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ful to think of a logically possible world as a world that it would have been in God’s power<br />

(hypothetically!) to create, had he so chosen… In determining whether it is logically possible<br />

that some statement is true, the constraints are largely conceptual.<br />

So we see that, if B-properties logically supervene on A-properties, the A-properties in<br />

question entail the B-properties, since it is not possible for those particular A-properties to<br />

hold without the B-properties holding too.<br />

Our prior example of lumpiness qualifies for such supervenience. One could rigorously<br />

define lumpiness in terms of some statistical property of the entity concerned, perhaps in<br />

terms of the variance of density over its volume. It is not possible for a substance to be uni-<br />

formly even and yet be ‘lumpy’, just as a substance with significantly varying density cannot<br />

be denied the term. That lumpiness is not all-or-nothing is beside to point – to the extent that<br />

a substance can be attributed or denied lumpiness, this can be done solely on the basis of its<br />

density distribution.<br />

An important subtlety must be addressed, however. For any property such as lumpi-<br />

ness, attributed by sentient beings on the basis of some phenomenal assessment, it may be<br />

retorted that it could not supervene on the physical, since two agents may differ over how<br />

‘lumpy’ they consider a substance to be – perhaps one always had lumpy porridge for<br />

breakfast and so became more tolerant of lumpiness in general. However, this would be to<br />

confuse ontology with epistemology. If lumpiness is a genuine property of substances, the<br />

inter-subjective differences do not reflect on the property itself. In the same way, we might<br />

say that, notwithstanding possible differences in the way that individuals may perceive col-<br />

ours, the actual colour of an object depends only on the wavelengths of electromagnetic ra-<br />

diation that it reflects.<br />

Natural Supervenience<br />

The second type of supervenience, natural supervenience is described thus (37):<br />

Natural supervenience holds when, among all naturally possible situations, those with the<br />

same distribution of A-properties have the same distribution of B-properties… This happens<br />

9

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