tig brief - Air Force Inspection Agency

NUGGETS FOR COMMANDERS
MAINTENANCE—MUNITIONS MANAGEMENT
Recent inspections show a requirement for greater emphasis on munitions
management procedures affecting Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) aircraft.
Live missile inspection dates are not properly tracked and missiles with
overdue inspections are loaded on aircraft. Also, live missiles are loaded on
ASA aircraft and not placed in proper environmental category code. Finally,
training/expendable munitions are loaded on ASA aircraft versus using current
operational assets. Failure to properly manage and maintain munitions may
lead to loss of life, serious injury or mission degradation supporting Homeland
Security. You can refer to AFI 21-201, TO 21M-AIM9X-2 and TO 21M-AIM9M-2.
SUPPORT—CRANE AND HOIST MANAGEMENT
Civil Engineers are responsible for the management of the base crane and
hoist program, but owners and users of the equipment perform most of the
work and are the keys to a successful program. Typically, the program manager
understands inspection and documentation requirements, but equipment
operators are not as informed. Typical deficiencies include: failure to properly
perform inspections; maintain documentation; and report damage. Recent
inspections show a need for greater emphasis on training equipment users on
proper management requirements. Failure to properly inspect cranes and hoists
poses a significant risk to personnel and equipment. Civil Engineer commanders
should understand that the crane and hoist program manager is responsible
for all cranes and hoists on the base, and as such, all related deficiencies
are assigned to base civil engineering. Non-compliance by equipment users
throughout the base must be addressed by the program manager and elevated if
necessary. For additional details, you can refer to AFSTSTD 91-46, Paragraphs
5.2.3 and 9.4.1.
OPERATIONS—TRAINING PROGRAMS
Compliance Inspections demonstrate a lack of appropriate documentation and
implementation of effective training programs. Issues include: an external
threat awareness program was not developed; Force Protection was not
taught during annual continuation training; and installation Force Protection
Priority Intelligence Requirements were not established. Additionally,
Operational Readiness Inspections demonstrate there is a growing trend in
inadequate support to commanders and the Threat Working Group. Specifically,
adequate Force Protection threat research is not being conducted, and rapid
dissemination of threat information by classified means is not always done.
Ultimately, failure to understand and adhere to Force Protection conditions
and requirements may place an increased risk against the installation and
personnel. AFI 14-119, AFI 14-105, and AFI 14-202 provide guidance.
26 Summer 2011