thesis

The Argument from Consciousness
In this paper, I will focus on the argument in natural theology that consciousness pro-
vides significant grounds for belief in classical theism. More precisely, that the undeniable fact
of subjective experience beckons an extra-scientific, personal explanation.
The argument has its origins in Locke (1959, IV, III, 28):
It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several
sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure, and pain, &c. These mechanical af-
fections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us, (there being no
conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a col-
our or smell which we find in our minds,) we can have no distinct knowledge of such opera-
tions beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects pro-
duced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our compre-
hensions.
Locke’s appeal to inconceivability and his invocation of a ‘god of the gaps’ principle
make his argument weaker than we might like. Nonetheless, the themes he raises are similar
to many of those in modern approaches to the issue.
The best known contemporary argument from consciousness to theism is to be found in
Swinburne (1979, 1986, 1996a) and it is on this which I will concentrate. Other significant
treatments are given in Adams (1987) and Taliaferro (1994). A critique of the argument is
found in Mackie (1982) while it is also discussed by Olding (1991).
As well as considering literature within the philosophy of religion, I will also broaden
this study into mainstream philosophy of mind by taking a modern theory of consciousness
and seeing how well it fares against the gauntlet thrown down by Swinburne et al. While
there are dozens of candidate naturalistic theories, I will focus on that of David Chalmers as
outlined in The Conscious Mind (1996). The main reason for this choice is that Chalmers is
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