated as a partial issue - separately<br />
for Serbia, separately for Republika Srpska, separately for the RSK; second, correlated<br />
with the fi rst, is the transfer of the Serbian national cause from the constitutive to the<br />
democratic sphere. Both have had a dramatic and lethal eff ect on the overall national<br />
interest, and have clearly shown that some of the subjects involved have amended the<br />
goals of their struggle. Th ey have uncritically abandoned the programme focused on<br />
the creation of a common Serbian state in the belief that it could not be realized at this<br />
time. As opposed to this concept, they advocate the solution of the issue through the<br />
achievement of democratic rights of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina.
Quite clearly, this turn in the national goal has a direct bearing on the effi cient functioning<br />
of government in Republika Srpska and the RSK, making it less free to meet all the<br />
challenges with which it is faced. Th e transfer of the national goal from the constitutive to<br />
the democratic sphere results in a planned destruction of attempts to develop an effi cient<br />
government machinery. Th at is, the Serbian cause regarded as a democratic issue does<br />
not seek its own state subjectivity, it opposes it. Th e so-called democratic solution sees<br />
the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th is is why its champions swoop down<br />
on both Serbian states and try to make them ineffi cient and incapable of responding to<br />
the requirements of the time.<br />
One of the by-products of such a policy is the forced division, i.e., trialism of power in<br />
the RSK. (...)<br />
However, let me stress once again that the confl ict of concepts is the fundamental<br />
current confl ict in Serbian lands, one that deliberately brings about the destruction of<br />
the state apparatus and is the true culprit for the fall of Western Slavonia. A strong state<br />
is an obstacle to the realization of the concept of coexistence between the Serbs and the<br />
Croats. Moreover, the weakening and the mutilation of the Krajina state have become<br />
the goals of some former Serbian nationalists. Th e destruction is to be wrought from<br />
within, by creating the illusion of an insatiable struggle for leadership and power which<br />
destroys everything around it; a struggle which is an end in itself.<br />
Distinguished assemblymen,<br />
Th is Assembly must once again clearly and publicly state which concept of solution of<br />
the issue it accepts: the so-called democratic or the constitutive one. On that basis, it<br />
should once again determine its position with respect to both Serbia (Yugoslavia) and<br />
Republika Srpska, but also with respect to war and peace, and the concept of its position<br />
in negotiations with Croatia and the international community. As far as I am concerned,<br />
I have declared by choice a long time ago, and I only accept the constitutive solution<br />
which is also the highest degree of achievement of the democratic right of the Serbian<br />
people. Anything else should proceed without me.<br />
On Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika Srpska<br />
Distinguished assemblymen, (...)<br />
Hence, I have never faced the dilemma of Belgrade vs. Pale. I have always chosen both<br />
Belgrade and Pale. I have never made any essential diff erences between the two, and do<br />
not intend to make any in the future either. Krajina cannot survive without Belgrade,<br />
but it cannot survive without Pale either. Let us start, for example, with geostrategic<br />
considerations. Any lay person knows that Eastern Slavonia and Baranja cannot survive,<br />
in military terms, without Yugoslavia, just as the western parts of Krajina cannot<br />
survive without Republika Srpska, with which they make up an integral strategic whole.<br />
Insisting on the censure of Pale within the scope of the internal Serbian squabble means<br />
at the same time condemning Krajina to military defeat and disappearance. I think that<br />
Western Slavonia could have been saved if Republika Srpska and the RSK had united<br />
before the aggression, as precursors of overall Serbian unifi cation.<br />
231
Th erefore, territorial integrity, i.e., the safeguarding of all Serbian territories, does not<br />
allow any partition into Belgrade, Pale and Knin. If the argument is pursued further, in<br />
this forced analysis Belgrade has a much higher economic and political weight than Pale.<br />
In Krajina we recognize this fact and, therefore, accept Belgrade as a go-between in most<br />
of our international political activities. Th erefore, whoever is against Belgrade is against<br />
Krajina. (...)<br />
Th at is my decision. My concern is Krajina, and it cannot be preserved by mere<br />
demagogical claims about the so-called peaceful solution of the issue which sees Krajina<br />
as an autonomous entity in Croatia and - mind you! - exclusively in the area of the<br />
so-called Knin and Glina districts. Krajina can be safeguarded only by insisting on the<br />
unifi cation of Serbian states. Anything else would lead to a massive exodus of Serbs<br />
west of the Drina to its eastern bank. All ill-intentioned people will then conclude with<br />
satisfaction, but they will not be alone, that the Serbs are fi nally in one state.<br />
Th e unifi cation of Serbian lands is the only way to preserve Krajina. Th e attacks on the<br />
champions of unifi cation are a good indicator that there are also people who do not<br />
care for Krajina any longer. Th ey are prepared to promote and cultivate, as an infectious<br />
disease, the germ of defeatism and disbelief in the possibility of its survival. Th ey are<br />
prepared to glorify the strength of the enemy and underrate their own power. Th ey are<br />
prepared to provoke and speed up internal Serbian quarrels by trying to cause anarchy<br />
and chaos in the state with accusations of individual leaders. Among other reasons,<br />
Western Slavonia also fell because of this anarchic situation in our country. If we do not<br />
oppose this imported chaos as well as the chaos being regerenerated within Krajina itself,<br />
we shall soon face a destiny like the one which befell Western Slavonia. Th e unifi cation<br />
of the RSK and Republika Srpska must become a matter of hours and no longer a<br />
matter of days or months. Anything else will take Krajina down the road to ruin.<br />
On the advocates of war and peace, warmongers and peacekeepers<br />
(...) Th e integral Serbian state is the solution of our problem. If we cannot achieve it in<br />
one piece, we can do it partially, if not momentarily, then gradually, but we must not lose<br />
any part of our national territory. Th ose who advocate this programme, which does not<br />
call for war but only for Serbian unity, are being labelled as warmongers and attacked,<br />
which is not only sad but also untrue...<br />
What are we to do? Th ese are my suggestions:<br />
- embrace the Serbian cause as a constituent issue and, within that context, urgently<br />
proceed to unifi cation with Republika Srpska (in Bosnia&Herzegovina);<br />
- cancel until further notice all economic and other negotiations with Croatia until all<br />
past implications of such negotiations are examined;<br />
- reinforce state power substantially by relieving all those who block it (in this regard,<br />
demand the immediate relief of the prime minister);<br />
- the government must hold its sessions in Knin;<br />
- eradicate crime by amending and adopting stricter criminal justice;<br />
- urgently reorganize the army; this has not been done so far because of obstruction; the<br />
specifi c plans exist, the dominant issue is the required funding;<br />
232
- amend the assembly procedures; the members of the assembly must answer to the<br />
people and not to individuals or specifi c parties;<br />
- provide adequate accommodation for refugees from Western Slavonia;<br />
- during talks with international mediators insist on the protection of the entire Serbian<br />
population left in Western Slavonia, and re-establishment of Serbian authorities aft er the<br />
departure of Croatian forces;<br />
- freeze the activities of all parties for at least 6 months or until this situation is<br />
overcome;<br />
- let us all unite in a single Serbian bloc. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 3, box 291<br />
24<br />
1995, 20 May<br />
Borovo Selo<br />
Decision of the Assembly of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” on starting the<br />
implementation of unifi cation with Republika Srpska<br />
____________________<br />
Pursuant to Article 123 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and to the<br />
results of the referendum held in June 1993 on the unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina with Republika Srpska and other Serbian states, and in accordance with the<br />
project of the Serbian Federation accepted by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina at its session on 10 November 1994, and accepted by the Assembly of Republika<br />
Srpska on 15-16 April 1995, at its third meeting of its fi rst regular session held in Borovo<br />
Selo on 20 May 1995 the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has adopted the<br />
following<br />
D E C I S I O N<br />
on the start of unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina and Republika Srpska<br />
Th e realization of unifi cation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska<br />
shall proceed. An inter-republican commission is being appointed, consisting of three<br />
members from each Republic, in order to prepare the concrete Plan of Unifi cation of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska. (...)<br />
Th e process of unifi cation shall not be pursued contrary to the interests of other Serbian<br />
states, primarily the SRJ, and it will be harmonized with all Serbian states. (...)<br />
233
No. 01-02-41/1-95 President of the Assembly<br />
Borovo Selo, 20 May 1995 Rajko Ležajić, B.S.<br />
(stamp) 37<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 3, box 2<br />
234<br />
25<br />
1995, 29 May<br />
Knin<br />
Minutes of the session of the Assembly of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” which approved<br />
the decision on state unifi cation with Republika Srpska<br />
(...)<br />
AGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION ON STATE UNIFICATION OF THE RSK AND<br />
THE RS<br />
Minister MILAN BABIĆ presented the chronological sequence of the work of the state<br />
commission, and the variants of the name of the future state. Th e common position was<br />
that it ought to be called UNITED SERBIAN REPUBLIC.<br />
Aft er the debate, the other members of the Assembly also unanimously agreed with the<br />
Decision.<br />
AGREEMENT WITH THE DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON INTER-<br />
IM CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFICATION<br />
Accepted unanimously along with the statement of reasons. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 3, box 407<br />
37 Round stamp with the text: RSK, Assembly of the Republic, Knin
29<br />
1995, 29 June<br />
Opinion of the cabinet of the president of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” concerning<br />
the preliminary draft of the law package for the preparation of the legislation of the<br />
“United Serbian Republic”<br />
__________________<br />
(...)<br />
Subject: Preliminary draft of the legislation of the United Serbian Republic<br />
Th is is to inform you that we have examined a package of sixteen laws draft ed by the<br />
joint commission for the preparation of the legislation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
and Republika Srpska, submitted for our consideration and, accordingly, for presenting<br />
our suggestions or amendments.<br />
Having compared the existing laws and legal solutions, the organization and mechanism<br />
of functioning of state administration and other key state institutions in the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina, with the principles and solutions envisioned in the preliminary<br />
draft s of the laws, we have concluded that the organization, functioning and concentration<br />
of authority are almost identical with the existing legal solutions in the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina, with the understanding, of course, that the new laws will be implemented<br />
throughout the territory of the United Serbian Republic.<br />
Th erefore, the draft envisions a centralized form of government with a minimum degree<br />
of local self-government.<br />
We fi nd that the off ered laws are justifi ed, of substantially and normatively high quality,<br />
and mainly have no particular comments in their regard.<br />
Th e President of the Republic Mr. Milan Martić has been informed about the preliminary<br />
draft s and off ered no major comments.<br />
However, he stressed that, in the talks with the highest government offi cials of Republika<br />
Srpska, it was agreed in principle that the future administrative centre of the United<br />
Serbian Republic would be Banja Luka. (...)<br />
Th e president believes that there is no need to emphasize in particular the interest of<br />
the citizens of the Serbian Republic of Krajina in having the administrative centre of the<br />
United SerbianRepublic in Banja Luka.<br />
Th ank you for your cooperation (...)<br />
__________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
Croatian Information Centre, A-159/075<br />
235
236<br />
30<br />
1995, 30 July<br />
Knin<br />
From the decision of the Supreme Defence Council of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina”<br />
on the proclamation of the state of war<br />
___________________<br />
Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council<br />
STATE OF WAR PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE RSK<br />
Knin, 30 July. At its meeting held on Friday evening the RSK Supreme Defence Council<br />
has decided, considering the latest developments aft er the occupation of Grahovo and<br />
possible Croatian aggression against the RSK, to proclaim the state of war throughout<br />
the RSK in accordance with Article 102 of the Constitution.<br />
[...]<br />
Th e government has heard and accepted the information of the minister of defence<br />
Milan Šuput on the steps taken with regard to the defence of the borders and civil defence<br />
activities. RSK President Milan Martić visited yesterday the area of the shelled village<br />
of Strumica, some twenty kilometres north of Knin towards Grahovo together with<br />
the SVK commander Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić, and stated on RSK Radio&TV<br />
that the Krajina defence lines in the area were stabilized.<br />
“We cannot believe that Croatia could decide to carry out an insane venture such as<br />
the attack on Knin”, said he, but added that the possibility was not to be excluded.<br />
According to his words, the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, with whom he<br />
spoke yesterday on the phone, assured him that Serbia could no longer be indiff erent.<br />
Speaking about the alliance with Republika Srpska, President Martić said that the<br />
RSK and the RS would act jointly, and that the presidents of the two states and the their<br />
military commanders were in continuous contact.<br />
“We have the strength to recoup what the Croatian army has seized”, stressed Martić,<br />
and urged citizens to be disciplined and comply with the instructions of the authorities.<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4207
APPENDIX 2<br />
THE BIHAĆ CRISIS -<br />
THE ASSAULT OF THE REBEL SERBS FROM<br />
BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA AND THE OCCUPIED<br />
PARTS OF CROATIA<br />
ON THE BIHAĆ SAFE AREA<br />
237
Chief of the HV General Staff General Janko Bobetko and HV General Krešimir Ćosić with General Gordon<br />
Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army; Pentagon, Washington, D.C., fi rst half of November 1994.<br />
238
Lieutenant General Krešimir Ćosić<br />
HOW WE CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE WAR<br />
Operation WINTER ‘94<br />
(memoir notes on the fi rst Bihać crisis - memories of a participant)<br />
The historical events linked with the so-called First Bihać Crisis and its connection<br />
with Operation Winter ’94 of the Croatian Army are almost totally unknown to the<br />
Croatian public. However, it can be claimed without any exaggeration that it was<br />
precisely the Croatian Army and its operation that indirectly prevented the fall of Bihać<br />
and a tragedy of the civil population comparable to the Srebrenica tragedy already in the<br />
winter of 1994, and the probable end of the war in neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina,<br />
in which the war criminals Karadžić and Mladić could have become victors. Memories,<br />
facts and original documents bear witness to the fact that the Croatian Army, as far<br />
back as late 1994, while defending Croatia successfully defended Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
in cooperation with the Fift h Corps of the BiH Army. Th e Serbs knew that the conquest<br />
of Bihać would leave Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina in an almost hopeless military<br />
and political situation. At the time they did everything they could in order to achieve<br />
that goal. At the time many people in the international community thought that the fall<br />
of Bihać was only a matter of days. However, Operation Winter ’94 reversed the course<br />
of the war both in Croatia and in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e Croatian Army was not<br />
impressed or confused by the deceits and threats about the might of the Serbian army<br />
palmed off by Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, with which they had too long deluded the<br />
international community, in particular the Contact Group led by Lord Owen. Operation<br />
Winter ’94 waged by the Croatian Army opened up the way, through Crni Lug, to Grahovo<br />
and Knin, and Bihać was saved. Th e events that followed in the summer of 1995<br />
were almost identical to those in late 1994, because the Second Bihać Crisis in the summer<br />
of 1995 was also linked with Croatian operations Summer 95 and Storm.<br />
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BIHAĆ IN NOVEMBER 1994<br />
FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR IN THE<br />
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA<br />
In late 1994 the war crisis in Bosnia&Herzegovina reached its climax. Th e organized<br />
and coordinated siege of Bihać by Serbian forces from Bosnia&Herzegovina and the<br />
temporarily occupied parts of Croatia, with the logistic support of the Yugoslav Army,<br />
was focused on the fi nal conquest of Bihać, followed by the establishment of total control<br />
over almost the entire territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e Serbian attacks on Bihać - a<br />
UN safe area - reached their peak on 29 November 1994. Th e fall of the town seemed to<br />
be imminent; it had been totally surrounded for months, with many people killed and<br />
wounded, weary and exhausted defenders and citizens. Th e eff orts of the international<br />
community were largely limited to providing emergency relief for refugees and humani-<br />
239
tarian aid for the survivors. Th rough the Contact Group news about the imminent fall of<br />
Bihać spread from London and Paris all the way to Washington. In such a situation, taking<br />
advantage of UNPROFOR and the ceasefi re agreement in Croatia, Milan Martić, the<br />
leader of the rebel Serbs in Croatia, mobilized the rebel Croatian Serbs and called them<br />
into play. Th ey crossed the Croatian state border into neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
and participated in the onslaught on Bihać together with Milošević’s, Šešelj’s and Arkan’s<br />
volunteers. It was quite clear to us that aft er the fall of Bihać these forces would regroup<br />
and redeploy in the occupied Croatian areas, particularly along the line of disengagement<br />
at Karlovac. If that were to happen, many vital communications with the southern<br />
parts of Croatia would be within range of mortar fi re by the rebel Serbs. In such a case<br />
Croatia would face the most diffi cult situation since the start of the Homeland War. Th e<br />
Croatian Army could not just look on Serbian aggression against Bihać and had to react<br />
in order to prevent its fall and the subsequent military and political linkup of the occupied<br />
territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina into a single state<br />
entity of the rebel Serbs.<br />
Similarly, the rebel Serbs knew that the Bihać-Cazin area, totally surrounded by their<br />
forces for months and successfully defended at a high cost by the 5 th Corps of the BiH<br />
Army and the 101 st HVO regiment, represented the main obstacle to the complete military,<br />
political and economic linkup of the RSK and the RS. Because of that the fi nal<br />
destruction of the 5 th ARBiH Corps was the main military and political objective of<br />
the rebel Serbs on either side of the border. In November 1994 Bihać became the key,<br />
decisive issue determining the outcome of the war both in the Republic of Croatia and<br />
in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e destruction of the 5 th ARBiH Corps and the fall of Bihać<br />
would have had a direct eff ect on the line of disengagement between the Croatian Army<br />
and the rebel Serbs, and particularly on the vital logistic routes via Karlovac and Maslenica<br />
to southern Croatia. Th e Croatian Army would be faced with a very tough situation.<br />
As a matter of fact, with the fall of Bihać the Republic of Croatia would fi nd itself in a<br />
totally lost military position, and negotiations at the Contact Group level would simply<br />
become meaningless. Of course, there would have been no Flash or Storm in 1995 without<br />
the successful termination of the fi rst Bihać crisis and the prevented fall of Bihać in<br />
1994. Because of all this, Operation Winter ’94 was without any exaggeration the turning<br />
point in the operations in this theatre, and Operations Summer ’95 and Storm its logical<br />
conclusions. In a nutshell, the Croatian Army was forced to a vigorous active defence,<br />
which started with Operation Winter ’94 in the harshest winter conditions.<br />
At the same time Croatia’s political leaders very intensively sought diplomatic avenues<br />
for resolving the crisis aff ecting the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina. Aft er<br />
the signing of the Washington Agreement (18 March 1994) the United States became<br />
more strongly involved in the resolution of this, the most complex and most serious international<br />
crisis. Th at was a major challenge for the US administration, which endeavoured<br />
once again to demonstrate and prove its pivotal role on the global political scene.<br />
However, that only took place one year later, in Dayton. But at the time Dayton was far,<br />
very far away.<br />
At the time many serious international military analysts claimed, for very pragmatic<br />
reasons, that objective and realistic political solutions must take into account realities on<br />
240
the ground, meaning, as they emphasized, the actual balance of the military forces of the<br />
warring sides. Due account needs to be taken of the fact that at the time under consideration<br />
the rebel Serbs still controlled about 25% of territory of the Republic of Croatia and<br />
almost 70% of the territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina. In such circumstances no realistic<br />
or objective international politician believed in political solutions acceptable to both<br />
belligerent sides. We knew that Karadžić, Mladić and Martić would never agree to political<br />
concessions found satisfactory by the Croats and Bosniaks until forced to do it by<br />
military force. Th erefore, everything was clear! Only a new balance of military forces on<br />
the ground could lead to new, acceptable political solutions. In this context the Serbian<br />
positions were stated most clearly by Lord Owen, Chairman of the Contact Group, who<br />
oft en pointed out: Don’t hope that you’ll get at the green table what you have not been able<br />
to win by military means. However, Lord Owen forgot that the Serbs, initially with the<br />
help of the JNA, had disarmed already in 1990 all the other republics and peoples in the<br />
former common states, and only then, together with the JNA, waged war on Slovenia,<br />
Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina in order to demonstrate their military power and “gallantry”.<br />
Unfortunately, just as Lord Owen did, the international community forgot all<br />
that. Th is applies in particular to the Contact Group, which was very inclined to accept<br />
the right of the stronger party to impose political solutions. And everything was clear! In<br />
the war-time conditions of the early nineteen-nineties, that was the will of the international<br />
community, and the political position of the warring sides was proportional only<br />
and exclusively to their military might and convincing performance on the ground. In<br />
keeping with this, having inherited from the JNA all the occupied parts of the Republic<br />
of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, Martić and Karadžić held - very long and too long<br />
- a highly important role in all negotiations with the international community, and particularly<br />
during the negotiations in Geneva. Th is lasted until their brutality, arrogance<br />
and intolerance was reduced to the proper political scale and position by the operations<br />
of the Croatian Army and the BiH Army in 1994 and 1995.<br />
Aware of such rules of the game, Karadžić, Mladić and Martić did their best to obtain<br />
fresh forces for the fi nal assault on Bihać through follow-on mobilization of rebel Serbs.<br />
Tension and danger of escalation and spreading of the confl ict - not only at Bihać but<br />
also along almost every front line - grew daily and hourly.<br />
Th e gravity of the situation was also confi rmed by the report of the US Ambassador<br />
in the UN, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, presented to the Security Council on 29 November<br />
1994 at the height of the fi rst Bihać crisis: Th e Bosnian Serbs started the war, and they<br />
are the only ones to reject the Contact Group Plan on the cessation of hostilities. Karadžić’s<br />
and Mladić’s aggression on the UN safe area at Bihać is also supported by the Serbs from<br />
the so-called Krajina, who freely attack the sovereign territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
ignoring the internationally recognized border bwtween the Republic of Croatia and<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina. Such conduct, focused on linking and uniting the areas held by the<br />
Serbs from the so-called Krajina with the areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs could also<br />
ignite a broader Balkan war. In the same report, Mrs. Albright stressed in particular: It is<br />
a fact that the attacks on the UN safe area at Bihać originate from the Udbina air base in<br />
Croatia controlled by the rebel Croatian Serbs. All this poses a great security threat to the<br />
241
UNPROFOR units on the ground, and has caused immense civilian casualties in the Bihać<br />
pocket. Because of all this the US administration believes that such an aggression also calls<br />
for an appropriate military response by NATO.<br />
242<br />
US INVOLVEMENT IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE<br />
CRISIS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE<br />
WASHINGTON TALKS IN NOVEMBER 1994<br />
In order to prevent further escalation of the confl ict at Bihać, which threatened to result<br />
in many refugees, huge civilian casualties and a humanitarian crisis of unforeseeable<br />
scale, the US administration began to be involved in the solution of that global crisis.<br />
Since the UN intelligence system simply did not function and more oft en than not provided<br />
disinformation rather than reliable information, confusing the representatives of<br />
the international community and thwarting the search for acceptable political solutions,<br />
the American administration fi rst endeavoured to establish its own intelligence system<br />
in order to gain a better and fuller insight of the actual balance of forces on the ground.<br />
Th e harmonization of political solutions with the actual balance of forces on the ground<br />
was almost impossible without the availability of reliable and timely information in real<br />
time.<br />
In early 1994 I visited Washington again, this time together with General Janko Bobetko,<br />
Chief of the HV General Staff . In the State Department we talked with Ambassador<br />
Holbrooke and then, in the Pentagon, with General Shalikashivili, Chairman of<br />
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of his staff , General Sullivan and General Wesley<br />
Clark. I still remember quite well Holbrooke’s reaction: he began to fi dget nervously<br />
in his chair aft er General Bobetko’s determined statement: We will attack on all fronts!<br />
I believe that was truly one of the most critical moments during the Homeland War.<br />
General Bobetko made the following point: Croatia will not be on the sidelines and just<br />
look on at what is happening at Bihać. We will be forced to react. We simply have to do<br />
it so that, if Bihać falls, we can prevent the penetration of the Bosnian Serb army into the<br />
temporarily occupied Croatian areas and prevent the massacre of the civil population in<br />
Bihać by the Serbs. Holbrooke retorted: You cannot go ahead. In such a large scale operation<br />
one could not avoid huge victims and a new large refugee wave. I still remember quite<br />
well the reaction of General Bobetko. Vividly surprised by Holbrooke’s answer, he said:<br />
Th at is your position. We are now going to the Pentagon and there I shall talk to General<br />
Shalikashvili. He certainly understands the seriousness and the complexity of the situation<br />
from the military standpoint. Half an hour later General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of<br />
the Joint Chiefs of Staff , met us with the same words: Th e Croatian Army must not mount<br />
a large scale military operation. Having said that, he did not accept Bobetko’s explanation<br />
that it was the only way to prevent genocide in Bihać. As it turned out, Holbrooke had<br />
called Shalikashvili and “prepared” him for the talk with the Croatian delegation.<br />
Th at was the fi rst in a series of talks that followed, focused on identifying acceptable<br />
solutions for the Bihać crisis. Th e Croatian offi cial position was clear and determined:<br />
if the Serbs from the temporarily occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia should
continue to attack Bihać, freely crossing the internationally recognized border between<br />
the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, the Croatian Army would mount attacks<br />
along all the lines of disengagement in order to protect its internationally recognized<br />
borders. Th e Croatian position caused the concern of the US administration, but<br />
also of the international community. Nobody wanted a new, unwanted and even greater<br />
escalation of the confl ict.<br />
Two days later, on 29 November 1994, I again came to Washington, D.C., this time<br />
with the Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak. We stayed at a hotel a hundred yards<br />
away from the Pentagon. While talking on the phone with President Tuđman, Minister<br />
Šušak said: President, more and more people over here claim that the fall of Bihać cannot<br />
be prevented and that, thereby, the war in Bosnia&Herzegovina has practically ended<br />
with the victory of Karadžić amd Mladić. We were surprised to see that Karadžić’s infl uence<br />
on the Contact Group had spread to Washington as well. According to confi dential<br />
intelligence, the fall of Bihać appeared to be a matter of hours and not any longer of<br />
days. President Tuđman’s voice was excited, high-pitched but determined: Our position<br />
is clear. Th e Croatian Army will not calmly look on as the rebel Serbs from Croatia and the<br />
Croatian areas participate in the aggression against Bosnia&Herzegovina while UNPRO-<br />
FOR is safeguarding their back. Th e international community must prevent the escalation<br />
of the confl ict, new tragedies, new refugees... there are already more than 600,000 refugees<br />
in Croatia...<br />
Th e key meeting started at 11 o’ clock in the Pentagon, in the main meeting room of<br />
the US Department of Defense. I sat by Minister Šušak; our Ambassador Petar Šarčević<br />
and Robert Hranj, the Croatian military attaché, were also present. On the US side, next<br />
to Dr. W. Perry (who was awarded a honorary doctoral degree by the University of Zagreb),<br />
US Secretary of Defense, sat General Wesley Clark, former NATO Commander<br />
and Democratic Party candidate at the 2004 presidential elections, Ambassador Holbrooke,<br />
and CIA, DIA and NSC representatives. Th e topics on the agenda included ways<br />
to avoid a new escalation of the confl ict, a new humanitarian crisis, the fall of Bihać,<br />
and the promotion of military cooperation between the US and Croatia which was also<br />
signed formally on the same morning.<br />
Minister Šušak presented the Croatian position and emphasized that Croatia did not<br />
require any military assistance, but sought understanding if it was forced to attack in<br />
order to protect its internationally recognized borders. Aft er the Director of the Defense<br />
Intelligence Agency General Hughes presented the situation on the ground, I personally<br />
explained on the map the way in which the UN safe area in Bihać could be helped, and<br />
a new humanitarian crisis of incalculable scale prevented. In military term, the position<br />
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps was extremely serious but, as I emphasized, the Croatian Army<br />
had a complete grasp of the conditions on the ground and it would, if required, force<br />
by its action the Serbian forces attacking Bihać from the temporarily occupied parts of<br />
the Republic of Croatia to withdraw and, thus, protect Bihać from further destruction.<br />
Ambassador Holbrooke did not participate in the discussion, and Secretary Perry, as the<br />
talks continued in the Pentagon, expressed “the full understanding of the US administration<br />
for all the problems encountered by Croatia, from the hundreds of thousands of<br />
243
efugees to the fact that rebel Serbs holding one-fourth of Croatian state territory did<br />
not recognize Croatian authorities, as well as the fact that in those hard wartime years<br />
Croatia was faced with the very diffi cult challenge of creating its own armed forces”.<br />
However, he stressed, they found, “in spite of Serbian provocations, Croatian restraint to<br />
be extremely important at this current juncture in order to prevent further escalation of<br />
the confl ict which might destabilize the whole region”.<br />
Presentation on the Bihać crisis by General Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency,<br />
during the meeting with the Croatian delegation led by the Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Šušak; Pentagon<br />
(Washington, D.C.), 29 November 1994.<br />
In such circumstances, the friendly exchange of positions and views between the<br />
Croatian state leadership and the US administration was particularly signifi cant in order<br />
to examine all the possibilities for the peaceful solution of the crisis and identify acceptable<br />
political solutions. But we always had in mind a statement made by Lord Owen<br />
already in early 1993: What is lost militarily cannot be regained any longer at the green<br />
table. At that time the Republic of Croatia also demonstrated full cooperativeness with<br />
the international community, but also its absolute determination to avoid ending up in<br />
an almost lost position through the fall of Bihać. It must be remembered that 25% of<br />
Croatia’s state territory was still temporarily occupied at the time. On the other hand,<br />
from the military standpoint the opportunities for liberating the temporarily occupied<br />
Croatian territories were almost ideal because the rebel Serbs had transferred all their<br />
244
forces from the so-called Krajina to the Bihać area. Th erefore, the Croatian Army could<br />
liberate its temporarily occupied territory without major problems, because it was almost<br />
without any forces or defence, and protected and defended by UNPROFOR instead<br />
of the rebel Serbs. Nevertheless, in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the crisis,<br />
the Republic of Croatia kept on the diplomatic talks and sought appropriate avenues to<br />
achieve acceptable solutions.<br />
Croatian delegation in the Pentagon (Washington, D.C.), 29 November 1994; (from the left ), the legendary<br />
Croatian basketball player Krešimir Ćosić, then Minister Counsellor at the Croatian Embassy in Washington,<br />
D.C., Chris Hill, General Wesley Clark, General Krešimir Ćosić.<br />
THE START - OPERATION WINTER ‘94<br />
Unfortunately, no competent or objective person in the broader international community<br />
had any illusions about possible political agreements and peaceful solutions with<br />
Karadžić, Mladić, Martić and Milošević. We do not believe in any political solution which<br />
would not be combined with corresponding solutions on the battlefi eld. Th e Serbs will never<br />
agree to any concessions which would satisfy the Bosnian or Croatian government until<br />
forced to do so, emphasized an eminent American military analyst and expert. Th e international<br />
community had quite a few diff erent, divergent and sometimes even confl ict<br />
solutions, and there were also some very open supporters of Karadžić and Milošević.<br />
245
Th at was certainly one of the most critical periods throughout the Homeland War. At<br />
the time Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina faced the almost greatest military, but also<br />
political crisis, because of the policy of the Contact Group, Lord Owen in particular. Th e<br />
alarm bells rang. What to do? Th ere where only two options - wait or attack!<br />
Waiting would open to the Serbs the road to Bihać and seizure of the town. Th e fall<br />
of Bihać would defi nitively mean defeat, both militarily and politically. Defeat without a<br />
fi ght was out of the question, in spite of all the opposition of the Contact Group which,<br />
on the one hand, barred to the Croatian leadership all military action and, on the other,<br />
tacitly opened to Karadžić and Mladić the route to Bihać. Th at was unacceptable<br />
for Croatia’s state policy. On the other hand, an assault could very quickly relieve the<br />
siege of Bihać, especially from the Croatian side, because the border of the temporarily<br />
occupied Croatian parts was guarded (in Croatia) by UNPROFOR, while the Serbs<br />
from Croatia attacked Bihać in neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina. At the same time<br />
Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, with Milošević’s support, deluded the international community<br />
with their peace off ers. At the Geneva negotiations they demonstrated peacekeeping<br />
and cooperativeness, and at Bihać brutal aggression, shelling of the town and<br />
thousands of civilian casualties. At the time the prudent and determined Croatian state<br />
policy and the strength of the Croatian Army played the key role in the solution of all<br />
these problems. In those moments the Croatian state leadership demonstrated all the<br />
required boldness, courage, determination and wisdom. Of course, all these facts do not<br />
support those people in Croatia who still claim that Croatia waged an aggression against<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
It its offi cial policy the Republic of Croatia refrained from an all-out assault and from<br />
an escalation of the confl ict, but its concentrated attack across Mount Dinara and Livanjsko<br />
Polje on 30 November 1994 provided the conditions for halting the siege of Bihać.<br />
Th e arrogance and brutality of Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, and their unwillingness to<br />
engage in any serious political talks and negotiations could not be tolerated indefi nitely.<br />
Refusal to accept the peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied Croatian territories<br />
into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia and the attack of<br />
the rebel Serbs on Bihać from Croatian territory were suffi cient reasons for the Croatian<br />
state leadership to mount Operation Winter ’94. Karadžić, Mladić and Martić soon felt<br />
quite well the impact of the only possible response to the situation.<br />
Th e operation was mounted in the nick of time! A snow <strong>storm</strong> broke on that day,<br />
30 November 1994 - a mark of the real, well-known harsh winter typical of the area.<br />
Th e opening of the avenue towards Knin across Mount Dinara in the middle of winter<br />
was a goal bordering on insanity. But it was the only way to help Bihać. In a spirited attack<br />
across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje Croatian forces broke through the<br />
Čelebići - Rujani line. While the Serbs from Knin were attacking Bihać, Croatian forces<br />
opened up the route of advance towards Grahovo and Knin. When the rebel Serbs fi -<br />
nally grasped, several days later, what was going on, it was too late. Croatian troops were<br />
already on top of Mount Dinara, and Knin was also in plain view. Th e rebel Croatian<br />
Serbs had to forget Bihać, and its siege soon came to an end. Bihać was saved. Th at was<br />
a turning point during the war in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e chief commanders of the<br />
operation were the Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina and Tihomir Blaškić.<br />
246
HV General Krešimir Ćosić and General Wesley Clark, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the JCS<br />
staff .<br />
Operation Winter ’94 turned out to be a total surprise for Karadžić, Mladić and Martić,<br />
and provoked their total mental and military insanity. On Christmas Eve, 24 December<br />
1994, the Chief of the HV General Staff General Bobetko summoned me to his cabinet:<br />
Ćosić, we have information that rebel Croatian Serbs are planning an air raid from the<br />
Udbina air base on the church in Livno during the Christmas Eve Mass in order to force the<br />
Croatian leadership, by causing mass civilian and believer casualties, to withdraw Croatian<br />
troops from Mount Dinara and Livanjsko Polje. We took all the necessary steps in order<br />
to prevent the insane and brutal bloodshed planned by Karadžić, Mladić and Martić.<br />
Th e military leadership of the rebel Croatian Serbs was prepared to commit even such a<br />
heinous crime in order to stop operation Winter ’94 and the breakthrough of Croatian<br />
forces across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje via Crni Lug towards Grahovo<br />
and Knin. Actually, the Serbian plan came as no surprise considering all their bestial<br />
crimes from Vukovar, Škabrnja, Dubrovnik and Ravno to the rocketing of downtown<br />
Zagreb with missiles carrying banned cluster bomb warheads, fi red from multiple rocket<br />
launchers in 1995.<br />
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPERATION WINTER ‘95<br />
What would have happened if the Croatian forces had not set off ? Th e total exhaustion<br />
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, which had a great number of troops killed and wounded, the<br />
247
lockade of Bihać over several months, continuous artillery shelling and air raids would<br />
have brought about the fall of Bihać and a humanitarian tragedy in the UN safe area<br />
equal to the one at Srebrenica. Had the ARBiH 5 th Corps been annihilated at the time,<br />
that would have marked the end of the war from the military bus also from the political<br />
aspect considering the positions of the international community and, in particular, of its<br />
chief negotiator Lord Owen. Th e Croatian Army would objectively fi nd itself in a very<br />
diffi cult situation, and its main logistic routes, especially via Karlovac and Maslenica,<br />
would be totally jeopardized. Let me stress once again: from the military standpoint, in<br />
late 1994 Bihać was the key of the war crisis in the former state. Aft er the fall of Bihać<br />
Croatia would have found it extremely diffi cult to establish a serious but also a political<br />
balance, and would simply be forced to accept almost every term tabled by Martić,<br />
Karadžić and Mladić. All these points must be highlighted because of the present and future<br />
generations. During the Homeland War the political position of the Croatian people<br />
was exclusively and solely dependent upon and proportional to the military strength of<br />
the Croatian Army. In the early nineteen-nineties we were reminded periodically of that<br />
fact by Lord Owen himself and his cynical remarks such as What is lost militarily, is also<br />
lost politically! Th at was Croatian reality during the Homeland War.<br />
If the Croatian forces had not mounted operation Winter ’94, there would have been<br />
no Flash or Storm. Without any exaggeration, the operation changed the course of the<br />
war. Th e delusions of the international community about the Serbian strength and power<br />
came to an end. Operation Storm would not have been so successful without the major<br />
eff orts in operation Winter ’94 and subsequent operations. It created almost all the necessary<br />
preconditions for the success of the military operations in the spring and summer<br />
of 1995 - from Flash through Summer ’95 to Storm.<br />
Soon aft er the start of operation Winter ’94 chaos and disorder swept the Serbian<br />
ranks, as demonstrated by the records of the Army of Republika Srpska. Th is is also illustrated<br />
by the transcripts of Karadžić’s talks with the mayors of many municipalities (Grahovo,<br />
Glamoč, Drvar, Prijedor, Šipovo, Ključ, Kupres...), mentioning “misinformation<br />
and rumours, and denouncing of authorities... the lack of fuel, ammunition, clothing,<br />
footwear”. Reference was made to rumours that “General Milovanović was paid millions<br />
of Deutschmarks not to seize Bihać; that military and state security was not functioning,<br />
that some persons were deliberately and systematically spreading misinformation<br />
among the people and the troops with terrible consequences; that the authorities and the<br />
SDS were being undermined; that court-martials were being set up; that there were enemies<br />
in the Serbian ranks”. “Ustashi forces and the ARBiH 5 th Corps were being accused<br />
of coordinated activities”, and stress was laid on the “necessity to suppress rumours and<br />
misinformation because of their destructive eff ect on troops morale”. Records also emphasized<br />
the high number of wounded and sick persons, the high casualty rate of 20%,<br />
missions mounted with only a half of required forces, the lack of fuel for the medical<br />
corps let alone tanks, etc. (See Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps/Str. Conf. No. 3-36/16<br />
Feb. 1995).<br />
Th e meeting held in the Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps with the presence of “the<br />
President of Republika Srpska Karadžić, President Krajišnik and General Ninković, and<br />
248
the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Martić, General Čeleketić etc.”, highlighted<br />
the problems on Mount Dinara, in Livanjsko Polje, on Mount PLješivica, the<br />
danger of ustashi linkup with the ARBiH 5 th Corps, and the lack of materiel, fuel and<br />
manpower. Karadžić stressed in particular: Personally I think the Serbian Army of Krajina<br />
is in a knockdown, while at the same time the Muslims are redeploying al their forces<br />
towards Izačić. If the ustashi attack in order to link up with the 5 th Corps, they [Krajina]<br />
will have a lot of problems and will not be able to defend themselves. (See Republika Srpska/Army<br />
of Republika Srpska/Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps/Str. Conf. No. 66-62/5<br />
May 1995; to the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska).<br />
In spite of all that, Karadžić and Mladić again arrogantly boasted about the imminent<br />
victory of the Serbian army while in Geneva in the summer of 1995. Unfortunately, the<br />
tragedy prevented for the fi rst time in Bihać by operation Winter ’94 occurred several<br />
months later in Srebrenica. A similar tragedy in Bihać was prevented for the second time<br />
on 4 August 1995 with the start of operation Storm.<br />
1<br />
1994, 27 October<br />
Th e General Staff of the «Army of Republika Srpska» requests from the Supreme<br />
Command of the Armed Forces of the «Republic of Serbian Krajina» help in the western<br />
Bosnian theatre - the Drvar area - and against the ARBiH 5th Corps<br />
___________________<br />
(...) Th e northwestern theatre of Republika Srpska (zone of responsibility of the 2 nd<br />
Krajina Corps) is seriously threatened from the Cazin area in the northwest and on the<br />
Kupres plateau in the southeast. It is the intention of our common enemy to split by<br />
coordinated action from the southeast and northwest the zone of responsibility of the<br />
2 nd Krajina Corps and thereby physically separate the Republic of Serbian Krajina from<br />
Republika Srpska.<br />
You need to understand that these are in this war the most critical moments for the<br />
Serbs west of the Drina. Minor eff orts of the Serbian Army of Krajina and the Army of<br />
Republika Srpska are required to eliminate the danger. For that purpose the following<br />
steps are indispensable:<br />
1. Th e Army of Republika Srpska needs to stop further hostile penetrations from the<br />
northwest and southeast. In the southeast (Kupres plateu) we have already been successful<br />
and mounted off ensive action along the Zlosela - Kupreška Vrata - Bugojno axis, and we<br />
are prepared for the defence of the Kupres plateau from the attack of Croatian forces<br />
from Livno, Šujica, Tomislavgrad, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf.<br />
249
However, we fi nd it diffi cult to hold out against the attacks from the Cazin area towards<br />
Petrovac because of the obstructive behaviour and fear of the local population, and of<br />
the greater part of the troops of the Army of Republika Srpska (from the area under<br />
consideration).<br />
We have done everything in order to bring manpower from other parts of Republika<br />
Srpska and have succeeded to the extent permitted by the situation in other theatres in<br />
which we are engaged. At present we are preparing a combined unit of brigade rank from<br />
all parts of Republika Srpska and we intend to commit it to a counter attack towards<br />
Cazin. We shall need 3-4 days for that.<br />
We are asking you to use the forces of your Lika, Kordun and Banija Corps in order to<br />
exert pressure from a semicircular perimeter on the Cazin area, i.e., on the forces of the<br />
5 th Corps of the so-called Army of BiH. You must also intersect all supply (smuggling)<br />
channels through which the 5 th Corps is re-supplied with manpower and materiel (as<br />
agreed on December 1993).<br />
Th ank you for the assistance given us so far by deploying units in the threatened areas<br />
and for the presence of President Martić 38 and the Commander of the SVK General<br />
Staff 39 in the threatened areas on 27 October 1994.<br />
We expect that we shall be able, by joint eff orts, to eliminate also this danger for the<br />
Serbian people west of the Drina. (...)<br />
_________________<br />
Original, typewritten Latin Script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, str. conf. 02/2-140<br />
250<br />
5<br />
1994, 13 November<br />
Grahovo<br />
Daily report of the 2nd Krajina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska on fi ghting in the<br />
Krupa and Kupres theatres, and attack on the Bihać safe area<br />
____________________<br />
In the Krupa - Radjić part of the front the enemy has fortifi ed its positions and did<br />
not mount any active operation against our forces. At Grabež and Ripač the enemy is<br />
fortifying and has tried to infi ltrate sabotage&terrorist units in our rear at Gorijevac, but<br />
the attempt was prevented. Hostile forces are putting up tough resistance at Tihotina -<br />
Pritočki Grabež.<br />
38 Milan<br />
39 Milan Čeleketić
In the southeastern part of the front the enemy has attacked the positions of the 5 th<br />
Light Infantry Brigade in the Procip and Rujeva Glava areas.<br />
In the Kupres threatre the enemy artillery has engaged the entire defence line of the<br />
7 th Motorized Brigade. During the night the enemy has retaken Opaljenica because of<br />
the irresponsible conduct of some offi cers commanding the Mrkonjić Battalion and the<br />
7 th Motorized Brigade. Our units are preparing for further off ensive action. At Ripač -<br />
Grabež the enemy has attempted to attack several times, but the line has shift ed only<br />
slightly. At Krupa - Radjić our units have not been able to score major success because of<br />
poor weather conditions.<br />
Along the Kupres front our units are fortifying and occupying more favourable tactical<br />
positions. Adequate action was taken against some commanding offi cers of the Mrkonjić<br />
Battalion because of their irresponsible conduct and unnecessary relinquishment of<br />
positions at Opaljenica.<br />
Th e situation on the ground has not changed substantially as compared to the day<br />
before. Th e damaged and burnt family homes are being repaired and the population is<br />
gradually returning to them.<br />
Th e condition of morale provides for the accomplishment of the tasks at hand.<br />
Rear security is functioning in spite of well-known problems such as the lack of<br />
munitions and fuel.<br />
Th e enemy will put up strong resistance along the current lines in order to defend<br />
Bihać.<br />
NATO aircraft have overfl own our positions forty times. According to information<br />
from the RSK, the air force of the Republic of Croatia has been placed on the highest<br />
state of combat readiness.<br />
All the indispensable activities started with the proclamation of the state of war are<br />
continuing in the zone of responsibility of the Corps in order to service the requirements<br />
of the armed forces in an effi cient and stable way.<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4284<br />
40 Fikret Abdić’s forces defected from the central government of Bosnia&Herzegovina in Sarajevo and fought<br />
as allies of the Serbian forces against the ARBiH 5th Corps. Th e dots are part of the original.<br />
251
252<br />
7<br />
1994, 20 November<br />
Report of the VRS Security&Intelligence Sector to General Milovanović concerning the<br />
letter of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the situation in Bihać aft er<br />
the assault of Serbian forces<br />
___________________<br />
(...)<br />
Th e reports read:<br />
Situation in the Bihać pocket, 09.00 a.m., Friday 18 November<br />
1. Military situation:<br />
If the RSK should continue to interfere the situation will remain disastrous. At 11.00<br />
hours two Serbian aircraft again fi red two rockets on the town of Bihać. Yesterday we<br />
had a meeting with Colonel Lemieux. Th e situation is not too optimistic, and the next<br />
move is the carving up of the pocket into three parts, which would result in a disastrous<br />
humanitarian situation for the civil population.<br />
1.1. Northern border: Abdić’s forces on both sides of Kladuša.<br />
Th e road to Gradina cut off . Th e road to Pećingrad is not yet cut off , but is being shelled.<br />
Th e town of Kladuša has not fallen yet. Th at could be the fi rst next pocket.<br />
Th e 505 th ARBiH Brigade has pushed Abdić’s forces back to Bojna. Th e withdrawal might<br />
have been planned in order to gain better positions for the assault on Kladuša.<br />
1.2. Western border: this is a new combat site. Th is morning the area of Cazin was hit<br />
by two missiles, and shelling continues at Gata. If the RSK manages to get to Gata fi rst,<br />
Ostrožac, Cazin and Bihać will be cut off .<br />
Bihać will be isolated and its water supply cut off because the springs are close to Serbian<br />
troops and RSK borders (the main springs are Klokot and Privilica); its power supply<br />
would also be cut off because the hydropower plant is on the river Una.<br />
1.3. Southern border: 285 rockets (shells) fell yesterday along the southern front line. At<br />
Grabež the VRS is getting closer and closer to the former borders. Th e Grabež plateau is<br />
apparently still controlled by the 5 th Corps (of the ARBiH). No information is available<br />
on Ripač.<br />
2. Political situation<br />
ICRC units cannot protect the civilian population or the Bangladesh battalion (620 men<br />
in Cazin, 346 in Kladuša and 280 in Bihać). [Th e only way to do it] would be to drive<br />
back the RSK units from Gata with the help of NATO (UN has no mandate for it).<br />
3. Safety<br />
Th e Bihać - Gata - Cazin road cannot be used for already 4 days because it can be shelled<br />
at any time, and the risk to get to it and cross is getting higher.
4. Humanitarian situation and aid<br />
About 2000 people fl ed from Izačić (Ličko Petrovo Selo checkpoint) and found refuge<br />
with relatives in Bihać.<br />
Th e food supplies can last only until the end of the month. UNHCR will deliver its last<br />
supplies over the next few days, and only hospitals will get some supplies for December.<br />
Th e ICRC is delivering the last personal packages to the most endangered inhabitants<br />
through the local Red Cross. Th is leaves about 800 packages for potential refugees from<br />
Kladuša or some other villages.<br />
Situation in the Bihać pocket, 09.00 a.m., Saturday, 11 November.<br />
1. Military situation:<br />
Last night there was some shelling outside the town. In the town of Bihać the night<br />
and the morning were relatively calm. Apparently the positions have not changed since<br />
yesterday. In the 5 th Corps (of the ARBiH) there is a strong feeling that they have been<br />
left to their own resources. Aggression from the RSK with such an unprecedented<br />
intensity had never been expected. Th e 5 th Corps is very motivated and convinced that<br />
it can withstand the current pressure from three sides. From the military standpoint the<br />
situation could stabilize. Th e fi rst off ensive was of primary importance and the outcome<br />
is becoming less predictable as time goes by. A high casualty rate can be expected.<br />
- Fighting is still going on north of Kladuša. Abdić’s forces have seized ... 40 and intersected<br />
communications with Cazin.<br />
Th is morning UN military observers managed to get from Cazin to Kladuša by car and<br />
reach the Bangladesh battalion at Polje.<br />
- Western border: no change since yesterday’s report.<br />
- Southwestern border: VRS could return to the old border (Ripač and Pritoka have been<br />
taken), but nobody can confi rm it. Th ere is fi ghting on the Grabež plateau.<br />
What is going to happen next? Will the VRS stop or go on and enter Bihać? Everybody<br />
is afraid to answer that question. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten , Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4043.<br />
40 Fikret Abdić’s forces defected from the central government of Bosnia&Herzegovina in Sarajevo and fought<br />
as allies of the Serbian forces against the ARBiH 5th Corps. Th e dots are part of the original.<br />
253
254<br />
11<br />
1994, 27 November<br />
Oštrelj - Petrovac<br />
Daily report of the Command of the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps to units involved in the<br />
assault on the Bihać safe area concerning the fi ghting and the refusal of the ARBiH 5th Corps to surrender, and the lack of materiel for sustaining the assault<br />
___________________<br />
(...) In spite of the ultimatum of the VRS Command in the Bihać theatre to the<br />
Muslims concerning their surrender until 20.00 hours last night, their futile resistance<br />
continues with no chance of success. Even the commander of the UNPROFOR forces in<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina, General Michael Rose, stated that the UN and NATO would not<br />
militarily intervene in the fi ghting at Bihać unless the civil population and UNPROFOR<br />
troops were endangered, and that the Muslim government in Sarajevo needed to abandon<br />
all illusions in that regard. (...)<br />
Rear security is functioning with the well-known diffi culties. A considerable shortage<br />
of munitions is felt, especially for larger calibres, and shortage of motor petrol. Th at can<br />
considerably slow down the accomplishment of combat missions unless it is dealt with<br />
in an adequate way.<br />
On the basis of available facts we estimate that the enemy will keep on trying to hold<br />
back our forces along the northwestern part of the front by decisive defence of its current<br />
positions. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4284<br />
14<br />
1994, 5 December<br />
Report of the VRS 2nd Corps Command to the VSK General Staff on the breakthrough<br />
of Croatian forces in the Kupres battlefi eld<br />
____________________<br />
(...) During the day the ustashi army has succeeded in pushing back our units at Čaprazlije<br />
- Sajković. By nightfall the ustashi entered Sajković.<br />
We are taking steps to stabilize defence at Kazanac by bringing in forces in the night<br />
of 5/6 Deceember 1994, and their commitment early in the morning on 6 December<br />
1994.
We are asking you to assess the situation, consider all the possible implications of the<br />
ustashi breakthrough and take immediate steps to engage the ustashi fl ank with your<br />
units. (...)<br />
__________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, str. conf., 5 Dec. 1994<br />
17<br />
1994, 16 December<br />
[Knin]<br />
Analysis of SVK materiel consumption in Operation “Spider” and plan of materiel<br />
procurement for continued assault on the Bihać safe area<br />
____________________<br />
(...) Th e planned operation “Military defeat of the 5 th Corps” is very complex, in military<br />
terms, and requires a large quantity of materiel.<br />
So far we have spent more than 6 million rounds of ordnance, e.g.:<br />
- 6 million rounds for infantry weapons;<br />
- 24,000 mortar shells;<br />
- 11,300 artillery shells;<br />
- 4,700 tank shells;<br />
- 110,000 rounds for AA weapons;<br />
- 183 rockets<br />
(...) Since the reserves of some types of munitions are fully spent, their renewal and the<br />
continuation of the operation require the procurement of the following:<br />
- 6 million rounds for infantry weapons and other infantry<br />
ordnance;<br />
- 65,000 mortar shells;<br />
- 11,500 artillery shells;<br />
- 7,000 tank shells;<br />
- 500,000 rounds for AA weapons;<br />
- 5,100 rockets (for multiple rocket launchers and self-guided).<br />
(...) Th e operation alone will require, without the renewal of critical war supplies and<br />
munitions:<br />
- 5.8 million rounds for infantry weapons;<br />
- 65,000 mortar shells;<br />
- 18,500 artillery and tank shells;<br />
255
- 60,000 rounds for AA weapons;<br />
- 5,100 rockets for multiple rocket launchers and self-guided rockets.<br />
So far Operation Spider has used up 756 tons of fuel over and above routine consumption<br />
(581 tons of D-2 and 175 tons of motor petrol), and 9 tons of lubricants. (...)<br />
Th e SVK fuel reserves have practically hit rock bottom. (...)<br />
Th e troops of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (Fikret Abdić’s followers)<br />
were delivered 7,260 infantry weapons. (...)<br />
Munitions must be procured for completing the operation if the ARBiH 5 th Corps is to<br />
be defi nitively defeated in the fi eld within two months:<br />
- infantry weapons, 9,055,314 rounds;<br />
- fi eld guns and howitzers, 36,059 shells;<br />
- tanks and self-propelled artillery, 7,191 shells;<br />
- rounds for AA weapons, 164,022;<br />
- rockets, 275.<br />
Th e total cost (basic materiel, munitions, fuel and lubricants) so far amounts to 28.6<br />
million dinars; if the operation is completed in two months, the additional cost will be<br />
26 million ND.(...)<br />
Th e total outstanding debt to the army suppliers exceeds 4.7 million dinars. Th is indicates<br />
a very marked lack of liquid funds which creates additional problems because some<br />
companies have already announced they would discontinue supply because of unpaid<br />
bills.<br />
Professional soldiers have not yet received their pay for November; the sum required is<br />
1,750,000 dinars, with a very low point value (average pay 181 dinars). Compensations<br />
have not yet been paid either to reservists and conscripts in military service; the necessary<br />
amount is 3,137,305 dinars (average 94 dinars for conscripts and 20 dinars for soldiers),<br />
bringing up the total to 4,887,306 dinars.<br />
Moreover, and that is a separate problem, one-off cash payments cannot be paid in<br />
cases of death or physical injury. Th is would require 140,000 dinars. Th e response of the<br />
families of the people killed or disabled is extremely unfavourable.<br />
Out of the total amount allocated from the General Staff budget (32,095,689 dinars),<br />
59.68% was spent on personal and 40.32% on material expenditure. Average monthly<br />
allocations amounted to 2.6 million dinars or 66.87 dinars a month per soldier. Material<br />
expenditure per soldier for the entire period from 1 January to 12 December 1994<br />
amounts to 376.14 dinars. (...)<br />
Let me note that, in the case of total aggression on the RSK, the VSK lacks the required<br />
munitions, fuel, clothing, footwear and food reserves. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 371<br />
256
19<br />
1995, 6 January<br />
Communication of the Command of the SVK 15th Infantry Brigade to subordinate units<br />
on the current situation on the battlefi eld and the reasons underlying the gridlock in<br />
the assault on the Bihać safe area<br />
___________________<br />
(...) 1. All sorts of rumours are circulating among the troops about Bihać, about what<br />
will happen and how it will happen. Th e Bihać operation and the collapse of the 5 th<br />
Corps are deadlocked because of the fi ghting at Glamoč - Grahovo. Th e Bihać action<br />
and the defeat of the 5 th Corps will follow aft er the situation in that theatre has been dealt<br />
with. Th erefore, we are not giving up Bihać. Th e achieved positions must be held fi rmly,<br />
especially in the area of responsibility of our brigade, because our positions provide the<br />
best prospects for pushing on to Bihać. Th erefore, we must not budge an inch.<br />
(...) 2. Wilful abandoning of positions by individual soldiers is becoming increasingly<br />
more frequent. It weakens the line and more soldiers are being wounded or killed. Th e<br />
responsibility for our losses rests fi rst of all with the deserters and all others avoiding the<br />
front line because the enemy attacks the weakest spot in the defence line. In the future<br />
all deserters will be sent to other, most dangerous battlefi elds, and will be rigorously<br />
punished for the casualties sustained by our troops, being directly responsible for them.<br />
3. We are aware of the situation and of the need to hold the achieved defence lines fi rmly.<br />
We also have great problems with providing rest for our troops and arranging visits to<br />
their families. We shall arrange a short rest period, about 3-5 days, and family visits<br />
for up to 10% of the troops per shift . However, before that we have to bring in all the<br />
deserters and other, less engaged brigade troops, primarily from the rear, in order to<br />
strengthen the defence lines and allow more troops in the fi rst front line to get proper<br />
rest. (...)<br />
4. As regards the transport of furniture collected for the soldiers’ families, we shall have<br />
the municipality, this being in its competence, transport the rest. However, this regards<br />
only items such as wood-burning stoves, couches, bedding, tableware and the like; the<br />
transport of machines, attachments and similar items will not be permitted. Individual<br />
transport requests and applications are forbidden. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
Republic of Croatia, General Staff of the Croatian Army, 1995<br />
257
1995, 17 February<br />
Oštrelj - Petrovac<br />
258<br />
20<br />
Summons requesting corps commanders and representatives of the VRS and SVK<br />
General Staff to attend the meeting of the Spider Command in order to analyze the<br />
gridlock in the assault on the Bihać safe area<br />
____________________<br />
From the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Spider Command, we have received a document,<br />
marked strictly confi dential, No. 197-170, of 16 February 1995, summoning the following<br />
persons to a meeting focused on further coordination and combat action:<br />
- the Commander of the SVK General Staff ,<br />
- the commanders of the 21 st , 15 th and 39 th SVK<br />
Corps, and<br />
- the Commander of the 2 nd VRS Krajina Corps.<br />
1. As specifi ed in the document, action against the 5 th Corps has been going on for more<br />
than three months, and we are still short of controlling the greater part of the territory<br />
and the 5 th Corps has not yet been knocked out of action. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
In possession of the editor<br />
1995, 1 March<br />
Petrinja<br />
21<br />
Request of SO Petrinja to the RSK Ministry of Defence concerning an analysis of<br />
developments in the Western Bosnian theatre, where the Petrinja Brigade suff ered<br />
great losses, and answers to questions concerning loss of territory between 1992 and<br />
1994<br />
__________________<br />
(...) Th e fi rst item on the agenda concerned the tragedy incurred by the members of<br />
the 31 st Infantry Brigade in the Western Bosnian theatre, the third in a line. Between<br />
November 1994 and late February this year fi ve members of the Brigade were killed,<br />
26 are reported missing and more than 20 (according to incomplete data) have been<br />
wounded.
(...) During the debate, which lasted four hours, many issues were raised:<br />
- Who issued the order to deploy the troops of the Serbian Army of Krajina, including<br />
the 31 st Infantry Brigade, to the Western Bosnian Th eatre? Th e military and political<br />
goals of the action in Western Bosnia were clear to the councilmen. What was not clear,<br />
however, was the reason why the action was not completed within the planned time, and<br />
how long the troops would have to hold positions 2-3 km deep in the Western Bosnian<br />
territory controlled by the forces of Fikret Abdić’s People’s Defence.<br />
- Why are civilians assumed to pass relevant information to the enemy also present next<br />
to the troops on the achieved positions?<br />
- Who is responsible for the widespread and almost legal black market along the RSK<br />
borders with Western Bosnia?<br />
- Why are troops sent to the front untrained, physically unprepared, ill and underequipped<br />
(cell phones)?<br />
- Why has the Serbian Army of Krajina only lost territory since the arrival of UN forces<br />
(Maslenica, Miljevac plateau, Medak pocket and, in the zone of responsibility of the 31 st<br />
Infantry Brigade, Pribilović Brdo), and why is it in disarray?<br />
- Th e mobilization on 19 November 1994, which led to the collapse of the economy, was<br />
based on what assessment? (...)<br />
__________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 5, reg. no. 156-3/1995<br />
22<br />
1995, 10 April<br />
Report of the SVK General Staff to Slobodan Milošević, Milan Martić and Momčilo<br />
Perišić on Croatian force activities, the situation in Western Bosnia, unit morale,<br />
personnel problems and relations with UNPROFOR in the fi rst quarter of 1995.<br />
____________________<br />
(...)<br />
Regular operational report of the SVK General Staff<br />
Copy to:<br />
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA<br />
(Att. Mr. Slobodan Milošević)<br />
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
(Att. Mr. Milan Martić)<br />
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY OF YUGOSLAVIA<br />
(Att. Colonel General Momčilo Perišić)<br />
259
1. Hostile forces<br />
Th e Croatian Army (HV) continues to mobilize and engage in training activities on<br />
RH territory. It is also preparing to stage an inter-branch exercise in the territory of the<br />
Osijek Corps District. For that purpose they have also mobilized part of the MUP RH<br />
special units and deployed them to the staging areas.<br />
Intensive reconnaissance and intelligence activities have been observed along the axis<br />
Marinci - Jarmina - Kortina - Hrastin - Vladislavci. HV units have entered the buff er<br />
zone and are fortifying.<br />
Over the past few days the HV has mobilized and deployed troops opposite the zone of<br />
responsibility of the 18 th Corps, i.e., in the greater area of Nova Gradiška - Psunja, and<br />
partly in the UNPA zone around Pakrac.<br />
More intensive grouping of ustashi forces and materiel has been observed opposite the<br />
zone of responsibility of the 15 th and 21 st Corps. Th e presence of a part of the 4 th Guards<br />
Brigade (Split) has also been noted in the past few days in the greater area of Perušić<br />
(zone of responsibility of the 15 th Corps).<br />
In the zone of responsibility of the 7 th Corps the ustashi have sustained their engagement<br />
and seizure of dominant heights on Mount Dinara and their artillery is engaging the area<br />
of Uništa every day. Th e ustashi are undertaking more intensive reconnaissance actions<br />
along the line Pakovo Selo - Žitnić - Dabar - left shore of lake Peruča. (...)<br />
Th e eff orts and the engagement of all command bodies are focused on combat training.<br />
A joint tactical exercise, Counterstrike, was carried out late in March, involving some<br />
units of the Kordun Corps, the air force and the 44 th Rocket Brigade. It included live<br />
fi ring drills with artillery, tanks, 2M ground-to-air rockets and direct fi re weapons. A<br />
live fi ring battle drill was carried out involving one reinforced infantry unit from the<br />
13 th infantry brigade. Similar exercises are being planned in the greater area of Mount<br />
Dinara.<br />
Th e March recruits are undergoing training. Aft er a month of training the young soldiers<br />
are fi t for combat as infantrymen.<br />
Th e fi rst generation of the (infantry and artillery) reserve offi cers’ school graduates is<br />
undergoing its postgraduate training, and at the training centre courses are under way<br />
for company and battery commanders and brigade commanders.<br />
In line with combat readiness requirements the current system of enhanced and<br />
continuous combat readiness steps is being upgraded along with changes in the alert,<br />
readiness and operational duty plans.<br />
Seven hundred SVK troops (from the 21 st and 39 th Corps) are engaged in operation<br />
Spider in the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (Fikret Abdić’s followers).<br />
Th e necessary preparations for the reception, training and planned commitment of<br />
volunteers in RSK territory have been completed. (...)<br />
2.1 Morale<br />
Morale in the SVK meets the combat readiness requirements. Th e malfunctioning<br />
of agencies intended to uphold the rule of law and the sluggish solution of problems<br />
aff ecting the functioning of the defence system have a negative eff ect on morale. Th e<br />
260
Ministry of Defence cannot provide the money for the payroll and for the supply of the<br />
SVK with fuel and other materiel.<br />
Resolution 981 of the Security Council has largely provoked a negative response,<br />
particularly the part according to which international forces are to be deployed along<br />
the borders between the RSK and the RS, and the border between these two republics<br />
and Serbia. (...)<br />
Between 1 January and 10 April 1995 the SVK casualty toll included 41 killed, 39<br />
wounded and 28 missing in action. Most of these relate to units committed to operation<br />
Spider. (...)<br />
Personnel issues:<br />
(...) (b) Transfer of offi cers (from the Army of Yugoslavia) for temporary duty in the<br />
SVK<br />
In early March 1995 the 40 th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of<br />
Yugoslavia called in offi cers born in the territory of the former SR of Croatia in order to<br />
interview them about their voluntary transfer to temporary duty in the SVK.<br />
Out of the total 600 offi cers interviewed, 112 offi cers expressed their wish to be transferred<br />
to the SVK. Aft er additional processing and preparations for departure 66 offi cers agreed<br />
to leave. On the date of departure by bus, aft er further hesitation and withdrawal, only<br />
15 offi cers and 15 non-commissioned offi cers left for the SVK. Such an attitude by some<br />
of the offi cers left a negative impression on those present.<br />
We believe that a professional analysis should determine the true reason underlying the<br />
poor offi cer response. Was it fear from military confl ict in the RSK, uncertain return,<br />
personal problems or something else? Information gained in this way would benefi t<br />
both the Army of Yugoslavia and the SVK in their future work with human resources<br />
and personnel analyses.<br />
2.4 Security in the units and in the territory<br />
1) Counterintelligence support<br />
Security conditions in the RSK are still very complex, aff ected largely by foreign<br />
intelligence services and their intelligence, psychological-propaganda and criminal<br />
actions. (...)<br />
Aft er the change of the UNPROFOR mandate they are engaged in psychological<br />
propaganda actions along the following lines: Krajina will be an integral part of Croatia;<br />
the Croats do not need war, and economic measures and the closing of the RSK border<br />
to the RS and the SRJ will force the Krajina leadership to accept the solution off ered by<br />
the West. (...)<br />
2) Crime, black-marketeering and robbery<br />
Problems giving cause for particular concern include crime of all kinds, arrogant<br />
and violent behaviour, and attacks on security offi cers. Fuel, lubricants, batteries,<br />
communications equipment, munitions and mines and explosive devices are mainly<br />
being stolen in the units, and that reduces combat readiness, while combat vehicles<br />
cannot be used.<br />
261
Black market trade with the (Army of BiH) 5 th Corps, Muslim authorities and Croats<br />
is widespread and growing continuously. Th eir authorities support such practices in an<br />
organized way because they also obtain intelligence information along with the illegally<br />
marketed goods.<br />
Black-marketeering is mainly kept at bay by the military police, while most police<br />
(militia) offi cers tolerate it. Some high level offi cials are exerting pressure to legalize<br />
such practices and avoid any involvement by security and police offi cers. Some corps<br />
and security department commanders are even being discreetly advised not to interfere<br />
with the black market because they could be liquidated.<br />
Because of the lack of active offi cers in lower echelon units control and command does not<br />
function, and the result is negligence. No security steps are being enforced. Materiel and<br />
confi dential information are poorly protected, and hardly at all in some units. Weapons<br />
are being used in uncontrolled ways. A typical case regards a group of 12 soldiers from<br />
the Obrovac brigade which deserted their positions on Mount Dinara and robbed at<br />
gunpoint private cafés along the Obrovac - Dinara road. Th e same group wasted a large<br />
quantity of ammunition in Knin. Large quantities of weapons, ammunitions and other<br />
goods intended for the black market were found in the apartments of arrested conscripts.<br />
Aft er disciplinary and legal action 8 conscripts were sentenced to several months in<br />
prison.<br />
Th e poor security conditions in the SK units and throughout the territory are also<br />
aggravated by the poor functioning of military tribunals and civil justice, which do not<br />
enforce any repressive measures against perpetrators of hostile actions, crime, the black<br />
market etc.<br />
In most cases, repressive measures are enforced by brigade and corps commanders.<br />
However, that is not enough, because the entire government apparatus is not involved,<br />
and the overall impression is that everyone can behave as he pleases. (...)<br />
THE COMMANDER<br />
Lieutenant General<br />
Milan Čeleketić<br />
(stamp) 41<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, str. conf., 3-171/1995<br />
262<br />
____________________<br />
41 Round stamp with the text: RSK, General Staff of the Serbian Army
24<br />
1995, 27 May<br />
Oštrelj - Petrovac<br />
Report of the 2nd Krajina Corps Command to the VRS General Staff concerning the<br />
meeting with Mile Mrkšić, commander of the Spider Operational Group, which<br />
considered operations against the ARBiH 5th Corps and Croatian forces on Mount<br />
Dinara and in Livanjsko Polje<br />
___________________<br />
(...) I have immediately reported verbally on the meeting. I did not forward any written<br />
documents because General Mrkšić said he would meet on 25 May 1995 with the<br />
Commander of the VRS General Staff and present the conclusions of the meeting. I<br />
informed General Mrkšić about the operational-tactical position of our forces with<br />
respect to the ARBiH 5 th Corps aft er their off ensive and stressed that the conduct of the<br />
SVK and of the NDWB [National Defence of Western Bosnia - Fikret Abdić’s followers]<br />
cannot be sustained any longer. I also highlighted the fact that the totally encircled<br />
Muslim corps is successfully holding its own against three SVK corps, the 2 nd Krajina<br />
Corps and NDWB troops. I supported that by noting that even now, while the Muslim<br />
off ensive is on, the SVK or the NDWB are not even staging demonstrations against the<br />
ARBiH 5 th Corps.<br />
I also warned him about the ustashi intentions on Mount Dinara, i.e., sstressed that their<br />
main goal was to cut off Knin and threaten the RSK capital.<br />
General Mrkšić agreed that we did not work together and in an organized way regarding<br />
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. He pointed out that the Spider command was now subordinated to<br />
him, that we need to mount a fast and well-organized operation to crack the ARBiH 5 th<br />
Corps, because of which he was to see you. He mentioned 28 May 1995 as the start of the<br />
joint assault for routing the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Aft er the operation against the 5 th Corps,<br />
the same system would be applied in mopping-up Livanjsko Polje and Mount Dinara<br />
and clear them of the ustashi. (...)<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
In possession of the editor<br />
263
264<br />
26<br />
1995, 11 June<br />
Knin<br />
Extraordinary operational report of the SVK General Staff to S. Milošević, M. Martić<br />
and M. Perišić on the situation in the Bihać theatre, in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount<br />
Dinara, SVK restructuring and anticipated offi cer reinforcements from the VJ<br />
___________________<br />
(...)<br />
Extraordinary report of the SVK General Staff<br />
- forwarded to<br />
Th e Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbia<br />
(att. Mr. Slobodan Milošević)<br />
Th e Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
(att. Mr. Milan Martić)<br />
Th e Cabinet of the Chief of the VJ General Staff<br />
(att. Colonel General Momčilo Perišić)<br />
1. HOSTILE FORCES<br />
(...) Encouraged by the tacit agreement of the international community regarding the<br />
action in Western Slavonia, Tuđman [President of the Republic of Croatia] continued<br />
to highlight the reintegration of the RSK. He accused Serbia of supporting the “war<br />
option” in the resolution of the crisis in the RS and the RSK because of the engagement of<br />
Serbian generals and selected VJ cadres for leading positions in the VRS and the SVK.<br />
In particular he stressed Croatia’s determination to reintegrate the RSK in the speech<br />
held at the opening of a new bridge in Osijek across the Drava.<br />
Political and diplomatic activities are followed by military activities as well. All the<br />
professional units in Western Slavonia have been shift ed to the north-western borders<br />
of the RSK focusing on Banija and Kordun. At the same time, HVO forces are being<br />
reinforced along the Livno - Glamoč - Grahovo axis. By gradual advance they intend to<br />
separate partly the RS and the RSK up to the line Knin - Grahovo - Drvar and, by assault<br />
on Banija and Kordun up to Prijedor and across Lika, cut up the RSK in cooperation<br />
with the 5 th Corps (in Bihać).<br />
In the next phase the entire area of this part of the RSK would be integrated into<br />
Croatia.<br />
Th ere are indications that Tuđman got the German approval for such an action.<br />
At present the HV and the HVO (Croatian Defence Council) are engaged more intensively<br />
at Livno - Grahovo, their goal being seizing control of Mount Šator, which would cut off<br />
Knin from Republika Srpska.<br />
NATO aircraft fl ew more sorties above the Adriatic and the territory of the former<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina under the control of the so-called Muslim-Croatian Federation.
No helicopter over-fl ights have been observed in RH territory across the RSK to Cazin.<br />
On 7/8 June pilotless planes (“drones”) were observed above the line of disengagement<br />
with the RH in Sectors “North” and “West” 42 . At about 02.03 hours the NATO air task<br />
force established contact with the pilot of the downed F-16 plane.<br />
Th e pilot rescue operation was carried out by 20 combat F-16, F-28 and F-111 aircraft<br />
with AWACS support, and four helicopters (two attack APACHE helicopters and two<br />
transport helicopters).<br />
2. OUR FORCES<br />
Over the past seven days the SVK commands and units focused on the formation of the<br />
Special Unit Corps. Th e implementation faces certain personnel and materiel problems<br />
which do not for the time being aff ect the planned formation of the units<br />
Th e advance of the enemy along the Dinara ridge has been stopped, and the VRS was<br />
provided assistance in preventing the enemy from establishing control over the Grahovo<br />
area. (...)<br />
Intensive preparations are under way for the review of the Special Unit Corps on St.<br />
Vitus day.<br />
Direct air fi re support was provided to army units committed to gaining control over<br />
Mount Dinara on 9 June 1995 at 09.30 hours.<br />
Th e US helicopters participating in the rescue of the downed F-16 pilot were attacked<br />
with S-2M rockets and PAT-20 mm antiaircraft guns, but were not shot down because of<br />
IR decoy fl ares and helicopter armour.<br />
3. MORALE<br />
Th e measures and activities taken to stabilize and build up the Army of Serbian Krajina<br />
have had a very positive eff ect on the morale of the troops and of the population.<br />
Th ese measures include fi rst of all the stabilization of defence lines, which improved<br />
trust in our defence potential.<br />
Trust has also been enhanced by our latest combat actions.<br />
As opposed to past views, the presence and the assistance of VJ offi cers is interpreted in<br />
positive terms, and this awareness has contributed to the optimism of the troops and of<br />
the population.<br />
Th e most negative impact on morale is still due to irregular disbursement of monthly<br />
pay and the very low pay.<br />
All the steps taken by the SVK commander are received with approval and a feeling of<br />
greater certainty regarding the potential to defend RSK territory.<br />
Th e feeling about the SRJ has also changed along positive lines bearing in mind the<br />
overall assistance we are receiving and, fi rst and foremost, the mobilization of combat<br />
capable persons who fl ed this country and their dispatch to Krajina.<br />
42 Occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia controlled by UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection<br />
Force).<br />
265
(...)<br />
6. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONAL-FORMATION PROBLEMS<br />
Th e organizational conditions have been provided, and all documentation prepared, for<br />
the formation of the Special Unit Corps (SUC). Th is includes interim SUC command<br />
and unit rosters. In the formation of the Special Unit Corps the SVK is faced with a<br />
pressing problem, the selection and shortage of the required number of professional<br />
soldiers from the Army of Yugoslavia in order to meet the requirements of existing and<br />
newly-formed units because the current defi ciency rate is 23%.<br />
(...)<br />
Since we have planned to include in the SVK SUC all the graduates of VJ military<br />
academies and secondary military schools hailing from the RSK, we must examine<br />
the possibility of speeding up their education in line with the proposal of the SVK<br />
commander.<br />
Moreover, the SRJ Supreme Defence Council needs to consider, as soon as possible, and<br />
resolve positively the questions raised a long time ago, such as the recognition of VJ<br />
offi cer and non-commissioned offi cer status for SVK offi cers and non-commissioned<br />
offi cers graduating from military schools at the Military School Centre of Republika<br />
Srpska (two offi cer school classes and four non-commissioned offi cer school classes,<br />
altogether 250). All these offi cers and non-commissioned offi cers are earmarked for the<br />
SVK Special Unit Corps.<br />
Th e troop manning concept has been prepared and is already being implemented<br />
according to the plan and the respective criteria.<br />
Organizational steps have been taken and plans prepared for assembling RSK servicemen<br />
and transferring them from the SRJ to the RSK.<br />
According to estimates and approximate indicators of the RSK Ministry of Defence,<br />
there are more than 10,000 servicemen from the RSK in Serbia and Montenegro, who<br />
went there aft er 17 August 1990.<br />
We consider the persistent assembling of RSK servicemen, their transfer to the RSK and<br />
integration into SVK units to be extremely important. Th e manning of the Special Units<br />
Corps with younger men of higher quality is particularly important.<br />
(...)<br />
8. DECISION<br />
I have decided that the engagement of the commands and units subordinated to the<br />
SVK General Staff should focus on the formation of the Special Unit Corps. As regards<br />
combat activities, the focus in the commitment of our forces should be operation Spider<br />
intended to knock out the ARBiH 5 th Corps, while part of the 7 th Corps has to be engaged<br />
in the area of Mount Dinara and along the Grahovo - Livno axis in order to seize the area<br />
and the facilities temporarily controlled by the HV and the HVO.<br />
Part of the forces will support, reinforce and cooperate with the VRS in its operation at<br />
Grahovo - Livno. (...)<br />
266
THE COMMANDER<br />
Lieutenant General<br />
Mile Mrkšić<br />
(stamp) 43<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, str. conf., 3-322/1995<br />
__________________<br />
27<br />
1995, July<br />
Knin<br />
Plan of counterintelligence support for Operation Sword-1 staged by the Serbian Army<br />
of Krajina and the Army of Yugoslavia - the use of biological warfare for the poisoning<br />
of the troops of the ARBiH 5th Corps<br />
____________________<br />
APPROVED<br />
THE COMMANDER<br />
Colonel General<br />
Mile Mrkšić<br />
PLAN<br />
of Counterintelligence Support for Operation “Sword-1”<br />
July 1995<br />
1. OBJECTIVE<br />
Provide by combined actions through the SVK Intelligence Service complete<br />
counterintelligence and physical protection of the convoy from Glina - Ličko Petrovo<br />
Selo to the Cazin area intended for a strategic strike against the units and commands<br />
of the 5 th Corps (of the BiH Army) by biological weapons, i.e., by poisoning consumer<br />
goods to be delivered through underground channels to the 5 th Corps.<br />
- Aft er incubation and the outbreak of dysentery, use the fact intensively for psychological<br />
propaganda by spreading misinformation and false data as envisioned by Operation<br />
“Sword”.<br />
2. TIMING<br />
11 to 13 July 1995, aft er which Plan Sword-1 becomes part of the Sword counterintelligence<br />
support operation.<br />
3. PLACE<br />
- Along the route Glina - Ličko Petrovo Selo - Japanska Krivina and back (...).<br />
43 Round stamp with the text: RSK, General Staff of the Serbian Army<br />
267
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 5007.<br />
268<br />
__________________<br />
28<br />
1995, 23 July<br />
Bihać<br />
Report of the Command of the ARBiH 5th Corps and the Command of the HVO Bihać<br />
General Staff to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia&Herzegovina in Zagreb on the<br />
powerful breakthrough of SVK forces threatening to rout the Bihać defences<br />
____________________<br />
23079500<br />
COMMAND OF THE 5 TH CORPS DEFENCE OF THE<br />
COMMAND OF THE HVO BIHAĆ REPUBLIC<br />
GENERAL STAFF MILITARY SECRET<br />
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<br />
“URGENT”<br />
__________________<br />
Bihać, 23 July 1995<br />
Information on the situation in the<br />
zone of responsibility of the 5 th<br />
Corps and HVO Bihać,<br />
forwarded to: EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF<br />
BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA IN<br />
ZAGREB<br />
MILITARY ATTACHÉ<br />
(Att. Zijah Poprženović)<br />
Forward to<br />
General<br />
Zvonimir Červenko 44<br />
Since the early morning hours the situation in the zone of responsibility of the 5 th Corps<br />
and HVO Bihać has changed radically. Strong armoured-mechanized and infantry<br />
44 At the time Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia.
forces of the aggressor are making energetic headway from Pećigrad and Tržačka Raštela<br />
towards Cazin. Th e situation can no longer be controlled, and by the evening the territory<br />
could be split into two parts and the 5 th Corps routed.<br />
We have many casualties because of the intensity of the assault, and we also running<br />
short of supplies and materiel. At the same time the aggressor is attacking along the axes<br />
Ličko Petrovo Selo - Bihać and Gorjevac - Ripač - Bihać.<br />
Th e population is panicking and there is a heavy loss of life. Along the lines of its attack the<br />
aggressor applies the “scorched earth” policy and is using poisonous chemical agents.<br />
We are urging you to take immediate steps.<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
In possession of the editor<br />
COMMANDER OF THE 5 TH CORPS<br />
Brigadier General<br />
Atif Dudaković<br />
COMMANDER OF THE<br />
HVO BIHAĆ GENERAL STAFF<br />
Colonel<br />
Ivan Prša<br />
__________________<br />
30<br />
1995, 24 July<br />
Petrinja<br />
Communication of the SVK 39th Corps Command to subordinate unit commands<br />
on possible aggression by Croatian forces intended to help the threatened ARBiH 5th Corps<br />
______________________<br />
(...) 1. Th e unfavourable development of the situation for the 5 th Corps of the so-called<br />
Army of BiH in Western Bosnia is used by the Croatian Army as a motive for aggression<br />
against the RSK.<br />
2. So far the Croatian Army has grouped its main forces in the greater area of Brinje,<br />
Otočac and Ogulin. Th eir main eff ort is expected from Plaški - Slunj - Šturlić, with a<br />
possible airborne assault in the Rakovica area and along positions east of the Slunj -<br />
Plitvice road. Demonstrations are possible along several axes, fi rst of all along the line<br />
Sunja - Kostajnica - valley of the Una. Th e attack will be supported by the air force.<br />
In case of aggression all the commands and units will follow the Annex to Plan Sword<br />
and specifi c orders. Th e General Staff will forward the necessary orders as required by<br />
the situation in due time.<br />
269
3. Other issues:<br />
1) Uncontrolled use of some munitions categories has been observed during past<br />
combat action. Th is refers fi rst of all to 130 and 105 mm munitions. At the same time,<br />
the consumption of mortar 60 and 82 mm shells is low, although we have large quantities<br />
of such munitions. In this regard the corps and brigade commands will take due action<br />
in order to promote effi cient munitions consumption.<br />
2) During action over the next day it should be borne in mind that units of the 5 th Corps<br />
(of the ARBiH) are not in shelters or trenches, and are therefore particularly vulnerable.<br />
Additionally, the balijas [insulting name for the Muslims] are grouped in a small territory,<br />
and this facilitates action against them and the use of fi re from all types of weapons.<br />
(...)<br />
Th e Commander<br />
Major General<br />
Slobodan Tarbuk<br />
270<br />
(stamp) 45<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
Republic of Croatia, Counterintelligence Agency<br />
31<br />
1995, 25 July<br />
Petrinja<br />
Communication of the SVK 39th Corps Intelligence Dept. to subordinate units on the<br />
possible Croatian airborne assault at Bihać<br />
___________________<br />
(...) Th e SVK General Staff calls attention to the almost certain Croatian aggression in the<br />
southern sector on 26 or 27 July 1995. Action is also possible in our zone. Th e airborne<br />
assault of Croatian special forces is being planned within the scope of direct support to<br />
the 5 th Corps (of the ARBiH).<br />
One assault route would be from [the island of] Krk and on south of the Udbina air base,<br />
and the other from Pleso [Zagreb], to the area of Bihać or Brekovica. Th e assault would<br />
be carried in the night of 25/26 July or 26/27 July 1995. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
Republic of Croatia, Counterintelligence Agency<br />
45 Text: Command of the 24th Infantry Brigade; str. conf., 39-158, 25 July 1995.
33<br />
1995, 26 July<br />
Bihać<br />
Report of the Command of the 5th ARBiH Corps to the Embassy of the Republic of<br />
Bosnia&Herzegovina on the diffi cult situation on the ground and linkup with Croatiuan<br />
forces as the only way out<br />
___________________<br />
5 th CORPS COMMAND 26079501<br />
Str. conf. no. 01-2/873-1 DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
Date: 26 July 1995 MILITARY SECRET<br />
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<br />
URGENT<br />
Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia&<br />
Herzegovina in Zagreb<br />
Att. Zijo Poprženović<br />
FOR FRIENDS<br />
Att. Breza<br />
I just spoke with General Delić. 46 He is meeting Blaškić 47 today to talk about Bihać. Let<br />
me inform you that over the past few days 700 of my troops were put out of action and<br />
only linkup with the Croatian Army holds any realistic prospects regarding our survival.<br />
You must present this fact to the relevant bodies.<br />
Are they taking any steps? Do they know our possibilities?<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
In possession of the editor<br />
46 Rasim<br />
47 Tihomir<br />
THE COMMANDER<br />
Brigadier General<br />
Atif Dudaković<br />
____________________<br />
271
272<br />
35<br />
1995, 26 July<br />
Report of the Intelligence Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security Directorate of<br />
the VJ General Staff on the implementation of the covert operation Sword-1 - the use of<br />
biological agents for the poisoning of foodstuff s delivered under cover to the ARBiH 5th Corps and intended to cause mass disease of its troops and knock them out of action.<br />
____________________<br />
INFORMATION<br />
Execution of mission during Operation Sword<br />
In early July the Command of the SVK General Staff issued a directive on the execution<br />
of Operation Sword related to off ensive action against the ARBiH 5th Corps in order to<br />
crush the latter. Th e start of Operation Sword is planned on 15 July in the early morning<br />
hours. 48<br />
Th e forces of Spider Command, parts of the 21st and 39th Corps, and the Special Units<br />
Corps will be committed to the operation.<br />
Within the scope of the operation (during its preparation) the SVK commander has<br />
decided to use biological agents by poisoning consumer goods (fl our, sugar, oil, liquid<br />
dish-washing detergent) to be sold through underground channels to the 5th Corps (of<br />
the ARBiH) in order to cause mass sickness of the troops and knocking them out of<br />
action.<br />
Th e incubation lasts 5-7 days. [Th e normal dose was tested, by injection into liquid food,<br />
on a defector from the ustashi49 army, M.G., not known to the international humanitarian<br />
organization. Th ree days later the symptoms listed below appeared, and lasted 6 days. He<br />
was medically treated, which probably reduced the duration of the reaction.] 50 Th e agent,<br />
a powder, is produced in Republika Srpska. If taken in larger quantities, depending on<br />
the resistance of the body, it can cause a lethal outcome. In normal use it causes stomach<br />
diseases, diarrhoea, headache and cramps in the stomach. No disease cases have been<br />
recorded until 22 July 1995.<br />
Th e provision of the goods for sale to the 5th Corps and the injection of the agent meant<br />
to put personnel out of action was entrusted to the Intelligence Centre of the VJ General<br />
Staff Intelligence Directorate in Topusko. Colonel NIKOLA ZIMONJA and lieutenant<br />
colonel MILAN KRKOVIĆ, and the businessman NENAD MIŠEVIĆ from Glina, were<br />
involved in the mission.<br />
Th e Security Department of the SVK General Staff was responsible for preparing the plan<br />
for the counterintelligence support of the operation (Sword-1) and, aft er that, providing<br />
48 For the plan of the operation see Appendix II, doc. no. 27.<br />
49 In Serbian sources members of the Croatian armed forces are mainly called ustashi (aft er the allies of the<br />
Germans in World War Two).<br />
50 Th e notes from the original document are given in square brackets.
for the safe passage of the convoy across the border at Ličko Petrovo Selo and back to<br />
base by ensuring checkpoint clearance and patrol escort, i.e., operational support of the<br />
mission by military police and security forces.<br />
Th e convoy comprised fi ve trailer trucks. It left Glina on 12 July at 18.00 hours and was<br />
supposed to cross the border at Ličko Petrovo Selo between 21.30 and 22.00 hours.<br />
However, that night NENAD MIŠEVIĆ could not establish contact and make the<br />
necessary arrangements with the assistant rear commander of the (ARBiH) 5 th Corps, a<br />
certain ŠANTIĆ, and the entry of the convoy had to be postponed for the following day,<br />
13 July 1995.<br />
According to MIŠEVIĆ’s statement, someone hampered and disputed the action from<br />
Belgrade, and since communications were jammed in the Cazin area, MIŠEVIĆ could<br />
not contact Šantić by cellular phone.<br />
Th e convoy spent the night and the following day in a lumber plant in Korenica, and its<br />
entry in the Cazin area was planned for 13 July between 22.00 and 23.00 hours at the<br />
same border crossing. Th e return was planned at 04.00 hours on 14 July.<br />
Th e convoy crossed into the Cazin area with no problems. However, on the return<br />
trip, the vehicles carrying Mišević and the foreign currency were spotted by the unit<br />
controlling the border crossing. Some drunken soldiers intervened and even opened<br />
fi re, alarming the other soldiers and even the local villagers (of Ličko Petrovo Selo), who<br />
wanted to intercept the convoy, search it and fi nd out who was engaged in illicit dealings<br />
with the (ARBiH) 5 th Corps.<br />
As the situation at the border crossing became increasingly serious and threatened<br />
to develop into an armed confl ict, colonel Zimonja contacted general Stevo Ševo and<br />
lieutenant colonel Petar Borić, and asked them to intervene personally through the line<br />
of command and let the convoy return safely to the RSK. Aft er lengthy persuasion, the<br />
furious soldiers and villagers fi nally let the trucks, the drivers and Mišević to cross into<br />
the RSK at about 13.00 hours.<br />
Th e trucks drove on to Glina, and Mišević with the foreign currency, Zimonja and<br />
Krković came to see me and lieutenant colonel Mihajlo Knežević [lieutenant colonel<br />
Knežević and myself were at the same time engaged for the operational cover of the<br />
members of the European Community who visited Plitvice on July 14 and 15 1995; I had<br />
Knežević with me on purpose because Zimonja and Krković could not stand him] in a<br />
facility equipped for security services at Plitvice.<br />
Mišević brought into the room in which we were assembled a briefcase full of foreign<br />
currency, emptied the money on a desk and began to divide it into amounts due to the<br />
parties involved. Most of the money were 500 and 1000 Deutschmark (DM) notes, plus<br />
several thousand Austrian schillings.<br />
Amazed by the amount of foreign currency, I realized that this was again a black market<br />
operation and not any action included in the planned operation against the (ARBiH) 5 th<br />
Corps. I tried to follow the proceedings as carefully as I could because it was impossible<br />
to record all that,<br />
Mišević had written some notes in ballpoint on paper. Th e price of the goods sold was<br />
specifi ed, and the balance read 1,237,000 DM on one paper and 1,000,000 DM on the<br />
273
other. Th erefore, the total value of the sold goods was 2,237,000 DM. According to colonel<br />
Zimonja they had paid a total of 50,000 DM for the goods. He gave me that information<br />
when complications arose and they did not know whether they would succeed in selling<br />
the goods to the (ARBiH) 5 th Corps, and added that the SVK had no grounds for making<br />
up the loss if the deal failed (because the goods were “poisoned”).<br />
While separating the DM in new notes (he counted and set apart 37,000 DM) Mišević<br />
was verbally attacked by lieutenant colonel Krković who wanted to know why Mišević<br />
was separating the new notes. Mišević told him that his boss had expressly ordered him<br />
to bring back new notes. Krković said “so what if he is a general, let him too fi nd a place<br />
where he can exchange them, and let him have a part in schillings”. Mišević countered<br />
that it had to be that way. Colonel Zimonja immediately wrote the name of general<br />
Mrkšić 51 on a sheet of paper, folded it, put 37,000 DM into the folded sheet and placed<br />
the lot into his briefcase with the promise that he would deliver the package.<br />
Interestingly enough, Knežević and myself were present during this exchange for the<br />
fi rst time, but they were not embarrassed at all.<br />
In the meantime, while the money was being counted and split, lieutenant colonel<br />
Krković pointed out several times that we should be rewarded as participants in the action<br />
with two to three thousand DM, and that general Mrkšić would approve that. Hearing<br />
Krković’s proposal, Zimonja and Krković fell silent, while I responded immediately by<br />
saying that I did not consider the whole thing to be a trade deal but a “serious mission”,<br />
and that I did not want to be part of it. Lieutenant colonel Knežević supported me, and<br />
we did not mention the proposal any more. Mišević then joined in and said that Knežević<br />
and myself were right and that, if required, he could let a trailer truck through specially<br />
for us and we could then split the proceeds. We turned the off er down a priori.<br />
I drew Mišević aside and talked about the situation. Interestingly enough, that was<br />
my fi rst meeting with the man, and he was very outspoken. He is about 35 years old,<br />
and moves exclusively in high society. He referred to Lilić 52 and Milošević 53 , and said<br />
they knew him. He also mentioned the Serbian Secretariat of International Aff airs and<br />
State Security Service. He said that in his illicit trade he fared best when his deals were<br />
approved by B. 54 Mikelić (about twelve times) and the crossing secured by the Krajina<br />
Ministry of the Interior and State Security Service for Kordun and Banija. Business had<br />
become extremely diffi cult, he remarked, since the army took over the control of the<br />
border. He was intensively involved in this business since 1992, when he started it with<br />
M. 55 Martić, and has changed several bosses in the meantime.<br />
Out of the mentioned foreign currency amount the SVK General Staff will get about<br />
400,000 DM. Th ey did not get it yet because the Deutschmarks were in old notes and were<br />
sent to Belgrade to be exchanged. Aft er that we shall send you the respective records. On<br />
51 Mile<br />
52 Zoran<br />
53 Slobodan<br />
54 Borislav<br />
55 Milan<br />
274
18 July I reported to general Mrkšić in the advance command post of the SVK General<br />
Staff in Slunj. Before the report he asked me whether Aco Dimitrijević had called me<br />
about the convoy. When I answered that he had not, the general said he would certainly<br />
call because someone had blown the deal in Belgrade and misinterpreted it.<br />
Th e conclusion is clear. Th e ultimate goal of this convoy and of many others so far has<br />
been material gain of certain individuals, including undoubtedly the SVK commander<br />
General M. Mrkšić. General Mrkšić is closely related to colonel M. Zimonja and he has<br />
allegedly brought Zimonja, through colonel Krga 56 , head of the Intelligence Directorate,<br />
to form the Intelligence Centre in Kordun (everybody is asking now why Kordun and<br />
Topusko were chosen), which is a cover for his organizing and personally managing<br />
illicit trade of goods with the (ARBiH) 5 th Corps. As far as the security bodies of the SVK<br />
General Staff are aware - and lieutenant colonel Mihajlo Knežević can say much more<br />
about the subject - the Centre in question has not by any means justifi ed its existence.<br />
Some people think (this is a reliable piece of information) that Mrkšić promised Krga he<br />
would bring him to the RSK and make him a general, a rank Krga could not get in the<br />
SRJ because he comes from this region and had no combat experience.<br />
On 21 July 1995 colonel Zimonja and lieutenant Krković left the RSK and returned to<br />
the VJ.<br />
We are forwarding this information in order to brief you and for your operational use.<br />
We urge you to pay due attention to the confi dential character of this letter considering<br />
the high offi cials involved and their illicit dealings.<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 5007<br />
ASSISTANT COMMANDER<br />
for Security Aff airs<br />
Colonel Rade Rašeta<br />
(stamp) 57<br />
__________________<br />
56 Branko<br />
57 Text: Serbian Army of Krajina, General Staff , Security Department<br />
275
276<br />
36<br />
1995, 26 July<br />
Communication of the RSK MUP to the special unit commander on the advance of<br />
Croatian forces which broke through the defence line at Grahovo and on its imminent<br />
fall<br />
_________________<br />
(...) Here at Grahovo the situation is truly serious and I am committing the last reserve<br />
troops and sending them there because the front line is broken and Grahovo could fall<br />
any moment. I know you are having a hard time, but please bear with the situation. I<br />
shall keep trying to get you out of this tight spot, but here things are maybe even worse.<br />
ACTING MINISTER<br />
PAVKOVIĆ NEBOJŠA<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 361.<br />
(stamp) 58<br />
____________________<br />
37<br />
1995, 26 July<br />
Report of the Operational Group 1 Command to the Advance Command Post of the<br />
VRS General Staff on the advance of Croatian forces in the action at Grahovo<br />
____________________<br />
(..)<br />
ROUTINE COMBAT REPORT<br />
1. In the morning the ustashi continued their artillery and infantry attacks on the defence<br />
zone of Operational Group 1 and succeeded by 15.00 hours in seizing Golo Brdo and Hill<br />
1056. At about 14.30 an ustashi helicopter overfl ew Grahovo. During the day Grahovo<br />
was hit by about 150 diff erent projectiles.<br />
2. Our forces have given combat and their tough resistance prevented a deeper<br />
breakthrough of ustashi forces.(...)<br />
Casualty fi gures: 4 killed, 12 wounded and 6 missing in action. (...)<br />
58 Confi rmation of receipt: Telegram received on 26 July at 21.20 hours by Jelinić.
3. Troop and offi cer morale is good although the troops are hard-hit by yesterday’s<br />
situation.<br />
(...)<br />
6. Numerical strength: 550.<br />
____________________<br />
Original, handwritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4284<br />
38<br />
1995, 28 July<br />
Bihać<br />
Report of the ARBiH 5th Corps to the BiH Embassy in Zagreb on the chetnik breakthrough<br />
at Bugar and heavy attacks from mounts Plješivica and Grmeč<br />
____________________<br />
COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE OF THE<br />
5 TH CORPS REPUBLIC<br />
Str. conf. No. 02/4-3-64 MILITARY SECRET<br />
Bihać, 28 July 1995 STRICTLY CONF.<br />
“URGENT”<br />
Information on aggressor action<br />
in the zone of responsibility of<br />
the 5 th Corps of the ARBiH<br />
To: EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF<br />
BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA (RBiH)<br />
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA<br />
MILITARY ATTACHÉ<br />
(Att. Zijah Poprženović)<br />
Th e aggressor has sustained combat operations in the zone of responsibility of the 5 th<br />
Corps. On 27 July 1995 the aggressor has succeeded in breaking through at Bugar and<br />
hill 373, supported by strong tank fi re and artillery of all calibres.<br />
In the night of 27/28 July our forces counterattacked along the same line, partly drove<br />
back the aggressor, but did not succeed in holding the achieved positions because of the<br />
extremely strong artillery fi re and tenacious resistance of the chetniks. In the morning<br />
hours on 28 July, aft er a strong artillery preparation, the aggressor forces attacked along<br />
277
the line Brkića Koplje - Visoka Glavica - Kapan and succeeded in taking Visoka Glavica.<br />
Attacks followed on Kestenovačka Glavica and Varmansko Selo, but our forces were<br />
successful in stopping them. Th e aggressor sustained strong shelling of these areas and<br />
of the civil settlements deep in our free territory. At the same time the aggressor attacked<br />
in the Grmeč and Plješevica areas. Th e targets were Vidov Vršak on Mount Grmeč and<br />
Gričine on Mount Plješevica. Aggressor’s reconnaissance groups were more active in the<br />
Majoruša area. Th e logistic supply of our forces was heavily shelled at Veliki Radić.<br />
Drawn up in one copy and delivered to<br />
- RBiH Embassy - Military Attaché<br />
Att. Zijah Poprženović<br />
- shelve<br />
Copy. typewritten, Latin script<br />
In possession of the editor<br />
278<br />
___________________<br />
39<br />
THE COMMANDER<br />
Brigadier General<br />
Atif Dudaković<br />
1995, 29 July<br />
Korenica<br />
Report of SUP Korenica to RSK MUP on the deployment of a unit at Resanova aft er the<br />
Croatian forces took Grahovo<br />
__________________<br />
(...)<br />
From the police station in Donji Lapac we have received the following message:<br />
Th e “b” complement of the Donji Lapac police station has been dispatched on a combat<br />
mission at the village of Resanovci, 15 km from Grahovo captured by the ustashi regular<br />
RH and HVO units, in order to prevent further advance of the latter. As we arrived at<br />
the front line of our defence in the village of Resanovci, we found the unit supposed to<br />
take up its positions, in cooperation with RS and the RSK units, towards Mount Ilica<br />
and further on towards Strmica, Tiškovci etc. By 12.00 hours these forces were not yet<br />
deployed along the allegedly agreed positions. RS units were deployed on the left fl ank<br />
of the “b” complement of the Donji Lapac police station. Th ere were no off ensive actions<br />
on either side during that time. (...)
__________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, MUP RSK, 08/4-16279/2-95.<br />
40<br />
1995, 30 July<br />
Knin<br />
Communication of the RSK State Information Agency Iskra on the visit of Ratko Mladić,<br />
CRS commander, to Knin and on his statement concerning the assault on Knin<br />
__________________<br />
(...)<br />
Knin, 30 July (Iskra) - Th e Commander of the General Staff of the Army of Republika<br />
Srpska, Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić, today stated in Knin that Serbian forces would<br />
quickly regain Grahovo and Glamoč, and other occupied territories.<br />
Stressing that Croatian aggression is aimed at cutting off the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina (RSK), in which eff ort the Croats are supported by their political brokers, General<br />
Mladić said that the Croats had made, with this move, the decisive mistake in this war, a<br />
mistake which will cost them dearly.<br />
Referring to the situation in the so-called Bihać pocket, he said that the Muslims<br />
would continue to provoke until they were defeated as in Srebrenica and Žepa, and those<br />
provocations would have stopped a long time ago, he added, but for their helpers in our<br />
own ranks.<br />
“Th e time has come for our people to grasp fully the fact that the war is not over yet, a<br />
fact which was clear to some people a long time ago. Let me give our people the following<br />
message: be determined in the defence of your homes and don’t fall for any propaganda”,<br />
said General Mladić, adding that he hoped the people would fi nd the strength to repel<br />
this Croatian aggression as well.<br />
“We must put in extra eff ort and hold out until the end of this war”, concluded the<br />
commander of the RS Army. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4207<br />
279
280<br />
41<br />
1995, 31 July<br />
Vrhovine<br />
Th e command of the 50th infantry brigade forwarded to all subordinated units the<br />
information received from the SVK 15th Corps on the situation aft er the breakthrough<br />
of Croatian forces and the taking of Grahovo and Glamoč, deployment of HV forces<br />
along possible attack positions and proclamation of the state of war<br />
___________________<br />
(...)<br />
On the basis of information received from the command of the 15 th Corps, conf. no. 240-<br />
43, this is to inform you as follows: Aft er the latest aggression of the HV and the HVO<br />
on the RS and parts of the RSK, the security situation in the RSK has become extremely<br />
complex. It has called for a number of radical measures which the RSK state and military<br />
leadership has had to take in order to thwart in time the general HV attack and to gear all<br />
human and material potentials to defence requirements. As it is already known, the RSK<br />
president M. 59 Martić has proclaimed the state of war. 60 Th e same decision was made<br />
for the entire area of the RS by the RS president. Grahovo and Glamoč are occupied<br />
aft er the latest aggression by regular HV units. All the population from these towns and<br />
surrounding villages fl ed to Drvar, Petrovac and Banja Luka. Encouraged by its very<br />
rapid advance the HV continues to advance towards Strmica and along Grahovsko Polje<br />
towards Resanovci, probably intending to block all routes linking Knin with the RS.<br />
Along these lines VRS and RSK units have stabilized their defence lines and stopped<br />
further advance by the aggressor. In other areas along the border of the RSK with Croata<br />
mobilization is in its fi nal stage and HV units deployed along the possible lines of attack.<br />
On the basis of heavy traffi c along the communications and enhanced reconnaissance<br />
activities it can easily be concluded that Croatia is preparing a large-stale assault on the<br />
RSK from several directions. Th e announced help to the forces of the 5 th Corps (of the BiH<br />
Army), probably agreed with Croatia, is only a cover for a large-scale off ensive prepared<br />
by Croatia and already under way against the RS. Th e ultimate objective is gaining the<br />
most favourable operational position for the attack on the RSK, and helping HV and<br />
“BiH army” forces for second phase operations towards Jajce, Mrkonjić, Srbobran and<br />
via Petrovac towards Bihać. Th e fall of Grahovo and subsequent HV actions towards<br />
Strmica and Resanovci have also directly jeopardized part of RSK territory in the zone of<br />
responsibility of the Lika Corps. Within the shortest possible time the Corps commander<br />
has committed the available reserves from the 103 rd infantry brigade, military police and<br />
59 Milan<br />
60 Th e proclamation of the state of war was decided by the RSK Supreme Defence Council on 30 July. See<br />
Appendix I, doc. 30.
MUP and established control over all routes leading from the jeopardized zone towards<br />
Dugopolje, Kaldrma and Tiskanovac - Drenovac, in order to thwart in time any possible<br />
advance of the aggressor along these lines. Contact was established with VRS units, and<br />
the command of the 103 rd infantry brigade has set up an advance command post along<br />
this line where part of the brigade command is stationed continuously. Th e fact is that<br />
this Croatian action has “saved” the 5 th Corps of Alija’s [Izetbegović, BiH President] army<br />
for the second time because it forced the Serbian army to regroup its forces from the<br />
Bihać theatre in order to halt deeper HV penetrations along the already mentioned line<br />
of attack. (..)<br />
___________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 5006<br />
42<br />
1995, 1 August<br />
Order of the command of the VRS 11th infantry brigade to subordinate units to block<br />
UNPROFOR units in case of a Croatian attack, disarm them and keep them as<br />
hostages<br />
__________________<br />
(...)<br />
During the imminent ustashi assault the blockade of the UN is an essential part of the<br />
defence of the Serbian people. Th erefore, I am issuing the following order:<br />
Block the UN forces and prevent their leaving for the Republic of Croatia, disarm them<br />
and keep them as hostages.<br />
Treat the UN troops correctly, without any mistreatment or insult, and leave them their<br />
vehicles and equipment. (...)<br />
Th e commanders of the subordinate units shall be personally responsible to me for the<br />
execution of this order.<br />
THE COMMANDER<br />
Lieutenant Colonel<br />
Dragan Novačić<br />
(stamp) 61<br />
____________________<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 595<br />
61 Round stamp with the text: Army Post Offi ce 9106, Vojnić<br />
281
282<br />
43<br />
1995, 3 August<br />
Report of the Security Department of the 15th Corps Command to the Security<br />
Department of the SVK General Staff on the increased pressure of Croatian forces<br />
which hampers the deployment of fresh forces for the Grahovo operation, and on the<br />
daily exodus of non-combatant population to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<br />
____________________<br />
To the<br />
General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina<br />
- Security Department<br />
1. Hostile activity<br />
Our deep tactical reconnaissance units have detected, along the entire line of<br />
disengagement with the 15 th Corps, intensive HV motor vehicle traffi c from the rear,<br />
primarily during the night. More intensive traffi c and the approach of motor vehicles<br />
to our border have been recorded from Gospić towards the line of disengagement with<br />
the 9 th , 18 th and 70 th infantry brigades (towards Medak, Teslingrad and Plaški). Th e<br />
number of newly-arrived HV vehicles is not matched by corresponding manpower and<br />
equipment fi gures, and we have therefore estimated that they are concurrently engaged<br />
in deception and demonstration in terms of bringing in new troops in order to force us<br />
to commit our units along the border and keep them in a state of readiness, and prevent<br />
us from committing fresh forces to the Grahovo operation.<br />
(...)<br />
We have also confi rmed information that the HV is mobilizing in Gospić, Perušić,<br />
Otočac, Brinje, Josipdol, Ogulin and other places, and keeping troops in readiness in the<br />
staging areas.<br />
We have no coordinates for the elements of the HV order of battle opposite the zone<br />
of the 15 th Corps, and this can have negative implications for the units and for the<br />
local population in our zone. If you have the exact coordinates of the HV fi re support<br />
positions, we urge their urgent delivery in order to complete our defence system and<br />
prepare the initial data tables for counter-fi re or preemptive strikes for the elimination<br />
of HV fi re capabilities early during the attack.<br />
We have also recorded the completion of the HV fi re system, primarily in engineering<br />
terms, and the extensive use of engineering machinery.<br />
On 2 August 1995 a pilotless aircraft overfl ew the zone of defence of the 18 th infantry<br />
brigade (Bunić) and Teslingrad at the altitude of about two thousand metres. Croatian<br />
MIG-211 aircraft also overfl ew Gospić.<br />
Th e scouts of our units have not detected any hostile presence or activity on Mount<br />
Velebit from Sveto Brdo to Visočica.
On 2 August in the morning the HV launched an infantry attack on the zone of defence<br />
of the 70 th infantry brigade (Plaški), which was repulsed with success. We have had no<br />
casualties of any kind.<br />
Th e 5 th Corps of the Muslim army has consolidated its ranks and is steadily holding the<br />
line opposite the zone of the 15 th Corps. We have had no casualties from occasional rifl e<br />
fi re.<br />
We have also observed enhanced demand for foodstuff s among the local population, and<br />
for war materiel, in the zone under the control of the 5 th Corps.<br />
According to still unconfi rmed information the 501 st brigade of the 5 th Corps of the<br />
Muslim army is planning an assault from Ripač towards Spasovo intended to deter the<br />
commitment of our 103 rd light infantry brigade in the Grahovo theatre.<br />
2. Security situation<br />
All the units are in position ready for decisive defence. In the assessment of the 15 th<br />
Corps command the Corps can successfully oppose ustashi aggression.<br />
(...)<br />
Th e intervention battalion to be set up from the 15 th Corps has not yet been formed. In<br />
the 9 th motorized brigade we have identifi ed a person with a destructive attitude who<br />
was publicly spreading defeatism, disrupting the combat readiness of the entire brigade<br />
and thwarting the formation of the mentioned unit. Th e same person publicly opposed<br />
the commander of the 9 th motorized brigade regarding the formation of the intervention<br />
battalion, and verbally attacked active offi cers saying “you offi cers are to be blamed for<br />
all this; you are incapable; I wonder who is leading us, we will drive you all out of the<br />
RSK”. Th ose present did not stand against him, which was a sign of approval. He has been<br />
brought to the command of the 9 th motorized brigade, which has taken the respective<br />
measures along with the security bodies. You will be informed in due time.<br />
In the villages of Lički Tiškovac, Drenovac and Ševina Poljana 30 soldiers have deserted<br />
and found refuge in the woods. Some people are helping them to survive. According<br />
to operational information, they fl ed in order to avoid combat actions of the 103 rd light<br />
infantry brigade. Th e necessary steps to bring them in and other measures are under<br />
way. We could not locate two soldiers of the 15 th light infantry brigade, who probably<br />
deserted.<br />
3. Situation in the territory<br />
A feeling of fear is present. Th e local population is very eager to fi ght. Th e number of<br />
requests for departure to the SRJ has decreased. Most of the persons unfi t or partially<br />
unfi t for military service have been mobilized, and are holding out well. Some soldiers<br />
were allowed to go home because of farming chores. Women and children are leaving<br />
daily for the SRJ.<br />
We are taking the required measures with regard to suspects in Teslingrad. Vedrana Biga<br />
(a Croat) was released from isolation.<br />
283
Dmitar Obradović, former security offi cer of the 70 th infantry brigade, who deserted<br />
from the security section of the Special Unit Corps, is hiding in Plaški. Search and<br />
apprehension is under way.<br />
(...)<br />
6. Conclusion<br />
As a whole, security conditions allow for successful decisive defence from possible HV<br />
aggression on our zone of defence. (...)<br />
___________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 4118<br />
284
APPENDIX 3<br />
EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION FROM<br />
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF CROATIA<br />
BEFORE AND DURING STORM<br />
285
286
(...)<br />
[1993, 23 March]<br />
Report on civil defence inspection in the municipalities of Vrginmost and Vojnić<br />
____________________<br />
4<br />
R E P O R T<br />
on the condition of civil defence and problems in its functioning<br />
in the territory of Kordun<br />
on 23 March 1993<br />
A group of Ministry of Defence offi cials inspected the Ministry of Defence Directorate for<br />
Kordun and the defence department responsible for that territory in order to gain insight<br />
into the condition of civil defence and problems in its functioning in the municipalities<br />
of Vojnić and Vrginmost.<br />
Th e condition and the problems were examined by Sava Milović, civil defence offi cer in<br />
the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters.<br />
Th e briefi ng on the purpose and objective of the visit was held in the Directorate of the<br />
Ministry of Defence in the presence of the head of the Directorate Boro Vorkapić and of<br />
Dušanka Ivošević, head of the District Civil Defence Staff . It included the defi nition of the<br />
basic points to be inspected and problems. Th e inspection was to provide instructions,<br />
depending on conditions, on how to overcome the diffi culties.<br />
1. Situation in the Vrginmost Civil Defence Staff<br />
Th e situation was established during the briefi ng with Stevan Kajganić, head of the<br />
Municipal Civil Defence Staff , and Mile Stanojčić, offi cer responsible for preparations in<br />
industry and social activities, in the presence of Dušanka Ivošević, head of the District<br />
Civil Defence Staff .<br />
Th e inspection established the following:<br />
Th e municipality of Vrginmost has 14,000 inhabitants living in 34 local communities.<br />
Th e municipal civil defence staff includes 7 persons covering the basic civil defence and<br />
rescue measures. Th ey are under compulsory work orders and are engaged as required.<br />
Th e staff also has two couriers and a typist.<br />
Th e civil defence staff cooperates fully with the municipal authorities.<br />
In the local communities there are 66 civil defence wardens, elderly people of authority<br />
among the population, who are successfully coping with their mission.<br />
Th e civil defence units formed so far include the following:<br />
- Th e veterinary unit with six civil defence members (there is a<br />
veterinary station with two veterinary surgeons).<br />
- Th e fi re-fi ghting unit with 13 members. Th e basic equipment is available, but the fi re-<br />
287
fi ghting tank and the combi-van have no batteries and cannot therefore be used. Th e<br />
problem becomes even more pressing because the municipality has no professional or<br />
volunteer fi re-fi ghting units.<br />
- Th e fi rst medical aid unit had 15 women trained for the mission, but they joined the<br />
SVK.<br />
- Th e unit for rescue from ruins has 9 members; however, their engagement is questionable<br />
because they are under compulsory work orders and are responsible for the protection of<br />
buildings and facilities. Th e problem of their engagement is made more diffi cult because<br />
they are also incorporated into operational SV RSK units.<br />
In keeping with the mission statement of the Civil Defence HQ of the Republic, shelter<br />
facilities were inspected and their selection reviewed.<br />
Th ere are no built shelters, and the most suitable cellars and similar facilities in the local<br />
communities have been selected for providing shelter for 8,341 persons. Th e population<br />
has been informed about the locations of such facilities, and the civil defence wardens<br />
have the lists of persons to be taken care of in them.<br />
Evacuation has been planned from 11 outlying local communities along the boundary<br />
with the Cazin area. Th e plan covers 1,213 persons who will be housed in 10 loyal<br />
communities. It has been worked out in great detail, including the specifi c persons to<br />
be transported by specifi c vehicles. Th e planned evacuation will require the provision of<br />
fuel - 1,670 litres of d2 diesel and 150 litres of 98 petrol.<br />
In the territory of the municipality there are at present 2,751 refugees housed in private<br />
homes. Most of them have been taken in by relatives.<br />
Food relief for the refugees and for about 5,000 socially handicapped persons, including<br />
the families of soldiers killed or wounded in action, is provided by the municipal branch<br />
of the Red Cross, which has established good cooperation with the United Nations High<br />
Commissioner for Refugees.<br />
A particular problem in the distribution of humanitarian aid is the availability of the<br />
required quantities of fuel.<br />
2. Situation in the Vojnić Civil Defence Staff<br />
Th e situation was established during the briefi ng with the head of the Defence Dept.,<br />
who is also responsible for civil defence because the head of the civil defence staff has<br />
been mobilized into a combat unit. Dušanka Ivančević, head of the District Civil Defence<br />
Staff , was also present during the briefi ng.<br />
Th e municipality of Vojnić has 9,500 inhabitants in 61 settlements, organized territorially<br />
in 14 local communities.<br />
Th e municipal civil defence staff includes 6 members, 3 on a permanent basis.<br />
Th ere are 90 civil defence wardens in the local communities. Th ey are coping well with<br />
their mission, but most of them are also responsible for other local activities.<br />
Th e following civil defence units have been organized so far:<br />
- One veterinarian platoon with a sanitation squad comprising 15 persons (there is also<br />
a veterinarian station with a staff of 4, 3 of whom are qualifi ed).<br />
- One fi re-fi ghting platoon, mobilized together with the available equipment (two tank<br />
288
trucks and one fi re attack vehicle) into an SV RSK brigade. Forest fi res can also be<br />
handled by including 19 workers of the Forestry Offi ce equipped among other things<br />
with motor saws.<br />
- A platoon for rescue from ruins with 18 members left out of 30; the remainder were<br />
mobilized into combat units.<br />
Th e provision of shelters for the population has been handled in a way similar to that in<br />
Vrginmost.<br />
Evacuation is planned for four outlying villages close to Kladuša. Th e transportation plan<br />
and organization are good. However, the plan does not foresee the provision of quarters<br />
in public facilities or private homes but refuge in the open on (mount) Petrova Gora.<br />
Enterprises, organizations and services of interest for protection and rescue are<br />
undermanned. Th us, the water supply department of the public utility company has only<br />
one employee (!?).<br />
3. Problems observed<br />
- Many persons originally assigned to the civil service have been mobilized into combat<br />
units; in some cases this involved complete units (e.g., the emergency medical aid unit<br />
in Vrginmost and the fi re-fi ghting unit in Vojnić).<br />
- Th e head of the civil defence staff in Vojnić was mobilized into a combat unit, and this<br />
has had a considerable bearing on the quality of actions carried out by the service.<br />
- A particular problem is the assignment of people under compulsory work orders (who<br />
could be used for protection and rescue) to other local actions followed also by their<br />
mobilization into combat units of the SV RSK.<br />
- Other problems include: availability of fuel for regular activities; implementation of<br />
protection and rescue actions; evacuation and distribution of humanitarian aid; lack of<br />
veterinarian drugs; etc.<br />
Prepared by:<br />
Sava Milović<br />
___________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
Croatian Information Centre, A 044-015/01<br />
289
290<br />
5<br />
[Okučani, July]<br />
Letter of the “Western Slavonia” Directorate to the Command of the SVK 18th Corps<br />
requesting, in line with the plan for the evacuation of the population to Republika<br />
Srpska, the specifi cations of the routes and crossings on the river Sava<br />
__________________<br />
No. 1 CONFIDENTIAL<br />
To<br />
Command of the 18 th Corps<br />
Okučani<br />
Att. lieut. colonel<br />
Marinko Gajić<br />
Th e evacuation of citizens can be ordered in the event of immediate danger, e.g., war,<br />
in accordance with the plan of defence or protection from natural disasters. According<br />
to the evacuation plan, evacuation teams in the municipalities must proceed with their<br />
mission as momentarily required.<br />
In the case of major combat operations the population of our area would be evacuated<br />
to Republika Srpska. Th erefore, we urge you to send us the routes for evacuation and<br />
the points for crossing the river Sava into Republika Srpska. We imperatively need this<br />
information in order to update our evacuation plans.<br />
Respectfully yours,<br />
Assistant Head of Department<br />
for Civil Aff airs<br />
Nikola Brujić<br />
__________________<br />
Original, handwritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 595
7<br />
1994, 1 February<br />
Okučani<br />
Report of the Okučani police station to the Okučani Secretariat for Internal Aff airs on<br />
the plan of evacuation of the population from Western Slavonia<br />
__________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS<br />
SECRETARIAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN OKUČANI<br />
OKUČANI POLICE STATION<br />
(stamp) 62<br />
No. 08-05-1-38/94.<br />
3 February 1994<br />
SECRETARIAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN<br />
OKUČANI<br />
Enclosed please fi nd the evacuation plan for the Okučani Police Station.<br />
Th e Commander<br />
Rade Španović<br />
(stamp) 63<br />
-----------<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS<br />
OKUČANI POLICE STATION<br />
No. 08-05-1-38/94.<br />
1 February 1994<br />
Pursuant to the offi cial letter of SUP Okučani No. 08-05-str. conf. 1-3-120/2-93 of 3<br />
January 1994 related to the possible evacuation of the population from the region of<br />
Western Slavonia in case of an emergency caused by the possible renewed aggression<br />
against this area, the following<br />
PLAN OF EVACUATION<br />
of the population from the municipality<br />
of Okučani<br />
is hereby adopted.<br />
62 Confi rmation of receipt: RSK, MUP, SUP Pakrac, no. 08-05/1-2-1-270/1-94.<br />
63 Round stamp with the text: RSK, MUP, SUP, Okučani Police Station.<br />
291
1. Inform all authorized persons about the plan through the duty service.<br />
2. In case of evacuation, agree and coordinate all measures and actions with the<br />
municipal civil defence staff , which will manage the evacuation. To be carried out by the<br />
commander with the duty service.<br />
3. In accordance with the daily assignment the duty offi cer shall immediately designate<br />
a car with three persons carrying long arms for escorting and protecting the column<br />
along the planned route. Th e column is to be escorted to the next organizational unit,<br />
which should be contacted and to which the column needs to be handed over for further<br />
protection. To be carried out by the duty offi cer with patrols.<br />
4. Be in touch with organizational units of the adjacent areas (Daruvar and Pakrac) in<br />
order to take over the columns at the boundary line and escort them along the planned<br />
route. To be carried out by the duty service.<br />
5. In case of a larger number of columns in one direction, reroute the traffi c, aft er<br />
assessing the load on a particular route, to another possible facility in agreement with<br />
the municipal civil defence headquarters. To be carried out by the commander with the<br />
duty service.<br />
6. In supporting and securing column movement use older and more experienced<br />
offi cers, and utilize available equipment (vehicles and communications equipment) as<br />
required by the situation. To be carried out by the commander, the duty service and the<br />
engaged offi cers.<br />
7. Planned routes of column movement:<br />
- Okučani - Stara Gradiška - Uskoci<br />
- Okučani - Gređani - Međustrugovi - Mlaka<br />
- Okučani - Borovac - overpass - Mlaka<br />
Th e columns need to be channelled along these routes.<br />
8. Th e plan is subject to change and amendment depending on problems during<br />
preparation or actual evacuation, and it will be updated accordingly.<br />
Encl.: SUP letter<br />
(stamp) 64<br />
292<br />
---------<br />
PLAN OF EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION OF THE<br />
“WESTERN SLAVONIA” REGION<br />
Plan prepared by:<br />
Rade Španović<br />
Pursuant to Article 64, heading 5, par. 4 of the Defence Law of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina of 1993, the evacuation of the population or of specifi c categories of the population<br />
(children, the elderly, the infi rm etc.) from a specifi c territory, and the evacuation of<br />
government bodies, companies and other juridical bodies together with the respective<br />
64 Ibid.
assets, can be ordered in the event of immediate war danger, state of war or state of<br />
emergency in accordance with the defence plan for the country.<br />
Evacuation under this article is ordered by the government, which specifi es the<br />
territory for the deployment of the evacuated population and the assets.<br />
Th e evacuation of civil population shall be organized and implemented by government<br />
bodies responsible for civil defence and protection.<br />
Th e evacuation of the population threatened by or involved in military action can<br />
also be ordered by an offi cer commanding a brigade or regiment, or of higher rank.<br />
Evacuation and relief are the responsibility of municipal civil defence and protection<br />
staff s as coordinators, civil defence and protection units in the local communities and<br />
neighbourhoods (Okučani), and civil defence and protection wardens responsible for<br />
evacuation. Th e main evacuation route would be the river Sava with four main crossings<br />
- villages of Uskoci, Jablanac, Mlaka and Jasenovac, by ferry or pontoon bridges. Th e<br />
convoys of the population envisioned for evacuation would be protected by troops or<br />
by police offi cers from the Pakrac and Okučani police stations. Th e evacuation of the<br />
population would start from the outer fringes of the municipality of Okučani - East +<br />
West (Paklenica, Rajić and Medari-Okučani) and the municipality of Pakrac along the<br />
north-south route (Brdske Kričke - Gornja Šumetlica - Trnakovac).<br />
Two alternative routes for the evacuated population convoys are available for the<br />
municipality of Pakrac:<br />
1. Rogoljica - Trnakovac - Donji Okučani - Gređani - forest road to the village of of<br />
Mlaka or Jablanac.<br />
2. Bijela Stijena - Rađenovci - villages of Rajić, Mlada or Jablanac.<br />
Several routes are available for the municipality of Okučani:<br />
1. Okučani - Strug - Stara Gradiška - Uskoci (forest roads).<br />
2. Okučani - Gređani - confl uence of the river Strug - Jablanac.<br />
Alternative : Okučani- Borovac - Mostine Mlaka.<br />
3. Okučani - Borovac - Mostine Mlaka.<br />
Th e route of the evacuee convoy has been worked out in detail in the plan of evacuation<br />
in case of aggression. Th ree buses, one passenger van, and a suffi cient number of cars and<br />
private tractors have been requisitioned for the evacuation of the population of Pakrac<br />
municipality. Main route for the municipality of Pakrac: village of Rogolji - Trnakovac -<br />
Okučani - Gređani - Mlaka.<br />
- village of Rogolji - Trnakovac - Benkovačko Brdo - Rajić - Mlaka or Jablanac<br />
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Decree on civil defence organization and functioning the<br />
following categories are eligible for evacuation:<br />
1. mothers with children up to 10 years of age having no wartime posting under a military<br />
or compulsory work order, or not subject to duty in civil defence units or bodies, and<br />
other persons legally responsible for caring and looking aft er children under 10;<br />
- children up to 14 years of age if school evacuation has been planned;<br />
- pregnant women;<br />
- elderly and infi rm persons requiring help and care.<br />
293
Th e population eligible for evacuation from the region of Western Slavonia”, the<br />
municipalities of Pakrac and Okučani, is shown in the tabular review of the categories.<br />
Th e persons in charge of evacuation in the event of immediate war danger have been<br />
supplied, in all local communities in the municipalities of Pakrac and Okučani, with<br />
fuel and indispensable medical supplies and food, kept in appropriate storage facilities.<br />
In case of evacuation along the east-west or north-south route deep into the territory of<br />
the municipality of Okučani, the population would be housed in the local communities<br />
of Lađevac and Bodegraj, respectively. Th e population of these communities has been<br />
informed and is responsible for providing quarters for the evacuees. Th e population of<br />
the municipality of Pakrac will be housed in the villages of Rogolji, Bobare, Lještani and<br />
Čaprginci.<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 10, box 8<br />
294<br />
8<br />
1994, 26 March<br />
Knin<br />
Response of the Ministry of Defence to the RSK Assembly regarding a member’s question<br />
on the provision of suffi cient quantities of fuel for the evacuation of the population<br />
____________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE<br />
No. 01-1020-2/94<br />
Knin, 26 March 1994<br />
To:<br />
ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
Th e Secretariat<br />
Re: Response to member’s question<br />
Th is Ministry has received under document no. 02-34/94 the question by member<br />
Branko Babić, “when will fuel be provided for evacuation?”, raised at the meeting of the<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina held on 21 March 1994.<br />
We are herewith responding as follows:<br />
Municipal civil defence headquarters have prepared plans for the evacuation of the<br />
population, and stated their requirements in terms of fuel required for the operation.
Th e total fuel requirements for evacuation have been forwarded by the Civil Defence<br />
Headquarters for the Republic, which has requested on several occasions the resolution<br />
of this highly important issue. However, because of the well-known diffi culties regarding<br />
the provision of fuel and higher demand for current functional activities, this Ministry<br />
has not been able to provide the total required quantity. Th e quantity secured so far is<br />
preserved and will be made available, when the situation demands it, to all municipal civil<br />
defence staff s which will be ordered to proceed with evacuation. In such a situation, fuel<br />
would be delivered immediately aft er the decision on the evacuation of the population<br />
from a specifi c territory.<br />
In this regard, the Ministry will do its best to provide the overall quantity of fuel required<br />
for evacuation, aft er which fuel will be distributed to the municipal civil defence staff s<br />
and to the persons responsible for evacuation.<br />
SM/MB<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 3, reg. no. 01-1020-2/1994<br />
(stamp) 65<br />
__________________<br />
10<br />
THE MINISTER<br />
Rear-admiral<br />
Dušan Rakić<br />
1995, April<br />
Knin<br />
RSK, Civil Defence Headquarters, assessment of threat and protection and rescue<br />
possibilities<br />
____________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
65 Round stamp with the text: RSK, Ministry of defence III, Knin<br />
66 Added by hand<br />
DEFENCE<br />
STATE SECRET<br />
“DINARA” 66<br />
Copy No. ____<br />
295
296<br />
A S S E S S M E N T<br />
OF THREAT AND OF PROTECTION AND<br />
RESCUE POSSIBILITIES<br />
Knin, April 1995 68<br />
Head of the Republican Civil<br />
Defence Headquarters<br />
Lieut. Colonel<br />
Duško Babić 67<br />
I. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT AND EXPOSURE TO COMBAT OPERATIONS<br />
1. Th e Position of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina, part of the former SFRY, is a non-compact area<br />
comprising, conditionally speaking, two entities.<br />
One territorially linked entity is made up of Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija<br />
and, conditionally, Western Slavonia, which can also be treated as a separate territorial<br />
entity considering its communications. Th is territorial entity is situated between today’s<br />
Republic of Croatia and the Cazin area, while parts of Northern Dalmatia, Bosnia and<br />
Western Slavonia are connected with Republika Srpska.<br />
Th e second territorial entity comprises Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem,<br />
bordering in the west on the Republic of Croatia, in the north on Hungary, and linked in<br />
the east with the Republic of Serbia (SR Yugoslavia).<br />
Th e total length of the border with the Republic of Croatia is 923 km, with the Cazin area<br />
118 km, and with Hungary 79 km.<br />
Th e area of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (without parts under UN protection and<br />
parts occupied by the Republic of Croatia) is 17,028 sq.km., and its population totals<br />
430,000, out of whom 120,000 are refugees (partly war-stricken people who fl ed from<br />
the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Serbian Krajina).<br />
Th e average population density is 25 per sq.km., and it is rather uneven, ranging from 54<br />
per sq.km. in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem to 10 per sq.km. in Lika.<br />
Th e form of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is particularly characteristic because of its<br />
great length and small depth (width). Th e greatest depth is 63.1 km. (between the villages<br />
of Škabrnja and Tiškovac), and the smallest at Jasenovac - 2.5 km., between Vedro Polje/<br />
Sunja and Kostajnica - 12.5 km., and between the village of Čanak and the border on<br />
Mount Plješevica - 19.5 km.<br />
67 Ibid.<br />
68 Th e original read: Knin, August 1994. Th e new date was added by hand.
2. Characteristics and degree of threat for specifi c parts and for the entire Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina<br />
Th e territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is generally at risk because of its form and<br />
position, great length and small depth, and because of the possibility of its being cut up<br />
into several parts and of being caught unawares, bearing in mind the very pronounced<br />
aggressive intentions and constant threats of the militarily strengthened Republic of<br />
Croatia.<br />
Because of these features, in addition to possible surprise and bearing in mind the<br />
military potential of the enemy, the entire territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina can<br />
be threatened at the same time.<br />
However, in strategic terms penetrations along given lines are more likely, as well as the<br />
cutting-off of parts of the territory of the Republic. An off ensive along the entire front is<br />
less probable.<br />
In view of the foregoing, the following lines of hostile action are possible:<br />
- Possible tactical lines of action in the Northern Dalmatian operational zone:<br />
- Zadar- Knin (Zadar - Benkovac - Knin),<br />
- Split - Knin (Muć - Drniš - Knin),<br />
- Šibenik - Knin (Šibenik - Oklaj- Knin),<br />
- Sinj - Knin (Sinj- Vrlika - Knin),<br />
with, most probably, a concurrent strike from the slopes of Mount Velebit and Skradin<br />
(via Bribirske Mostine) focused on cutting off Benkovac and Obrovac from Knin, with<br />
linkup in the Bruška area.<br />
Towards Knin the enemy will most probably attempt to advance via Oklaj, followed by<br />
Moseć and Petrovo Polje, which would cut off the greater area of Drniš. Th is would allow<br />
hostile forces to reach Mala Promina and put Knin at great risk.<br />
- Possible tactical lines of action in the Lika operational zone:<br />
- Gospić - Gračac<br />
- Gospić - Teslingrad - Ljubovo - Udbina<br />
- Otočac - Vrhovine - Plitvice<br />
- Brinje - Plaški- Plitvice<br />
- Tactical lines of action in the Kordun and Banija operational zone:<br />
- Ogulin- Slunj - Plitvice<br />
- Karlovac - Vojnić - Velika Kladuša-<br />
- Sisak -Petrinja - Topusko<br />
- Sisak - Kostajnica - Dvor<br />
Th e Slunj line is the most sensitive because it could involve splitting the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina into two parts.<br />
- Possible lines of hostile action in Western Slavonia:<br />
- Kutina - Novska - Okučani,<br />
297
- Pakrac - Okučani,<br />
the most likely objective being to cut off Western Slavonia from Novska - Gradiška.<br />
- Tactical lines of action in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem:<br />
- Vrpolje - Vinkovci - Vukovar<br />
- Budimci - Osijek - Kopačevski Rit or<br />
- Budimci - Osijek - Bijelo Brdo - Bogojeno<br />
- Valpovo -Beli Manastir - Batina<br />
Along these lines one expects action by strong land forces with armoured and<br />
mechanized units and powerful artillery support. Th e use of short-acting agents is not<br />
to be excluded.<br />
In terms of the foregoing, the threat for specifi c parts of the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
can conditionally be determined in three degrees.<br />
Th e zone of the fi rst degree of threat includes the following:<br />
- settlements in the zone between the current lines of disengagement (the so-called<br />
buff er zone);<br />
- border settlements and settlements up to 10 km from the current line of<br />
disengagement;<br />
- settlements in the wider zone of the mentioned tactical lines.<br />
Towns at particular risk include Drniš, Benkovac, Obrovac, Teslingrad, Plaški, Slunj,<br />
Petrinja and Pakrac.<br />
If air raids are expected, the following towns in this zone would also be threatened: Knin,<br />
Gračac, Udbina, Korenica, Vojnić, Vrginmost, Glina, Kostajnica, Okučani, Beli Manastir<br />
and Vukovar.<br />
Th e zone of the second degree of threat comprises settlements up to 20 km from the<br />
line of disengagement and settlements between the wider zones of tactical action. Th ey<br />
would be at risk in case of successful initial actions by hostile forces along specifi c tactical<br />
lines and artillery engagement.<br />
Th e zone of the third, the lowest degree of threat includes small enclaves between tactical<br />
lines linked with peripheral parts deep in the territory. Th e wider area of Srb - Donji<br />
Lapac is of the greatest importance in this zone.<br />
In the event of concurrent Muslim action, the threat in this zone would increase<br />
considerably and the part along the line of contact with the Cazin area would become a<br />
fi rst degree zone.<br />
3. Assessment of the consequences of hostile action<br />
Th e consequences, eff ects of destruction and human and material losses are assessed in<br />
terms of the type, quantity and use of weapons, and depend on the following:<br />
298
- the degree of territory vulnerability in the combat area;<br />
- functioning of the observation and information services, and timely alarming of the<br />
population;<br />
- degree of shelter completion;<br />
- preventive protection measures.<br />
Th e most intensive action and the largest quantity of weapons will be focused on<br />
settlements in the zone of the fi rst threat degree and along the approved tactical lines of<br />
assault.<br />
Th e consequences of artillery and aircraft action will involve the following:<br />
- destruction, knocking out or damage of industrial, traffi c, residential and other<br />
facilities;<br />
- congestion of traffi c facilities, particularly in larger urban settlements - towns;<br />
- damage of public utilities, plants and installations (water supply facilities, pumping<br />
stations and storage reservoirs; water supply, sewage, power, postal, telephone and<br />
telegraph networks);<br />
- fi res of varying scope in residential and industrial facilities; fi res set by incendiary<br />
weapons in woods and crops;<br />
- blasting and torching of facilities in parts of the territory possibly taken by the enemy,<br />
including the destruction of cultural and material goods.<br />
Th e extent of destruction, knocking out or damage of residential buildings in the zone<br />
of most intensive action (peripheral villages and towns) may reach 80%, with 20-40% of<br />
units sustaining damage preventing their use.<br />
Air raids against towns can be expected to cause a 5-15% rate of destruction of up to 5%<br />
of aff ected residential units, possible damage or knocking out of vital public utilities, and<br />
considerable damage of the municipal infrastructure.<br />
Th e town streets would be congested and according to estimates a maximum of about<br />
20% would be rendered unserviceable because of caving-in. Considerable damage would<br />
also be wrought on industrial facilities, food warehouses, silos and reservoirs.<br />
Th e destruction of facilities/buildings will regularly be associated with a number of small<br />
fi res (non-extinguished burners, ranges etc., burning electrical installations), some of<br />
which may develop into major fi res depending on timely intervention and the quantity<br />
of infl ammable material present on the site of the fi re. Larger fi res are more likely if<br />
incendiary weapons are used, or if petrol stations or infl ammable material storage<br />
facilities catch fi re.<br />
Experience acquired during previous actions by the Croatian army and occupation of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina warrants the conclusion that the possibly occupied places<br />
will be totally destroyed.<br />
Th e population will suff er owing to the use of various weapons. A higher number of<br />
casualties among the population can be expected because of<br />
- lack of basic shelters;<br />
- inadequate number of auxiliary shelters, cellars and other suitable facilities;<br />
- delayed warning (no automatic activation of alarm sirens; limited time of seeking<br />
refuge in shelters);<br />
299
- inadequate preparation and equipping of the population for personal and mutual<br />
protection.<br />
In view of the foregoing, the following consequences for the population are estimated:<br />
In the zones of intensive action (peripheral settlements, wider areas of tactical lines of<br />
assault), 3-5% killed and 10-15% lightly and severely injured. Injuries may involve fi rst<br />
and second degree burns.<br />
Because of the greater concentration of population, higher building density and, as a<br />
rule, higher fi re risk, casualties in towns - possible air raid targets - could amount to<br />
5-10% lightly and 20% severely injured, out of whom up to 5% with fi rst, second and<br />
third degree burns.<br />
Depending on the features of the settlement/town, building density and type, and fl oor<br />
number, part of the population would also be buried under ruins: according to estimates,<br />
about 15% would be shallowly, 10% moderately and up to 5% deeply buried.<br />
In the zones of a second threat degree the consequences would amount to 20-40%<br />
of those in the fi rst degree zones, while third degree zones would not, conditionally<br />
speaking, sustain any consequences.<br />
It has already been mentioned that settlements possibly taken by the enemy would be<br />
totally destroyed. Accordingly, and on the basis of previous experience, mass killings<br />
can be expected along with, to a smaller extent, arrests and detention of the remaining<br />
population.<br />
In addition to these consequences, the population will also be at risk because of the<br />
following:<br />
- Munitions and explosives of concern (unexploded ordnance) such as artillery shells,<br />
aerial bombs etc.. Th eir number can be estimated at 5% of the total.<br />
- Since residential buildings will be damaged and ruined, part of the population will<br />
be left roofl ess. Along with the current 120,000 refugees and displaced persons, and<br />
possible future relocation of the population through organized and planned evacuation<br />
or self-initiated departure from the zone of intensive action, this will make relief of the<br />
population a much more complex mission.<br />
- Th e declining standard of living and living conditions, lack of products for personal<br />
and general hygiene and extensive migration will further aggravate the already poor<br />
hygiene-epidemiological situation.<br />
Th e situation will also deteriorate because of diffi culties or complete breakdown of water<br />
supply due to the destruction of water supply facilities, damage on the water supply and<br />
power network, and possible spills of fecal water. Such conditions will favour the spread<br />
of infectious diseases and epidemics.<br />
Th e damage or burning of certain industrial facilities containing hazardous material can<br />
lead to chemical accidents posing a particular risk for the population.<br />
Every municipality needs to determine such facilities and the types of hazardous materials<br />
liable to develop and propagate in specifi c circumstances, prepare special estimates<br />
300
of risk in specifi c weather, and plan the measures and procedures for protection and<br />
mitigation of possible consequences.<br />
Livestock and crops, and products therefrom, will be particularly jeopardized. Livestock<br />
diseases (zoonoses) are likely to develop in such conditions. Th erefore, particular care<br />
is required in protecting animals, foodstuff s of animal origin, and crops and plant<br />
products.<br />
Th e overall consequences will become additionally serious if combined with natural<br />
disasters such as earthquakes, fl oods or drought. Th ey would further complicate<br />
protection and rescue operations.<br />
Th erefore, every municipality also needs to prepare appropriate protection assessments<br />
and plans for specifi c natural disasters liable to aff ect it.<br />
II ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS AND POSSIBLE PROTECTION AND RESCUE OPERATIONS<br />
1. Preparation and organization of personal and mutual protection<br />
Out of the total population (430,000), 60% or 260,000 are able-bodied. If about 20%<br />
of the total can be engaged in SVK and MUP units, agencies and services, and about<br />
5% (110,000) in civil defence, this leaves about 150,000 persons who can be organized,<br />
prepared and trained for personal and mutual protection measures.<br />
Even if part of the population has attended earlier training courses for general purpose<br />
or specialized civil defence units, and fi rst aid courses (school programmes, drivers<br />
etc.), the population is not adequately prepared for personal and mutual protection. Th e<br />
possible involvement of the population in implementing personal and mutual protection<br />
is hampered by the lack of standard personal and collective protection equipment.<br />
Owing to this degree of preparation and equipment, the population can be employed for<br />
preventive measures such as guiding people to shelters, blacking out and fi re protection,<br />
and use of materials and equipment available at hand for fi rst-aid (personal and mutual),<br />
fi ghting initial and small fi res, rescuing shallowly buried people and general care. Wellorganized<br />
personal and mutual protection along with well-trained civil defence wardens<br />
can mitigate the overall consequences by about 40%.<br />
2. Organization and functioning of protection and rescue measures - needs and<br />
possibilities<br />
About 490,000 shelter places would have to be provided, out of which:<br />
- in residential areas 340,000<br />
- in companies and institutions (including kindergartens and schools) 105,000<br />
- in public areas 45,000<br />
With respect to the estimated zones at risk and the degree of protection off ered by specifi c<br />
shelter facilities, the population will require<br />
301
- 120,000 places in basic protection shelters;<br />
- 170,000 places in auxiliary protection shelters;<br />
- 200,000 places in trench shelters.<br />
Th e already built shelters do not meet the requirements. However, cellar and other<br />
premises matching needs can also be used extensively in addition to the limited number<br />
of basic and auxiliary protection shelters. Such facilities could cover about 60% of the<br />
requirements. Solutions for the remaining population need to be sought in transferring<br />
population to less threatened parts in which trench shelters would be provided.<br />
Th e possibilities for providing trench shelters are minimal because of limited availability<br />
of construction machinery, shelter decks and fuel. Th e problem is particularly pronounced<br />
in peripheral settlements where the availability or non-availability of shelter facilities<br />
may aff ect the decision of the population whether to stay or leave.<br />
Th e evacuation of the population needs to be planned from the zones aff ected by the fi rst<br />
degree of threat, and especially from peripheral settlements and places along a specifi c<br />
tactical line of action.<br />
Evacuation plans need to include pregnant women, women with children up to ten years<br />
of age, and elderly, sick and infi rm persons.<br />
In larger towns which can be air raid targets evacuation should cover part of the above<br />
mentioned evacuation-eligible persons for whom at least auxiliary shelter facilities<br />
cannot be provided.<br />
Th e general position is that the population should leave the settlements, borderland<br />
ones, in particular, only in cases of immediate danger. Accordingly, evacuation plans<br />
must exclude timely evacuation.<br />
Th is also means that the sending of transport means to settlements from which evacuation<br />
is envisioned can be planned only in extremely favourable circumstances.<br />
Th is principle, i.e., evacuation only in specifi c, well-assessed situations and on decision<br />
of responsible bodies, means that the material required for evacuation (especially fuel)<br />
must be secured in time and made available to civil defence headquarters and offi cers,<br />
or even vehicle owners.<br />
Th e evacuees need to be quartered in less jeopardized zones. Th e quarters must be<br />
prepared in detail in due time, and basic necessities for the evacuees provided.<br />
In addition to citizens these activities need to involve companies and organizations<br />
in industry, health care, municipal services, construction, factory&offi ce canteens,<br />
humanitarian organizations and societies, educational institutions, etc.<br />
In addition to planned and organized evacuation, in some situations the population<br />
will leave on their own initiative. Such situations require appropriate panic-prevention<br />
measures, and the population needs to be directed to places intended for reception and<br />
relocation.<br />
When planning relief of the aff ected population the needs should be assessed in terms of<br />
the degree of destruction or unhabitability of residential buildings as follows:<br />
- 20-40% in the areas of most intensive action;<br />
- up to 5% in towns subject to air-raids.<br />
302
Accommodation possibilities need to be examined in terms of the place of residence or<br />
adjacent settlements. Maximum use needs to be made of the citizens’ residential space<br />
and material goods, and public facilities along with planning and preparing special<br />
locations. Preparation must be detailed (including inspections of households and their<br />
potential and identifying appropriate solutions in cooperation with local authorities).<br />
Th is is required because the number of aff ected persons - population to be evacuated<br />
and the existing 120,000 refugees and displaced persons - may exceed 50% of the total<br />
population. Companies, authorities and organizations need to be involved in the overall<br />
relief of evacuees.<br />
Possible air-raids call for blackout in order to reduce bombing effi ciency.<br />
Auxiliary power sources need to be provided by electric power producing and distribution<br />
companies and through internal power sources (for companies which cannot stop<br />
production in spite of total blackout), while strictly observing this protection measure.<br />
Apart from short-acting agents, this assessment does not foresee the use of other, nuclear/<br />
chemical/biological weapons. Attention is drawn nevertheless to the need for specifi c<br />
radiological-chemical-biological protection. Th is need will be particularly pronounced in<br />
municipalities threatened by possible chemical accidents as well as municipalities likely<br />
to feel the eff ect of such accidents.<br />
Th is protection and rescue measure requires in particular the planning of<br />
- chemical and biological control (reconnaissance) of the territory;<br />
- laboratory analyses;<br />
- personal and collective protection measures;<br />
- protection of animals and foodstuff s of animal origin;<br />
- DDDD 69 measures.<br />
All these measures include the check-up of equipment and resources for their<br />
implementation.<br />
In such conditions, no special preventive protection is possible from destruction. Instead,<br />
special units need to be organized for rescue from ruins and for the clearing of ruins.<br />
Fire protection measures in both preventive and operational terms are particularly<br />
important because of the fi re load of specifi c buildings and spaces, possible fi re breakout<br />
and propagation and, especially, in cases where incendiary weapons are used. Considering<br />
the relatively limited possibility to organize fi re-fi ghting units because of the small<br />
number of professional and voluntary fi remen, and properly trained persons, the small<br />
number and obsolescence of fi re-fi ghting engines, equipment and fi re extinguishing<br />
agents, particular attention needs to be paid to fi re prevention measures. Th ey include,<br />
conditionally, the storage of infl ammable and explosive materials in residential, industrial<br />
and other buildings, the removal of unnecessary infl ammable materials from cellars<br />
and attics, provision of barrels fi lled with soil and water reserves, regular fi lling and<br />
maintenance of fi re-extinguishing equipment, and preventive operations in forests. All<br />
these steps can be implemented by citizens through personal and mutual protection,<br />
69 Decontamination<br />
303
specifi c services and employees in companies, MUP inspection services, and fi remen -<br />
members of professional and volunteer fi re departments.<br />
Protection from unexploded ordnance is to be organized by informing the population<br />
about the procedures to be followed when coming across unexploded ordnance and by<br />
forming detection, inactivation and destruction units.<br />
Depending on the assessment of needs, the provision of fi rst medical aid may require<br />
considerable resources. Th is can be done through self-help and mutual help within<br />
the scope of personal and mutual protection, and by general protection civil defence<br />
units, specialized emergency medical units, Red Cross fi rst-aid units and health care<br />
organizations.<br />
Th e scope of emergency medical aid could be limited because of the shortage of<br />
medical supplies and equipment, and solutions need to be found in the use of auxiliary<br />
resources.<br />
All available eff orts and resources are required in the rescue and protection of animals and<br />
foodstuff of animal origin because of possible livestock risks and diseases. Th is includes<br />
livestock owners, veterinary companies and services, livestock breeding companies,<br />
slaughterhouses and companies engaged in the protection and storage of foodstuff s of<br />
animal origin.<br />
Crops and plant products (720,000 of arable area and about 540,000 hectares of forests)<br />
will need protection in terms of protective agents, hail<strong>storm</strong> protection and other forms<br />
of protection, especially regarding plant products.<br />
Th e assessment and the number of the people and animals killed, their identifi cation,<br />
transport and burial, the removal of waste and other hazardous materials along with<br />
decontamination will determine the sanitization requirements.<br />
Th ese protection measures, focused on preventing the spread of infectious diseases,<br />
epidemics and other consequences, will demand the involvement of municipal services,<br />
construction and transport companies, health care and veterinarian institutions. If they<br />
should fall short of the needs, civil defence and sanitization units can be included.<br />
According to estimates, the organization and implementation of protection and rescue<br />
measures can mitigate overall consequences by 20-25%.<br />
3. Needs and possibilities in the organization of civil defence units and agencies for the<br />
management of protection and rescue actions<br />
Th e described consequences and the assessment of the possible threat for the population<br />
and material goods draw attention to the necessary implementation of preventive<br />
protection measures and operational protection and rescue actions. In addition to<br />
companies and other entities equipped and qualifi ed for protection and rescue the<br />
implementation of operational measures will require the organization of civil defence<br />
units and bodies for the management of protection and rescue actions.<br />
As shown in the preceding assessments of the needs and possibilities, personal and<br />
mutual protection (along with effi cient civil defence wardens) can help to mitigate overall<br />
consequences by about 40%, and the organization and implementation of protection and<br />
304
escue measures by about 20-25%. Th e remaining 35-40% need to be dealt with by the<br />
organization of civil defence units.<br />
Th e prospects of organizing and manning civil defence units and headquarters are<br />
realistic if they would require the involvement of about 5% of the population, i.e., slightly<br />
in excess of 20,000 able-bodied persons, taking due account of the requirements of the<br />
SVK, MUP, republican bodies and organizations, local government bodies, companies<br />
and other legal entities. Manning problems can occur with respect to units requiring<br />
mentally and physically healthy persons, i.e., conscripts (units for rescue from ruins,<br />
fi re-fi ghting units, units for radiological-chemical-biological protection, and units for<br />
the inactivation and destruction of unexploded ordnance). Th is problem can be resolved<br />
by double assignment - the person involved can be under a compulsory work order and,<br />
if required, assigned to a protection and rescue civil defence unit or supervisory body.<br />
A similar problem can be expected in the supply of standard materiel (intended mainly<br />
for SVK units).<br />
Solutions need to be sought in cooperation with the respective commands and agencies<br />
supervising persons under compulsory work orders.<br />
Depending on the assessment of consequences, municipalities should try to organize<br />
universal civil defence units in every settlement.<br />
Units responsible for rescue from ruins need to be set up on the basis of the assessed<br />
number of persons buried in ruins and of the quantity of material to be cleared or<br />
removed from the roads or streets. Due regard should be taken of the fact that the period<br />
of 3 days (72 hours) is the optimum time for purposeful and effi cient rescue. Moreover,<br />
rescue operations must not be interrupted but carried out on a continuous basis, i.e., in<br />
three shift s.<br />
Th e calculation of the necessary number of rescue workers is based on the conditional<br />
time required for rescuing one person:<br />
- shallowly buried two hours<br />
- moderately buried fi ve hours<br />
- deeply buried twelve hours<br />
Th e calculated needs with regard to the number of rescue workers will infl uence the kind<br />
and composition of the civil defence unit to be organized. In principle, universal civil<br />
defence units will be used in the rescue of shallowly and moderately buried persons, and<br />
specialized units for rescue from ruins in rescuing deeply buried persons. Th e training of<br />
units for rescue from ruins (and ruin clearance) will depend on the availability of local<br />
construction enterprises, municipal services or similar companies with the required<br />
number of skilled employees (masons, carpenters, electricians, joiners, plumbers,<br />
construction machine operators, drivers etc.) and the respective equipment and tools,<br />
and on the number of craft smen and other citizens who could be engaged in ruin<br />
clearance.<br />
Th e organization of radiological-chemical-biological protection units needs to be considered<br />
primarily in terms of the consequences of a possible chemical accident in a specifi c<br />
305
municipality. In other municipalities at least squad strength units will be organized with<br />
elements for chemical reconnaissance and decontamination; laboratory facilities will be<br />
organized separately as feasible, as well as facilities for the decontamination of persons,<br />
materiel and weapons, clothing, equipment and specifi c surfaces.<br />
Considering the possible number and magnitude of fi res, in most municipalities it will<br />
not be possible to organize civil defence fi re-fi ghting units which would meet requirements<br />
in terms of protection and rescue in the event of fi re. Th erefore, maximum use should be<br />
made of available and trained manpower and fi re-fi ghting equipment.<br />
Moreover, in order to ensure timely intervention, the territory must be covered as much<br />
as possible by universal civil defence units which can be used in fi ghting initial and<br />
smaller fi res.<br />
Because of the shortage of qualifi ed personnel and its impact on the training of units<br />
for the inactivation and destruction of unexploded ordnance, at least one team ought<br />
to be organized, conditionally, in every municipality. Th e training of such units will<br />
depend on the availability of appropriately trained persons, mine clearance experts and<br />
specialized members of MUP units. Such units need to be manned on a voluntary basis.<br />
In addition to diffi culties in ensuring the necessary personnel, a specifi c problem will<br />
be the provision of appropriate instruments, material and equipment for discovering,<br />
inactivating and destroying unexploded ordnance.<br />
Th e training requirements for fi rst medical aid units will be assessed on the basis of the<br />
number of injured persons, preparation and qualifi cation of the population for self-help<br />
and mutual help, organization and equipment of universal units, numbers of Red Cross<br />
fi rst aid units and degree of development of the health care service. In the assessment<br />
due attention needs to be paid to the fact that about 60% of the total number of injured<br />
persons are light cases who can be dealt with through self-help, mutual help and with the<br />
help of universal civil defence units. Medical aid for the remaining 40% more seriously<br />
injured persons will be provided by fi rst aid units, bearing in mind the calculation that a<br />
team can take care of 25 seriously injured persons over a period of eight hours. Such units<br />
will be manned by drawing on already qualifi ed personnel and students of secondary<br />
medical schools, possibly also by using unemployed health care workers. Other citizens<br />
can also be called to help as stretcher-bearers, drivers etc.<br />
Sanitation units will be formed in municipalities in which municipal services,<br />
construction companies, health care and veterinary services are not capable, in terms<br />
of their organization and human resources, of meeting the requirements regarding<br />
protection and rescue measures.<br />
Every municipality will assess on its own the needs and possibilities of organizing water<br />
rescue units, veterinary units (for rescuing animals and saving foodstuff s of animal<br />
origin) and, possibly, crop and plant product protection.<br />
Depending on needs and possibilities, and on the degree of organization of the civil<br />
defence in specifi c municipalities, special civil defence units can be organized at the<br />
regional level as intervention protection and rescue forces covering specifi c regions.<br />
Successful management of protection and rescue actions demands proper training for<br />
such activities according to the following sequence:<br />
306
- republican civil defence headquarters;<br />
- regional civil defence staff s;<br />
- municipal civil defence staff s;<br />
- local civil defence units (for parts of municipalities);<br />
- civil defence wardens in larger residential buildings, blocks, streets, settlements,<br />
companies and other legal entities.<br />
Appointments need to be considered with regard to the following:<br />
- civil defence offi cers in the Ministry of Defence;<br />
- expertise in specifi c forms of protection and rescue;<br />
- previous experience (and training) in civil defence bodies<br />
4. Needs and possibilities of implementing protection and rescue missions by companies<br />
equipped and qualifi ed for such actions<br />
Th e degree of threat and the assessed consequences highlight the need for the full<br />
engagement of companies equipped and qualifi ed for protection and rescue, particularly<br />
in the fi eld of construction, municipal services, health care, veterinary services,<br />
factory&offi ce canteens, hotels&restaurants, fi re brigades etc. Th eir regular activity<br />
implies the need for their engagement in the protection and rescue of people, property<br />
and cultural assets.<br />
In order to ensure successful preparation, civil defence bodies covering all companies<br />
equipped and qualifi ed for protection and rescue will prepare specifi c tasks on the<br />
basis of which these companies, depending on their resources, will plan (upscale) their<br />
wartime job specifi cation and carry out the necessary preparations, with the help of civil<br />
defence bodies, in providing the necessary personnel and equipment.<br />
Th e current organization of such companies falls short even of minimum requirements,<br />
and eff orts are required in order to boost their capacity and make them roadworthy for<br />
the extensive protection and rescue missions. 70<br />
__________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265.<br />
70 Th e same assessment was adopted by the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters on 14 July 1995.<br />
307
308<br />
11<br />
1995, 11 May<br />
Knin<br />
Report of the Security Department of the SVK General Staff to the Security Directorate<br />
of the VJ General Staff on enhanced HV propaganda activities, losses sustained in the<br />
assault on the Bihać safe area and civilian exodus from Benkovac<br />
_________________<br />
General SVK Staff<br />
Security Department<br />
Str. conf. 37-403<br />
11 May 1995<br />
To<br />
Security Directorate<br />
Daily report<br />
1. Hostile activities:<br />
Intensive HV propaganda continues to spread, among other things, many contradictory<br />
information on the time and lines of attack on the RSK, which makes it very diffi cult to<br />
separate genuine data from false ones. Th e campaign waged by the propaganda battalion<br />
of the HV General Staff over the past dozen days has been given the highest ratings, and<br />
they were extensively assisted by experts from the US, Germany and Austria.<br />
2. Situation in the units and in the territory<br />
Th e situation in the units with respect to morale and motivation has not changed<br />
substantially as compared with previous reports. Rumours are still being propagated<br />
intensively; for instance, an HDZ branch has allegedly been set up in Petrinja, with about<br />
1,000 members, Croats and Serbs, with a Serb at its head.<br />
In some places along the line of disengagement of the 39th corps the HV has been<br />
broadcasting PA messages calling our troops to surrender and promising them<br />
amnesty.<br />
In order to prevent the leaking of secret military information the intelligence department<br />
of the 39th corps has initiated, in cooperation with the State Security Service (SDB) and<br />
MUP, the seizure of illegal radio stations and cellular telephones. So far 4 cellular phones<br />
have been seized from<br />
- D.B., entrepreneur from Glina,<br />
- N.N., private entrepreneur from Glina,<br />
- M.B., manager of NIK, Petrinja,<br />
- C.D., owner of Drvoplast, Petrinja. 71<br />
71 Th e document lists the full names.
All these persons are already known to the authorities for their illicit trade and links with<br />
persons in the Republic of Croatia.<br />
During the action taken to recoup specifi c hills from the ARBiH 5 th corps, SVK and VZB<br />
[Abdić’s] units have sustained the following casualties: three killed and fi ve wounded, and<br />
3 killed and six wounded, respectively. Additionally, it is almost certain that the Muslims<br />
have captured 9 men, black marketeers (now reported as missing), and 20 women.<br />
Encouraged by their relatives and other Serbs in France, the population in Benkovac and<br />
its surroundings is intensively preparing to leave the area for the SRJ. As reported by our<br />
sources, over the past two weeks or so three busloads of women and children have left<br />
for Belgrade because they are afraid of being cut off from the rest of the RSK like Western<br />
Slavonia.<br />
Th e Minđušari group, occasionally engaged in combat within special militia units, has<br />
announced that it could break into the Ministry of Defence and arrest everybody there,<br />
with Tanjga 72 at their head, because they consider them guilty of the fall of Western<br />
Slavonia.<br />
Rade Čubrilo, president of the 1991 veterans’ association, known for his paramilitary<br />
ambitions and pro-chetnik orientation, during the day intercepted SVK offi cers in<br />
Knin, including major general Lončar 73 , and provoked them by relaying greetings from<br />
Okučani and Western Slavonia, asking them why they were not there, what gave them<br />
the right to receive pay in the amount of 3,000 dinars, etc.<br />
Having heard of the incident President Martić 74 ordered his arrest, but nothing has been<br />
done until tonight and the man still walks around freely.<br />
Members of the RSK Assembly from Western Slavonia intend to step down from the<br />
Assembly at its fi rst meeting because Western Slavonia does not exist any more in the<br />
RSK. Th ey intend to do it out of protest for the fall of Western Slavonia.<br />
Assistant commander for<br />
security aff airs<br />
Colonel Rade Rašeta<br />
(stamp) 75<br />
___________________<br />
Original, typewritten Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, Security Department, 37-403/1995<br />
72 Rade<br />
73 Dušan<br />
74 Milan<br />
75 Receipt stamp: telegram no. 177, 11 May 1995<br />
309
1995, 30 May<br />
Knin<br />
310<br />
12<br />
Order of SVK General Staff concerning measures for the elimination of weaknesses in<br />
the armed forces and other developments underlying the loss of territory<br />
____________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SERBIAN ARMY<br />
Problems in the military organization<br />
and the elimination of negative developments<br />
as one of the causes underlying defeat and<br />
loss of SVK territory<br />
MILITARY SECRET<br />
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<br />
30 May 1995<br />
O r d e r<br />
Our young state, the RSK, is being created at the wish of all its citizens as a guarantee of<br />
their life in freedom.<br />
Unfortunately, in spite of many eff orts, many functions of the state have not come<br />
alive. We are witnessing lack of unity in our leadership, poor functioning of the legal<br />
system, black-marketeering and war profi teering. All these developments have had a<br />
negative eff ect on the functioning of the command system. Weaknesses in the military<br />
organization have demoralized both our troops and our citizens.<br />
Owing to weaknesses in the state and in the SVK, so far the Miljevac plateau, Maslenica,<br />
Divoselo and Western Slavonia have been lost.<br />
In order to put an end to such unwanted developments and prevent continued threat to the<br />
state and to the people, a number of actions have been taken, focusing on the integrated<br />
functioning of the state and of its bodies, including the SVK, in the strengthening of our<br />
defence.<br />
Th e SVK General Staff is busy upgrading military organization. Th e fi rst professional<br />
units are being formed. We are on the way to establishing, within a short time, an army<br />
of which our people and the Serbs worldwide will be proud.<br />
We shall be capable of preventing and punishing every ustashi attack if we eliminate<br />
indiscipline, black market practices, arbitrariness and abandonment of positions before<br />
the enemy.<br />
In line with the foregoing, and in order to eliminate all major shortcomings and<br />
indiscipline in the SVK, I am hereby
ORDERING<br />
as follows:<br />
1. All black market traffi c with hostile forces must be discontinued because we have<br />
lost people and territory owing to such practices. Places used by black-marketeers for<br />
the exchange of goods with the enemy must be engaged by fi re as decided by the corps<br />
commander.<br />
2. Prevent escape during combat, uncontrolled abandonment of positions and spreading<br />
of panic among the troops and the population. Rules of engagement must be respected<br />
in combat. I am hereby permitting the use of fi rearms in preventing indiscipline.<br />
3. Corps commanders are hereby authorized to prevent, in their zone of responsibility,<br />
the destructive action of individuals and groups intended to weaken defence and spread<br />
panic among the people.<br />
4. Troops shall be duly issued ammunition, and any carousing shall be punished and<br />
duly reported; moreover, any lack of discipline shall be punished by transfer according<br />
to a special schedule.<br />
5. Th e corps commands shall elaborate in their zones of responsibility the measures for<br />
civil defence, and entrust municipal bodies and local communities with organizing the<br />
withdrawal, quartering and feeding of the population (women, children and the elderly)<br />
from areas of possible action.<br />
6. In their conduct in and off combat all offi cers and non-commissioned offi cers need<br />
to set an example to the troops, and see to the implementation of this order. Due steps<br />
need to be taken against individuals failing to abide by these positions as provided for<br />
by the order.<br />
7. Th e Serbian army of the RSK shall be informed about this order aft er the previous<br />
analysis of the situation in the corps and brigades, and the highlighting of specifi c<br />
problems in units and zones of responsibility.<br />
Th is order does not penalize past but future mistakes, and shall enter into force on 2 June<br />
1995 at 12.00 hours.<br />
RSK soldiers and offi cers, we are entering the fi nal stage of accomplishment of our<br />
national goals, and we can no longer allow any future loss of RSK people and territory.<br />
Th e RSK is more important than any individual interest or right, and I am therefore<br />
aware of my own responsibility and of the measures I am taking.<br />
With trust in the Serbian fi ghter and his bravery, I am placing myself at the service of<br />
my people.<br />
Th e Commander<br />
Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić<br />
76 RSK, General Staff of the Serbian Army<br />
(stamp) 76<br />
311
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 6, str. conf., 30 May 1995<br />
312<br />
_____________________________<br />
13<br />
1995, 6 June<br />
Knin<br />
Communication of the military cabinet of the RSK president to the SVK General<br />
Staff concerning the visit of the delegation from Obrovac which reported an alarming<br />
military&security situation threatening to develop into a spontaneous exodus of the<br />
population<br />
________________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
MILITARY CABINET<br />
No. 020/8-513/2/95<br />
Knin, 9 June 1995<br />
SVK General Staff<br />
Re: Offi cial meeting with the delegation<br />
of the Municipality of Obrovac, information<br />
Th e head of the military cabinet of the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina,<br />
lieutenant general Milan Čeleketić, received on 8 June 1995, at the suggestion of President<br />
Martić77 , the delegation of the municipality of Obrovac including Mr. Vukčević78 , mayor<br />
of Obrovac, Mr. Macura79 , member of the RSK Assembly and Mr. Dopuđ80 former<br />
commander of the Obrovac brigade.<br />
As reported by the mentioned gentlemen, the military&security situation in Obrovac<br />
is alarming, and if radical and concrete steps are not taken immediately in order to<br />
strengthen defence capability in the area, the population will start to leave either<br />
spontaneously or in an organized fashion. We believe that their serious concern needs<br />
to be recognized, and that the noted military organization weaknesses should be duly<br />
analyzed.<br />
77 Milan<br />
78 Mirko<br />
79 Lazar<br />
80 Jovan
In this regard, we suggest that the situation in the zone of responsibility of the 4 th light<br />
infantry brigade needs to be ascertained on the spot, and that the most responsible<br />
offi cers of the SVK General Staff ought to receive the Obrovac delegation, this having<br />
been requested by the delegation.<br />
Enclosed please fi nd the report on the tour of the positions of the 4 th light infantry brigade<br />
in the Velebit area handed us by the members of the Obrovac delegation.<br />
Respectfully yours,<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 340<br />
Lieutenant Colonel<br />
Žarko Novaković<br />
_______________________<br />
14<br />
1995, 29 July<br />
Knin<br />
Order of the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence staff s concerning<br />
the implementation of evacuation and relief plans<br />
________________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS<br />
No. nov. 01-78/95<br />
Knin, 29 June 1995<br />
DEFENCE<br />
OFFICIAL SECRET<br />
REGIONAL CIVIL<br />
DEFENCE STAFFS<br />
To whom it may concern<br />
Pursuant to the Decision on the proclamation of a state of war, and in accordance with the<br />
latest situation, the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters hereby issues the following<br />
O R D E R<br />
1. Regional Civil Defence Staff s need to be activated immediately, a continuous tour of<br />
duty established and, as required, some staff members kept continuously available on<br />
call.<br />
313
2. Municipal civil defence staff s shall be ordered to:<br />
- organize a continuous tour of duty and staff member activity<br />
with respect to evacuation and relief;<br />
- update relief and evacuation plans, including the<br />
putting of persons responsible for specifi c assignments on<br />
standby;<br />
- put organized civil defence units on standby;<br />
- through civil defence wardens animate citizens to prepare<br />
relief facilities and implement other measures and procedures<br />
for personal and collective protection;<br />
- determine the potential of enterprises considering integration<br />
into the implementation of protection and rescue measures.<br />
3. Monitor the situation through SVK commands and take the necessary steps.<br />
4. Monitor the activities of municipal civil defence staff s, and off er professional and other<br />
assistance in developing appropriate solutions.<br />
5. Daily report all measures and activities, and possible problems, to this Headquarters<br />
as of 30 July 1995 at 13.00 hours.<br />
Copy to:<br />
1. Regional civil defence staff s in Northern Dalmatia, by<br />
messenger<br />
2. Lika, Kordun, Banija,<br />
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, by fax<br />
3. Records, here<br />
(stamp) 81<br />
Memo to<br />
1. Ministry of defence<br />
2. Chief of the SVK General Staff<br />
3. Prime minister<br />
________________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265<br />
81 RSK, Republican Civil Defence Headquarters, Knin<br />
314<br />
HQ Head<br />
Duško Babić
16<br />
1995, 31 July<br />
Drniš<br />
Report of the Drniš Dept. of the Ministry of Defence to the Northern Dalmatia<br />
Directorate on measures for the preparation of evacuation<br />
_______________________<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
Municipality of Drniš<br />
Ministry of defence<br />
Drniš Dept.<br />
No. str. conf. 01-10/95<br />
Drniš, 31 July 1995<br />
Ministry of defence<br />
“Northern Dalmatia” Directorate<br />
K N I N<br />
Re: Report on steps taken with regard to the new situation<br />
In line with the new situation, the Municipal Civil Defence Staff (MCDS) has taken the<br />
following steps:<br />
- Continuous duty of the MCDS has been introduced for the civil defence staff members<br />
and employees of the Ministry of Defence Dept.<br />
- Th e wardens of all local communities in the territory of the municipality of Drniš<br />
were visited except the warden in the local community of Baljci, with whom we are in<br />
continuous contact. We are planning to visit Baljci on 1 August 2009. We informed the<br />
wardens about the new situation, and about the measures and steps they were supposed<br />
to take. Particular focus was placed on shelters and evacuation related preparations.<br />
Th e wardens completed their assignments and reports from all local communities<br />
arrived at the MCDS during the day. Lists of persons envisaged for evacuation were<br />
updated, and fuel issued in November 1994 and vehicles were checked.<br />
Apart from problems in the town of Drniš, where two vehicles (one tractor and one<br />
truck) were found to be malfunctioning, throughout the municipality there were no<br />
problems either with vehicles or with fuel. Th e unserviceable vehicles will be replaced as<br />
soon as possible in agreement with the manager of DP Drništrans.<br />
- Branka Ćakić, member of the MCDS, shall organize as soon as possible a fi rst aid<br />
course, this being one of our top priorities.<br />
You will be duly and timely informed about all changes.<br />
Respectfully yours,<br />
(stamp) 82<br />
82 RSK, Municipal Civil Defence Staff , Drniš<br />
315
Original, typewritten, Latin script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265<br />
316<br />
__________________<br />
17<br />
Head of the Municipal Civil<br />
Defence staff<br />
Ana Mirković<br />
1995, 31 July<br />
Knin<br />
Report of the Military and Civil Aff airs Sector of the RSK Ministry of Defence concerning<br />
mobilization and bringing of the units to full wartime complement, and spontaneous<br />
evacuation of the population aft er the news that Croatian forces had broken through<br />
the defence lines at Strmica<br />
______________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE<br />
Military and Civil Aff airs Sector<br />
No. 403-201/95<br />
Knin, 31 July 1995<br />
Offi cial secret<br />
Strictly confi dential<br />
Regular daily report<br />
1. Mobilization and wartime complement<br />
During general public mobilization focus was placed on achieving full strength in SVK<br />
war units with conscripts and materiel. Mobilization is carried with the assistance of<br />
the military police and the conscripts are immediately transferred to war units. Since<br />
there are no conscripts without specifi c assignments, the conscripts transferred to war<br />
units are those who most frequently abandon the units. Between 17 July and today 2,850<br />
conscripts were transferred from compulsory work order status to war units. By order<br />
of the Ministry of Defence 51 employees of the Ministry were transferred to SVK war<br />
units.<br />
In the Knin area 30 motor vehicles are being requisitioned for the requirements of<br />
the SVK General Staff . Also in the Knin area, 4 pack horses were requisitioned for the<br />
requirements of the 7 th Rear Base. Nine doctors have returned from specialization in the<br />
SRJ, and will be assigned to war units and to the Sveti Sava Hospital in Knin.
In the Lika area mobilization is completed, and motor vehicles, tractors etc. are being<br />
requisitioned as required by war units. Both are proceeding smoothly. In the Plaški area<br />
6 tractors have been mobilized for the howitzer battalion. Six nurses were mobilized<br />
for the medical unit of the Plaški brigade. Six trucks were requisitioned at Plaški for the<br />
103 rd light infantry brigade.<br />
Kordun<br />
Eight trucks were requisitioned for SVK requirements.<br />
Banija<br />
Seventeen volunteers, persons declared unfi t for military service, applied to SVK units.<br />
Second recruitment and peacetime complement<br />
Th e following persons were recruited for military service:<br />
- Northern Dalmatia 38 conscripts<br />
- Lika 61 “<br />
- Kordun 23 “<br />
- Banija 68 “<br />
Total 90 “<br />
Civil defence<br />
Civil defence units, staff s and wardens are updating plans for protection, rescue,<br />
evacuation, relief and shelter. During aggression on Grahovo civil defence staff s in<br />
Northern Dalmatia and Lika provided relief to 220 refugees.<br />
Civil defence wardens were particularly involved in preventing movements of the<br />
population caused by rumours.<br />
Last night someone in Strmica spread the rumour that the ustashi had broken through<br />
defence lines and were entering Strmica, causing panic and uncontrolled movement.<br />
Panic was dealt with and the population remained in their homes aft er the timely<br />
intervention of the head of the municipal civil defence staff in Knin and civil defence<br />
wardens.<br />
4. Defence preparations<br />
Activities focused on continued downsizing of the number of persons temporarily<br />
employed in government bodies through compulsory work orders. Th us, the persons<br />
under compulsory work orders in the ministries include the ministers, their assistants<br />
and one driver per ministry. Other administrative personnel are persons not eligible for<br />
military service (women and persons unfi t for combat duty).<br />
Compulsory work order units are being formed at brigade level in order to prepare the<br />
territory for combat operations. So far four such units, 30-50 person strong, have been<br />
established in the Knin area.<br />
317
5. Surveillance and reporting service<br />
Th e service monitors the situation on the front, on land and in the air space, and is on<br />
alert status in order to inform the population about imminent danger and respond to<br />
orders by competent offi cials.<br />
Copy to:<br />
- Ministry records<br />
- Ministry of defence<br />
- SVK General staff , general Sekulić<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 291<br />
318<br />
___________________<br />
18<br />
ASSISTANT MINISTER<br />
Colonel Duško Babić<br />
1995, 2 August<br />
Knin<br />
Th e RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters requests from the regional staff s<br />
reports on the implementation of civil defence plans, evacuation and relief<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS<br />
No. conf. 01-82/95<br />
Knin, 2 August 1995<br />
DEFENCE<br />
OFFICIAL SECRET<br />
CONFIDENTIAL<br />
To<br />
REGIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE<br />
STAFFS<br />
To Whom It May Concern<br />
Pursuant to order conf. no. 01-78/95 of 29 July 1995, IMMEDIATELY, and not later than<br />
3 August 1995 by 19.00 hours, forward r e p o r t s as follows:<br />
1. Shelters (plan update, preparation of facilities, animation of the population).<br />
2. Evacuation (plan update, material support, preparation of persons in charge, formation<br />
of committees/teams for reception, distribution etc.).
3. Relief (accommodation facilities; provision of equipment and material, food, personal<br />
and general hygiene agents).<br />
4. Preparation and organization of protection and rescue steps (individually; steps taken<br />
and organized activities including possible integration of enterprises into protection and<br />
rescue operations).<br />
5. Presence of hazardous materials and protection steps taken.<br />
6. Activated protection and rescue forces, and forces on alert.<br />
7. Problems: functioning, material supply.<br />
Copy to:<br />
1. “Northern Dalmatia” regional civil defence staff , by messenger<br />
2. “Lika”, “Kordun”, “Banija”, and “Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem”, by fax<br />
3. Records<br />
Memo to:<br />
1. Minister of defence<br />
2. Chief of SVK General Staff<br />
3. Prime minister<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265<br />
(stamp) 83<br />
___________________<br />
19<br />
HQ Head<br />
Duško Babić<br />
1995, 2 August<br />
Order of the RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence<br />
staff s to proceed immediately to the implementation of evacuation plans<br />
___________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS<br />
No. str. conf. 01-92/95<br />
Knin, 2 August 1995<br />
83 RSK, Republican Civil Defence Headquarters<br />
DEFENCE<br />
OFFICIAL SECRET<br />
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<br />
ENCODED<br />
319
To<br />
REGIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE STAFFS<br />
To Whom It May Concern<br />
Preparation for the evacuation<br />
of material, cultural and other<br />
assets<br />
Order IMMEDIATELY, through municipal civil defence staff s, bodies and organizations,<br />
enterprises and other juridical persons, the implementation of preparations for the<br />
evacuation of<br />
- material assets,<br />
- archives, civil registers, records and confi dential papers,<br />
- movable cultural assets,<br />
- money, securities and respective records.<br />
In preparing evacuation the responsible entities are required to<br />
- prepare lists - reviews of material assets in terms of type and<br />
quantity, and prepare such assets for evacuation;<br />
- determine the sites - facilities for their storage on the<br />
new location (in cooperation with Ministry of Defence<br />
directorates and departments);<br />
- provide vehicles for transport (if short of requirements,<br />
try to obtain vehicles through Ministry of Defence bodies);<br />
- form (un)loading teams;<br />
- form commissions responsible for implementation.<br />
As a rule, the evacuation of material assets should not be carried out simultaneously with<br />
the evacuation of specifi c categories of the population (if ordered in time), exception<br />
being made for articles, means and equipment used for relief purposes.<br />
Th e course of preparations must be reported daily to this Headquarters starting from 4<br />
August 1995 by 20.00 hours.<br />
HQ Head<br />
Duško Babić<br />
(stamp) 84<br />
Copy to:<br />
1. “Northern Dalmatia” regional civil defence<br />
staff , by messenger<br />
2. Regional civil defence staff s “Lika”,<br />
“Kordun”, “Banija” and “Eastern<br />
84 ibid.<br />
320
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem”,<br />
encoded<br />
3. Records<br />
Memo to:<br />
1. Minister of defence<br />
2. Chief of SVK General Staff<br />
3. Prime minister<br />
____________________<br />
Original, typewritten, Cyrillic script<br />
HR-HMDCDR, 2, box 265<br />
21<br />
1995, 3 August<br />
Knin<br />
Daily report of the Security Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security Directorate<br />
of the VJ General Staff concerning the request of the General Staff to have the SVK air<br />
force bombard Split because of the attack on Drvar, the spreading of rumours about the<br />
HV attack on the RSK, the situation in SVK units, the situation in the Grahovo-Glamoč<br />
theatre, and prevailing public opinion that the SVK could not defend itself, and that it<br />
would be better for the people to move out than to become encircled and perish.<br />
SVK GENERAL STAFF<br />
Security Department<br />
Str. conf. no. 37-616<br />
3 August 1995<br />
Daily report to:<br />
SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF THE VJ GENERAL STAFF<br />
Att. General A. 85 Dimitrijević<br />
During the day our units have kept their positions, with the engagement of the air force<br />
and artillery, and there has been no major shift of the front line from Mandići - Dubrave<br />
- Mount Brežine - Koščica hill - Ograci hill - Javorov Vrh - Veliki Mračaj- Mali Mračaj -<br />
Javorova Glava - Samar, - Igla - Bezdan - Grgić - Suvi Vrh - Dinara- Razvale -Unište - the<br />
large cave right.<br />
During the day the chief of the SVK General Staff visited the forward command post of<br />
the VRS General Staff in order to arrange cooperation and further off ensive action at<br />
85 Aleksandar<br />
321
Grahovo - Livanjsko Polje. Specifi c tasks were agreed, but we do not know when they<br />
will be accomplished because the impression is that in the western part the RS has hardly<br />
any forces capable of off ensive action. Th e VRS is concealing this fact. At the meeting<br />
of the chief of the SVK General Staff at the forward command post of the VRS General<br />
Staff the SVK was requested to carry out air raids on Split as a reprisal for the shelling if<br />
Drvar.<br />
During the meeting the SVK was also blamed for the fall of Grahovo and Glamoč.<br />
1. Foreign factor<br />
Th e analysis of information obtained from diff erent sources on HV aggression on the<br />
SVK warrants the following conclusions.<br />
Th e Croatian Intelligence Service or Western intelligence services (certainly within the<br />
scope of their global policy towards Krajina) have been spreading, several times a day<br />
and from diff erent sources, misinformation about the unconditional HV aggression on<br />
the RSK.<br />
As established, more than 80% of misinformation has been spread through UNPROFOR,<br />
in most cases through liaison offi cers or friends, always taking into account that such<br />
misinformation should reach the highest levels (brigade and corps commanders, and<br />
senior offi cers in the SVK General Staff ). False and misinforming written material was<br />
given to persons believed that they would pass it on to such offi cers.<br />
Th e second category of sources used by foreign intelligence services to launch<br />
misinformation were telephone communications between intelligence agencies and the<br />
republican state security offi cers abroad.<br />
Th e third channel used by the Croatian Intelligence Service were radio communications<br />
intercepted and recorded by the radio tapping service.<br />
Th e fourth group of misinformation - or half-truths - includes data obtained from sources<br />
sent by diff erent services to the Republic of Croatia or the 5 th Corps, not qualifi ed for<br />
proper appraisal of what they saw or heard.<br />
Finally, intelligence services in the units do not function at all, and our units do not have<br />
any tactical depth information about hostile forces and do not monitor the situation.<br />
Th e foregoing considerations obviously show how realistic and timely are the decisions<br />
made from the highest down to the lowest echelon.<br />
Yesterday (2 August) the European Community RC and teams in the RSK were ordered<br />
by the UN High Command in Zagreb to establish the following:<br />
- Air raids on Mount Dinara and facilities in the Grahovo area: did the planes take off<br />
from the Udbina airstrip or from Mahovljani near Banja Luka? If from Udbina, are the<br />
planes and pilots from the air force of Republika Srpska?<br />
- Number of SVK troops killed and wounded? On which sites and where are they taken<br />
care of? Can the ICRC visit them and talk to them?<br />
- Artillery and rocket positions? Did the VRS take part in artillery support?<br />
- Response of the military and state leadership to the negotiations in Geneva? What is<br />
the response of the citizens?<br />
322
2. Situation in the units<br />
Aft er the proclamation of the state of war, alcohol abuse among the troops is on the<br />
rise, resulting in ever more frequent injuries, killings, verbal and physical quarrels,<br />
obstruction of commands and serious disruption of combat readiness.<br />
Aft er the decision of the SVK High Command to launch an off ensive at Grahovo<br />
- Livanjsko Polje, parts of the Special Unit Corps, MUP units and part of the special<br />
“Captain Dragan’s” 86 unit were committed to the operation. In our assessment, the units<br />
did not accomplish the mission; the authority of certain persons had to be saved and,<br />
accordingly, the units were withdrawn from action.<br />
Th e fact is that the 2nd brigade under the command of “colonel” MILOŠ CVJETIČANIN<br />
did not accomplish the mission except some minor operations of no signifi cance for<br />
further action. MUP units which were included into the Special Unit Corps aft er the<br />
“Vidovdan [St. Vitus] parade” not only failed to accomplish their mission but even<br />
abandoned their positions. Th ey were returned to their positions but refused to remain<br />
within the Special Unit Corps. “Captain Dragan”, supposed to be responsible for deep<br />
reconnaissance of enemy deployment, reconnoitred instead the positions of our forces.<br />
What is only true is that military police units at all levels, including the military police<br />
battalion, are fi ghting properly, with no hesitation or fear, and have not abandoned a<br />
single position.<br />
In connection with the current situation the commander has made the following<br />
moves:<br />
On 2 August he recalled “general” Stupar from the Grahovo theatre, formed a strategic<br />
reserve out of the uncommitted forces of the Special Unit Corps and attached units in<br />
Kordun.<br />
During the day the 2nd brigade was pulled out of combat and redeployed to Bruvno<br />
(municipality of Gračac) to be in readiness for “special action” in all directions.<br />
During the day “captain Dragan” left the SVK, disgruntled because he had requested to be<br />
appointed commander of the 92dn motorized brigade of the 7th Corps and promised that<br />
he would bring it to full combat readiness within a month. When the SVK commander<br />
disagreed, Dragan demonstratively left Krajina.<br />
Let me note that “captain Dragan” was ‘nominated’ commander of the 92nd brigade by the<br />
Republican State Security Service of Serbia (MILAN KNEŽEVIĆ, aka “Nedo”) because<br />
they persistently tried to present the current commander of the 92nd motorized brigade,<br />
lieutenant colonel JANKO ĐURICA, as incapable of commanding the unit.<br />
Th is has become a fairly complex internal problem with, so far, an uncertain outcome.<br />
If our internal political and the external environments are added, the case is more than<br />
serious.<br />
As reliably verifi ed there is other than lip service no practical cooperation with the VRS.<br />
Untruths and lies are paid with human lives.<br />
As off ensive operations against the 5th Corps have come to a standstill, illicit trade is<br />
fl ourishing and threatens to assume uncontrollable dimensions.<br />
86 Dragan Vasiljković<br />
323
Th e security system at all levels is geared to the same function as the leadership and<br />
command system. However, in spite of all problems, the counterintelligence service is<br />
functioning and unity within the service is still at a high level.<br />
An attempt to disrupt the system was made in the Special Unit Corps and in the 15th Corps. Lieutenant colonel PETAR BORIĆ has totally identifi ed himself with “general”<br />
STEVO ŠEVO, who has no tolerance for the security service. Together they oft en exert<br />
pressure on specifi c security departments and brigades. However, the counterintelligence<br />
service has remained functional thanks exclusively to the sound, professional and<br />
responsible eff orts of the 15th Corps security department (captain POTKONJAK and<br />
lieutenant LONČAR), with whom I am in continuous contact.<br />
Ref.; your information str. conf. no. 33-226 of 26 July 1995. 87<br />
Th e sum of 37,000 DEM is mentioned on page three (3), paragraph four. Additionally<br />
we received the information that the sum involved was 190,000 DEM, which he received<br />
subsequently.<br />
3. Situation in the territory<br />
On 3 August 1995 the impression was gained, in contact with citizens, of elements of<br />
panic, although still controlled. Citizens are mainly accusing the authorities, i.e., the<br />
political leaders of the SVK, and believe that the situation is due to their carelessness and<br />
negligence. Th ey hope that we have not been betrayed and believe, as the last resort, that<br />
the SRJ will help.<br />
Furthermore, citizens think that we are not able to defend ourselves and that, if no<br />
substantial help is provided by the SRJ, it is better for the people to move elsewhere<br />
rather than to be encircled and perish.<br />
According to reliable information received during the day, RSK prime minister M. 88<br />
Babić told the ministers to pack up and be ready for moving to Donji Lapac. He asked<br />
Nikola Štrbac, secretary of the government, whether he was sure that those in Knin<br />
would defend Knin in the event of an attack. Štrbac replied that he (Babić) should know<br />
the answer having spent some time there. Babić did not continue the conversation on<br />
the subject.<br />
ASSISTANT COMMANDER<br />
for security aff airs<br />
Colonel Rade Rašeta<br />
Copy, typewritten, Latin script<br />
Copy in possession of the editor<br />
87 See Appendix II, doc. no. 35.<br />
88 Milan<br />
89 text illegible<br />
324<br />
(stamp) 89<br />
____________________
22<br />
1995, 4 August<br />
Knin<br />
Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council on the evacuation of the population<br />
from the municipalities of Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, Gračac and Knin to Srb and<br />
Lapac<br />
_________________________<br />
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA<br />
SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL<br />
Knin, 4 August 1995<br />
16.45 hours<br />
No. 2-3113-1/95<br />
Because of the new situation caused by the open general aggression of the Republic of<br />
Croatia on the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and aft er the fi rst, initial defence success, a<br />
large part of Northern Dalmatia and part of Lika are threatened. Accordingly,<br />
WE HAVE DECIDED<br />
1. to proceed with planned evacuation of all persons unfi t for combat from the<br />
municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac;<br />
2. to implement evacuation according to prepared plans and routed from Knin via Otrić<br />
towards Srb and Lapac;<br />
3. request assistance from the UNPROFOR Command, Sector South, with headquarters<br />
in Knin.<br />
Knin, 4 August 1995<br />
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC<br />
Mile Martić<br />
(stamp) 90<br />
CERTIFIED IN THE SVK GENERAL STAFF at 17.20 hours and fi led under the above<br />
number.<br />
___________________________<br />
Žrtve agresije Hrvatske vojske na Republiku Srpsku Krajinu - Sjeverna Dalmacija, Lika,<br />
Banija i Kordun (Oluja) - avgust 1995 (Victims of the aggression of the Croatian Army<br />
on the Republic of Serbian Krajina - Northern Dalmatia, Lika Banija and Kordun /<br />
Storm/ - August 1995); published by Savo Štrbac, edited by Jovo Rašković; www.veritas.<br />
org.you/srpski/publikacije.htm<br />
90 RSK, General Staff of the Serbian Army<br />
325
326
APPENDIX 4<br />
PLAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY<br />
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACEFUL<br />
REINTEGRATION OF OCCUPIED CROATIAN TERRITORIES<br />
INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM<br />
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,<br />
EARLY 1995<br />
327
328
18 January 1995<br />
“PLAN Z-4”<br />
Part One<br />
1<br />
DRAFT AGREEMENT ON KRAJINA,<br />
SLAVONIA, SOUTHERN BARANJA<br />
AND WESTERN SIRMIUM<br />
CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE KRAJINA<br />
I Establishment of the Serbian Krajina<br />
I.1 Boundaries<br />
I.2 Applicability of Laws and Governmental Acts<br />
I.3 Flags and Emblems<br />
I.4 Language<br />
I.5 Domicile<br />
II Division of Governmental Responsibilities between the Central and<br />
Krajina Governments in respect of Krajina<br />
II.1 General Division<br />
II.2 International Agreements and Representation<br />
II.3 Currency<br />
II.4 Taxation<br />
III Structure of the Krajina Government<br />
III.1 Legislature<br />
III.2 President<br />
III.3 Courts<br />
III.4 Independence of Offi cials<br />
III.5 Transitional Arrangements<br />
IV Participation of Krajina in the Central<br />
Government<br />
IV.1 Elections<br />
IV.2 Appointments to Central Government Offi ces<br />
V Demilitarization<br />
V.1 Demilitarization of Krajina<br />
V.2 Border with Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
329
VI Police Forces in Krajina<br />
330<br />
VI.1 Regular Police<br />
VI.2 Border Police<br />
Part Two<br />
ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING SLAVONIA, SOUTHERN BARANJA, WESTERN<br />
SIRMIUM AND OTHER AREAS<br />
VII Governance<br />
VII.1 General<br />
VIII Transitional Provisions<br />
VIII.1 International Forces and Monitors<br />
VIII 2 Demilitarization<br />
VIII.3 Monitoring of Police<br />
IX Special Governance and Power-Sharing for Eastern Slavonia, Southern<br />
Baranja and Western Sirmium<br />
IX.1 Special Governance<br />
IX.2 Power-Sharing<br />
X Police Forces<br />
X.1 Composition and Weapons<br />
Part Th ree<br />
COMMON PROVISIONS<br />
XI Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms<br />
XI.1 General<br />
XI.2 Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons<br />
XI.3 Citizenship<br />
XI.4 Restoration of or Compensation for Lost Property<br />
XI.5 Compliance of Governmental Organs<br />
XI.6 Human Rights Treaties<br />
XI.7 Human Rights Court<br />
XI.8 Ombudsmen<br />
XII Self-Government and Administration of Areas with Minority Populations<br />
XII.1 Minority Populations Areas
XII.2 Boundaries of Minority Population Areas<br />
XII.3 Provisions Governing Minority Population Areas<br />
XIII Special Constitutional Court for Krajina and Part Two Areas<br />
XIII.1 Establishment, Competence and Procedures<br />
XIII.2 Composition<br />
XIV Prosecutions Relating to Present Confl ict<br />
XIV.1 Domestic Prosecution<br />
XIV.2 International Prosecution<br />
XV Amendment of Constitution and Laws of Croatia<br />
XV.1 Adoption of Amendments<br />
XV.2 Further Changes in Amendments<br />
XVI Indivisibility of Croatia<br />
XVI.1 No Change Intended<br />
XVII Final Clauses<br />
XVII.1 Entry into Force and Implementation<br />
XVII.2 Languages<br />
Annexes<br />
A Boundaries:<br />
1. Of Krajina<br />
2. Of the Eastern Area<br />
B List of International Human Rights Instruments to be<br />
Incorporated into the Present Agreement<br />
C Composition and Competence of the Human Rights Court of Croatia<br />
D Initial Appointment and Functions of the Ombudsmen<br />
E Texts of Agreed Amendments to the Croatian Constitution and of<br />
Legislation to implement the present Agreement<br />
F Transitional Governance of the Eastern Area<br />
331
332<br />
DRAFT AGREEMENT ON KRAJINA, SLAVONIA, SOUTHERN BARANJA<br />
AND WESTERN SIRMIUM<br />
Th e representatives of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the representatives<br />
of the Entity designated as the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK)<br />
Hereby agree as follows:<br />
PART ONE:<br />
CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT ON KRAJINA<br />
Chapter I Establishment of the Serbian Krajina<br />
Article I: 1 Boundaries<br />
1. Th ere shall be established the autonomous Serbian Krajina (herein referred to as „<br />
Krajina“), to consist of the territory indicated on Map 1 in Annex A 1 . 91 [ 1 Th is territory<br />
will be a single continuous territory comprising the Serb majority areas of the United Nations<br />
Protected Areas (UNPAs) Sectors North and South, as defi ned in the 1001 census, with due<br />
consideration to geographic and economic factors.]<br />
2. At any time aft er the entry into force of the present Agreement, the boundaries of Krajina<br />
may be changed by agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia (to<br />
be refl ected in appropriate legislation) and the Legislature of Krajina. During a period<br />
of six months from the entry into force of the present Agreement, the Implementation<br />
Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XVII.1 is empowered to change the<br />
boundaries for a distance not exceeding two kilometers from their location in accordance<br />
with Map 1 in Annex A, provided that it acts by consensus aft er hearing representatives<br />
of the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and of Krajina.<br />
3. Th ere shall be no border controls at boundaries between Krajina and other parts of<br />
the Republic of Croatia.<br />
Article I.2 Applicability of Laws and Governmental Acts<br />
1. Laws adopted by the Croatian Sabor shall apply in Krajina only to the extent that<br />
they fall within the exclusive responsibility of the Central Government as specifi ed in<br />
paragraph 1 of Article II.1 or are delegated to the Government pursuant to paragraph 3<br />
of that Article, or they are approved by the Legislature of Krajina.<br />
91 Notes which are integral parts of documents are given in square brackets
2. Th e Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and any laws applicable to Krajina in<br />
accordance with paragraph 1 shall be faithfully enforced and applied by the competent<br />
organs of the Krajina Government.<br />
3. All actions taken by a competent governmental authority of the Republic of Croatia<br />
shall be accepted as valid by the competent governmental authorities of Krajina, and<br />
all actions taken by a competent governmental authority of Krajina shall be accepted as<br />
valid by the governmental authorities of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
Article I.3 Flags and Emblems<br />
1. Krajina may adopt its own emblem and fl ag, which may be displayed on its territory,<br />
including at all its boundaries, in accordance with laws adopted by the Legislature of<br />
Krajina.<br />
2. Th e fl ag and emblem of the Republic of Croatia may be displayed within Krajina<br />
on or at premises occupied by institutions of the Croatian Government, as well as at<br />
international borders.<br />
3. Individuals within any part of the Republic of Croatia shall be free to display the<br />
emblem and fl ag of the Republic of Croatia and of Krajina.<br />
Article I.4 Language<br />
Th e Legislature of Krajina may provide for the use of the Serbian language and the<br />
Cyrillic script, provided that the interests of minorities in Krajina are duly protected in<br />
accordance with chapter XI.<br />
Article I.5 Domicile<br />
Any citizen of the Republic of Croatia who is domiciled in Krajina shall be entitled to<br />
receive from the Krajina Government documentation recording such domicile, to be<br />
issued in accordance with regulations agreed to with the Government of the Republic<br />
of Croatia.<br />
Chapter II Division of Governmental Responsibilities between the Central and Krajina<br />
Governments in respect of Krajina<br />
Article II.1 General Division<br />
1. Th e Government of the Republic of Croatia (herein sometimes the „Central<br />
Government“) shall in respect of Krajina have exclusive responsibility for the following,<br />
except as otherwise specifi ed in or allowed by the present Agreement:<br />
(a) Conducting foreign aff airs, taking into account<br />
Article II.2;<br />
333
334<br />
(b) Th e defence of the Republic of Croatia against<br />
external threats;<br />
(c) Citizenship of the Republic of Croatia, subject to<br />
Article XI.3;<br />
(d) Regulating, provided that Krajina shall not be<br />
treated less favourably than other parts of<br />
Croatia:<br />
(i) international commerce, including customs;<br />
(ii) domestic trade across the boundaries of Krajina, including the use of<br />
principal road arteries and the railroads;<br />
(iii) fi nance;<br />
(iv) intellectual property;<br />
(v) product standards;<br />
(vi) communications;<br />
(e) Issuing and regulating currency, subject to Article II.3;<br />
(f) Allocating electronic frequencies for radio, television and other purposes,<br />
provided that there shall be allocated to Krajina at least as many frequencies<br />
as it currently uses as well as for least one television station.<br />
(g) postal activities;<br />
(h) protecting the environment, except to the extent that there are no impacts<br />
beyond the boundaries of the Krajina.<br />
2. Th e Government of Krajina shall have all responsibilities with respect to Krajina that<br />
are not covered by paragraph 1 above, and in particular the following, except as otherwise<br />
specifi ed in or allowed by the present Agreement:<br />
(a) Education;<br />
(b) Culture;<br />
(c) Housing;<br />
(d) Public services;<br />
(e) Business;<br />
(f) Charitable activities;<br />
(g) Energy;<br />
(h) Local land use;<br />
(i) Protection of the environment of Krajina, subject to subparagraph 1 (h);<br />
(j) Natural resources;<br />
(k) Radio and television;<br />
(l) Social welfare;<br />
(m) Tourism;<br />
(n) Certifi cates of Domicile in Krajina, subject to Article I.5;<br />
(o) Creation of corporations and other juridical persons;<br />
(p) Police, subject to Chapter VI;<br />
(q) Taxation, subject to Article II.4.
3. Th e Central and the Krajina Governments may agree to delegate to each other other or<br />
to administer jointly or in a coordinated manner any of their respective responsibilities.<br />
Th ey may establish joint commissions for this purpose.<br />
Article II.2 International Agreements and Representation<br />
1. Th e Government of Krajina may enter into agreements relating to education, culture,<br />
charitable activities, radio and television, and tourism with other entities or states with<br />
predominantly Serb populations and may enter into trade and business agreements with<br />
such entities or states subject to subparagraphs 1(d) (i-ii) of Article II.1, provided any<br />
such agreements are not inconsistent with the interests of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
2. Th e Government of Krajina may enter into other international agreements with<br />
the approval of the Central Government; which approval shall not be withheld<br />
unreasonably.<br />
3. Th e Government of Krajina may send representatives to states and international<br />
organizations.<br />
Article II.3 Currency<br />
1. Th e Central Bank of Croatia shall issue special currency (notes and coins) for Krajina,<br />
whose value shall be on par with the currency it issues for the rest of the Republic of<br />
Croatia and whose designation and design shall be determined by the Government of<br />
Krajina.<br />
2. Banks and other fi nancial institutions throughout the Republic of Croatia shall be<br />
required to accept both forms of currency issued by the Central Bank of Croatia. Legal<br />
tender for payments due within Krajina shall be the currency issued for Krajina, and<br />
for payments due within other parts of Croatia shall be the other currency issued by the<br />
Central Bank. Individuals shall, subject to any contractual or other requirements, be free<br />
to use either or both forms of such currency.<br />
Article II.4 Taxation<br />
1. Th e Central Government shall not impose and the Krajina Government may impose<br />
taxes on:<br />
(a) property located in Krajina (including estate and inheritance taxes);<br />
(b) transactions carried out within Krajina (including sales, value added and<br />
excise taxes)<br />
(c) income earned within Krajina by natural persons domiciled therein<br />
(including social insurance taxes);<br />
(d) income earned within Krajina by juridical persons established under the<br />
laws of the latter.<br />
2. Th e Central and the Krajina Government may enter into agreements to prevent or<br />
335
to mitigate the evasion of taxes and double taxation consequent on the provisions of<br />
paragraph 1.<br />
3. Th e Central and the Krajina Governments may enter into agreements for transferring<br />
between them any taxing authority specifi ed in paragraph 1 and for the corresponding<br />
transfer of governmental responsibilities pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article II.1.<br />
336<br />
Chapter III Structure of the Krajina Government<br />
Article III.1 Legislature<br />
1. Th e Legislature of Krajina shall be elected democratically on a proportional basis, for<br />
a period of 4 years. All citizens of the Republic of Croatia domiciled in Krajina who are<br />
over the age of 18 may vote in elections for the Legislature and may be candidates for<br />
seats in the Legislature.<br />
2. Th e Legislature may adopt laws relating to:<br />
(a) Matters that are within the responsibility of the Government of Krajina;<br />
(b) Th e organizations and functioning of all organs of the Krajina<br />
Government, including all necessary budgetary arrangements and<br />
the raising of taxes required therefor.<br />
Article III.2 President<br />
1. Th e President of Krajina shall be elected democratically for a period of 5 years. All<br />
citizens of the Republic of Croatia domiciled in Krajina who are over the age of 18 may<br />
vote in elections for the President and may be candidates for that offi ce.<br />
2. Th e president of Krajina shall be responsible for the execution of:<br />
(a) Th ose provisions of the present Agreement that are within the responsibility<br />
of the Government of Krajina;<br />
(b) All laws and decrees of the Central Government that are applicable to Krajina;<br />
(c) All laws adopted by the Legislature of Krajina;<br />
(d) All decrees promulgated by the President of Krajina.<br />
3. Th e President of Krajina may promulgate decrees as authorized by laws of the Central<br />
Government applicable to Krajina or by laws adopted by the Legislature of Krajina.<br />
4. Th e President of Krajina shall appoint such Ministers as provided for in laws adopted<br />
by the Legislature of Krajina, who shall be approved by that Legislature and shall have<br />
duties, responsibilities and powers as provided in such laws. Any Minister may at any<br />
time be removed by the President, and shall be so removed on a vote of no confi dence by
the Legislature. Th e Minister shall form the Cabinet of Krajina, which shall meet under<br />
the chairmanship of the Minister designated by the President and shall have duties,<br />
responsibilities and powers as provided by law or decree.<br />
Article III.3 Courts<br />
1. Th e judicial power in Krajina shall be vested in such courts of fi rst instance and such<br />
appellate courts as are specifi ed in laws adopted by the Legislature of Krajina, which laws<br />
shall specify the respective jurisdictions of these courts, as well as the salaries and other<br />
terms of service of the Judges. Th e Judges of all courts of Krajina shall be nominated by<br />
the President of Krajina and approved by a majority of the Legislature, and shall serve<br />
until age 70 unless they resign or are removed for cause by the Judges of the same court<br />
acting by consensus.<br />
2. Decisions of the appellate courts of Krajina may be appealed to a special chamber<br />
of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia whose members shall be appointed<br />
by the President of the Special Constitutional Court from among the Judges of the<br />
Supreme Court of Croatia and of the highest appellate court of Krajina, in consultations<br />
with the President of the High Judiciary Council of Croatia and the President of any<br />
corresponding body of Krajina.<br />
Article III.4 Independence of Offi cials<br />
No members or offi cers of the Legislature, the President, the Ministers, the Judges or any<br />
other organs of Krajina Government shall require for their appointment the approval<br />
of any offi cer or organ of the Central Government, and no such offi cer or organ may<br />
remove any member, offi cer or offi cial of the Krajina Government, provided that they<br />
may be removed by the Special Constitutional Court on conviction of a crime resulting<br />
in imprisonment.<br />
Article III.5 Transitional Arrangements<br />
1. Th e elections provided for in paragraph 1 of Articles III.1 and in paragraph 1 of<br />
Article III.2 shall be held no later than one year from the entry into force of the present<br />
Agreement.<br />
2. For a transitional period until the elections referred to in paragraph 1 have been<br />
held, but in no event for more than one year from the entry into force of the present<br />
Agreement, the functions of the organs and offi cials provided for in Articles III. 1-3 shall<br />
be performed by the corresponding organs and offi cials now performing such functions<br />
in Krajina.<br />
337
338<br />
Chapter IV Participation of Krajina in the Central Government<br />
Article IV.1 Elections<br />
1. Citizens of the Republic of Croatia who are domiciled in Krajina shall participate in the<br />
same way as all other citizens in the selection of members of the Central Government,<br />
including the elections to the Croatian Sabor and of the President.<br />
2. For the purposes of elections to the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Sabor,<br />
Krajina shall consist of two counties, whose boundaries and designation ¸2 [ 2 Although the<br />
Croatian term for „county“ is „županija“ the Krajina Government shall not be obliged to use the<br />
latter term] shall be established by the Legislature of Krajina.<br />
3. Until new elections to the Croatian Sabor, the Legislature of Krajina shall appoint ten<br />
members to the House of Representatives of the Sabor and nine 3 [ 3 In accordance with<br />
paragraph 2 of Article VI, Krajina will be entitled to six members of the Chamber of Counties;<br />
the transitional arrangement here proposed would temporarily add two seats for Sector East and<br />
one seat for Sector West.] members to the House of Counties.<br />
4. All persons serving in either Chamber of the Croatian Sabor who declare themselves<br />
as having Serb nationality shall constitute the Serb Caucus of the Sabor.<br />
Article IV.2 Appointments to Central Government Offi ces<br />
In appointments to any offi ces and posts of the Central Government, including that to<br />
Minister and of Judges, citizens of the Republic of Croatia who are Serbs domiciled in<br />
Krajina shall be considered on the same basis as all other citizens of Croatia, and such<br />
domiciliaries shall be represented in such offi ces and posts in the same proportion as<br />
they constitute of all citizens. At least one member of the Krajina Government shall<br />
be named a member of the Central Government. 4 [ 4 Th is provision conforms to the fi nal<br />
paragraph of Article 18 of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights, etc. of Croatia.]<br />
Chapter V Demilitarization<br />
Article V.1 Demilitarization of Krajina<br />
1. Krajina shall not establish, maintain or permit the formation of any military force.<br />
2. Th e demilitarization of Krajina shall start no later than three years aft er the entry into<br />
force of the present Agreement, and shall be completed no later than fi ve years aft er such<br />
entry into force. All weapons removed from Krajina shall be destroyed by or under the<br />
supervision of UNPROFOR.<br />
3. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article V.2, the military forces of the Central<br />
Government shall not enter into any part of Krajina, except at the specifi c invitation of<br />
the President of Krajina.
Article V.2 Border with Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
1. Th e Government of the Republic of Croatia shall endeavor to enter into an agreement<br />
with appropriate authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the demilitarization of their<br />
mutual border.<br />
2. Until an agreement for the demilitarization of the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
has been concluded, the Security Council of the United Nations may decide to station<br />
forces of the United Nations on that portion of the border that constitutes a boundary of<br />
Krajina. 5 [ 5 It is understood that neither the Croatian Government nor that of Krajina can object<br />
to the deployment of UN forces.] With the approval of the Governments of the Republic of<br />
Croatia and of Krajina, the forces of other international organizations or of states may be<br />
stationed on that portion of the border.<br />
3. Should it not be possible to arrange for either the demilitarization of or the stationing<br />
of any international or foreign forces on any part of the Krajina portion of the Croatian<br />
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republic of Croatia may<br />
station its military forces along such part of the border, provided that such forces shall<br />
not be stationed more than 5 kilometers from the international border.<br />
Chapter VI Police Forces in Krajina<br />
Article VI.1 Regular Police<br />
1. Th e police force of Krajina shall be established in accordance with laws adopted by the<br />
Legislature of Krajina and shall be under the control of the President of Krajina through<br />
a Minister designated by the President.<br />
2. Th e ethnic composition of the police force shall refl ect that of the population of<br />
Krajina, as indicated in the 1991 census until a later country-wide census has been<br />
completed, and any police units stationed in particular communities shall refl ect the<br />
ethnic composition of these communities.<br />
3. Th e police force shall be equipped with arms and vehicles of the same or equivalent<br />
types used by police in other parts of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
Article VI.2 Border Police<br />
Posts at offi cial crossings along the border of Krajina with Bosnia and Herzegovina shall<br />
be manned by border police of the Republic of Croatia. Patrols along that border shall be<br />
carried out by joint units of Croatian and Krajina border police.<br />
339
340<br />
PART TWO:<br />
ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING SLAVONIA, SOUTHERN BARANJA,<br />
WESTERN SIRMIUM AND OTHER AREAS<br />
Chapter VII Governance<br />
Article VII.1 General<br />
All areas, except for those covered by Part One, that are under United Nations protection<br />
pursuant to resolutions 743 (1992) and 762 (1992) of the Security Council of the United<br />
Nations (herein the „Part Two Areas“) shall be subject to governance by the Government<br />
of the Republic of Croatia in accordance with the provisions set out or referred to in this<br />
Part.<br />
Chapter VIII Transitional Provisions<br />
Article VIII.1 International Forces and Monitors<br />
1. Subject to decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations, or of the competent<br />
organs of other international organizations acceptable to the Governments of the<br />
Republic of Croatia and of Krajina, UNPROFOR or other international forces, as well<br />
as civilian monitoring units, shall be stationed in all or parts of the Part Two Areas<br />
for a transitional period of at least fi ve years, for the purpose of ensuring the full and<br />
faithful implementation of Part Two and of the applicable provisions of Part Th ree of the<br />
present Agreement, as well as of the „Vance Plan“ as set out in Annex III to the Secretary-<br />
General`s report to the Security Council of 11 December 1991 (S/23280).<br />
2. Th e Government of the Republic of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the international<br />
forces referred to in paragraph 1, for the purpose of facilitating the accomplishment of<br />
their functions.<br />
Article VIII.2 Demilitarization<br />
1. During the transitional period specifi ed in paragraph 1 of Article VIII.1 the Part Two<br />
Areas shall be demilitarized, except that military forces of the Republic of Croatia may<br />
be stationed within 5 kilometers of international borders, and may use access routes to<br />
such borders in agreement with and under the supervision of the international forces<br />
referred to in that paragraph 1.<br />
2. Th e demilitarization of the Part Two Areas shall start no later than one month aft er<br />
the entry into force of the present Agreement, and shall be completed no later than<br />
three months aft er such entry into force. All weapons removed from the Areas shall be<br />
destroyed by or under the supervision of UNPROFOR.
Article VIII.3 Monitoring of Police<br />
During the transitional period specifi ed in paragraph 1 of Article VIII.1 the composition<br />
and operations of all police forces operating in the Part Two Areas shall be monitored by<br />
a police component of the international forces referred to in that paragraph.<br />
Chapter IX Special Governance and Power-Sharing<br />
for Eastern Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium<br />
Article IX.1 Special Governance<br />
1. During the fi rst two years of the transitional period described in this parts, unless<br />
another period is determined by the Security Council of the United Nations, Eastern<br />
Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium (herein the „Eastern Area“), to<br />
consist of the territory indicated on Map 2 in Annex A, shall subject to the approval<br />
of the Security Council be administered by the United Nations in accordance with the<br />
provisions of Annex F.<br />
2. In addition to ensuring the peaceful governance of the Eastern Area and the<br />
implementation of the transitional arrangements in this part, the special task of the<br />
United Nations administration shall be to:<br />
(a) Encourage and facilitate the return of persons who were forced to leave<br />
their homes in the Eastern Area aft er 1 July 1991;<br />
(b) Arrange for elections of offi cials and legislators who will, in accordance<br />
with the law of the Republic of Croatia, govern or represent the Eastern<br />
Area aft er the end of the special transitional period specifi ed in paragraph 1.<br />
Article IX.2 Power-Sharing<br />
At the end of the period of United Nations administration in accordance with paragraph<br />
1 of Article IX.1, any villages, towns or municipalities within the Eastern Area that<br />
constitute Serb majority areas within the meaning of Article XI.1 shall have selfgovernment<br />
in accordance with Article XI.3.<br />
Chapter X Police Forces<br />
Article X.1 Composition and Weapons<br />
1. All police forces in the Part Two Areas shall have an ethnic composition refl ecting<br />
that of the areas in which the force is operating, as indicated in the 1991 census until a<br />
later country-wide census has been completed.<br />
2. Th e police force shall be equipped with arms and vehicles of the same or equivalent<br />
types customary for police forces in European states.<br />
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342<br />
PART THREE:<br />
COMMON PROVISIONS<br />
Chapter XI Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms<br />
Article XI.1 General<br />
Th e application of the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and<br />
fundamental freedoms provided in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, in the<br />
Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and<br />
Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, and in the instruments<br />
listed in Annex B shall be ensured throughout Croatia. In particular:<br />
1. All persons within the Republic of Croatia shall enjoy the rights:<br />
(a) To life;<br />
(b) To liberty, with arrest and detention authorized only by law;<br />
(c) To equality before the law;<br />
(d) To freedom from discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language,<br />
religion or creed, political or other opinions, and national or social origin;<br />
(e) To fair criminal proceedings;<br />
(f) To freedom from torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment;<br />
(g) To privacy;<br />
(h) To freedom of movement;<br />
(i) To asylum;<br />
(j) To protection of the family and of children;<br />
(k) To property;<br />
(l) To fundamental freedoms: free speech and press; freedom of thought,<br />
conscience, and belief; freedom of religion, including private and<br />
public worship; freedom of assembly; freedom of association, including<br />
freedom to form and belong to labour unions and the freedom not to<br />
associate; and freedom to work;<br />
(m) To education;<br />
(n) To welfare;<br />
(o) To health;<br />
(p) To nutrition;<br />
(q) To shelter; and<br />
(r) To protection of minorities and vulnerable groups.<br />
2. All citizens of the Republic of Croatia shall enjoy the rights:<br />
(a) To form and belong to political parties;<br />
(b) To participate in public aff airs;
(c) To have equal access to public service; and<br />
(d) To vote and stand for election.<br />
Article XI.2 Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons<br />
All refugees and displaced persons have the right to return freely to their homes of<br />
origin.<br />
Article XI.3 Citizenship<br />
1. Any person who was a citizen of the Socialist Republic of Croatia within the Socialist<br />
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 21 December 1990 shall as of that date be considered<br />
as a citizen of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
2. Dual citizenship shall be allowed:<br />
(a) No citizen of the Republic of Croatia shall, without his consent, be<br />
deprived of that citizenship merely by acquiring the citizenship of<br />
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;<br />
(b) No citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall solely by reason<br />
of that citizenship be prevented from acquiring the citizenship of the<br />
Republic of Croatia or be required to renounce the former citizenship<br />
as a condition of acquiring the latter.<br />
Article XI.4 Restoration of or Compensation for Lost Property<br />
All persons shall have the right, to be implemented in accordance with legislation of the<br />
Republic of Croatia and, as applicable, of Krajina, to have restored to them any property<br />
of which they were deprived in the course of ethnic cleansing or other unlawful acts and<br />
to be compensated for any property which cannot be restored to them. All statements<br />
or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to the relinquishment of<br />
rights to land or property, shall be treated as null and void.<br />
Article XI.5 Compliance of Governmental Organs<br />
All governmental organs and administrative agencies of the Republic of Croatia and of<br />
Krajina shall apply and conform to the rights and freedoms provided in the Constitution<br />
and the Constitutional Law referred to in Article XI.1, and to those otherwise specifi ed<br />
in the present Chapter, or in instruments listed in Annex B.<br />
Article XI.6 Human Rights Treaties<br />
1. Th e Republic of Croatia shall as soon as possible become a party to each of the<br />
international treaties listed in Annex B.<br />
343
2. All governmental organs and administrative agencies of the Republic of Croatia<br />
and of Krajina shall cooperate with any supervisory bodies established by any of the<br />
instruments listed in Annex B.<br />
344<br />
Article XI.7 Human Rights Court<br />
Th e Republic of Croatia shall make arrangements with the Council of Europe for the<br />
establishment of a Human Rights Court of Croatia in accordance with Resolution 93 (6)<br />
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council and as specifi ed in Annex C hereto.<br />
Article XI.8 Ombudsmen<br />
Th e Government of the Republic of Croatia shall provide for the appointment of<br />
Ombudsmen to assist in implementing the rights and freedoms specifi ed in this Chapter.<br />
For an initial period of at least three years and as long as appropriate legislation has<br />
not yet been adopted by the Croatian Sabor with the concurrence of the Serb Caucus<br />
of the Sabor, the provisions relating to the initial appointment and functions of the<br />
Ombudsmen shall be as set out in Annex D.<br />
Chapter XII Self-Government and Administration of Areas with Minority Populations<br />
Article XII.1 Minority Population Areas<br />
Wherever in a village, municipality or town within Krajina the majority of the population<br />
is Croat, or Serb within any Part Two Area (herein a „minority population area“), the<br />
provisions set out in this Chapter shall apply in order to ensure the maximum degree of<br />
self-government for such local majority.<br />
Article XII.2 Boundaries of Minority Population Areas<br />
1. Notwithstanding any provision of the Law on Local Self-Government and<br />
Administration of 29 December 1992 (herein the „Self-Government Law“) or the Law<br />
on the Territories of Counties, Cities and Municipalities of the Republic of Croatia of 29<br />
December 1992, the boundaries of a minority population area shall be drawn so as to<br />
include as many members of the group for which the area is to be established without<br />
thereby reducing their proportion below 60%.<br />
2. A minority population area may not consist of two or more non-contiguous areas.<br />
3. In establishing the boundaries of minority population areas, account shall be taken of<br />
the views of persons who might be included or excluded from the area in question.<br />
4. Th e boundaries of minority population areas may be changed as a result of an offi cial<br />
census.
5. Disputes concerning the boundaries of minority population areas shall be resolved<br />
by the Special Constitutional Court established by Article XIII.1.<br />
Article XII.3 Provisions Governing Minority Population Areas<br />
1. Th e Self-Government Law shall apply to minority population areas, with the following<br />
exceptions:<br />
(a) All minority population areas shall be considered as units of local<br />
government and self-government;<br />
(b) All references to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia shall be<br />
deemed to be to the Special Constitutional Court established by Article XII.1.<br />
(c) All appointment of offi cials of or serving in minority population areas,<br />
including teachers, shall be made as specifi ed in the Constitution and<br />
applicable laws of Croatia, provided that when such appointments are<br />
not made by the authorities of that area, such authorities may fi le a<br />
reasoned objection to the body appointing such offi cials, and if a solution<br />
has not been found satisfying both authorities, the matter may be referred<br />
by either to the Special Constitutional Court. Appointments shall as far<br />
as feasible be made from among domiciliaries of the minority population area<br />
in which they are to serve, and the ethnic composition of each group of<br />
such offi cials shall as far as feasible refl ect that of the area.<br />
(d) Article 65 of this Law shall apply only if the local unit is part of the same<br />
minority population area as the municipality or town or city referred to in that<br />
Article.<br />
(e) Articles 71 and 82, and the third paragraph of Article 83, of the Law shall not<br />
apply.<br />
(f) Th e dismissal of the representative body of a local self-government unit<br />
in accordance with Article 81 or of a municipal prefect or mayor in<br />
accordance with the third paragraph of Article 83 may be appealed<br />
by those concerned to the Special Constitutional Court and if so appealed<br />
shall not take eff ect until that Court has so decided.<br />
(g) Th e suspension of a general act pursuant to Article 80 of the Law may only<br />
be ordered, as a provisional measure, by the Special Constitutional Court.<br />
(h) Disputes referred to in the second sentence of the second paragraph of<br />
Article 87 shall be submitted to the Special Constitutional Court.<br />
2. Before submitting a dispute or matter to the Special Constitutional Court pursuant to<br />
paragraph 1 above, the authorities or parties concerned shall make an eff ort to resolve<br />
any diff erence by common agreement. Th e Court may at any time require that further<br />
eff orts be made that end.<br />
345
346<br />
Chapter XIII Special Constitutional Court<br />
for Krajina and the Part Two Areas<br />
Article XIII.1 Establishment, Competence and Procedures<br />
1. Th ere shall be established a Special Constitutional Court for Krajina and the Part<br />
Two Areas (herein the „Special Constitutional Court“ or the „Court“) to which shall<br />
be submitted for fi nal disposition all disputes arising under the present Agreement<br />
(excepting matters decided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XVII.1), including any<br />
disputes relating to the interpretation or implementation of any of the provisions of<br />
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Law on Human Rights<br />
and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the<br />
Republic of Croatia, or any other law and legislative decree amended or supplemented<br />
pursuant to the present Agreement or required for its implementation.<br />
2. Except as otherwise provided by the present Agreement, disputes may be submitted<br />
to the Special Constitutional Court by the President of the Republic of Croatia or by its<br />
Prime Minister, by the President or the Legislature of Krajina and by the Chairman of<br />
the Serb Caucus of the Sabor.<br />
3. Th e Special Constitutional Court shall establish its own procedures, which may<br />
include provisions for the establishment of chambers and for the hearing of appeals from<br />
the decisions of such chambers.<br />
4. All costs of the Special constitutional Court, including that of the salaries of the<br />
Judges, which shall not be lower than those of the judges of the Constitutional Court of<br />
Croatia, shall be borne by the Republic of Croatia.<br />
Article XIII.2 Composititon<br />
1. Th e Special Constitutional Court shall consist of:<br />
(a) Two judges of the Constitutional Court of Croatia, designated by the President<br />
of that Court;<br />
(b) Two judges of the highest or senior appellate court of Krajina, designated by the<br />
President of that Court;<br />
(c) Th ree judges who shall not be citizens of the Republic of Croatia or of any<br />
neighboring state, appointed by the President of the Court of Justice of the European<br />
Union 6 [ 6 Th e President of that Court would have to be approached before the present Agreement<br />
is completed to determine whether he will assume that task. If not, other offi cials who might be<br />
approached are the President of the ICJ, the President of the European Court of Human Rights or<br />
the Chairman-in-Offi ce of CSCE.]<br />
2. Th e President of the Special Constitutional Court shall be elected by a majority of all<br />
the Judges of the court, form among those appointed pursuant to subparagraph 1(c).
Chapter XIV Prosecutions Relating to Present Confl ict<br />
Article XIV.1 Domestic Prosecution<br />
1. Neither the Republic of Croatia nor Krajina shall prosecute, except as provided in<br />
paragraph 2, any person for crimes allegedly committed in connection with the confl ict<br />
in Croatia aft er 1 August 1990.<br />
2. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article XIV.2, prosecutions shall, however, be undertaken<br />
against any person accused of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,<br />
violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide or crimes against humanity 7 [ 7 Th ese<br />
are the same crimes to which the competence of the International War Crimes Tribunal for former<br />
Yugoslavia extends pursuant to Articles 2-5 of the Tribunal`s Statute.] under any provisions of<br />
domestic law that permit such prosecution.<br />
3. Trials of persons accused pursuant to paragraph 2 shall exclusively be conducted in<br />
a War Crimes Tribunal for Croatia which shall be established by and operate under the<br />
supervision of the Special Constitutional Court. Prosecution in the Tribunal may be<br />
conducted by prosecutors appointed for that purpose by either the Government of the<br />
Republic of Croatia or of Krajina.<br />
Article XIV.2 International Prosecution<br />
1. All organs af the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and of Krajina shall cooperate<br />
with the International Tribunal for the Prosecutiona of Persons Responsible for Serious<br />
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former<br />
Yugoslavia since 1991 established by resolution 827 (1993) of the Security Council of the<br />
United Nations, in collecting or allowing the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal to<br />
collect evidence of crimes within the jurisdiction of that Tribunal, in making available<br />
witnesses and accused persons, and in any other way requested by the competent<br />
authorities of the Tribunal.<br />
2. Should the International Tribunal formally so request, the War Crimes Tribunal for<br />
Croatia shall defer to the competence of the latter Tribunal in respect to any proceeding. 8<br />
[ 8 Based on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Statute of the International War Crimes Tribunal for<br />
Former Yugoslavia.]<br />
Chapter XV Amendment of Constitution and Laws of Croatia<br />
Article XV.1 Adoption of Amendments<br />
1. Th e Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Law on Human Rights<br />
and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in<br />
the Republic of Croatia, as well as other laws and legislative decrees shall be amanded<br />
or supplemented as specifi ed in Annex E, in order to implement the provisions of the<br />
present Agreement.<br />
347
2. Th e amendments and legislation required to be adopted by paragraph 1 shall enter<br />
into force no later than six months aft er the signature of the present Agreement.<br />
348<br />
Article XV.2 Further Changes in Amendments<br />
Th e amendments and legislation adopted pursuant to Article XV.1, as well as existing<br />
provisions of the instruments referred to in paragraph 1 of Article XV.1 that are required<br />
for the implementation of the provisions of the present Agreement, shall not be amended<br />
or repealed without the approval of the Legislature of Krajina and the concurrence of the<br />
Serb Caucus of the Sabor.<br />
Chapter XVI Indivisibility of Croatia<br />
Article XVI.1 No Change Intended<br />
Nothing in the present Agreement shall be deemed to alter the indivisible nature of the<br />
Republic of Croatia specifi ed in Article 1 of its Constitution.<br />
Chapter XVII Final Clauses<br />
Article XVII.1 Entry into Force and Implementation<br />
1. Th e present Agreement shall enter into force aft er its signature on behalf of both<br />
parties, on a date one month aft er the entry into force of the amendments and legislation<br />
required to be adopted by paragraph 1 of Article XV.1 and the completion of the<br />
arrangements with the Council of Europe specifi ed in Article XI.7.<br />
2. Any questions concerning the time-table for or the methods of implementing the<br />
provisions of the present Agreement may be decided by an Implementation Commission<br />
consisting of one representative each of the Russian Federation, of the United States of<br />
America, of the United Nations and of the European Union, the latter two to be appointed<br />
by the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on<br />
the Former Yugoslavia. 9 [ 9 It is envisaged that the Implementation Commission may be a<br />
continuation of the existing group that cosponsored the 29 March 1994 ceasefi re agreement<br />
negotiations and the negotiating process for subsequent stages, including the preparation of this<br />
text.]<br />
Article XVII.2 Languages<br />
Th e present Agreement shall be concluded in the English, Croat and Serb languages. In<br />
cases of inconsistencies, the English text shall prevail.
DONE THIS________________________day of___________________1995, at<br />
___________________, in three copies. 10 [ 10 One each for the two parties and one for the<br />
United Nations.]<br />
A N N E X A<br />
MAP 1: BOUNDARIES OF KRAJINA<br />
Article 1 Map<br />
Th e boundaries of Krajina shall be as indicated on the Map below. 11 [ 11 As indicated in<br />
footnote 1, the territory of Krajina is to be a single continuous territory comprising the Serb<br />
majority areas of UNPAs Sectors North and South, as defi ned in the 1991 census, with due<br />
consideration to geographic and economic factors.]<br />
Article 2 Boundary Demarcation Commission<br />
1. A Boundary Demarcation Commission shall be established for the physical<br />
demarcation of those parts of the boundaries of Krajina that do not constitute an<br />
international border.<br />
2. Not later than six months aft er the entry into force of the present Agreement, the<br />
President of the Republic of Croatia and the President of Krajina shall each appoint one<br />
member of the Boundary Demarcation Commission. A third member, who shall be the<br />
Chairman of the Commission, shall be appointed by the two Presidents acting jointly or,<br />
if they are unable to agree, by the President of the Special Constitutional Court at the<br />
request of the President of either the Republic of Croatia or of Krajina; the Chairman of<br />
the Commission shall not be a citizen of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
MAP 2: BOUNDARIES OF THE EASTERN AREA<br />
(Article IX.1, paragraph 1)<br />
Article 1 Map<br />
Th e boundaries of the Eastern Area shall be as indicated on the Map below.<br />
349
350<br />
A N N E X B<br />
LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE<br />
PRESENT AGREEMENT<br />
(Article XI.1)<br />
1. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide<br />
2. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights<br />
3. 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of the Victims of War, and the 1977<br />
Geneva Protocols I-II<br />
4. 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental<br />
Freedoms, and the Protocols thereto<br />
5. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto<br />
6. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women<br />
7. 1961 European Social Charter and the Protocol 1 thereto<br />
8. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness<br />
9. 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial<br />
Discrimination<br />
10. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 1966 and 1989<br />
Optional Protocols thereto<br />
11. 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights<br />
12. 1979 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination<br />
against Women<br />
13. 1981 [UN] Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and of<br />
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief<br />
14. 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment<br />
or Punishment<br />
15. 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading<br />
Treatment or Punishment<br />
16. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child<br />
17. 1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families<br />
18. 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human<br />
Dimension of the CSCE, Part IV<br />
19. 1990 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of<br />
Minorities, paras. 10-13<br />
20. 1992 [UN] Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,<br />
Religious and Linguistic Minorities<br />
21. 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
A N N E X C<br />
COMPOSITION AND COMPETENCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COURT OF CROATIA<br />
(Article XI.7)<br />
Article 1 Council of Europe resolution<br />
Th e Human Rights Court of Croatia (the „Court“) shall operate within the framework of<br />
the mechanism established by the Council of Europe by resolution 93 (&) of its Council<br />
of Ministers, as that resolution may be amended from time to time.<br />
Article 2 Composition<br />
1. Th e Court shall initially consist of nine Judges:<br />
(a) Two of the Judges shall be appointed by the High Judiciary Council of Croatia;<br />
(b) One of the Judges shall be appointed by the corresponding organ of Krajina;<br />
(c) One of the Judges shall be appointed by the President of the Special<br />
constitutional Court aft er consultation with representatives of other<br />
national and ethnic communities or minorities.<br />
(d) Five of the Judges shall be appointed by the Committee of Ministers<br />
of the Council of Europe in accordance with the above-cited resolution. Th ese<br />
Judges may not be citizens of the Republic of Croatia nor of<br />
neighbouring States.<br />
2. Th e Judges appointed under sub-paragraphs 1 (a) – (c) shall serve until age 70 and<br />
may only be removed, for cause, by a consensus of all the other Judges of the court.<br />
3. If the Court concludes that its business requires the participation of more Judges<br />
to avoid undue delays in the disposition of cases, the Government of the Republic of<br />
Croatia shall make arrangements with the Council of Europe for the appointment of<br />
additional Judges, in accordance with the above-specifi ed procedures and proportions.<br />
Article 3 Procedures and Organization<br />
1. Th e Court shall regulate its own procedures and organization.<br />
2. Each panel of the Court is to have the composition specifi ed for the Court in<br />
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the present Annex.<br />
3. Th e equality of the parties shall be ensured in every proceeding.<br />
4. Th e Court shall allow written and oral pleadings in every proceeding pursuant<br />
to Articles 5 to 7 of the present Annex.<br />
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352<br />
Article 4 Competence<br />
Th e competence of the Court shall extend to any question concerning a constitutional<br />
or other legal provision of the Republic of Croatia or of Krajina relating to human rights<br />
or fundamental freedoms, including those in the present Agreement or in any of the<br />
instruments listed in Annex B hereto.<br />
Article 5 Submission of Appeals<br />
Any party to a proceeding in which another court of the Republic of Croatia or of Krajina<br />
has pronounced a judgement that is not subject to any other appeal (for a reason other<br />
than the lapse of a time-limit for which the moving party is responsible), may appeal<br />
such judgement to the Court on the basis of any question within its competence. Th e<br />
decision of the Court on such an appeal shall be fi nal and binding.<br />
Article 6 Appeals of Protracted Proceedings<br />
1. An appeal may also be taken to the Court if a proceeding is pending for what<br />
it considers an unduly long time in any other court of the Republic of Croatia or of<br />
Krajina.<br />
2. Th e Court shall decide whether to accept such an appeal aft er a preliminary<br />
consideration of whether the proceeding in such other court had been pending too long<br />
and whether the subject of the appeal is within its competence.<br />
Article 7 Stated Questions<br />
Any appellate court of the Republic of Croatia or of Krajina may, at the request of any<br />
party to a proceeding pending before it or on its own motion in relation to such a<br />
proceeding, address to the Court a question arising out of the proceeding if the question<br />
relates to any matter within the competence of the Court. Th e response of the Court is<br />
binding on the requesting court.<br />
Article 8 Duration<br />
Th e Court shall continue to function until the Republic of Croatia becomes a party to<br />
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, unless the<br />
Council of Europe mechanism referred to in article 1 of the present annex ceases at some<br />
earlier date to be in force in respect of the Republic of Croatia.
A N N E X D<br />
Initial Appointment and Functions of the Ombudsmen<br />
(Article XI.8)<br />
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS<br />
Article 1 Functions of Ombudsmen<br />
1. Th e Ombudsmen are to protect human dignity, rights and freedoms as provided in any<br />
constitutional or other legal provision of the Republic of Croatia or of Krajina relating<br />
to human rights or fundamental freedoms, including those in the present Agreement or<br />
in any of the instruments listed in Annex B hereto, and in particular shall act to reverse<br />
the consequences of the violations of these rights and liberties and especially of ethnic<br />
cleansing.<br />
2. In carrying out their functions, the Ombudsmen must be guided by law and by the<br />
principles of morality and justice.<br />
Article 2 Individual Functioning<br />
Each Ombudsman shall exercise his functions individually, except as otherwise<br />
provided herein. Two or more Ombudsmen may cooperate in carrying out any of their<br />
functions.<br />
Article 3 Independence<br />
Th e Ombudsmen are independent in carrying out their functions and no governmental<br />
organ or any other person may interfere with such functions.<br />
Article 4 Appointment<br />
1. Th ere shall be four Ombudsmen: two Croat, one Serb, and one for other national or<br />
ethnic communities or minorities. Until the Croatian Sabor adopts, with the concurrence<br />
of the Serb Caucus of the Sabor, a law relating to the appointment and functioning of the<br />
Ombudsmen, these shall be appointed and may be removed by the Chairman-in-Offi ce<br />
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<br />
2. Each of the Ombudsmen shall with the approval of the High Judiciary Council of<br />
Croatia appoint one or more deputies.<br />
3. Th e terms of service of the Ombudsmen and their deputies shall be the same<br />
respectively as those of the President and of Judges of the Supreme Court of Croatia.<br />
4. Each Ombudsman shall also appoint additional staff within the framework of the<br />
budget approved therefore by the High Judiciary Council of Croatia.<br />
353
354<br />
II. THE COMPETENCE AND THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMEN<br />
Article 5 Organs and Entities Subject to Monitoring<br />
Th e Ombudsmen may follow the activities of any organ of the Government of the<br />
Republic of Croatia and of the Government of Krajina, or of any governmental units<br />
subordinate thereto, as well as of any other institution or person by whom human<br />
dignity, rights or liberties may be negated or ethnic cleansing may be accomplished or<br />
its eff ects preserved.<br />
Article 6 Powers<br />
In the course of carrying out his functions, an Ombudsman may examine all offi cial<br />
documents, including secret ones, as well as judicial and administrative fi les, and require<br />
any person (including any offi cial) to cooperate, in particular by transmitting relevant<br />
information, documents and fi les. Ombudsmen may also attend court and administrative<br />
hearings, as well as meetings of other organs and enter and inspect any place where<br />
persons deprived of their liberty are confi ned or work.<br />
Article 7 Maintenance of Confi dentiality<br />
Th e Ombudsmen, their deputies and any other person who carries out inquiries pursuant<br />
to article 6 above are required to maintain the secrecy of whatever they learn in the<br />
course of such inquiry, and must treat all documents and fi les in accordance with the<br />
applicable rules.<br />
III. REPORTS OF THE OMBUDSMEN<br />
Article 8 Annual and Special Reports<br />
1. Each Ombudsman shall present an annual report to the President of the Republic of<br />
Croatia and to the President of Krajina, to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee<br />
of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Chairman-in-Offi ce<br />
of CSCE. Th ese reports shall be published.<br />
2. An Ombudsman may also present at any time special reports to any competent<br />
authorities.<br />
IV. REGULATIONS OF THE OMBUDSMEN<br />
Article 9 Adoption of Regulations<br />
Each Ombudsman shall draw up, or the Ombudsmen may collectively draw up, regulations<br />
that specify their organization and the method of exercising their functions, which shall
e promulgated in the Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia. Th ese regulations may<br />
be changed by a law adopted by the Croatian Sabor with the concurrence of the Serbian<br />
Caucus of the Sabor.<br />
A N N E X E<br />
Texts of Agreed Amendments to Croatian Copnstitution and of Legislation to<br />
Implement the Presen Agreement<br />
(Article XV.1)<br />
[To be prepared, in the course of negotiating the Agreement]<br />
A N N E X F<br />
Transitional Governance of the Eastern Area<br />
(Article IX.1, para. 1)<br />
1. No military forces except those of the United Nations or of any other international agency<br />
invited by the Security Council shall be in the Eastern Area. Any military forces in the Area<br />
at the time of the establishment of the UN administration shall immediately be disbanded.<br />
Th e UN Administrator shall, in accordance with paragraph 7 below, organize the police to<br />
function in the Area.<br />
2. Th e Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, aft er consultation with the parties<br />
hereto, appoint an Administrator for the Eastern Area, whom the Secretary-General may<br />
replace at any time.<br />
3. Th e Administrator shall exercise all executive functions in respect of the Eastern Area, in<br />
addition to such other functions as are specifi ed herein.<br />
4. Th e Administrator shall establish an Advisory Council, to which he may initially appoint<br />
local offi cial functioning in the area and the representatives of refugees and displaced persons<br />
from the area, which shall be replaced, as soon as feasible, by persons elected according to<br />
a procedure that the Administrator shall determine. He shall consult with such Council in<br />
carrying out his responsibilities.<br />
5. Th e Administrator shall establish, and may from time to time change, the boundaries of<br />
local administrative districts, as well as the system of local governance, including courts and<br />
administrative agencies, taking account as far as he considers appropriate of the relevant<br />
provisions of the Constitution and legislation of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
6. Except as otherwise determined by the Administrator, the law applicable during the period<br />
of UN administration shall be that applicable in other parts of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
355
7. In accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement, to help facilitate the<br />
return of refugees and displaced persons in security, the Administrator shall organize<br />
and control a uniformed police force, which shall as soon as possible come to have a<br />
proportionally balanced ethnic composition; for this purpose the Administrator shall<br />
employ, as soon as feasible, as many non-Serb (Croat and other) police as necessary. He<br />
may in this respect be assisted by police forces or advisers made available at the request<br />
of the United Nations.<br />
8. Th e international border of the Eastern Area shall during the period of UN<br />
administration be monitored by Croatian customs offi cials working in cooperation with<br />
military and police forces under the control of the Administrator.<br />
9. Th e costs of any international elements of the UN administration shall be borne by the<br />
United Nations. All other costs of governance shall be borne by the Republic of Croatia<br />
or by the resources of the Eastern Area, for which purpose the Administrator may raise<br />
appropriate taxes and other revenues. During the period of UN administration, the<br />
Republic of Croatia may raise, with the consent of the Administrator, taxes in the Eastern<br />
Area and from its domiciliaries, for the expenses of the Eastern Area and for other<br />
purposes, provided that the proportional tax burden in the Area and on its domiciliaries<br />
does not exceed that in other parts of the Republic of Croatia.<br />
HR - Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova RH<br />
(Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia)<br />
356
2<br />
From the interview with Leonid Kerestedjiants, fi rst Russian Ambassador to the<br />
Republic of Croatia, on the Serbian refusal of “Plan Z-4”<br />
In early 1995 you led the negotiations for Plan Z-4?<br />
Yes, together with US Ambassador Peter Galbraith. We really sincerely wanted to put an<br />
end to bloodshed and believed in Z-4 as a document preserving the territorial integrity<br />
of Croatia and incorporating the “breakaway” regions, but also resolving on a long-term<br />
basis the Serbian issue in Croatia. We tackled the task seriously. Of course, from this<br />
perspective this looks more like a formality than it really was.<br />
You think, therefore, that Z-4 was a very serious plan?<br />
Of course, because we believed that it would also provide the basis for dealing with<br />
all the other problems in the region. Minister Kozyrev told me that the international<br />
community was taking Z-4 very seriously because it was actually drawn up as a kind<br />
of an introduction for a similar plan in Kosovo. It is precisely this fact, which obviously<br />
reached Milošević, 92 that determined such an outcome of the war in Croatia.<br />
How did the negotiations proceed?<br />
Plan Z-4 was devised by the international representatives. When we received the plan,<br />
Peter Galbraith and me had to present it to the Croatian and to the Serbian side. We were<br />
in charge of the operational aspect and then went to present the plan to Tuđman 93 . We<br />
had agreed that Galbraith would present the plan to the Croats and show by doing so<br />
that Washington was behind it, while I would present it in Knin to let them know that<br />
Russia agreed to the plan. When we came to Pantovčak, I remember, the top Croatian<br />
leadership with Tuđman at their head were already sitting at the table. While Peter<br />
talked, the room was uncomfortably silent, as during a funeral. One could feel that the<br />
Croats resisted the plan, but everyone waited for Tuđman’s response. He was thoughtful<br />
and worried. Th en he started to talk, very nervously. He briefl y said that he was not<br />
enthusiastic and that for the Croats it was not a stimulating plan, but that he understood<br />
that the plan was just the beginning of the search for a fi nal resolution of the crisis, and<br />
that the only positive thing about the document was the fact that it proceeded from “the<br />
territorial integrity of Croatia”. However, he also said that the price of the plan was out<br />
of proportion with what had happened in Croatia. He thought the plan was too pro-<br />
Serbian. Aft er we left , Peter and I felt as if a weight was off our mind. We believed that the<br />
hardest part of the job had been done and that the Serbs in Knin would accept the plan<br />
without hesitation or discussion because we had “dented” the Croats. We talked how we<br />
would start working, aft er the Serbian agreement, on “taking some things from the Serbs<br />
and giving them to the Croats”.<br />
92 Slobodan, President of the Republic of Serbia<br />
93 Franjo, President of the Republic of Croatia<br />
357
And you went to Knin?<br />
Yes, we came to Knin and I presented the plan. Th ey took us to the fortress, and they<br />
had lambs roasting on the spit there. Peter and I thought it was an encouraging sign. As<br />
we had agreed, I spoke Serbian and avoided Croatian terms. And, when I said, at the<br />
end of my presentation, “when you look at this plan...”, and pushed the plan towards<br />
Martić, 94 everybody appeared to be shocked. As silence fell, Martić briefl y said: “We will<br />
not look at this”. He pushed the document away from him. Unpleasant stillness followed.<br />
I changed my tone and began to threaten them openly. I told them that everything would<br />
end “very poorly for them, the leadership, and for Krajina”, if they did not take look at<br />
the plan. I even told them that I did not care for them personally and added that they<br />
should at least think of the people they had led. Th ey still refused. Th e meeting became<br />
pointless, and we left . I approached Martić and said:” You have now signed the death<br />
sentence for Krajina and Serbian presence in the area. You shall be held responsible for<br />
that, and you can be sure that Russia will take care of that”. But he would not budge.<br />
Th en a member of their leadership approached me - I am not going to mention his name<br />
yet - and said: ”Milošević ordered us to do so.” I immediately realized that he had done<br />
it because of Kosovo, that is, because of the implementation of a similar plan in Kosovo.<br />
Today the Serbs are losing Kosovo, and they missed the change of getting autonomy in<br />
Croatia.<br />
Vlado Vurušić, “Russia was on Croatia’s side”, Jutarnji list, Zagreb. 17 February 2007,<br />
34-35<br />
358<br />
3<br />
2003, 25 June<br />
Testimony of Peter Galbraith on the Serbian rejection of “Plan Z-4” at the trial of<br />
Slobodan Milošević<br />
Prosecutor Nice: I turn now to the Z-4 process, something of which the Chamber<br />
has heard from a couple of witnesses, substantially from the witness Babić. Th is was a<br />
process, “Z” for “Zagreb,” and involving the United States, Russia, the European Union<br />
and the United Nations. It lasted from when and until when?<br />
Galbraith: From March 23rd, 1994, until Operation Storm, August 4th, 1995.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th e overall intended structure of the process?<br />
Galbraith: It was a three-stage process that began with the negotiation of a ceasefi re in<br />
Croatia between the Serbs - a Serb-held part of the country and the government-held<br />
94 Milan, president of the «RSK»
part of the country. Th at was followed by economic and confi dence-building negotiations<br />
And then the third stage was to be a political settlement within Croatia.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: How far did the process get?<br />
Galbraith: We were able to negotiate a ceasefi re agreement in the early hours of the<br />
30th of March. We were, aft er much delay, able to achieve an economic and confi dencebuilding<br />
agreement on the 2nd of December, 1994, which however was only partially<br />
implemented. And we were unable to present the political plan and to initiate serious<br />
negotiations on a political settlement.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: I’ll turn to your overall assessment of the participants in a few minutes’<br />
time. But at this stage, what was Martić’s revealed enthusiasm for the process?<br />
Galbraith: He was, I think, supportive of the ceasefi re and, I think, extremely reluctant<br />
about any kind of economic and confi dence-building measures, and opposed to any<br />
kind of political settlement.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: In your judgement, was his approach the result of his own independent<br />
judgement or was he guided or driven from elsewhere?<br />
Galbraith: I think he was heavily infl uenced by the defendant.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th e accused’s attitude towards the Z-4 process and in particular<br />
towards the economic and confi dence-building measures, was that revealed to you? If<br />
so, when and how?<br />
Galbraith: Th e accused was actively involved in discussions on the economic and<br />
confi dence-building measures, not ones - I hasten to add - that I was involved in but<br />
that Lord Owen and that Th orvald Stoltenberg were involved in. He off ered a number of<br />
positions, notably trying to avoid any kind of Croatian control of the borders between<br />
Serbia and Eastern Slavonia or between the Krajina and Bosnian Serb territory. Th at was<br />
one of his primary concerns. And in the end, he went along with the conclusion of this<br />
agreement, which is why it actually happened.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Babić, did you meet Babić at all in 1994?<br />
Galbraith: I did not.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did you learn of his attitude to or reaction towards the Z-4 process or<br />
not?<br />
Galbraith: I did. I fi rst met him on the 23rd of January, 1995...<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Forgive my interrupting you. Did you learn anything about his reaction<br />
in the course of 1994?<br />
Galbraith: Well, yes. He was a leader in the RSK parliament, leader of the largest political<br />
party, and actually he was oft en opposed to the economic and confi dence-building<br />
measures. I think he saw it as a useful political club against Martić.<br />
359
Prosecutor Nice: You then met him on the 23rd of January of 1995, and that was your<br />
fi rst meeting, paragraph 4 I think it is of the perhaps oddly numbered summary. Yes?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, I did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: What happened there?<br />
Galbraith: I went down to Knin to brief him on the Z-4 political plan that we were<br />
planning to present in the next week. We had lunch, and we had a very engaged<br />
discussion. He was intrigued by the plan. He said that there were a number of features<br />
of the plan that he thought were very interesting. He said that certainly there was room<br />
for improvement. But his general approach was -- he was at least interested in it, and<br />
seeming that this was something worth pursuing.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Can we look briefl y at Tab 1 of the exhibit. Does this document,<br />
Ambassador, set out the draft Z-4 agreement at that stage?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, it does.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: I don’t want to go through it in detail. You might, I think, express the<br />
view that it was in some ways generous in its terms?<br />
Galbraith: It allowed the Krajina Serbs very, very substantial self-government, indeed<br />
almost total self-government in the territory of Croatia, where according to the 1991<br />
census Serbs were a majority. So yes, it was extremely generous.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: For those particular areas?<br />
Galbraith: For those areas.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And we’ll just take a couple of examples using the page numbers at the<br />
top. On page number 6 we have fl ags and emblems, its own fl ag.<br />
Galbraith: Th at is correct. Th ey could have their own fl ag and their own emblems.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Page 10 at the top, currency and taxation covered specifi cally.<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Th e issue of the currency was a very important one, because they objected<br />
to using the Croatian kuna, because they said this was the same currency that had been<br />
used by the fascist Croatian state in the Second World War. And so this plan provided<br />
that they could have their own bank notes. Th ey would call ... they could call them the<br />
dinar or whatever they wanted. Th ey could have their own designs. Although, from a<br />
monetary point of view, it would be the equivalent of the kuna and controlled by the<br />
Croatian Central Bank.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: I see at page 12, its own president, and so on. Yes?<br />
Galbraith: Yes.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Well, thus you’re meeting with Babić on the 23rd of January. Had there<br />
been a plan that you should meet Martić aft er meeting Babić?<br />
360
Galbraith: Yes, there was. If I could just add one other thing to Babić’s reaction. In fact,<br />
at one stage in that meeting, on the 23rd of January, he was concerned that the plan had<br />
actually off ered too much autonomy, had been too generous, because he was concerned<br />
that it might make the Krajina Serb autonomous entity responsible for pensions and<br />
other things, which he had hoped would be picked up by the central government in<br />
Zagreb. I said of course that would not be a problem to have less autonomy. I was due<br />
to meet Milan Martić in the aft ernoon, and Martić cancelled that appointment. He said<br />
it was inappropriate for the ambassador ... and a breach of protocol for the ambassador<br />
to have met the foreign minister ... the so-called foreign minister before meeting the<br />
president.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: We’ll move on in the meetings before we come back to the general<br />
character assessment. On the 30th of January, did you and other sponsors of the plan<br />
meet with Martić, Babić, and Mikelić?<br />
Galbraith: We did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Tell us about that in a sentence or so.<br />
Galbraith: We had presented the plan as a basis for negotiation, not as a fi nal document<br />
... as a take-it-or-leave-it document to President Tuđman in the morning, and in<br />
the aft ernoon we fl ew to Knin, where we met in the castle with the top Krajina Serb<br />
leadership, including Martić, Babić, and Mikelić. We attempted to hand over the plan,<br />
and Martić would not take it. He wouldn’t touch it.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: How did the meeting end?<br />
Galbraith: Well, of course we were somewhat shocked that he would actually not even<br />
physically receive the plan, much less that he would ... that they would refuse to negotiate<br />
on the basis of it. We attempted to persuade them in every possible way that this was not<br />
in their interest, that if they refused to negotiate it would increase greatly the likelihood<br />
that the Croatians would take military action, that it would be much harder for the<br />
international community to prevent a military outcome. But none of these arguments<br />
worked. At the end of the meeting Mikelić, the so-called Prime Minister, said to us,<br />
he said, “You should be professional diplomats. You’re making a great mistake.” And I<br />
replied, “A great mistake has been made, but we will see by whom.”<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And I think you made an observation that relates to Babić and his<br />
approach.<br />
Galbraith: Yes. As we were leaving, Babić came up to me and he said in English, “I’m<br />
sorry.”<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Well, now, you’d seen Tuđman in the morning. Was Tuđman ever<br />
prevailed upon to accept the proposal?<br />
Galbraith: He agreed to negotiate on it but very reluctantly. However, given that the<br />
Serbian side refused even to receive the plan, Croatia’s bona fi des were simply not put<br />
to test.<br />
361
Prosecutor Nice: What about the accused?<br />
Galbraith: Well, part of the plan was that we’d present it fi rst to Tuđman, then to the<br />
Krajina Serbs, and then we would go to Belgrade. Th e accused refused to see us.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: On the 9th of March, did you meet Babić again?<br />
Galbraith: I did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: On this occasion, the purpose of the meeting?<br />
Galbraith: We had worked out an agreement in Copenhagen with Tuđman to extend<br />
the United Nations’ mandate. It was going to be changed from being an UNPROFOR<br />
mandate to being an UNCRO mandate with some essentially cosmetic changes that<br />
would keep the UN there. And I went down for the purpose of persuading Babić that<br />
they should be cooperative with this, but it also provided an occasion to discuss the Z-4<br />
plan.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: What, if anything, did he say about it?<br />
Galbraith: Well, fi rst he received a copy of the plan, and again he was very interested in<br />
diff erent aspects of it.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: We’ll come a little later to something else he said about the plan and<br />
the reactions to it, but let’s move on chronologically to Operation Storm. When did you<br />
learn that Croatia was planning military action?<br />
Galbraith: On or about the 21st of July, 1995.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th e apparent reason for this?<br />
Galbraith: It was because there was a combined attack by the Krajina Serbs and the<br />
Bosnian Serbs on the Bihać enclave. Th is came shortly aft er the successful attack on<br />
Srebrenica, which had cost 7,000 lives, and there was an ongoing attack on the enclave of<br />
Žepa. And the Croatians were concerned that if Bihać fell, their strategic position would<br />
become much worse because the Serb side would not have any internal lines to defend,<br />
that is, they wouldn’t have to defend against the Bosnian 5 th Corps that was in Bihać,<br />
and that this then could lead to the creation of a western Serb state, a unifi ed western<br />
Serb state with the Bosnian Serbs and the Krajina Serbs. Second, they were concerned<br />
that the survivors of Bihać would come to Croatia. And of course they’d already been<br />
overwhelmed by several million refugees passing through Croatia during these war<br />
years. And fi nally, they saw little prospect that there would be a peaceful solution to<br />
the Krajina problem. Th ey believed that this was an opportune time for them to retake<br />
the area because with the events that had happened in Srebrenica, the international<br />
community would be disinclined to take any action against the Croatian government for<br />
doing something that essentially would save Bihać.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did the failure of the Z-4 process, which had lasted some eight months<br />
or thereabouts and was already a year old overall, did that play a part in all this?<br />
362
Galbraith: It played a very signifi cant part. Th e Croatian President Tuđman and his<br />
colleagues in the government saw no prospect that there could be a negotiated settlement<br />
that would bring about the return of this territory to Croatia or the return of Croatians<br />
who had been driven out of the territory. So they felt that the military option was the<br />
only one that was available to them. I think that they were contemplating doing it later<br />
in the year, in December of 1995, when the UNCRO mandate expired. But the events in<br />
Bihać ... in Srebrenica and the attack on Bihać provided a window of opportunity that<br />
they decided to use.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Was the accused’s attitude to Z-4 process and settlement generally<br />
understood, known, and discussed at this time?<br />
Galbraith: It was discussed ... it was known at this time. It was continuously discussed by<br />
those who were involved in the peace process. I think certainly the Croatian government<br />
saw the accused as critical to any settlement. And when they saw no likelihood that he<br />
would agree, this was an important factor in their decision to take military action.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did you on the 25th of July send a cable to the United States Secretary<br />
of State giving an account of a survivor from Srebrenica that you’d been provided with?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, I did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And although we haven’t time for material of this kind, interesting<br />
though it is, I think that the material had been provided to you by your wife, is it, or<br />
friend at the time, now your wife?<br />
Galbraith: Now my wife.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And was an eyewitness account from a survivor.<br />
Galbraith: Th at is correct; somebody who had been in a group of men and all the members<br />
of the group but him were executed. So he was a survivor of a mass execution.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And was the account that you were given and that you were able to<br />
draw on for your cable to the United States. Was the account detailed as to those involved<br />
in the massacre?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, it was. It specifi cally said that General Mladić had spoken to the group,<br />
had told them that they could expect no comfort or help from their Alija, from the<br />
president of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And as to any unit or troops involved, was the eyewitness detailed on<br />
that?<br />
Galbraith: Well, certainly he described the troops as being members of the Bosnian Serb<br />
army. I don’t think in the account that I had that he listed specifi c units, but I haven’t<br />
gone back and checked the cable.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Now, you sent that cable to the United States. Did the late-President<br />
Tuđman consult you about what the United States’ position on military attack would be?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, he did.<br />
363
Prosecutor Nice: Did you respond to that? And if so, when?<br />
Galbraith: I responded that ... we delivered several démarches to the Croatian<br />
government in this period. Th e Croatians were concerned that if they took military<br />
action, that they would face sanctions from the UN Security Council for having a wider<br />
war. We responded by expressing understanding for the situation in which they found<br />
themselves and understanding for the fact that they were prepared to expend blood and<br />
treasure to save Bihać. We were deeply concerned that Bihać would fall, that it would<br />
become another Srebrenica. It was four times as populous as Srebrenica, so we were<br />
concerned that we could see 30 to 40 thousand people being massacred if Mladić and<br />
the Bosnian Serbs did the same thing there. We did not approve any kind of military<br />
action, and we pointed out that military action would have serious ... that it was always<br />
a risky proposition, that if Croatia got into any diffi culty, it certainly couldn’t expect any<br />
help from the United States. And I warned Tuđman in the strongest possible terms that<br />
should there be any kind of military action, that we would hold him accountable and<br />
Croatia accountable for protecting the civilian population, Serb civilians, as well as for<br />
making sure that UN peacekeepers in the area were not hurt.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th ough you didn’t support, did you expressly oppose, or did you leave<br />
that neutral?<br />
Galbraith: We neither supported nor opposed.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Despite what must have seemed -- was to turn out to be an inevitable<br />
war, did you make one last eff ort yourself to avert that consequence?<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Our position on this, the US government position, was as I said - and<br />
I just want to emphasize it - very much aff ected by what was happening in Bihać. We<br />
recognised that a war was going to have terrible humanitarian consequences but that it<br />
was a lesser evil than what we thought was the likely massacre of 40,000 people in Bihać<br />
if the Serbs applied Srebrenica rules there. Nonetheless, we wanted to do everything<br />
possible to try and fi nd a peaceful settlement, and so when I spoke to President Tuđman<br />
on the 1st of August in Brioni, on instructions from the State Department, I raised<br />
with him the possibility of meeting Babić in Belgrade later that week. I should preface<br />
this by saying that the previous weekend I had been in touch with Babić through the<br />
United Nations and had proposed a meeting to try and see if we could head off the war.<br />
He had said, “You’re not welcome to come to Knin, but I’d be prepared to meet you in<br />
Belgrade.”<br />
Prosecutor Nice: “Who had made you ... who had made you unwelcome in Knin?”<br />
Galbraith: Martić.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: But Babić was prepared to meet you in Belgrade?<br />
Galbraith: Babić said I wouldn’t be welcome in Knin, but he wanted to meet me in<br />
Belgrade. Tuđman initially said this would be an interesting idea but don’t wait until<br />
the end of the week; do it right away. Incidentally, a few hours later he had his press<br />
364
secretary, his deputy press secretary call to say maybe it wasn’t such a good idea, but the<br />
US government was determined to see if there was any hope for peace, so they instructed<br />
me to go to Belgrade. I went there on the morning of the 2nd, and at 8.00 in the evening,<br />
I met with Babić.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th e 2nd of August, 1995 you met Babić. What did you tell him?<br />
Galbraith: I told him that a catastrophe was about to overtake the Krajina Serbs, that<br />
the Croatian military was poised for military action, that because of the attacks that the<br />
Krajina Serb army had participated in into Bihać there was virtually no sympathy for<br />
them in the international community, and that they would have to agree with terms<br />
that President Tuđman had outlined to avoid military action. Th ose terms included a<br />
withdrawal of all RSK forces from Bihać, the reopening of a pipeline through Sector North<br />
that had been opened by the economic agreement but closed down by the Krajina Serbs,<br />
the opening of road and rail links through Knin, and most importantly, an agreement to<br />
begin immediate negotiations for political settlement within Croatia.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Do you remember roughly how many items there were in the<br />
requirements?<br />
Galbraith: I think there were seven.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: What was Babic’ć general reaction to your proposal?<br />
Galbraith: Babić came alone to this meeting which was held at the American Embassy<br />
in Belgrade. His demeanour was extremely serious. He listened attentively to everything<br />
I said. And then he replied in the following manner: He began by apologising by what<br />
had happened on the 30th of January. He said that it was incomprehensible that the<br />
Krajina Serb government should have received the representatives of the most powerful<br />
countries in the world, that is, the United States, Russia, the European Union, and then<br />
to have refused to receive the plan. He had said that this was something that was decided<br />
by those higher than him, specifi cally Martić and Milošević. He then went on to say that<br />
he could understand fully why the Croatians were attacking at Glamoč and Grahovo,<br />
places in the Livno Valley that they that they’d taken, and why they were poised to attack<br />
the Krajina region, that he could not understand the reasons why his government had<br />
launched an attack into Bihać. He said that he would accept the conditions, at least all the<br />
conditions but the last one, the political condition, where we had some more discussion.<br />
He said that he didn’t feel that he could say that he would accept a settlement based on<br />
reintegration into Croatia. He said, “No political leader could say that.” So I said, “Well,<br />
as an alternative, why don’t you say that you will agree to negotiate on the basis of the Z-4<br />
plan, which is in fact an arrangement to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia.” We had a<br />
back and forth about Eastern Slavonia. I said that it would be impossible to go beyond<br />
the provisions of the Z-4 plan on Eastern Slavonia which would not have the special<br />
autonomy, because it was not a Serb-majority area.<br />
365
Prosecutor Nice: Let’s pause there. And I may be allowing you to go just a little too fast.<br />
You’d explained earlier that the Z-4 plan was going to provide autonomy for those areas<br />
with Serb majority at the relevant census. Eastern Slavonia didn’t qualify?<br />
Galbraith: Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia did not qualify, nor did all of the<br />
sectors north and south.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did Babić say anything to you at that stage about why it was that the<br />
accused was opposed to this plan? And if not, did you discover from elsewhere why he<br />
was opposed to this plan?<br />
Galbraith: If I can just explain, I hope very briefl y, what came out of the meeting was<br />
in fact this agreement, that he would publicly state his acceptance of all these points,<br />
but in lieu of saying he would negotiate on the basis of reintegration into Croatia he<br />
would negotiate on the basis of the Z-4 plan. Further, I told him that the Z-4 plan was<br />
unachievable at this point in time, that Tuđman had the upper hand, he would never<br />
accept autonomy that extensive, and that the most that the Krajina Serbs could hope for<br />
was something that was roughly based on Croatian constitutional law. He understood<br />
that. He accepted that. I said, “I will convey this as a private message from you to Tuđman<br />
that you understand this, that you’re not looking for ... you understand you’ll never get<br />
the Z-4 plan.” He fully agreed. Th en came the issue of whether this could be sold to the<br />
leadership in Knin, and he said, “Well, my party has a majority in the assembly. I think I<br />
can get them to go along.” Th e question was then: Would Martić go along? He said, “One<br />
sentence from Milošević and we can get the agreement of Knin.”<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And he was right about that. Th ings would not have unfolded in the<br />
way they did.<br />
Galbraith: Th at is right. In my view, the war could have been avoided and 180,000 Serbs<br />
would not have become refugees.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did Babić say anything about eff orts he had made at the time to see<br />
the accused?<br />
Galbraith: He said that he had tried to see the accused and that the accused would not<br />
see him.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: On the occasion of this very visit to Belgrade or on some other<br />
occasion?<br />
Galbraith: On the occasion of this visit to Belgrade.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And was that account of his consistent with what you learnt of an<br />
eff ort made by the United States chargé d’aff aires?<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Aft er this agreement was concluded and given what Babić had said about<br />
the decisive role of the defendant, and given what we understood to be the decisive role<br />
of the defendant, the United States sought to make a démarche to the defendant. Th e<br />
chargé tried to see him on the 3rd of August, the next day, to get Milošević to make a<br />
statement of support for this deal, and he would not see the American chargé.<br />
366
Prosecutor Nice: And, of course, the chargé d’aff aires was the principal, the senior<br />
diplomat at the time, there being no ambassador in that post.<br />
Galbraith: Th at is correct.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Very well. Babić made his public statement;<br />
Galbraith: He did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did that attract any or any signifi cant support?<br />
Galbraith: He made a statement, and there was a meeting in Geneva on the 3rd of<br />
August between the Croatian government delegation and a Krajina Serb delegation. Th e<br />
idea was that the Krajina Serb delegation would be instructed to accept the full package<br />
that Babić had accepted. Th ey were certainly ambiguous in their statement. It was not<br />
the clear-cut acceptance that was required, and again I think the reason they didn’t make<br />
any clear-cut acceptance is that Babić alone - by this point, incidentally, he was the Prime<br />
Minister of the RSK - didn’t have suffi cient authority to command the delegation in<br />
Geneva. Milošević, of course, was silent. I fl ew back to Zagreb, where I saw Tuđman. At<br />
the meeting with Tuđman - this was at now 5. 45 on the 3rd of August - I urged him to<br />
hold off on military action. I said that we would know within a matter of days whether<br />
the Krajina Serbs were serious, because there were concrete steps that they had to take,<br />
very quickly, and that it was important to give them a chance to see if they were serious,<br />
because the alternative, war, would be so disastrous, particularly for the population of<br />
the Krajina region. Tuđman didn’t believe that Babić had the clout to deliver the Krajina<br />
Serbs, and so he listened, but basically he went ahead with his decision for war.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Can you look briefl y at an existing exhibit, 352, tab 104, a British<br />
code cable of August 1995 dealing with these matters. You’ve seen it before or had the<br />
opportunity to see it before. I hope the Chamber has got it before. Have you reviewed<br />
this code cable from your British counterpart?<br />
Galbraith: I have reviewed it.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Is it accurate, subject to what must be said in paragraph 8?<br />
Galbraith: It is accurate. He was a very skilled diplomat.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And at paragraph 8 he says this: “Commenting on his discussions,<br />
Galbraith recognised that Babić might not have authority to conclude a deal on these<br />
lines. He might be disowned by his RSK colleagues in Knin and by the Assembly, but<br />
it was a last chance for peace. He, Galbraith, would be seeing Tuđman tonight at 5.45<br />
local time to report the outcome of his talks with Babić in Belgrade. Milošević was being<br />
briefed by the American Embassy in Belgrade. Comment?”<br />
Galbraith: At the time, of course I had hoped that our chargé would be able to see<br />
Milošević. I expected, given the imminence of war, given that the scale of the military<br />
action which was going to be the largest military action in the confl ict since 1992, that of<br />
course Milošević would see the American representative, and I didn’t know at the time<br />
367
I briefed my diplomatic colleagues that that was not going to happen. So Ambassador<br />
Hewitt accurately conveyed what I said, but of course what I had hoped and frankly<br />
expected to happen didn’t happen.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: You see, the document ends with the hope that Mr. Roberts can be<br />
instructed to take action with Mr. Milošević. Th at would be then the British chargé<br />
d’aff aires, Ivory Roberts. Did he have easy access to the accused, to your knowledge?<br />
Galbraith: Yes, I think he had good relations with the authorities in Belgrade.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: So it should have been possible to communicate the state of play to the<br />
accused had he been receptive at that time.<br />
Galbraith: It certainly should have been.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Very well. Well, following these eff orts, the attack began.<br />
Galbraith: It did.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Th e consequences you’ve already summarised a little earlier. Perhaps<br />
this would be a convenient moment for you to give your assessment from all your<br />
experience of at least two, possibly three, of the fi gures you’ve referred to, in terms of<br />
intelligence, ability, leadership, from what you saw. First of all, Martić.<br />
Galbraith: Martić was a former policeman, I thought a man of very limited intelligence.<br />
Although he was the president of the so-called Republika Srpska Krajina, I don’t think<br />
that he had any particular interest in the people of that territory, and I thought he was<br />
way out of his depth.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Infl uenced by . . . ?<br />
Galbraith: Infl uenced by the defendant, by the government of Serbia, the Serbian<br />
military, the Yugoslav military, certainly would be unwilling to act on a key matter on<br />
his own without the approval from Belgrade.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Babić?<br />
Galbraith: Babić was also a nationalist. And I don’t want to convey the idea that there are<br />
any saints in this process. He was a nationalist, he was a participant in the creation of the<br />
RSK and in the expulsion of the Croatian population. Nonetheless, I thought he was the<br />
most charismatic of the politicians. I thought that he had the interests of the Krajina Serb<br />
population much more at heart than any of them. I think he was the only one, actually,<br />
who had any concern for the local population. I thought he was easily intimidated, both<br />
by Martić and by Milošević.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: For these two, was cohabitation, living together, a possibility?<br />
Galbraith: Well, cohabitation with each other was extremely diffi cult.<br />
368
Prosecutor Nice: Living together, as between the ethnic groups.<br />
Galbraith: For Martić, it was absolutely out of the question. He repeatedly told me that<br />
Serbs and Croats could never live together and that if the area was reintegrated into<br />
Croatia, that he would not stay. Babić I think was more open to the idea that Serbs and<br />
Croats could live together.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Was he popular amongst the people of Krajina?<br />
Galbraith: He was the most popular politician, particularly in Sectors North and South.<br />
He had been the mayor of Knin. And in my judgement, of course, he was the man who<br />
had actually won the election in 1994.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: What, if any, control did he have of the army?<br />
Galbraith: He had no control over the army. And of course that’s why he was capable of<br />
being intimidated.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Moving forward. In the course of Operation Storm, did you take a<br />
public position on human rights abuses committed by the Croatian army?<br />
Galbraith: I was and the United States government was repeatedly and publicly critical<br />
of Croatian human rights violations, which were severe and inexcusable.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: How regularly, if at all, did you take these matters to Tuđman?<br />
Galbraith: Well, I mean, I saw him on a number of occasions in this period, as well as<br />
his chief of staff , Hrvoje Šarinić, and other offi cials of the Croatian government, and<br />
on every one of these occasions I raised our concerns about what was happening to the<br />
population in the Krajina, the human rights violations.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Did you almost famously on one occasion fi nd yourself on a tractor,<br />
preventing violations? And if so, in a summary, tell us how that came about.<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Th ere was a group of about 40,000 Serb refugees who had not been able<br />
to escape to Bosnia and they’d been surrounded by Croatian forces near Topusko in<br />
former Sector North. A ceasefi re was negotiated which permitted them to leave, pass<br />
through the town of Sisak and go onto the highway to Eastern Slavonia and possibly<br />
then on to Serbia. When the fi rst group of these refugees left and passed through the<br />
town of Sisak, they were attacked by a Croatian mob, and it happened that there was an<br />
AP - Associated Press - reporter there. And that was late in the evening. I think it was<br />
the 9th of August. Th e next morning, early, I read the story. And it described the attack.<br />
It described a mother whose car window had been smashed with a brick, pulling shards<br />
of glass out of her baby’s blanket. And it described the Croatian policemen standing<br />
around, laughing, and basically saying, “Th ese people got what they deserved.” I thought<br />
that was an outrage. I read the story over the phone to Hrvoje Šarinić, Tuđman’s chief<br />
of staff . I said if they didn’t do anything about it, I would go down and join the convoy<br />
myself. I made an appointment to see Tuđman at 12.30. I read him the story. I said that<br />
this kind of thing would have a devastating impact on Croatia’s relations with the United<br />
369
States, and that he absolutely had to stop it. I said that in a normal democratic country,<br />
the Minister of the Interior would have been sacked or resigned in light of this. Tuđman<br />
got quite angry, and so I decided that I needed to follow through on my threat to join<br />
the convoy.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And I think you went down in an armoured vehicle but...<br />
Galbraith: I went down in an armoured vehicle to Petrinja, where, basically, there were<br />
no Croatian civilians, it was a military zone. And the convoy was along the highway, and<br />
it was stopped, and I so I walked along the convoy. My plan was to put my armoured car<br />
into the convoy and drive along with the American fl ag fl ying, but I ran into a garbage<br />
collector who was originally from Karlovac but had moved across the line into the<br />
Serbian side. He was quite friendly, recognised me from television, and he invited me to<br />
join him on his tractor with his wife and two small children, and so I decided to do that.<br />
And I drove with him on the tractor through Sisak. Th ere was a crowd along, jeering,<br />
shouting insults, but the Croatian government had policemen every 10 metres and there<br />
were no incidents.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: One other detail from this period. You were, as you’ve indicated, on<br />
television from time to time. You once gave an interview, I think where you made a<br />
comment about ethnic cleansing which needs interpretation.<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Th is was for British television. I think it was the BBC. I said that the<br />
Croatians had not engaged in ethnic cleansing in Krajina, although they had engaged<br />
in serious human rights abuses. And my point was that ethnic cleansing was where<br />
the forces had come into a town, paramilitaries backed by the military, terrorised the<br />
population, engaged in killings, rapes, and forced the population to leave. In this case,<br />
the population had left before the Croatians arrived, probably rightly fearing what the<br />
Croatians might do but nonetheless they were not there when the Croatians actually<br />
arrived. And so therefore it wasn’t ethnic cleansing. Th e analogy that I would use is that<br />
you might enter a room with intent to commit murder but if the individual whom you<br />
intended to kill wasn’t in the room and had departed the scene, your bad intent probably<br />
isn’t a crime.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Before we move on to Dayton, from the things that you had to deal<br />
with him over, your assessment of Tuđman as a leader or strategist or tactician at the<br />
time?<br />
Galbraith: I thought Tuđman was an eff ective leader in the sense that he knew where he<br />
wanted to take Croatia. He surrounded himself with some capable subordinates, such as<br />
the Foreign Minister Granić and the Defence Minister Šušak. He was able to delegate to<br />
them and they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in command.<br />
To say that he was an eff ective leader is not to say that his motives were good. He was a<br />
nationalist, he had a vision of Croatia that oft en struck me as being out of the nineteenth<br />
century, and he had very little respect for fundamental human rights.<br />
370
4<br />
2002, 21 November<br />
Testimony of Milan Babić on the Serbian rejection of “Plan Z-4” at the trial of Slobodan<br />
Milošević at Th e Hague<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the<br />
main points of the Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: Th e main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of the Republic<br />
of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the Serbian Autonomous Region<br />
of Krajina and which was then known as Sector North and Sector South under the<br />
protection of the United Nations, should be given political, territorial autonomy within<br />
the Republic of Croatia. It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a<br />
currency that would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National<br />
Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which would imply<br />
a high level of autonomy.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was<br />
it an international proposal?<br />
BABIĆ: Th e Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four ambassadors in<br />
Zagreb, that is, by the international community.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the transcript earlier on, it was said that ... it is<br />
actually on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright... that she<br />
accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct?<br />
BABIĆ: Ambassador Galbraith, the Ambassador of the United States to Croatia, Peter<br />
Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that plan.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th is plan, did that actually mean the reintegration<br />
of the three regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, into<br />
the Croatian Republic?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right. Only Western Slavonia would be settled immediately, whereas<br />
Eastern Slavonia within a period of fi ve years, and the territory of SAO Krajina would<br />
have a high degree of political and territorial autonomy in Croatia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Were the politicians of the Krajina, you in the<br />
RSK... in a position ... did they accept this Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in Krajina rejected<br />
the plan. Th e plan was accepted only by the last Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian<br />
Krajina in August 1995.<br />
371
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And when you said March and February, which<br />
year? Is it also 1995?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right, 1995.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who opposed the Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: Th e President of the Republic of Serbia, according to Milan Martić, the President<br />
of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, who said half an hour prior to the beginning of the<br />
meeting with the international community that President Milošević 95 had said that the<br />
plan should not even be considered.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: When did Mr. Milan Martić consult with Mr.<br />
Milošević, and of what time period are you speaking when you refer to a meeting with<br />
the international community?<br />
BABIĆ: It was that week. I think it was the end of February/beginning of March. So at<br />
the beginning of the week Martić went to Belgrade for consultations. It was a Monday or<br />
Tuesday. On Th ursday, an announcement was issued of the Supreme Defence Council<br />
of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, in negative terms, about the plan, and then I think<br />
it was the following Monday when there was the meeting with representatives of the<br />
international community at which Martić said half an hour prior to the meeting that<br />
Milošević had said that the plan should not even be taken into consideration. And at the<br />
meeting with representatives of the international community, Ambassador Farista Djijan<br />
[Leonid Kerestedjiants] handed it to him. He wouldn’t even take it into his hands.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: On that occasion, then, did the Krajina authorities<br />
reject the plan, in that meeting with the internationals?<br />
BABIĆ: Actually, it was not even taken into consideration, so it was not accepted.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you speak with Mr. Milošević yourself about<br />
the Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: I did, at the beginning of April 1995.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What did you discuss?<br />
BABIĆ: He was the fi rst to mention the fact that the Z-4 plan was good but that the<br />
territory of the municipality of Slunj should have been divided lengthwise. He didn’t<br />
give any explanations for this. And then we actually discussed the events in Livanjsko<br />
Polje and the hinterland of Knin, the aggression of the HVO towards Knin. I’ve already<br />
spoken about that. And then he also said that it was not 300,000 people of Krajina against<br />
4 million Croats but that the whole logistics of Serbia was behind us.<br />
95 Slobodan<br />
372
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You said that Mr. Milošević was in favour of the<br />
Z-4 plan when you spoke to him? He had only some remarks in relation to Slunj.<br />
BABIĆ: It appeared that way, yes. However, one never knew with him for certain whether<br />
he really stood behind what he said; at least, I was not always sure.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You have already mentioned this meeting in<br />
relation to the fi ghting that took place at the same time in Bosnia with participation of<br />
Milan Martić and his forces, and you mentioned the region of Livno and this gash and<br />
the line that Mr. Milošević showed you to this eff ect. Was there also fi ghting at that time<br />
in the Bihać region, with participation of RSK forces?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, that was the second time...<br />
[JUDGE MAY: We’ll adjourn now. Twenty minutes. ]<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: For your orientation, we are at the moment at<br />
paragraph 280 of the proofi ng summary, but I will also address paragraph 312, because<br />
it fi ts into the context and would speed up matters. Martić or RSK force participation<br />
in Bosnia ... did Milan Martić and RSK forces participate in the fi ghting in Bosnia and<br />
Herzegovina as early as summer 1992?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right, in the so-called corridor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Is that the Posavina corridor?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, that’s right.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What is the importance of the Posavina corridor<br />
for Bosnia and for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Serbs in the Krajina<br />
region?<br />
BABIĆ: It is the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina and the Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
with Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And in which time period did RSK forces, with<br />
Milan Martić, participate in the fi ghting in 1992?<br />
BABIĆ: At the beginning of the summer of 1992. In June already they were there, at the<br />
end of June.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And who was in charge, in overall charge of the<br />
operations in the Posavina corridor?<br />
BABIĆ: Th e army of Republika Srpska and General Mladić. 96<br />
96 Ratko<br />
373
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You have mentioned the fi ghting in 1994, 1995,<br />
in the region of Livno in Herzegovina, and my question was before the break: did forces<br />
from the RSK also participate in the fi ghting around Bihać?<br />
BABIĆ: Th ey did.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who ... what were the forces on both sides? Who<br />
was fi ghting whom in Bihać?<br />
BABIĆ: On one side, there was the 5 th Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,<br />
which was defending its territory, and it was being attacked by the forces of the army<br />
of Republika Srpska and the forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, consisting of the<br />
Serbian army, the police, the Serbian DB 97 and the forces of Fikret Abdić<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th e police forces of the state security service of<br />
Serbia that participated, who led them? Who commanded them in this fi ghting?<br />
BABIĆ: I was told it was Frenki 98 , that he was in command, or rather, the DB from<br />
Petrova Gora.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And who told you that?<br />
BABIĆ: People from Kordun, from the region, members of the government of Krajina.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th is participation of the RSK forces in Bosnia<br />
and Herzegovina, did this cause problems for the position of the RSK towards the<br />
international community and the Croatian authorities?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes. In 1994 in particular, and in 1995, this compromised the position of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina in relation to the international community, because Bihać<br />
was an area protected by the international community.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did it increase the danger of an all-out attack on<br />
the RSK by the Croatian forces?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes. Th at was the reason why the Croatian army and the HVO from the territory<br />
of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an off ensive to deblock Bihac. Th at was what was<br />
publicly announced by the authorities in Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it meant<br />
cutting off the Republic of Serbian Krajina from Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did the RSK authorities and the Republika<br />
Srpska authorities actually have a military agreement on assisting each other in that<br />
time period?<br />
BABIĆ: I know there was an agreement between Martić and Karadžić, that is, between<br />
the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and that<br />
97 state security service<br />
98 Franko Simatović<br />
374
agreement referred to brigades of the army of Republika Srpska that would assist the<br />
army of the RSK. As for other parts of the agreement, I’m not sure about that.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to show<br />
the witness the Exhibit tab 96 of Exhibit 352. Th is is a document of the 30th of July, 1995,<br />
referring to a visit by Mr. Akashi, the special representative of the Secretary-General<br />
of the United Nations, and other persons, in relation to an agreement, a proposed<br />
agreement. Th e proposed agreement referred to, is that the Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: No. Th is was - this should have been a component part of the Z-4 plan, or<br />
rather, a precondition for the implementation of the Z-4 plan. So this was an agreement<br />
on the disengagement of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the Bihać pocket;<br />
or, to be more precise, this was not an agreement, it’s an announcement on agreement,<br />
announcement of approving the proposals made by Mr. Akashi to the leadership of the<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And the proposal was that no troops or individual<br />
soldiers of the RSK would get engaged in the Bihać pocket, and refrain from any crossborder<br />
ćactivities; is that what is proposed here?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th ere is a handwritten note on it saying the 20th<br />
of September... No, I am sorry. I withdraw my question. Th is proposal to disengage in the<br />
RSK, was that actually implemented?<br />
BABIĆ: No.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What did happen? What was instead done?<br />
BABIĆ: Combat continued. Mrkšić 99 or Milan Novaković, who was in command there,<br />
or Martić or the police or the MUP of Serbia, none of them were withdrawn from the<br />
fi ghting in that region.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the transcript, it says Maksić. Is that correct or<br />
... in the document as such it says General Mrkšić.<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right. Mile Mrkšić, General Mile Mrkšić, the commander of the army of<br />
the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In 1994, did the Minister of Interior of the RSK<br />
have a problem to get control over the police in the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,<br />
and Western Srem?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, that’s right. Th e Minister of the Interior, right?<br />
99 Mile<br />
375
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Who was the Minister of Interior in 1994?<br />
BABIĆ: Until the end of 1994, it was Ilija Prijić, who was replaced in that capacity, and<br />
the Assembly appointed Mr. Perišić, but he didn’t take up his post either in Eastern<br />
Slavonia or in the rest of the RSK either. So from the end of 1994 until August 1995,<br />
the RSK did not have a Minister for the Interior. One of the deputies was the acting<br />
minister.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did a delegation from the RSK then meet Mr.<br />
Milošević to consult him in this problem?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, that’s right. In 1995, April, around the 26th of April.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Were you part of this delegation?<br />
BABIĆ: I was.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who else was present? Who else was present<br />
from both sides?<br />
BABIĆ: Borislav Mikelić, Uroš Funduk, Slobodan Milošević, Jovica Stanišić, as far as I<br />
remember. Whether there was anybody else, I can’t quite remember now.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What did you ask of Mr. Milošević, if anything?<br />
BABIĆ: We asked that Milošević allow Slobodan Perišić to be appointed, or rather, that<br />
Slobodan Perišić, who was elected the Minister of the Interior for RSK, should take over<br />
that function as Minister of the Interior of RSK.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And what was Mr. Milošević’s reaction to this?<br />
What happened at the meeting?<br />
BABIĆ: First of all, Jovica Stanišić commented this request, and he said, “We have<br />
invested too much in all that,” and he was thinking of MUP Krajina, “for us to relinquish<br />
it to somebody else now.” Slobodan Milošević reacted to that and said the following: He<br />
told the delegation of the RSK, that is, told us, “You must understand that we must assist<br />
you in this way, via the state security service, because it works in a specifi c secret way,<br />
and that’s why we can’t help you, assist you, through the public security service.” In that<br />
way, he lent his support to Jovica Stanišić and his position on the issue.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Was that situation solved on the day of this<br />
meeting? Could Mr. Milošević help you in relation to the Minister of Interior?<br />
BABIĆ: No. Th e RSK was left without a Minister of the Interior.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I’m dealing now with paragraph 293 and the<br />
following two in the proofi ng summary. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Milošević<br />
on the Z-4 plan in August 1995?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, a telephone conversation.<br />
376
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: At that time, had you discussed the Z-4 plan with<br />
Mr. Galbraith?<br />
BABIĆ Yes, with Ambassador Peter Galbraith, several times before that.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And immediately before you had this telephone<br />
conversation, what was the option given to you by Mr. Galbraith?<br />
BABIĆ: He off ered that we should accept and adopt the Z-4 plan and the disengagement<br />
of the armed forces of Krajina in the Bihać pocket. He said that we should accept a new<br />
mandate for the UN peacekeepers, which was known as the UNCRO mandate, United<br />
Nations Croatia, and that communications and roads be opened in Croatia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: At that time, were you the president of the RSK?<br />
BABIĆ: I was the Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<br />
Martić was the president.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Why did you not simply accept it?<br />
BABIĆ: I accepted in my capacity as Prime Minister, but I informed Ambassador<br />
Galbraith that this could not be put into practice without the will and acquiescence of<br />
President Milošević.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You said you had a telephone conversation with<br />
Mr. Milosevic on the 3rd of August, 1995. How did you reach him? Did anyone help<br />
you?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes. Jovica Stanišić did, from Jovica Stanišić’s cabinet or offi ces.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you go to his offi ce, and where was it?<br />
BABIĆ: I did go to see Stanišić in his offi ce, which was located in the building of the<br />
Federal Internal Aff airs Ministry.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who was present? Who else was present when<br />
you saw him?<br />
BABIĆ: Radovan Stojčić aka Badža was there, and so was the head of the counterintelligence<br />
service of State Security of Serbia, a man whose name I don’t remember, but<br />
he resembled Frenki 100 .<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Is that the same man you mentioned earlier on to<br />
have seen in another meeting with Kertes 101 ?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right. Th at’s the man, on the 4th of January, 1992.<br />
100 Franko Simatović<br />
101 Mihalj<br />
377
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you explain to these three gentlemen that<br />
you wanted to accept the Z-4 plan and discuss it with Mr. Milošević?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right. I said that I had accepted this with Galbraith, and they looked at<br />
each other in a slightly hostile fashion. Th ey were a little hostile. But they did put me in<br />
touch with Milošević.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And what did Mr. Milošević say to you in relation<br />
to the Z-4 plan?<br />
BABIĆ: He repeated - or rather, he mumbled something. To give an example, it’s as if<br />
he was speaking out of a dream. He just said, “Yes. Yes. Just slowly, slowly, everything<br />
should be conducted calmly.” Th ose were his words over the phone. And he said, “Contact<br />
Vlatko Jovanović. Consult him.”<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And did you do that?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, I did. I met Minister ... foreign aff airs minister Vlatko Jovanović in the<br />
ministry building.<br />
JUDGE MAY: Yes?<br />
THE ACCUSED MILOŠEVIĆ: Just a technical correction. Th e witness says that I<br />
answered him calmly, and here it says, it’s been translated as, “Yes. Yes. Just slowly...” So<br />
there’s a diff erence between “slowly” and “calmly,” especially when we’re talking about war<br />
and peace. Th ere’s a big diff erence between the two words. So the witness said “mirno,”<br />
and it was translated as “slowly.”<br />
JUDGE MAY: Yes. Th at’s to be noted.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What were the exact words that Mr. Milošević<br />
said to you? Just to clarify this matter. What exactly did he say to you?<br />
BABIĆ: “Yes. Yes. Everything should be done calmly, or peacefully,” “Mirno.”<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you actually at that time have time to do it<br />
slowly or calmly, or was there an urgency? What had Mr. Galbraith told you how much<br />
time would you have to make up your mind? Was there an urgency, a special urgency on<br />
the 3rd of August, 1995?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes. Reactions were to come the following day. I was to give a statement, and<br />
this was to be implemented, what I had accepted and what I was to make public by way<br />
of a statement.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you actually have an ultimatum from Mr.<br />
Galbraith to accept the plan right now, otherwise consequences would happen?<br />
BABIĆ: He said what we could expect if we didn’t accept, which meant a Croatian<br />
aggression, and that we could fare the same as Western Slavonia.<br />
378
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And did you accept it publicly, and could prevent<br />
this aggression?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, I did. I made a statement to that eff ect, that I accepted.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Was the RSK then attacked?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, it was, the next day, in the morning.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to show<br />
the witness the Exhibit tab 103 of Exhibit 352, and it relates to minutes of the fi rst session<br />
of the RSK government from July 1995, referring to the international negotiations. And<br />
there is no need to discuss it. It speaks for itself. And in addition to that, I would like to<br />
put to the witness tab 104 of that same exhibit, 352. It is a coded cable dated 3rd August<br />
1995. And I would like to quote from this document. First of all the question: Have you<br />
been shown this document and been translated part of it during your conversation with<br />
the Prosecutor?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, orally it was shown to me.<br />
JUDGE MAY: We need to know what this is, where it comes from.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it’s a code cable from the UK<br />
embassy in Zagreb, regarding a conversation between Ambassador Galbraith and the<br />
Prime Minister of the RSK.<br />
THE ACCUSED MILOŠEVIĆ: Mr. May, I’m afraid I have a record from the fi rst session<br />
of the government under this tab.<br />
JUDGE MAY: Make sure the accused gets the right document.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: When I read this quote, we need to go into<br />
private session, because I just saw that it is necessary.<br />
[private session]<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th e quote is: “RSK Prime Minister tells my<br />
American colleague that to avoid war he is ready to meet Tuđman’s conditions and will<br />
announce this today. Unclear whether he has other RSK leadership on board. Milošević<br />
being briefed by Americans on Galbraith’s discussions with Babic, need to get Belgrade<br />
backing to lend credibility.” Witness, was this the situation at that time, and is this quote<br />
correct as to your discussions with Mr. Galbraith?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, with the exception of the fact that I don’t know about any briefi ng of<br />
Miloševićc by international factors. All I know is that a member of the French embassy<br />
in Belgrade had told me that Milošević did not support us.<br />
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff , if you look at the paragraph 9 of the same document,<br />
it says: “Galbraith assured us that he had the full support of the State Department.” What<br />
is - who are “us” here?<br />
379
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: “Us” is the UK embassy. It’s actually a report of<br />
the UK embassy, referring to a discussion of Mr. Galbraith with the witness and their<br />
further discussions on the matter and the considerations of Mr. Galbraith.<br />
JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was mistaken. Th ank you.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you see Mr. Milošević aft er the attack, the<br />
so-called Operation Storm, on the 8th of August, 1995?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes, around the 8th of August, 1995, in Botićeva Street, a villa in Botićeva<br />
Street.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th e villa in Botićeva Street, what is it? What kind<br />
of a building is it? Is it an offi cial building?<br />
BABIĆ: It is the residence of the government of Serbia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you ask for this meeting with Mr.<br />
Milošević?<br />
BABIĆ: Th e initiative fi rst came from Buba Morina, the commissioner for refugees of<br />
the Republic of Serbia in Banja Luka, saying that I should go to Belgrade to see where<br />
the refugees from Krajina would be accommodated. So I went to Belgrade. I reported to<br />
the Prime Minister, Mirko Marjanović, who asked me for a statement. Aft er I had given<br />
that statement, he linked me with President Milošević and he made the appointment for<br />
meeting Mr. Milošević.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What kind of a statement asked he of you to<br />
make?<br />
BABIĆ: Mirko Marjanović asked me to make a statement to the eff ect that Yugoslavia<br />
was not to blame for the exodus of the Serbian people from Krajina. He even had a<br />
prepared text of a few sentences, and he also indicated what I should write down.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put the<br />
tab 105 of Exhibit 352 to the witness. Is this the statement that you made on request of<br />
Mr. Marjanović?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We do not need to comment on this further. And<br />
when you then saw Mr. Milošević, what did he ... what did you ask of him, or what did<br />
you discuss with him?<br />
BABIĆ: I came to see him. Th is was on the eve of his departure for Moscow for a meeting<br />
with Yeltsin. First of all, the security would not let me in and then he came out and let me<br />
in, and we spoke in the room next to the entrance because in the conference hall there<br />
were other offi cials from Yugoslavia and the army. I could see this from the registration<br />
plates of the cars. Th is was a brief meeting that I had with him. I asked where the people<br />
would be accommodated, the people from Krajina who had fl ed.<br />
380
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: What was his answer to this?<br />
BABIĆ: He said, “In Kosovo.” I asked, “How many people can fi t into Kosovo? It’s<br />
overpopulated, and there was ethnic tension.” He said, “100,000, and many can also go<br />
to Republika Srpska” And I asked him whether we could go to Eastern Slavonia. He<br />
said, “No, not for the time being.” Th en I asked him, “And where will the government<br />
go, the government of Krajina?” And he said, “Let it stay in Belgrade. If necessary, for<br />
negotiations. And you personally,” he said, “you can apply to Mirko Marjanović regarding<br />
your own personal needs.”<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did the refugees from the RSK actually end up in<br />
Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or where did they go?<br />
BABIĆ: At fi rst, that same day, as soon as the refugees started coming from Krajina,<br />
Ratko Mladić, the commander of the army of Republika Srpska, blocked the bridge<br />
across the Vrbas, and he wouldn’t let refugees go any further. I went to see him.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We should go into private session for this<br />
meeting.<br />
[Private session]<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You said you went to see Mr. Mladić. Where did<br />
you meet him, and why did you want to see him?<br />
BABIĆ: In Banja Luka, because Mladić had blocked the way and prevented people<br />
from moving any further. And the refugees had formed two columns: One going<br />
from Bosanski Novi and Prijedor towards Banja Luka, and another one from Bosanski<br />
Petrovac, Mrkonjić Grad, via Manjača, towards Banja Luka. So there was a block, and<br />
the situation was really diffi cult. Many had relatives in Vojvodina, in Belgrade, in other<br />
places, and they couldn’t stay there on the road. And as far as I heard from the authorities<br />
of Republika Srpska, they intended to put up the refugees at the camp at Manjača. And<br />
I went to see Mladić to appeal to him to deblock the road, and I went to see him in a<br />
building in Banja Luka. He said that he would lift the blockade but up to Derventa. He<br />
said they should stay here in Republika Srpska. Th is is our land. And he did deblock the<br />
passage across the Vrbas, but then he blocked the way at the crossings into Serbia on the<br />
Drina and the Sava Rivers, where all adult males, able-bodied males were separated from<br />
their families and made to stay in Republika Srpska and the rest of their families crossed<br />
into the Republic of Serbia.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.<br />
[Open session]<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You said that able-bodied males were separated<br />
from their families. For what reason? What were they supposed to do?<br />
381
BABIĆ: Th ey were integrated into the army of Republika Srpska, and those who had<br />
crossed into Serbia, they were arrested and taken to Eastern Slavonia, to a camp under<br />
Arkan or to the front line, the so-called front lines.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Does that mean they were forcefully recruited<br />
into the VRS and into the army - into Arkan’s unit?<br />
BABIĆ: Th at’s right.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Where did those who reached Serbia, where did<br />
they settle?<br />
BABIĆ: Th ey were accommodated in two ways: First, people who had relatives,<br />
close relatives, the fi rst generation, could stay with their families. All the others were<br />
transported by the police to certain centres all over Serbia, including Kosovo, in columns<br />
of tractors or cars or in trains. I heard the stories of many people when they arrived by<br />
train in Priština and other towns in Kosovo. Th ey were fl abbergasted and they took the<br />
fi rst chance to fl ee from there.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did refugees from the Krajina arrive in<br />
Vojvodina?<br />
BABIĆ: Yes.<br />
PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Were Croatian inhabitants then driven out of<br />
Vojvodina? Do you know that?<br />
BABIĆ: Th ere was some incursion into Croatian homes and throwing the inhabitants<br />
out; however, the Serbian police intervened and prevented people moving into Croatian<br />
homes.<br />
http://www.icty.org/case/slobodan_milosevic/#trans<br />
382
A armija<br />
army<br />
ABKO atomsko-biološko-kemijska<br />
obrana<br />
nuclear-biological-chemical<br />
defence<br />
AP automatska puška<br />
automatic gun<br />
AP autonomna pokrajina<br />
autonomous province<br />
APZB Autonomna pokrajina<br />
Zapadna Bosna<br />
Autonomous Province of<br />
Western Bosnia<br />
ARBiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine<br />
Army of Bosnia and<br />
Herzegovina<br />
ARJ artiljerijsko raketna jedinica<br />
artillery rocket unit<br />
b/d borbena djelovanja<br />
combat actions<br />
BG borbena grupa<br />
combat group<br />
BiH, B&H Bosna i Herzegovina<br />
Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
b/k borbeni komplet<br />
combat set<br />
bobr borbene brigade<br />
combat brigade<br />
BOV borbeno vozilo<br />
combat vehicle<br />
b/zad borbeni zadatak<br />
combat task<br />
CIA Central Intelligence Agency<br />
CIVPOL Civil Police (UNPROFOR)<br />
CVŠ <strong>centar</strong> vojnih škola<br />
Military School Center<br />
CZ Cazinska Krajina<br />
CZ civilna zaštita<br />
national guard<br />
č četa<br />
troop<br />
čABHO četa atomsko-biološko-<br />
hemijske obrane<br />
nuclear biological chemical<br />
defense troop<br />
ABBREVIATIONS<br />
DEM njemačka marka<br />
German Mark (Deutch Mark)<br />
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency<br />
dp domobranska pukovnija<br />
home guard regiment<br />
DTG diverzantsko teroristička grupa<br />
terrorist sabotage group<br />
EZ Europska zajednica<br />
European Community<br />
FČ formacijska četa<br />
formation troop<br />
gbr gardijska brigada<br />
guard brigade<br />
gbrHV gardijska brigada HV<br />
Croatian military guard brigade<br />
g/m general major<br />
Mayor General<br />
GrOD građevinsko odjeljenje<br />
building department<br />
g/s glavnim snagama<br />
with the main forces<br />
GS HV Glavni stožer Hrvatske vojske<br />
General Staff of the Croatian<br />
Army<br />
GS HVO Glavni stožer Hrvatskog vijeća<br />
obrane<br />
General Staff of the Croatian<br />
Defence Council<br />
GŠ General Staff<br />
GŠ SV, GŠ SVK Glavni štab SV/SVK<br />
General Staff of the Serbian<br />
Army/of the Serbian Krajina Army<br />
hab haubica<br />
howitzer<br />
had haubički divizion<br />
howitzer division<br />
HDA <strong>Hrvatski</strong> državni arhiv<br />
Croatian State Archives<br />
HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica<br />
Croatian Democratic Union<br />
HHO <strong>Hrvatski</strong> helsinški odbor<br />
Croatian Helsinki Committee<br />
HIS Hrvatska izvještajna služba<br />
Croatian intelligence service<br />
HMDCDR <strong>Hrvatski</strong> <strong>memorijalno</strong>-<br />
<strong>dokumentacijski</strong> <strong>centar</strong><br />
<strong>Domovinskog</strong> rata<br />
383
Croatian Memorial-<br />
Documentation Centre of<br />
the Homeland War<br />
HR-DAS <strong>Hrvatski</strong> državni arhiv u<br />
Sisku<br />
Croatian State Archives in<br />
Sisak<br />
HR HB Hrvatska Republika Herceg-<br />
Bosna<br />
Croatian Republic of Herceg-<br />
Bosna<br />
HRZ Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo<br />
Croatian Air Force<br />
HUPMEZ <strong>Hrvatski</strong> ured pri Promatračkoj<br />
misiji Europske zajednice<br />
Croatian Offi ce with the<br />
European Community<br />
Monitoring Mission<br />
HV Hrvatska vojska<br />
Croatian Army<br />
HVO Hrvatsko vijeće obrane<br />
Croatian Defence Council<br />
IA izviđačka avijacija<br />
patrol aviation<br />
IC infracrveni<br />
infrared<br />
ID izviđačko diverzantske snage<br />
reconnaissance and sabotage<br />
forces<br />
IDG izviđačko diverzantska grupa<br />
reconnaissance and sabotage<br />
group<br />
IDOd izviđačko diverzantsko<br />
odjeljenje<br />
reconnaissance and sabotage<br />
squad<br />
IDV izviđačko diverzantski vod<br />
reconnaissance and sabotage<br />
platoon<br />
IG izviđačka grupa<br />
reconnaissance group<br />
IKM istureno komandno mesto<br />
forward command post<br />
inžp inženjerijski puk<br />
enginery regiment<br />
ipod izviđačko patrolno odjeljenje<br />
reconnaissance patrol squad<br />
iv izviđački vod<br />
reconnaissance platoon<br />
IZM GSHV Istureno zapovjedno mjesto<br />
Forward Command Post of<br />
the Croatian Army General<br />
Staff<br />
IZpM istaknuto zapovjedno mjesto<br />
forward command post<br />
384<br />
JNA Jugoslavenska narodna<br />
armija<br />
Yugoslav People’s Army<br />
k. kota<br />
kota<br />
K korpus<br />
Corps<br />
KC GŠ VJ Personnel Center of the Yugoslav<br />
Army General Staff<br />
KC PsU VJ Kadrovski <strong>centar</strong> Personalne<br />
uprave Vojske Jugoslavije<br />
Center of the Personnel Division<br />
of the Yugoslav Army<br />
KK krajiški korpus<br />
Krajina Corps<br />
km kilometar<br />
kilometar<br />
KM komandno mjesto<br />
command post<br />
KMORH Kabinet ministra obrane Republike<br />
Hrvatske<br />
Cabinet of the Defence Minister<br />
of the Republic of Croatia<br />
KO kontraobavještajno<br />
counter intelligence<br />
KS komanda stana<br />
staff command<br />
KSJ Korpus specijalnih jedinica<br />
Special Unit Corps<br />
KSS korpus specijalnih snaga<br />
special forces corps<br />
KT I KZ kontrolna točka i kontrolna<br />
zaštita<br />
Checkpoint and Control<br />
protection<br />
k-ta komandanta<br />
commander<br />
KZS kontrolno zaštitna služba<br />
control protection service<br />
larv PVO laki artiljerijski raketni puk<br />
protivvazdušne obrane<br />
light artillery regiment of the air<br />
defense<br />
LBA laka borbena avijacija<br />
light combat aviation<br />
lbr laka brigada<br />
light brigade<br />
L/o linija obrane<br />
line of defense<br />
lpbr laka pješačka brigada<br />
light infantry brigade<br />
MA muslimanska armija (Armija<br />
BiH)<br />
B&H Army<br />
mabr motorizovana artiljerijska<br />
brigada<br />
motorized artillery brigade
Map mješoviti artiljerijski puk<br />
mixed artillery regiment<br />
MB minobacači<br />
mortars<br />
MIP Ministarstvo inostranih<br />
(vanjskih) poslova<br />
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs<br />
MKCK Međunarodni komitet<br />
Crvenog križa<br />
International Red Cross<br />
Committee<br />
MO Ministarstvo obrane<br />
Ministry of Defense<br />
MORH Ministarstvo obrane Republike<br />
Hrvatske<br />
Ministry of Defence of the<br />
Republic of Croatia<br />
Mpoad mješoviti protuoklopni<br />
artiljerijski divizion<br />
mixed antitank artillery<br />
division<br />
mtrb motorizirana brigada<br />
motorized brigade<br />
MTS materijalno-tehnička sredstva<br />
materiel<br />
MUP Ministarstvo unutarnjih<br />
poslova<br />
Ministry of the Interior<br />
m/v military vehicals<br />
MVPP moralno vaspitanje i<br />
propagandni poslovi<br />
Moral education and<br />
propaganda aff airs<br />
MZ mjesna zajednica<br />
local community<br />
NATO North Atlantic Treaty<br />
Organization<br />
ND new dinars<br />
NH nuklearno hemijska<br />
nuclear chemical<br />
NHB b/s nuklearno hemijska borbena<br />
sredstva<br />
nuclear chemical means of<br />
combat<br />
NO AP ZB Narodna obrana Autonomne<br />
pokrajine Zapadna Bosna<br />
National Defense of the<br />
Autonomous Region Western<br />
Bosnia<br />
NSC National Security Council<br />
NŠ načelnik štaba<br />
Chief of the Staff<br />
NVO naoružanje i vojna oprema<br />
armament and military<br />
equipment<br />
OB odjeljenje bezbjednosti<br />
security department<br />
OBC obavještajni <strong>centar</strong><br />
intelligence center<br />
OG operativna grupa<br />
operational group<br />
OG operativna grupa<br />
task force<br />
OG-2 operativna grupa 2<br />
task force 2<br />
OMJ oklopno mehanizirana jedinica<br />
armored mechanized unit<br />
ONO općenarodna obrana<br />
National defense<br />
OS RH Oružane snage Republike<br />
Hrvatske<br />
Armed Forces of the Republic of<br />
Croatia<br />
OUN Organizacija Ujedinjenih naroda<br />
United Nations Organization<br />
PA protuavionski<br />
anti-aircraft<br />
PAP poluatomatska puška<br />
semi-automatic gun<br />
PAR protuavionska raketa<br />
antiaircraf rocket<br />
PAT protuavionski top<br />
antiaircraft gun<br />
pbr pješačka brigada<br />
infantry brigade<br />
p/č prateča četa<br />
support troop<br />
PDB pozadinska bezbjednost<br />
logistics security<br />
PDTB pozadinska teritorijalna<br />
bezbjednost<br />
logistics teritorial security<br />
p/g pogonsko gorivo<br />
fuel<br />
PkPO pomoćnik komandanta za<br />
pozadinu<br />
assistant commander fot the<br />
logistics<br />
PM puškomitraljez<br />
machine gun<br />
PMEZ Promatračka misija Europske<br />
zajednice<br />
European Community<br />
Monitoring Mission<br />
PO pozadinsko odjeljenje<br />
logistics department<br />
POA Protuobavještajna agencija<br />
Counterintelligence Agency<br />
PoB pozadinska baza<br />
Logistics base<br />
385
PoD pozadinski odred<br />
logistics squad<br />
PoOB (PoOb) pozadinsko obezbjeđenje<br />
logistics security<br />
POOd protuoklopni odred<br />
antitank squad<br />
pov. br. povjerljivo broj<br />
confi dential number<br />
p/s pomoćne snage<br />
support forces<br />
PSS poletno sletna staza<br />
runway<br />
PU politička uprava<br />
political administration<br />
PVL profesionalna vojna lica<br />
Professional military person<br />
PVO protuzračna obrana<br />
antiaircraft defense<br />
r. rijeka<br />
river<br />
rbr. raketna brigada<br />
rocket brigade<br />
RCG Republika Crna Gora<br />
Republic of Montenegro<br />
rd raketni divizion<br />
rocket division<br />
RGP radio prislušna grupa<br />
radio surveillance group<br />
RH Republika Hrvatska<br />
Republic of Croatia<br />
RJ ratna jedinica<br />
war unit<br />
RS Republika Srpska<br />
Republic Srpska<br />
RSDB Republička služba državne<br />
bezbjednosti<br />
Republic Service of State<br />
Security<br />
RSK Republika Srpska Krajina<br />
Republic of Serbian Krajina<br />
RŠCZ Republički štab civilne zaštite<br />
Republic Staff of Civil<br />
protection<br />
RTB Radio televizija Beograd<br />
Radio Television Beograd<br />
RV ratno zrakoplovstvo<br />
Airforce<br />
s. selo<br />
village<br />
SAD Sjedinjene Američke Države<br />
United States of America<br />
SAO Srpska autonomna oblast<br />
Serbian Autonomous Region<br />
SAOK Srpska autonomna oblast<br />
Krajina<br />
Serbian Autonomous Region<br />
of Krajina<br />
386<br />
SDB služba državne bezbjednosti<br />
State Security Service<br />
SDO sledovanje<br />
rations<br />
SDS Srpska demokratska stranka<br />
Serb democratic party<br />
SFRJ Socijalistička Federativna<br />
Republika Jugoslavija<br />
Socialist Federal Republic of<br />
Yugoslavia<br />
SIS Sigurnosno-informativna služba<br />
Security&Information Service<br />
SJB stanica javne bezbjednosti<br />
Public safety station<br />
SJP MUP Specijalne jedinice Ministarstva<br />
unutarnjih poslova<br />
Ministry of Interior Special Units<br />
SMON Stanica milicije opšte nadležnosti<br />
Police station of general<br />
jurisdiction<br />
SnB sanitetski bataljun<br />
Medical Corps battalion<br />
SnOb sanitetsko obezbjeđenje<br />
Medical Corps security<br />
SnOs sanitetsko osiguranje<br />
Medical Corps security<br />
SnSl sanitetsko skladište<br />
Medical Corps magazine<br />
SO skupština općina<br />
assembly of municipalities<br />
SOC Stožerni operativni <strong>centar</strong><br />
Staff Operational Centre<br />
SOS strane obavještajne službe<br />
Foreign intelligence services<br />
SP strogo povjerljivo<br />
strictly confi denial<br />
SR savezna republika<br />
federal republic<br />
SRJ Savezna Republika Jugoslavija<br />
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<br />
SS signalna stanica<br />
signal station<br />
str. pov. strogo povjerljivo<br />
strictly confi dential<br />
SUP sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove<br />
Ministry of the Interior<br />
SVA MORH Središnji vojni arhiv Ministarstva<br />
unutarnjih poslova<br />
Central Military Archives of the<br />
Ministry of the Interior<br />
SVK Srpska vojska Krajine<br />
Serbian Krajina Army<br />
SVOJIN služba za zračno osmatranje,<br />
javljanje i navođenje<br />
Service for the air spotting,<br />
reports and iducement
SVŠ srednja vojna škola<br />
military highscool<br />
s/z sjeverozapad<br />
north-west<br />
TG taktička grupa<br />
tactical group<br />
TO Teritorijalna obrana<br />
Territorial defence<br />
TOb tehničko obezbeđenje<br />
technical security<br />
TrHe transportni helikopter<br />
transport helicopter<br />
TS - 2 Druga taktička skupina<br />
Second Tactical group<br />
tt trigonometrijska točka<br />
trigonometric (trig) point<br />
UMZ udružene mjesne zajednice<br />
united local communities<br />
UNCRO United Nations Confi dence<br />
Restoration<br />
Operation in Croatia<br />
UNHCR United Nations High<br />
Commissioner for Refugees<br />
UNPA United Nations Protected<br />
Area<br />
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection<br />
Forces<br />
URS Ujedinjena Republika Srpska<br />
United Republic Srpska<br />
USMSP Ured za suradnju s<br />
Međunarodnim sudom pravde<br />
Offi ce for Cooperation with<br />
the International Court of<br />
Justice<br />
V vojske<br />
armies<br />
VAG vojno artiljerijska grupa<br />
military artillery group<br />
vbr vazdušna brigada<br />
air brigade<br />
Vbr višecjevni bacač raketa<br />
multiple launcer rocket<br />
VDI vojnodiplomatsko izaslanstvo<br />
military diplomatic embassy<br />
v i pvo zračne i protuzračne obrane<br />
air defense<br />
VJ Vojska Jugoslavije<br />
Yugoslav Army<br />
v/o vojni obveznici<br />
military conscript<br />
VP vojna pošta<br />
military post<br />
VP Vojna pošta, VP<br />
Army post offi ce, APO<br />
VRH vlada Republike Hrvatske<br />
Goverment of the Republic of<br />
Croatia<br />
VRS Vojska Republike Srpske<br />
Army of Republika Srpska<br />
VSA MORH Vojnosigurnosna agencija<br />
Ministarstva obrane Republike<br />
Hrvatske<br />
Military Intelligence Agency of the<br />
Ministry of Defense of the Republic<br />
of Croatia<br />
VSA MORH Vojnosigurnosna agencija<br />
Ministarstva obrane Republike<br />
Hrvatske<br />
Military Security Agency of the<br />
Ministry of Defence of the<br />
Republic of Croatia<br />
VSO Vrhovni savet odbrane<br />
Supreme defence council<br />
VTO višekanalna telefonska stanica<br />
multichanell phone cell<br />
z zemaljski<br />
terrene<br />
ZAVNOH Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće<br />
narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske<br />
State Antifasist Council of the<br />
National Liberation of Croatia<br />
ZHRZ Zapovjedništvo Hrvatskog ratnog<br />
zrakoplovstva<br />
Croatian Air Force Command<br />
ZM zapovjedno mjesto<br />
command post<br />
ZMIN sustav zračnog motrenja i<br />
navođenja<br />
air surveillance and control<br />
system<br />
z/o zona odgovornosti<br />
areas of ressponsibility<br />
ZP Zborno područje<br />
Corps District<br />
ZZP Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja<br />
Corps District Command<br />
ZZPB Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja<br />
Bjelovar<br />
Command of Bjelovar Corps<br />
District<br />
ZZPG Zapovjedništo Zbornog područja<br />
Gospić<br />
Command of Gospić Corps<br />
District<br />
ZZPK Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja<br />
Karlovac<br />
Command of Karlovac Corps<br />
District<br />
387
ZZPO Zapovjedništvo Zbornog<br />
područja Osijek<br />
Command of Osijek Corps<br />
District<br />
ZZPS Zapovjedništvo Zbornog<br />
područja Split<br />
388<br />
Command of Split Corps<br />
District<br />
ZZPZ Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja<br />
Zagreb<br />
Command of Zagreb Corps<br />
District
A<br />
Abdić Fikret, 51, 63, 142, 374<br />
Akashi Yasushi, 375<br />
Albright Madeleine, 241<br />
Anić Boris, 13<br />
B<br />
Babić Branko, 294<br />
Babić Duško, 296, 314, 318-320<br />
Babić Milan, 13-15, 20, 25, 26, 59, 179,<br />
186, 202, 204, 221, 222, 234, 371<br />
Barić Nikica, 9, 42, 46-48, 160, 168, 169,<br />
197<br />
Basarac Ivan, 118<br />
Bečirević Kemo, 51, 168<br />
Belošević Robert, 38<br />
Bernić Domagoj, 122, 168<br />
Bešlić Hrvoje, 122<br />
Biga Vedrana, 283<br />
Bilandžić Dušan, 46<br />
Bing Albert, 47, 48, 197<br />
Bistrović Josip, 87<br />
Bjegović Đorđe, 201, 202<br />
Bistrović Josip, 87<br />
Bjegović Đorđe, 201, 202<br />
Blaškić Tihomir, 246<br />
Bobetko Janko, 39, 55, 56, 70, 71, 96, 106,<br />
238, 242<br />
Bor Petar, 273<br />
Borić Petar, 273, 324<br />
Bošnjak Milorad, 14-16<br />
Božić Aleksandar, 8<br />
Bradaš Miloš, 30<br />
Branković Vuk, 19<br />
Brujić Nikola, 290<br />
LIST OF NAMES<br />
Buha Aleksa, 202<br />
Bulat Čedomir, 107, 130, 132<br />
Bulatović Momir, 24<br />
C<br />
Clark Wesley, 242, 243, 245, 247<br />
Crnjac Miljenko, 73, 107, 108, 116<br />
Č<br />
Čanić Ivan, 99<br />
Čeleketić Milan, 52, 223, 249, 250, 262, 312<br />
Čermak Ivan, 85<br />
Červenko Zvonimir, 92, 268<br />
Čobanov Damir, 78<br />
Čubrilo Rade, 309<br />
Ć<br />
Ćakić Branka, 315<br />
Ćosić Krešimir, 11, 176, 179, 238, 239, 245,<br />
257<br />
D<br />
Delić Rasim, 271<br />
Dimitrijević Aco, 275<br />
Dimitrovska Dijana, 14, 20<br />
Domazet-Lošo Davor, 39, 168<br />
Dragičević Radmila, 30<br />
Dragojević Andrea, 160<br />
Drašković Vuk, 15, 1<br />
Dudaković Atif, 22, 143, 269, 271, 278<br />
Dž<br />
Džanko Luka, 134<br />
389
Đ<br />
Đerić Branko, 194, 196,<br />
Đinđić Zoran, 17<br />
Đurica Janko, 323<br />
F<br />
Felić Bejdo, 40, 51<br />
Forand Alain, 15, 26<br />
Funduk Uroš, 376<br />
G<br />
Gajić Marinko, 290<br />
Galbraith Peter, 49, 357-371, 377-380<br />
Gašparović Željko, 133<br />
Ghali Boutros Boutros, 60<br />
Goršeta Damir, 8<br />
Gotovina Ante, 54-57, 64, 65, 81, 85, 89,<br />
147, 151, 168, 171, 246<br />
Granić Mate, 40, 48, 85, 168, 170, 370<br />
Grgac Stjepan, 120<br />
H<br />
Hadžić Goran, 24, 59, 202<br />
Holbrooke Richard, 168, 242, 243<br />
Holjevac Tuković Ana, 13<br />
Hranj Robert, 243<br />
I<br />
Ivančević Dušanka, 288<br />
Ivanić Milan, 14<br />
Ivošević Dušanka, 287<br />
Izetbegović Alija, 23, 53, 64, 168, 281<br />
J<br />
Javier Bernard, 150<br />
Jarčević Slobodan, 27, 202, 204<br />
Jarnjak Ivan, 85<br />
Jevđović Zoran, 13<br />
Jović Dejan, 46<br />
K<br />
Kajganić Stevan, 287<br />
Kalapać Mladen, 15<br />
390<br />
Karadžić Radovan, 26, 52, 56, 62, 67, 148, 149,<br />
164, 185, 194, 202, 205, 239, 241, 243, 245-249,<br />
374<br />
Kinkel Klaus, 224<br />
Knežević Mihajlo, 89, 273, 275<br />
Knežević Milan, 323<br />
Knežić Branislava, 30, 157, 162, 169<br />
Kohl Helmut, 224<br />
Konstantinović-Vilić Slobodana, 30, 157, 162,<br />
169<br />
Korade Ivan, 82<br />
Kostović Ivica, 159<br />
Kovačević Drago, 205,<br />
Kovačević Dušan, 202<br />
Kovačević Radovan, 14, 15<br />
Kovačević Slobodan, 82, 88<br />
Krajišnik Momčilo, 199, 202, 205, 208, 248<br />
Krković Milan, 272<br />
Krpan Vladimir, 122<br />
Krstičević Damir, 82<br />
Kuprešanin Vojo, 190<br />
L<br />
Lalić Borka, 187<br />
Lang Slobodan, 32<br />
Lazanski Miroslav, 20<br />
Leskovac Rade, 205<br />
Ležajić Rajko, 14, 234<br />
Lončar Dušan, 19<br />
Longin (vladika), 202<br />
Lukić Vladimir, 202<br />
M<br />
Mamula Branko, 168<br />
Mareković Marijan, 113, 143, 153<br />
Marijan Davor, 8, 35, 47, 48, 143, 153, 168-171,<br />
175, 197<br />
Marjanović Mirko, 380<br />
Markač Mladen, 81, 90<br />
Marković Milena, 30<br />
Martić Milan, 13-15, 19, 24-27, 29, 52, 60, 67,<br />
89, 154, 162, 164, 167, 179, 180, 202,<br />
221, 223, 228-230, 235, 236, 239-241,
245-250, 259, 264, 274, 280, 309, 312,<br />
325, 358-361,364-366, 368, 369,<br />
372-375, 377<br />
Matanović Predrag, 119<br />
Matijašević Velibor, 189<br />
Matković Risto, 187<br />
Mihanović Nedjeljko, 85<br />
Mikelić Borislav, 24-26, 59, 179, 221, 274,<br />
361, 376<br />
Milanović Milan, 24<br />
Milošević Slobodan, 16, 17, 20, 23-26, 28,<br />
40, 49, 53, 54, 59, 64, 67, 148, 150, 161,<br />
169, 179, 180, 185, 222, 228, 236, 240,<br />
245, 246, 259, 264, 274, 357, 358,<br />
365-368, 371-373, 376-380, 382<br />
Milanović Manojlo,52, 67, 179, 201, 248,<br />
252<br />
Miljavac Pavao, 73<br />
Mirković Ana, 316<br />
Mišević Nenad, 272-274<br />
Mladić Ratko, 19, 67, 148, 149, 181, 239,<br />
241, 243, 245-249, 279, 363, 364, 373,<br />
381<br />
Mrkšić Mile, 12, 14, 15, 17-19, 22, 24, 44,<br />
88, 180, 236, 263, 267, 274, 275, 311,<br />
375<br />
Mrvić-Petrović Nataša, 30, 157, 162, 169<br />
Mušinbegović Hasib, 51, 168<br />
N<br />
Nazor Ante, 32<br />
Nikolić-Ristanović Vesna, 30, 157, 162, 169<br />
Ninković Špiro, 248<br />
Nobilo Mario, 48<br />
Norac Mirko, 97<br />
Novačić Dragan, 281<br />
Novaković Kosta, 15<br />
Novaković Mile, 29<br />
Novaković Žarko, 313<br />
O<br />
Obradović Danica, 30<br />
Obradović Dmitar, 284<br />
Owen David, 169, 239, 241, 244, 246, 248, 359<br />
P<br />
Pavle (patrijarh), 19<br />
Pajić Tošo, 14, 15, 130, 132<br />
Paspalj Mile, 194, 199, 202<br />
Pavlović Radovan, 14, 19<br />
Perišić Momčilo, 25, 180, 259, 264<br />
Perry William, 243<br />
Pešić Miljenko, 17<br />
Poprženović Zijah, 268, 271, 277<br />
Predragović Milenko, 29<br />
Prijić Ilija, 66, 376<br />
Prša Ivan, 269<br />
R<br />
Radelić Zdenko, 9, 47, 48, 169, 197<br />
Radinović Radovan, 43, 45, 169<br />
Radišić Dragan, 53, 67, 169<br />
Radoš Ivan, 13<br />
Raguž Jakša, 8<br />
Rakić Dušan, 295<br />
Rakić Rajko, 71, 80, 83, 87, 88<br />
Rašeta Rade, 275, 309<br />
Rašković Jovan, 185, 197, 325<br />
Ražnjatović Željko - Arkan, 382<br />
Reljić Smiljan, 65<br />
Roberts Ivory, 368<br />
Rose Michael, 254<br />
Rupić Mate, 9, 173, 175<br />
S<br />
Sačić Željko, 90-93, 101, 103, 105, 158<br />
Sekulić Milislav, 17, 23, 24, 40, 44, 51, 62, 63,<br />
82-86, 88, 91, 97-99, 101, 105, 107-109, 111,<br />
112, 116, 118, 119, 125, 129, 135, 140, 143,<br />
148, 150, 151, 154, 162, 166, 169, 318<br />
Silajdžić Haris, 23<br />
Simatović Franko, 98<br />
Simić Branko, 205<br />
Stevanović Ivana, 30, 157, 162, 169<br />
Stipetić Petar, 65, 71, 74, 117, 120-122, 128-130,<br />
132, 146, 153<br />
Stojčić Radovan, 377<br />
391
Stoltenberg Th orvald, 359<br />
Stupar Milorad, 108, 323<br />
Š<br />
Šarčević Petar, 243<br />
Šarinić Hrvoje, 40, 49, 53, 54, 64, 150, 169,<br />
369<br />
Šešelj Vojislav, 17, 204, 240<br />
Ševo Stevo, 97, 273, 324<br />
Škare Ožbolt Vesna, 65<br />
Španović Rade, 291, 292<br />
Španović Stojan, 25, 203<br />
Štrbac Nikola, 324<br />
Štrbac Savo, 15, 325<br />
Šuput Milan, 14, 15, 236<br />
Šušak Gojko, 16, 85, 156, 243, 244, 370<br />
T<br />
Tanjga Rade, 309<br />
Tarbuk Slobodan, 118, 122<br />
Todorović Boško, 46<br />
Tuđman Franjo, 16, 17, 20-23, 28, 48, 49,<br />
53, 57, 60, 64, 65, 85, 86, 122, 130, 162,<br />
163, 165, 169, 224, 225, 243, 264, 357,<br />
392<br />
361-367, 369, 370, 379<br />
Tuđman Miroslav, 84<br />
Tus Anton, 6, 9, 70, 129<br />
V<br />
Vasiljković Dragan (Captain Dragan), 19,<br />
20, 323<br />
Vilić Dušan, 46, 152, 167<br />
Vještica Dušan, 80, 83, 187<br />
Vojnica Branko, 208<br />
Vojnović Milivoj, 14, 66<br />
Vrcelj Marko, 27, 40<br />
Vujanić Ljubica, 187<br />
Vukčević Milan, 312<br />
Vuković Mirko, 100, 103<br />
Vurušić Vlado, 358<br />
Z<br />
Zečević Zdravko, 187, 194, 196<br />
Zimonja Nikola, 272-275<br />
Zubak Krešimir, 23<br />
Ž<br />
Živić Dražen, 47, 48, 100, 169, 197<br />
Žunec Ozren, 39, 169
A<br />
Austria, 308<br />
LIST OF PLACES<br />
B<br />
Banja Luka, 10, 49, 139, 140, 141, 168, 169,<br />
178, 194, 196, 200, 202, 220, 235, 280, 322,<br />
380, 381<br />
Beli Manastir, 298<br />
Benkovac, 11, 14, 42, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89,<br />
154, 176, 181, 182, 186, 188, 189, 190,<br />
195, 229, 297, 298, 308, 309, 325<br />
Beograd, 24, 40, 44, 51, 62, 63, 82-86, 88,<br />
91, 97-99, 101, 105, 107-109, 111, 112,<br />
116, 118, 119, 125, 129, 135, 140, 143,<br />
148, 150, 151, 154, 162, 166, 177<br />
Bihać, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 21-23, 32, 36, 40,<br />
49-56, 62-64, 67, 73, 105, 123, 154, 164,<br />
166, 170, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181,<br />
182, 237, 239-246, 248-255, 257, 258,<br />
264, 268-271, 277, 279-281, 308, 362-365,<br />
373, 374, 375, 377<br />
Biograd n/m, 72, 81, 82, 89, 212, 219,<br />
Bjelovar, 36, 39, 43, 56, 57, 70, 71, 73, 74,<br />
106, 117, 124, 128, 130, 134-138, 145, 148,<br />
149, 153<br />
Bijeljina, 195<br />
Borovo Selo, 179, 230, 233, 234<br />
Bosanska Dubica, 135<br />
Bosanska Gradiška, 135<br />
Bosanska Kostajnica, 118<br />
Bosanska Krupa, 51, 179, 180, 250, 251<br />
Bosanski Novi, 118, 125, 140, 381<br />
Bosanski Petrovac, 52, 61, 85<br />
Bosansko Grahovo, 18, 19, 21-23, 52, 55-58,<br />
62, 64, 66, 67, 71, 79, 80, 82, 84, 171,<br />
LIST OF PLACES<br />
179, 181, 182, 189, 203, 225, 236, 239,<br />
246-248, 250, 257, 264-266, 276, 278-280,<br />
282, 283, 317, 321-323, 365<br />
Bosnia & Hercegovina, 7, 9, 10- 12, 17, 28, 29,<br />
32, 39, 42, 47, 49, 51, 57, 61, 64, 65, 69, 70,<br />
80, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 103, 105, 113, 135,<br />
137, 142-144, 152, 157, 169, 175-179, 183,<br />
185, 209, 215, 216, 222, 224, 230-232, 237,<br />
239, 240, 241, 243, 246, 251, 253, 254, 264,<br />
268, 271, 277<br />
Brinje, 269, 282, 297<br />
Bunić, 96, 97, 100-103, 139, 218, 282<br />
C<br />
Cazin, 22, 42, 155, 216, 240, 249, 250, 252,<br />
253, 265, 267, 269, 273, 288, 296, 298<br />
Cerić, 148<br />
Cetingrad, 111, 113, 115, 129, 140<br />
Copenhagen, 350<br />
Crni Lug, 239, 247<br />
Croatia, 7-25, 27, 30-32, 36, 39-43, 45-49, 51,<br />
53, 59-61, 64-67, 70, 74, 80, 85-88, 90, 93,<br />
103, 127, 130, 134, 135, 141, 144, 150, 151,<br />
152, 156-171, 175-183, 185, 189, 191, 197,<br />
203, 204, 209-211, 216, 221, 224-232, 236,<br />
237, 239-248, 251, 257, 261, 264, 265, 268,<br />
270, 277, 280, 281, 285, 296, 297, 309, 322,<br />
325, 327, 331-348, 351-360, 362-367, 370,<br />
371, 374, 377<br />
Č<br />
Čanak, 42, 96, 97, 102, 105, 296<br />
Čepin, 145<br />
Češko Selo, 119, 121, 123, 145<br />
393
Čista Mala, 212<br />
Čista Velika, 83<br />
Ć<br />
Ćelavac, 90, 91, 139<br />
D<br />
Dabar, 98, 99, 260<br />
Daruvar, 57, 135, 292<br />
Dayton, 240<br />
Derventa, 381<br />
Divoselo, 225, 310<br />
Doboj, 21<br />
Donji Lapac, 15, 31, 90, 92, 100, 102, 103,<br />
142, 156, 157, 186, 188, 189, 190, 197,<br />
278, 298, 324<br />
Drava, 264<br />
Drežnik Grad, 96, 97, 101<br />
Drina, 13, 24, 52, 203, 232, 249, 250, 381<br />
Drniš, 11, 14, 68, 82, 83, 86, 89, 154, 176,<br />
182, 203, 219, 297, 298, 315, 325<br />
Drvar, 31, 52, 61, 64, 67, 179, 182, 248,<br />
249, 264, 280, 321, 322<br />
Dubrovnik, 21, 66, 89, 146, 164, 204, 247<br />
Dugopolje, 281<br />
Dvor na Uni, 68, 69, 117, 119, 123-126,<br />
129, 130, 142, 143, 155, 162, 186, 188<br />
Đ<br />
Đakovo, 71, 73, 148, 153<br />
Đevrske, 86<br />
F<br />
Farkašić, 118, 218<br />
G<br />
Generalski Stol, 107, 218<br />
Geneva, 65, 130, 156, 164, 165, 241, 246,<br />
249, 322, 347, 350, 367<br />
Genthod (kraj Ženeve), 65<br />
Germany, 224, 308<br />
Glamoč, 67, 71, 80, 147, 171, 180-182, 203,<br />
394<br />
220, 248, 257, 264, 279, 280, 321, 322, 365<br />
Glamočko polje, 79, 80, 147, 158, 180<br />
Glina, 29, 30, 47, 49, 68, 117-125, 127, 129,<br />
130, 131, 132, 139, 140, 142, 164, 186, 188,<br />
218, 232, 267, 272, 273, 298, 308<br />
Glinska Poljana, 118, 121, 218<br />
Golubić, 20, 85<br />
Gora (selo), 119<br />
Goražde, 21<br />
Gornji Vakuf, 52<br />
Gornji Žirovac, 124<br />
Gorski Kotar, 72, 192, 211, 212, 216, 217,<br />
Gospić, 36, 43, 70, 71, 74, 89-92, 96-106, 111,<br />
116, 140, 155, 156, 164, 203, 218, 282,<br />
297,<br />
Grabež, 51, 250-253<br />
Grabovac, 114, 124, 139<br />
Gračac, 11, 14, 29, 81, 87, 88, 89-92, 97, 100-102,<br />
154, 155, 164, 176, 182, 186, 188-190, 197,<br />
218, 229, 297, 298, 323, 325<br />
Gradac, 107, 126, 218<br />
Grahovo, 18, 19, 21-23, 52, 55-58, 62, 64, 66,<br />
67, 71, 79, 80, 82, 84, 171, 179, 181, 182,<br />
189, 203, 225, 236, 239, 246, 247, 248, 250,<br />
257, 264-266, 276, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283,<br />
317, 321-323, 365<br />
H<br />
Hrvatska Dubica, 123, 128, 136, 137<br />
Hrvatska Kostajnica, 42, 89, 117, 118, 120,<br />
123-126, 128, 130, 134, 136, 137, 142, 154,<br />
155, 186, 188, 218, 269, 296-298<br />
<strong>Hrvatski</strong> Čuntić, 124, 218<br />
I<br />
Igman, 21<br />
Imotski, 204<br />
Ivanić Grad, 113, 121, 139, 140<br />
Izačić, 249, 253<br />
J<br />
Jajce, 80, 147,280<br />
Jarmina, 260
Jasenice, 79<br />
Jasenovac, 42, 128, 134-136, 181, 293, 296<br />
Josipdol, 108, 282<br />
Jošani, 103<br />
K<br />
Karin, 81, 86, 89, 154<br />
Karlovac, 18, 36, 40, 41, 43, 51, 68, 70, 71,<br />
73, 74, 91, 104, 106-116, 128, 130, 139,<br />
150, 157, 160, 164, 218, 226, 240, 248,<br />
297, 370<br />
Kašić, 30<br />
Knin, 6, 10-12, 14-20, 22-27, 29, 31, 32, 40,<br />
42, 44, 46, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 60-65, 67,<br />
68, 78, 79, 80-89, 91-93, 97-99, 101,<br />
105, 107-109, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119,<br />
125, 129, 135, 139, 140, 143, 148, 150,<br />
151, 154-156, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168,<br />
169, 171, 176, 178-182, 186, 188-190,<br />
194, 197, 201-209, 211, 212, 216, 217,<br />
219, 221, 223, 227, 229, 232, 234, 236,<br />
239, 246, 247, 255, 262-264, 267, 279,<br />
280, 294-298, 308-310, 312-314, 316-319,<br />
321, 324, 325, 357, 358, 360, 361, 364-367,<br />
369, 372<br />
Konjic, 51, 204<br />
Korana, 106, 107, 109, 111-114, 116, 212,<br />
350<br />
Korenica, 13, 15, 53, 89, 96, 97, 98, 100-102,<br />
142, 154, 164, 178-183, 185, 186, 188,<br />
189, 190, 218, 219<br />
Krnjak, 31, 68, 112, 114, 182<br />
Kulen Vakuf, 51, 90, 92, 103,<br />
Kupres, 22, 49, 51, 52, 54, 147, 170, 179,<br />
180, 203, 248-251, 254<br />
Kupreška vrata, 52, 54, 80, 249<br />
Kupreško polje, 147<br />
Kutina, 139, 297<br />
L<br />
Lasinja, 107, 115, 218<br />
Lička Jesenica, 97-100, 102<br />
Lička Kaldrma, 87, 140<br />
Lički Osik, 96-99, 102, 219<br />
Lički Ribnik, 90, 92, 101<br />
Ličko Lešće, 101<br />
Ličko Petrovo Selo, 96, 97, 102,103, 113, 142,<br />
253, 267, 269, 273<br />
Livanjsko polje, 22, 27, 36, 54-57, 59, 60, 64,<br />
70, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89, 147, 158, 170, 180,<br />
216, 246, 247, 249, 263, 264, 322, 323, 372<br />
Livno, 18, 52, 54-57, 64, 170, 180, 204, 225,<br />
247, 249, 264, 266, 365, 373, 374<br />
Lovinac, 90, 91, 101<br />
LJ<br />
Ljubovo, 96, 97, 99-101, 154, 297<br />
M<br />
Mali Alan, 84, 90, 91<br />
Marinbrod, 123, 140<br />
Marinci, 148, 260<br />
Martin Brod, 86<br />
Mazin, 92, 101, 103,<br />
Medak, 26, 30, 48, 90-92, 97, 100, 102, 218,<br />
225, 259, 282<br />
Mirkovci, 217<br />
Montenegro, 7, 10, 17, 47, 165, 178, 187-189,<br />
199, 204, 206-208, 266<br />
Moščenica, 118, 119, 122, 140<br />
Mrkonjić Grad, 381<br />
Muć, 18, 297<br />
N<br />
Nadin, 81<br />
Nebljusi, 179<br />
Nebojan, 118, 140<br />
Nijemci, 218<br />
Nova Gradiška, 56, 137, 149, 218, 260<br />
Novo Selo Glinsko, 123<br />
Novska, 56, 70, 135, 137, 149, 218, 297<br />
Nuštar, 148<br />
O<br />
Obrovac, 11, 14, 31, 81, 84, 86-90, 154, 176,<br />
182, 186, 188-190, 262, 297, 298, 312, 313,<br />
325<br />
395
Ogulin, 40, 41, 73, 97, 106-108, 110-114,<br />
153, 155, 218, 269, 282, 297<br />
Oklaj, 81, 86, 297<br />
Okučani, 54, 56, 59, 139, 181, 182, 218,<br />
290-294, 297, 298, 309<br />
Osijek, 36, 43, 48, 70, 71, 74, 134, 145, 148,<br />
149, 158, 169, 217, 226, 260, 264,<br />
298,<br />
Oštrelj, 180, 254, 258, 263<br />
Otočac, 89, 97, 99, 139, 164, 218, 269, 282,<br />
297<br />
Otok, 100, 102, 113<br />
Otrić, 14, 71, 87, 90, 92, 101, 352<br />
P<br />
Pađene, 85, 171<br />
Pakovo Selo, 260<br />
Pakrac, 57, 182, 186, 218, 260, 291-294,<br />
298<br />
Pale, 15, 25, 26, 49, 207, 222, 231, 232<br />
Paljuv, 84<br />
Peruča,26, 80, 83, 203, 260<br />
Perušić, 97, 218, 260, 282<br />
Petrinja, 18, 26, 68, 89, 117-126, 128, 129,<br />
131, 139, 142, 143, 152, 154, 155, 164,<br />
168, 171, 180, 181, 186, 188, 218, 229,<br />
258, 269, 270, 297, 298, 308, 370<br />
Petrova Gora, 29, 107, 127, 128, 180, 211,<br />
216, 217, 219, 289, 374<br />
Petrovac, 52, 61, 85, 101, 140, 180, 220,<br />
250, 254, 258, 263, 280, 381<br />
Plaški, 91, 97, 106, 108, 110, 218, 269, 282-284,<br />
297, 298, 317<br />
Plitvice, 97, 111, 113, 142, 269, 273, 297<br />
Plitvice Lakes, 96, 100, 108, 129, 178, 205,<br />
218<br />
Plješevica, 278, 296<br />
Pokupsko, 119, 120, 123<br />
Požega, 139<br />
Prijeboj, 96, 97, 102, 103, 113<br />
Prijedor, 10, 140, 178, 198, 248, 264, 381<br />
Primišlje, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116<br />
Pristeg, 81<br />
Privlaka, 218<br />
396<br />
Prnjavor, 124<br />
Prozor, 52, 249<br />
Pula, 139<br />
R<br />
Ripač, 51, 53, 250-253, 269<br />
S<br />
Saborsko, 91, 96, 100, 106, 108<br />
Sarajevo, 21, 39, 40, 47, 51, 64, 168-170, 206,<br />
208, 251, 253, 254<br />
Serbia, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 23-25, 46, 48,<br />
49, 62, 67, 160, 161, 165,170, 175, 178, 179,<br />
183, 185-189, 199, 205-208, 216, 222, 224,<br />
228-231, 236, 259, 261, 264, 266, 296, 323,<br />
357, 359, 368, 369, 372-375, 377, 380-382<br />
Sinj, 18, 54, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 139, 140, 146,<br />
219, 297<br />
Sisak, 89, 118, 120, 128, 131, 139, 140, 156,<br />
157, 188, 297<br />
Skrad, 129<br />
Slatina, 120<br />
Slavonski Brod, 170, 185<br />
Slovenia, 189, 212, 241<br />
Slunj, 40, 51, 54, 91, 100, 107, 108, 111-116,<br />
119, 140, 142, 155, 164, 212, 218, 229, 269,<br />
275, 297, 298, 372, 373<br />
Split, 14, 18, 23, 26, 36, 43, 54, 56, 57, 61, 64,<br />
65, 70, 71, 74, 79,80, 81-92, 96, 102, 129,<br />
146, 147, 151, 155, 156, 169, 171, 182, 226,<br />
249, 260, 269, 274, 297, 321, 322<br />
Srb, 11, 14, 15, 31, 84-87, 92, 140, 155, 156,<br />
171, 176, 182, 298, 325<br />
Srebrenica, 21, 23, 32, 62, 71, 166, 239, 248,<br />
249, 279, 362, 363, 364<br />
Strmica, 61, 68, 84, 85, 182, 278, 280, 316, 317<br />
Sunja, 42, 68, 89, 117, 118, 120, 122-124, 134,<br />
136, 140, 152, 154, 155, 218, 269, 296<br />
Sveti Rok, 84, 90, 91<br />
Š<br />
Šator planina, 57, 180, 264<br />
Šibenik, 18, 19, 72, 79, 80-83, 85, 219, 297<br />
Šid, 145
Šipovo, 147, 248<br />
Široka Kula, 99, 101, 102<br />
Škabrnja, 86, 247, 296<br />
T<br />
Teslić, 51<br />
Tomislavgrad, 52, 54, 80, 147, 249<br />
Topusko, 30, 59, 112, 113, 119, 129-131,<br />
140, 162, 272, 275, 297, 369<br />
Travnik, 21<br />
Trebinje, 204<br />
Treskavica, 21<br />
Trgovi, 126<br />
Tržačka Raštela, 71, 96, 102, 113, 143, 269<br />
Tržić, 108, 129<br />
Turanj, 51, 106, 110, 111, 114, 139<br />
Tušilović, 109, 114, 182<br />
Tuzla, 21<br />
U<br />
Udbina, 25, 50, 53, 89, 91, 92, 97, 99,<br />
101-103, 139, 140, 141, 154, 218-220,<br />
241, 247, 270, 297, 298, 322<br />
Unište, 321<br />
United States of America, 11, 172, 204,<br />
240, 348, 358, 363-369, 371<br />
V<br />
Vaganac, 101, 102<br />
Vakuf, 51, 52, 90, 92, 103, 204, 249<br />
Varaždin, 109<br />
Velebit, 71, 72, 80-82, 84, 90-93, 98, 101,<br />
105, 154, 219, 282, 297, 313<br />
Velika Kladuša, 51, 63, 116, 297<br />
Veljun, 107, 112, 114<br />
Vinkovci, 217, 226, 298<br />
Vodice, 212<br />
Vojnić, 89, 106-108, 113-116, 124, 129,<br />
130, 154, 161, 181, 186, 188, 218, 281,<br />
287, 288, 289, 297, 298<br />
Vojvodina, 46, 381, 382<br />
Vratnik (pass), 124, 126<br />
Vrginmost, 51, 89, 107, 115, 124, 129, 130,<br />
139, 154, 181, 186, 188, 218, 287, 289, 298<br />
Vukovar, 148, 163, 170, 218, 247, 298<br />
Vukšić, 81, 84<br />
W<br />
Washington, 17, 64, 91, 168, 238, 240, 242-245,<br />
357<br />
Y<br />
Yugoslavia, 7, 14, 20, 23-25, 46, 47, 49, 59, 60,<br />
67, 160, 165-170, 178, 181, 185-193, 195,<br />
197, 202, 203, 206, 207-210, 213-215, 222,<br />
230, 231, 259, 261, 266, 267, 282, 296, 343,<br />
347, 348, 354, 373, 374, 380<br />
Z<br />
Zadar, 18, 19, 30, 48, 57, 79-87, 151, 219, 226,<br />
297<br />
Zagreb, 9, 16, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 39,<br />
40, 42, 43, 46-49, 51, 57, 59, 60, 63-66,<br />
68-71, 74, 84, 96, 105, 106, 113, 116-130,<br />
134, 136, 137, 139, 142, 152, 153, 156, 157,<br />
159, 160, 163, 165, 168-171, 179, 181, 185,<br />
197, 226, 243, 247, 268, 270, 271, 277, 322,<br />
358, 361, 367, 371, 379<br />
Zemunik, 26, 139<br />
Zemunik Gornji, 84, 86<br />
Zrinska gora, 117, 123, 126, 127, 139<br />
Ž<br />
Žažvić, 81, 85<br />
Željava, 144<br />
Žepa, 21, 23, 32, 279, 362<br />
Žirovac, 70, 117, 124, 125, 126, 142, 143<br />
Žitnić, 81, 260<br />
Županja, 145, 217, 218<br />
Župić, 118, 119, 121<br />
397
398
399
400