thesis

The Problem of Complexity
Consider how it was that science was able to explain warmth, coolness, tepidity and in-
tense heat with reference to a single kinetic property of molecules. The feat was achieved by
placing the former descriptions on a continuous linear scale (‘temperature’) and demon-
strating how position on this scale is directly related to another continuous value – the mean
speed squared at which molecules within a body are moving. All phenomena 7 related to
temperature such as heat transfer and changes between solid, liquid and gaseous states
could then be explained in terms of molecules’ kinetic activity.
To be as successful as the thermodynamic account of heat, a theory of consciousness
would have to perform a similar simplification. But the contents of consciousness are so
much more complex than descriptions of molecular movements and the like that this seems
like an unattainable goal. One can learn a lesson from the attempts of the introspectionist
movement’s to atomise human phenomenology at the start of this century. According to
Güzeldere (1997, 14), there was an
apparently irreconcilable conflict between results coming out of different laboratories… Titch-
ener’s laboratory reported that they discovered a total of “more than 44,435” discriminably dif-
ferent sensations, largely consisting of visual and auditory elements. In contrast, Külpe’s pub-
lished results pointed to a total of fewer than 12,000…
Apart from their inability to come even close to agreement, the breadth of the taxonomy
that each laboratory arrived at highlights the inordinate complexity of phenomenology in
comparison with ordinary physical descriptions of events. It is difficult to imagine how a
simple scientific theory could find connections between physical events and the vast hetero-
geneity of conscious experiences while remaining true to what they are really like.
7 Excluding our experience of temperature, of course.
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