IN THE COURTS OF THE NATIONS - DataSpace - Princeton ...

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influential argument based on internal sources from Ottoman Jewish communities (especially responsa literature), showing that although Jews may have had some de jure autonomy, their de facto autonomy was quite limited and subject to curtailment at any time. 58 Hacker concludes that this lack of de facto autonomy helps explain Jews’ “very considerable use of Muslim courts.” 59 Najwa Al-Qattan goes one step further, expressing skepticism that non-Muslim legal institutions even existed in the Ottoman Empire. 60 She argues that not only did Jews (and Christians) receive “consistent and fair treatment” in the sharī‘a courts, constituting a positive explanation of their attraction to Islamic legal institutions, but that the almost certain absence of their own courts of law provides a second, negative explanation. 61 The picture Al-Qattan paints is one in which non-Muslims made extensive use of sharī‘a courts, both by choice and by necessity. 62 Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Ronald C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640 (New York: New York University Press, 1993). 58 Joseph Hacker, “Jewish Autonomy in the Ottoman Empire, its Scope and Limits: Jewish Courts from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries,” in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Avigdor Levy (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1994), especially 165-6. Hacker traces a number of cases in which Jews appealed to the Islamic authorities in order to curtail the jurisdictional powers of a local Jewish judicial official. The response of the authorities was typically to deny the Jewish judge the ability to rule on a range of subjects. (Hacker goes into detail concerning the case of Rabbi Benjamin b. Matityah from Arta, though he also points out similar cases from Aleppo, Safed, Jerusalem, Izmir, Istanbul, and Salonica.) 59 Ibid., 181. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that all scholarship had thus far “fall[en] short of explaining the dimensions of this phenomenon, i.e., turning to the Muslim courts….” (ibid., 182). 60 Najwa Al-Qattan, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 3 (1999): 430-2. For the dissertation, see idem, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Documenting Justice in Ottoman Damascus, 1775-1860” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1996). Al- Qattan argues that responsa literature, the main source of evidence for the existence of Jewish courts, “is problematic and restricted to one century.” 60 While this particular claim is inaccurate—there is extensive responsa literature from the Ottoman Empire from much of the early modern and modern periods—her general argument might, at first, appear compelling. Al-Qattan refers only to Aryeh Shmuelevtiz’s study of responsa literature from the sixteenth century; since she does not read Hebrew, it seems likely that she was simply unaware of the existence of literature from later periods. For a similar argument concerning Christian courts in Ottoman Kayseri, see Ronald C. Jennings, “Zimmis (Non-Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 21, no. 3 (1978): 271. 61 Al-Qattan, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court,” 436. 62 Other studies of non-Muslims in Ottoman şeriat courts include: Jennings, “Zimmis in the Sharia Court of Kayseri”; Gerber, “Arkhiyon beit-ha-din ha-shara‘i shel Bursah”; Rossitsa Gradeva, “Orthodox Christians in the Kadı Courts: The Practice of the Sofia Sheriat Court, Seventeenth Century,” Islamic Law and Society 4, no. 1 (1997); Çiçek, “A Quest for Justice”; Richard Wittmann, “Before Qadi and Vizier: Intra-Communal Dispute 22

Recently scholars working on the medieval Mashriq have offered more nuanced models of the interactions between Jewish and Islamic courts. Gideon Libson’s work asks a new kind of question; how did the possibility of recourse to Islamic courts influence the development of Jewish law? 63 Libson argues that despite Jews’ right to judicial autonomy, Islamic law “considered the rabbinical courts to be part of the overall Muslim legal system….” 64 The constant availability of Islamic courts pushed the geonim to adapt to the reality that Islamic courts always provided an alternative to Jewish courts. 65 Additionally, Uriel Simonsohn uses the framework of legal pluralism to argue for a complex interaction between Jewish and Islamic courts. 66 Ultimately, however, Libson and Simonsohn draw primarily on geonic literature; their Resolution and Legal Transactions among Christians and Jews in the Plural Society of Seventeenth Century Istanbul” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2008); Haim Gerber, Crossing Borders: Jews and Muslims in Ottoman Law, Culture, and Society (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2008), chapter 2; Sophia Laiou, “Christian Women in an Ottoman World: Interpersonal and Family Cases Brought Before the Shari‘a Courts During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cases Involving the Greek Community),” in Women in the Ottoman Balkans: Gender, Culture, and History, ed. Amila Buturovic and Irvin C. Schick (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007); Sabrina Joseph, “Communicating Justice: Shari‘a Courts and the Christian Community in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Greece,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 20, no. 3 (2010). See also Mark S. Wagner, “Halakhah through the Lens of Sharī‘a: The Case of the Kuḥlānī Synagogue in Ṣan‘ā’, 1933-1944,” in The Convergence of Judaism and Islam: Religious, Scientific, and Cultural Dimensions, ed. Michael M. Laskier and Yaacov Lev (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), which examines an interesting case of Jews in Yemen bringing an internal dispute before Islamic judicial authorities. In general, however, these studies do not propose alternative models for non-Muslim legal autonomy. 63 Gideon Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law: A Comparative Study of Custom during the Geonic Period (Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2003). 64 Ibid., 45. 65 For instance, Libson traces the development of the category of “rebellious wife” in Jewish law to the geonim’s attempt to preclude recourse to Islamic courts which offered divorce initiated by women: ibid., 111. See also Yehezkel David, “Girushin be-yozmat ha-ishah: ‘Al pi te‘udot min ha-genizah ha-qahirit u-meqorot aḥerim,” Sinai 143 (2011): 37-9. David also notes the existence of a Jewish equivalent of khul‘ divorce referred to as “gerushei pidyon” (ibid., 48-55). 66 Simonsohn, A Common Justice, 11-14. Unlike Hacker and Al-Qattan, Simonsohn discusses the functioning of Jewish courts as occurring alongside, and often in competition with, Islamic courts (ibid., 130-42). Simonsohn also addresses the motives for Jews’ turn to Islamic courts, including the limitations on Jewish judicial authority (especially the limited ability to enforce decisions) and the attractions of Islamic legal institutions, such as differences in substantive law and greater formality: ibid., 175-82. 23

influential argument based on internal sources from Ottoman Jewish communities (especially<br />

responsa literature), showing that although Jews may have had some de jure autonomy, their de<br />

facto autonomy was quite limited and subject to curtailment at any time. 58 Hacker concludes<br />

that this lack of de facto autonomy helps explain Jews’ “very considerable use of Muslim<br />

courts.” 59 Najwa Al-Qattan goes one step further, expressing skepticism that non-Muslim legal<br />

institutions even existed in the Ottoman Empire. 60 She argues that not only did Jews (and<br />

Christians) receive “consistent and fair treatment” in the sharī‘a courts, constituting a positive<br />

explanation of their attraction to Islamic legal institutions, but that the almost certain absence of<br />

their own courts of law provides a second, negative explanation. 61 The picture Al-Qattan paints<br />

is one in which non-Muslims made extensive use of sharī‘a courts, both by choice and by<br />

necessity. 62<br />

Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Ronald C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman<br />

Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640 (New York: New York University Press, 1993).<br />

58<br />

Joseph Hacker, “Jewish Autonomy in the Ottoman Empire, its Scope and Limits: Jewish Courts from the<br />

Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries,” in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Avigdor Levy (<strong>Princeton</strong>: The<br />

Darwin Press, 1994), especially 165-6. Hacker traces a number of cases in which Jews appealed to the Islamic<br />

authorities in order to curtail the jurisdictional powers of a local Jewish judicial official. The response of the<br />

authorities was typically to deny the Jewish judge the ability to rule on a range of subjects. (Hacker goes into detail<br />

concerning the case of Rabbi Benjamin b. Matityah from Arta, though he also points out similar cases from Aleppo,<br />

Safed, Jerusalem, Izmir, Istanbul, and Salonica.)<br />

59<br />

Ibid., 181. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that all scholarship had thus far “fall[en] short of explaining the<br />

dimensions of this phenomenon, i.e., turning to the Muslim courts….” (ibid., 182).<br />

60<br />

Najwa Al-Qattan, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination,” International<br />

Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 3 (1999): 430-2. For the dissertation, see idem, “Dhimmis in the Muslim<br />

Court: Documenting Justice in Ottoman Damascus, 1775-1860” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1996). Al-<br />

Qattan argues that responsa literature, the main source of evidence for the existence of Jewish courts, “is<br />

problematic and restricted to one century.” 60 While this particular claim is inaccurate—there is extensive responsa<br />

literature from the Ottoman Empire from much of the early modern and modern periods—her general argument<br />

might, at first, appear compelling. Al-Qattan refers only to Aryeh Shmuelevtiz’s study of responsa literature from<br />

the sixteenth century; since she does not read Hebrew, it seems likely that she was simply unaware of the existence<br />

of literature from later periods. For a similar argument concerning Christian courts in Ottoman Kayseri, see Ronald<br />

C. Jennings, “Zimmis (Non-Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of<br />

Anatolian Kayseri,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 21, no. 3 (1978): 271.<br />

61<br />

Al-Qattan, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court,” 436.<br />

62<br />

Other studies of non-Muslims in Ottoman şeriat courts include: Jennings, “Zimmis in the Sharia Court of<br />

Kayseri”; Gerber, “Arkhiyon beit-ha-din ha-shara‘i shel Bursah”; Rossitsa Gradeva, “Orthodox Christians in the<br />

Kadı Courts: The Practice of the Sofia Sheriat Court, Seventeenth Century,” Islamic Law and Society 4, no. 1<br />

(1997); Çiçek, “A Quest for Justice”; Richard Wittmann, “Before Qadi and Vizier: Intra-Communal Dispute<br />

22

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