thesis

Assessing the Theory
Firstly, we should note that Chalmers’ theory, as far as it goes, seems to be coherent.
However, that qualification is also earned by the view that there is only one mind, flipping
from moment to moment between all the available streams of consciousness. Instead, we
must ask whether the theory is plausible – to do so requires fleshing out some of its conse-
quences, each of which are well discussed in the book.
Epiphenomenalism
Chalmers spends considerable time discussing the problem of epiphenomenalism, con-
sidering ways in which he can escape it by reconsidering the nature of causation (e.g. in
Humean terms or by permitting overdetermination) (150–160). He concludes (160):
I do not describe my view as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of expe-
rience remains open, and a more detailed theory of both causation and of experience will be
required before the issue can be settled. But the view implies at least a weak form of epiphe-
nomenalism, and it may end up leading to a stronger sort. Even if it does, however, I think the
arguments for natural supervenience are sufficiently compelling that one should accept them.
Nonetheless, as I understand the term, he is clearly an epiphenomenalist. If the physical
domain is causally closed, contra-causal free will is an impossibility. Events in the brain de-
velop through either deterministic or random processes and there is no room for agency or
personal explanation in the causal nexus. Although a compatibilist might call such a being
‘free’, she is clearly not free in the sense of being able to make indifferent choices regarding
what her body does.
Are there any ways to conclusively refute epiphenomenalism, aside from a basic appeal
to its unattractiveness or counter-intuitiveness? The main criticism of it seems to be that we
make judgements and talk about our conscious experiences. Is it not absurd to claim that my
being conscious is explanatory irrelevant to my saying “I do not see how it is possible that
my physical brain causes me to be conscious”? As Searle says (1997, 48):
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