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observability of one half of the correlations means that there is a certain doubt about the<br />

data.” (167). Why he does not see it reasonable to apply his principle of credulity used later for<br />

developing his argument from religious experience (254–260) is left unanswered. But in any<br />

event, if such correlations could be established across many different subjects and subjects<br />

were able to see for themselves the predictive use of the discoveries, there would be little rea-<br />

son to doubt that Swinburne’s first condition had been fulfilled.<br />

Producing a Causal Account<br />

The second stage, according to Swinburne, is to show “what causes what” (167):<br />

To show that the brain-events are the ultimate determinant of what goes on, the materialist<br />

will need to show that the occurrence of all mental events is predictable from knowledge of<br />

brain-events alone… whereas the occurrence of all brain-events is not predictable from knowl-<br />

edge of mental events alone.<br />

Swinburne assumes that the naturalist will believe that causation between brain events<br />

and mental events flows only in one direction. While true of someone who insists that the<br />

domain of physical events is causally closed, two other possibilities are available to the<br />

broad-minded scientist: (a) a dualist-interactionism where mental events also lie within the<br />

scope of purely scientific (i.e. non-personal) explanation and (b) a dualist-interactionism<br />

which includes some raw notion of agency. While the latter option would entail an admis-<br />

sion of personal causation into the explanatory picture (and thus take a step in Swinburne’s<br />

direction), it has no necessary connection with theism.<br />

For this stage, Swinburne cites two difficulties. The first is “man’s experience of choice”<br />

(168) which, according to his principle of credulity, he believes should not be doubted with-<br />

out good reason. But as I have already argued, there is no reason why the scientist cannot<br />

also invoke agency as part of her picture of the mind. In any case, as Swinburne admits,<br />

“freedom of choice may be an illusion” (167).<br />

The second is that, under quantum theory, (168)<br />

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