thesis
thesis
thesis
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
ful to think of a logically possible world as a world that it would have been in God’s power<br />
(hypothetically!) to create, had he so chosen… In determining whether it is logically possible<br />
that some statement is true, the constraints are largely conceptual.<br />
So we see that, if B-properties logically supervene on A-properties, the A-properties in<br />
question entail the B-properties, since it is not possible for those particular A-properties to<br />
hold without the B-properties holding too.<br />
Our prior example of lumpiness qualifies for such supervenience. One could rigorously<br />
define lumpiness in terms of some statistical property of the entity concerned, perhaps in<br />
terms of the variance of density over its volume. It is not possible for a substance to be uni-<br />
formly even and yet be ‘lumpy’, just as a substance with significantly varying density cannot<br />
be denied the term. That lumpiness is not all-or-nothing is beside to point – to the extent that<br />
a substance can be attributed or denied lumpiness, this can be done solely on the basis of its<br />
density distribution.<br />
An important subtlety must be addressed, however. For any property such as lumpi-<br />
ness, attributed by sentient beings on the basis of some phenomenal assessment, it may be<br />
retorted that it could not supervene on the physical, since two agents may differ over how<br />
‘lumpy’ they consider a substance to be – perhaps one always had lumpy porridge for<br />
breakfast and so became more tolerant of lumpiness in general. However, this would be to<br />
confuse ontology with epistemology. If lumpiness is a genuine property of substances, the<br />
inter-subjective differences do not reflect on the property itself. In the same way, we might<br />
say that, notwithstanding possible differences in the way that individuals may perceive col-<br />
ours, the actual colour of an object depends only on the wavelengths of electromagnetic ra-<br />
diation that it reflects.<br />
Natural Supervenience<br />
The second type of supervenience, natural supervenience is described thus (37):<br />
Natural supervenience holds when, among all naturally possible situations, those with the<br />
same distribution of A-properties have the same distribution of B-properties… This happens<br />
9