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observability of one half of the correlations means that there is a certain doubt about the<br />
data.” (167). Why he does not see it reasonable to apply his principle of credulity used later for<br />
developing his argument from religious experience (254–260) is left unanswered. But in any<br />
event, if such correlations could be established across many different subjects and subjects<br />
were able to see for themselves the predictive use of the discoveries, there would be little rea-<br />
son to doubt that Swinburne’s first condition had been fulfilled.<br />
Producing a Causal Account<br />
The second stage, according to Swinburne, is to show “what causes what” (167):<br />
To show that the brain-events are the ultimate determinant of what goes on, the materialist<br />
will need to show that the occurrence of all mental events is predictable from knowledge of<br />
brain-events alone… whereas the occurrence of all brain-events is not predictable from knowl-<br />
edge of mental events alone.<br />
Swinburne assumes that the naturalist will believe that causation between brain events<br />
and mental events flows only in one direction. While true of someone who insists that the<br />
domain of physical events is causally closed, two other possibilities are available to the<br />
broad-minded scientist: (a) a dualist-interactionism where mental events also lie within the<br />
scope of purely scientific (i.e. non-personal) explanation and (b) a dualist-interactionism<br />
which includes some raw notion of agency. While the latter option would entail an admis-<br />
sion of personal causation into the explanatory picture (and thus take a step in Swinburne’s<br />
direction), it has no necessary connection with theism.<br />
For this stage, Swinburne cites two difficulties. The first is “man’s experience of choice”<br />
(168) which, according to his principle of credulity, he believes should not be doubted with-<br />
out good reason. But as I have already argued, there is no reason why the scientist cannot<br />
also invoke agency as part of her picture of the mind. In any case, as Swinburne admits,<br />
“freedom of choice may be an illusion” (167).<br />
The second is that, under quantum theory, (168)<br />
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