thesis

Information (in the actual world) has two aspects, a physical and a phenomenal aspect. Wher-
ever there is a phenomenal state, it realises an information state, an information state that is
also realised in the cognitive system of the brain. Conversely, for at least some physically real-
ised information spaces, whenever an information state in that space is realised physically, it is
also realised phenomenally.
This principle does not on its own come close to constituting a full psychophysical theory.
Rather, it forms a sort of template for a psychophysical theory by providing a basic framework
in which detailed laws can be cast. In fleshing out the principle into a theory, all sorts of ques-
tions need to be answered. For example, to just which physically realised information spaces
does the basic principle apply?
Before considering some of the consequences of this approach, it would only be fair to
quote his caveat (277):
I do not present a full-fledged theory with a comprehensive set of basic laws, but I put forward
suggestions about the constructs involved in these laws, and about what the broad shape of
the laws might be. This could be considered a prototheory: a skeleton around which a theory
might be built.
The ideas in this chapter are much sketchier and more speculative than those elsewhere in the
book, and they raise as many questions as they answer. They are also the most likely to be en-
tirely wrong.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, we may note that a hard-headed naturalist
has to accept much of what Chalmers has to say. Although his principle of organisational
invariance is the most likely to be queried by others, denying the causal closure of the physi-
cal world would entail taking a big step away from the prevailing scientific world-view.
Therefore, any criticisms that can be levelled at Chalmers’ theory are also likely to detract
from other naturalistic accounts. To the extent that there are successful, the natural theologi-
ans’ position is strengthened.
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