IN THE COURTS OF THE NATIONS - DataSpace - Princeton ...

IN THE COURTS OF THE NATIONS - DataSpace - Princeton ... IN THE COURTS OF THE NATIONS - DataSpace - Princeton ...

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made to swear the oath of payment despite the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to owing the outstanding debt, even though this went against all apparent rules of Islamic legal procedure. 180 Studies of law in pre-colonial and colonial North Africa noted the extent to which Muslims generally sought to avoid swearing oaths, 181 an observation that held just as true for Jews. 182 Lawrence Rosen’s account of the reluctance to take oaths in twentieth-century Morocco may shed some light on the considerations shaping the decisions of actors in the nineteenth century. Rosen notes that in addition to the simple fear of divine judgment should one swear falsely, Moroccans are wary to take oaths because even appearing to swear falsely could reduce a man’s social capital and “risk his overall attractiveness as a partner” in future commercial relations. 183 There is evidence in the Assarraf collection that oaths were more often threatened than actually required. For instance, on January 31, 1880, Zaynab b. Mulūk al-Qamrī sued Shalom, claiming that she had given him two silver bracelets as security for her husband’s presence in court. 184 At first Shalom denied that he had the bracelets; Zaynab responded by threatening to make him take an oath in support of his plea. Three weeks later, Shalom admitted that he had the bracelets after all and that he was keeping them until he settled with Zaynab’s husband—and thus avoided having to take an oath. 185 180 File #5, 15 Rajab 1296. 181 See, e.g., Maeterlinck, “Les institutions juridiques au Maroc,” 479; Kellal, “Le serment,” 19-20. Maeterlinck and Kellal both observe that the oath became a tool for blackmail since individuals were so eager to avoid it. 182 See, for instance, DNA, 2.05.15.15.81, George P. Hunos to John Drummond Hay, 25 July 1877, in which Humos observed that forcing a certain Jew from Safi to take an oath “is considered prejudicial to his social position, for he is considered one of the influential elders of the Jewish community of this town.” See also Goitein’s discussion of Jews’ reluctance to take oaths during the medieval period: Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, v. 2, 340. 183 Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice, 34-5. 184 TC, File #1, 18 Ṣafar 1297. Shalom sued Zaynab’s husband, Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Qamrī al-Bashīmī, on February 9 of the same year (TC, File #5, 27 Ṣafar 1297) about a loan that he had guaranteed for Zaynab, which she in turn had guaranteed for her brothers Idrīs and Bū Shitta. However, it is likely that Zaynab had guaranteed Aḥmad’s presence in court for yet an earlier case (one not preserved in the Assarraf collection), since usually guarantees for the presence of the defendant in court were made in the midst of a trial. Thus, Zaynab would have given Shalom the bracelets as security long before the court case of February 9. 185 This was recorded in an entry of 10 Rabī‘ I 1297, under the initial maqāl. 114

In another instance of oath avoidance, the Jew Ḥaim b. Ya‘aqov Harosh sued the Muslim Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Tabrānī over ownership of a mechanized mill (probably for grinding flour). 186 Ḥaim claimed that he owned the mill even though it was in Aḥmad’s possession, but he could not prove his case. Ḥaim resorted to demanding that Aḥmad take an oath establishing that he—and not Ḥaim—was the true owner of the mill. Although Aḥmad could have easily ended the case in his favor by taking an oath to this effect, Aḥmad and Ḥaim instead reached a compromise (ṣulḥ). 187 They agreed to have the machine’s value appraised by an expert (mu‘allim mawākinā) and whoever kept the machine would pay the other half its price. It is essential to point out that Aḥmad’s advantage of having the possibility of taking an oath had nothing to do with the fact that his opponent was a Jew. Rather, the dénouement of this case followed the procedural guidelines laid out in Islamic law, which stipulated that if the plaintiff could not provide proof then he could demand an oath from the defendant. Nonetheless, Aḥmad refused to take an oath against the word of a Jewish plaintiff. This is another instance in which Jews’ experience in sharī‘a court owed more to the nature of Islamic law than to the fact that they were Jews. 188 Despite their shared aversion to oath-taking, Jews and Muslims appearing in the Assarraf collection did sometimes take oaths. For instance, in a case in which Shalom had to confirm that his debtor, Mālik b. Laḥsan al-Sūsī, still owed him an outstanding debt, Shalom went to the 186 TC, File #9, 1 Rabī‘ I 1301. In fact, the nature of the contested item is somewhat unclear; it was referred to as a “French machine” (al-majānna afrānsīsī [sic]): in the Moroccan context, “machine” (usually written as mākīna) typically meant an automated mill for grinding wheat into flour, olives into oil, etc. (see Holden, The Politics of Food in Modern Morocco, 48). On the introduction of mechanized mills in Morocco more generally, see ibid., Chapter 2. 187 This is recorded in an entry on the reverse of the document. 188 For more instances of oath avoidance, see File #10, 7 Muḥarram 1302; File #1, 22 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1323. See also the incident discussed above (in the discussion of releases), File #6, 8 Ṣafar 1327. At times, the legal document specifically says that one or both parties dropped the requirement of the oath from the other: File #10, 9 Rabī‘ I 1296; File #2, 25 Rabī‘ I 1298; File #4, 13 Ṣafar 1302; File #1, 14 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1322; File #5, 9 Shawwāl 1332. 115

In another instance of oath avoidance, the Jew Ḥaim b. Ya‘aqov Harosh sued the Muslim<br />

Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Tabrānī over ownership of a mechanized mill (probably for grinding<br />

flour). 186 Ḥaim claimed that he owned the mill even though it was in Aḥmad’s possession, but<br />

he could not prove his case. Ḥaim resorted to demanding that Aḥmad take an oath establishing<br />

that he—and not Ḥaim—was the true owner of the mill. Although Aḥmad could have easily<br />

ended the case in his favor by taking an oath to this effect, Aḥmad and Ḥaim instead reached a<br />

compromise (ṣulḥ). 187 They agreed to have the machine’s value appraised by an expert<br />

(mu‘allim mawākinā) and whoever kept the machine would pay the other half its price. It is<br />

essential to point out that Aḥmad’s advantage of having the possibility of taking an oath had<br />

nothing to do with the fact that his opponent was a Jew. Rather, the dénouement of this case<br />

followed the procedural guidelines laid out in Islamic law, which stipulated that if the plaintiff<br />

could not provide proof then he could demand an oath from the defendant. Nonetheless, Aḥmad<br />

refused to take an oath against the word of a Jewish plaintiff. This is another instance in which<br />

Jews’ experience in sharī‘a court owed more to the nature of Islamic law than to the fact that<br />

they were Jews. 188<br />

Despite their shared aversion to oath-taking, Jews and Muslims appearing in the Assarraf<br />

collection did sometimes take oaths. For instance, in a case in which Shalom had to confirm that<br />

his debtor, Mālik b. Laḥsan al-Sūsī, still owed him an outstanding debt, Shalom went to the<br />

186<br />

TC, File #9, 1 Rabī‘ I 1301. In fact, the nature of the contested item is somewhat unclear; it was referred to as a<br />

“French machine” (al-majānna afrānsīsī [sic]): in the Moroccan context, “machine” (usually written as mākīna)<br />

typically meant an automated mill for grinding wheat into flour, olives into oil, etc. (see Holden, The Politics of<br />

Food in Modern Morocco, 48). On the introduction of mechanized mills in Morocco more generally, see ibid.,<br />

Chapter 2.<br />

187<br />

This is recorded in an entry on the reverse of the document.<br />

188<br />

For more instances of oath avoidance, see File #10, 7 Muḥarram 1302; File #1, 22 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1323. See also<br />

the incident discussed above (in the discussion of releases), File #6, 8 Ṣafar 1327. At times, the legal document<br />

specifically says that one or both parties dropped the requirement of the oath from the other: File #10, 9 Rabī‘ I<br />

1296; File #2, 25 Rabī‘ I 1298; File #4, 13 Ṣafar 1302; File #1, 14 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1322; File #5, 9 Shawwāl 1332.<br />

115

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