tig brief - Air Force Inspection Agency

Recommendations

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IN FOCUS Lt. Col. Sekou T. Billings AFIA/PI Kirtland AFB U.S. Air Force photo The Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) is the Air Force Inspector General’s (IG) web-based application tool that provides the capability for MAJCOM IGs to manage formal inspections by standardizing the planning, scheduling, conducting, and report writing processes. Additionally, this system records inspection results, monitors unit’s progress to address observations discovered by IG teams and enables analysis of inspection data to identify performance trends across the Air Force. IGEMS was initially fielded in October of 2008 and is presently utilized by more than 2,100 users within AFIA, AFMC, AFRC, AFSPC, AMC, and USAFE. A classified-capable version of IGEMS (IGEMS-C) is on track for deployment and use in December of 2011. This will allow the MAJCOMs IGs to capture inspection data from Nuclear Surety Inspections, Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections, Operational Readiness Inspections, and Compliance Inspections in a secure environment. Both IGEMS and IGEMS-C are comprised of a single database and a single interface for input and output of IG observations from discovery to closure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Air Force. Both systems use an open architecture to facilitate Air Force-wide trending analysis and enable cross communication of inspection and analysis results by using normalized data 14 Summer 2011 INSPECTOR GENERAL EVALUATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM and standardized reporting. The Air Force Inspection Agency, Process Improvement and Integration Directorate has lead responsibility for the classified and unclassified versions of IGEMS, while the Air Force Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems, Acquisition Support Systems Division, Business Support Systems Branch has program management responsibility for IGEMS and IGEMS-C. Photo by Eleanor Harris SMgt Phil Sanchez from AFIA oversees IGEMS software maintenance release; conducts IGEMS training sessions for MAJCOM/IG teams; and is the Air Force liaison to all MAJCOM/IG administrators.
EVOLVING ATSO INSPECTION SMSgt. Daniel C. Simpson HQ AFSOC/IGIS Hurlburt Field The threat facing our forces today is far different than it was 20 years ago. In today’s world, we are confronted with regional conflicts involving insurgent forces or terrorist threats to our installations as opposed to major conflicts with nation-states. As the likelihood of major conflict with a nation-state lessens, so does the threat of traditional chemical weapon employment. Our most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan show the threat of chemical weapon use was overestimated. Does this mean chemical weapons are no longer a threat to be reckoned with? Absolutely not, but today and in the foreseeable future there are threats far more likely and deadly to our forces. This being said, perhaps it is time for the Inspector General (IG) to rethink how we inspect a unit’s ability to survive and operate (ATSO) during an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). According to Air Force Instruction 90-201, Inspector General Activities, ATSO “evaluates the unit’s ability to conduct the full range of contingency operations, either in a stand-alone, joint, or coalition forces operating environment, while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-state use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, major accidents, natural disasters, or HAZMAT incidents using the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS).” Key to this is the idea that the units must be capable of conducting operations while responding to or recovering from a myriad of possible incidents. Although our governing instruction provides some flexibility in the inspection of ATSO, in practice we still use “Cold War” scenarios at the expense of scenarios much more likely to occur in today’s operating environment. The inability of our inspection process to adjust to the evolving threat results from years of linking chemical attacks to ATSO that it is part of the ORI culture and has proved difficult to let go. Where we fail is assuming any ATSO scenario must include CBRN and it must take place during the employment phase of the ORI. Aircraft crashes and natural disasters occur at any time; consequently, we should consider including them during all phases of the ORI. Units with primary missions conducted from the CONUS, such as bomber or missile wings, should not be expected to respond to chemical attacks with tactical ballistic missiles (the only scenarios which drive mass populations to don ground crew ensembles). Continuing to conduct their mission under elevated terrorist threats or after an aircraft crash is much more realistic and effective for evaluating their state of ATSO readiness. Of course, if units have forces that are tied to Operations Plans which support CBRN threat areas, they should be evaluated under the appropriate scenario. Key to changing the ORI culture and how we inspect ATSO is to revise the ATSO graded subareas documented in AFI 90-201. Currently, ATSO sub-areas and their supporting descriptions are Summer 2011 almost exclusively tied to CBRN attack criteria, particularly “protection” and “contamination avoidance and control.” Redefining the sub-areas to align with the Air Force Incident Management System phases of response (prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation) will allow the IG and unit commanders to create scenarios that test a unit’s ability to respond and recover in the context of their assigned mission and locale. These broader areas capture universal activities conducted prior to, during, or after any incident regardless of type. In essence it will allow ATSO scenarios to be scalable in scope and variety, while inspecting against the threats most likely to impact the unit’s mission. The time has come for the inspection process to align itself with the threats facing today’s Air Force. In order to provide commanders an accurate snapshot of unit readiness, we have to change our way of thinking and, in turn, change how we inspect ATSO. To do this we must incorporate a full spectrum threat concept into our inspection process. Only then we will truly be inspecting a unit’s ability to survive and operate. Photo: Team Dover members take a break between exercises during the Ability to Survive and Operate training April 20, 2011, at Dover Air Force Base, Del. ATSO tested Team Dover Airmen on changing from Mission Oriented Protection Posture 2 to MOPP 4 during the course of the training. (U.S. Air Force photo by Steve Kotecki) Editor’s note: SAF/IGI is reviewing these proposals to consider revising AFI 90-201. 15
Page 1 and 2: The Official Magazine of the Air Fo
Page 3 and 4: FROM THE TOP TABLE OF CONTENTS Col.
Page 5 and 6: The Commander and Nuclear Surety Co
Page 7 and 8: Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA)
Page 9 and 10: system. ISITT recommended creation
Page 11 and 12: ight direction and the new criteria
Page 13: classified version of the tool is c
Page 17 and 18: facts during each Nuclear Surety Ov
Page 19 and 20: ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT SMSgt
Page 21 and 22: 21 CTIA - The Wireless Association
Page 23 and 24: Flynn and Leaf Awards MAJCOM-Level
Page 25 and 26: Tibbets was a warrior and leader, r
Page 27 and 28: MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION REFERRAL D

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