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point will have greater force. More challenging for the naturalist are the constructive argu-<br />
ments against scientific explanation, specifically the problem of phenomenological com-<br />
plexity and Davidson’s argument against psychophysical laws. Both suggest that no matter<br />
how far science develops, there will be no way for it to posit nomological connections be-<br />
tween the mental and the physical while doing justice to our experiences or conception of<br />
ourselves.<br />
Whether the problem of phenomenological representation can ever be solved or not, the<br />
trouble with the argument for scientific inexplicability is that it suffers all of the criticisms of<br />
any other ‘god of the gaps’ natural theology. To explain a gap in our understanding by ref-<br />
erence to an entity who has no scientific role other than the plugging of that gap is to replace<br />
one mystery by another – if God is able to explain the connection between mental and<br />
physical events, why cannot some natural but incomprehensible principle do the same? On<br />
its own, therefore, the argument from scientific inexplicability is too weak to gain any firm<br />
ground for theism. I will now turn to consider whether there is a more positive reason to<br />
accept that consciousness implies the existence of a personal God.<br />
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