thesis

INTRODUCTION
Of the areas in which philosophy is still forging new territory, the philosophy of mind is
one of the most exciting and innovative. Since the publication of Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of
Mind in 1949, many philosophers have taken up the challenge of attempting to understand
how human and animal 1 minds fit into, interact with and get a hold on the world outside.
One branch of philosophy that stands to be significantly affected by any consensus that
emerges is the philosophy of religion. Mainstream philosophy of religion remains strongly
grounded in classical theism, of which the Cartesian dualist-interactionist theory of the
mind 2 , built on folk-psychological intuitions, is a central component. Just as the physical,
finite world’s existence is explained by the actions of an infinite, spiritual god, so too are the
physical actions of man partially explained by his spiritual nature – the posited non-
materialism of our souls provides a crucial analogy with which we can understand God.
Furthermore, theistic beliefs in life after death, resurrection or even reincarnation entail cer-
tain views on the metaphysical nature of the self. If people are nothing but their bodies or
brains, it is difficult to conceive of how one might survive one’s death as an individual, be
reincarnated in another body, or be resurrected in one’s own.
Many concepts in eastern religion are also tied up with these issues. In Advaita, the
equation of Atman with Brahman can be understood as an ontological statement regarding
the relationship of an individual’s pure consciousness to some sort of primal formless con-
sciousness underlying the universe as a whole. In Buddhism, Nirvana not only entails a self-
less attitude towards the world but also a change in conscious phenomenology. Some recent
studies such as Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and Austin (1998) have begun to exam-
ine this fascinating common ground.
1 Most philosophers agree that animals have similar minds to humans, albeit less complex.
2 For determinists, substitute epiphenomenalist for interactionist, but Cartesian dualism remains.
2