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The Genus Serratia

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224 F. Grimont and P.A.D. Grimont CHAPTER 3.3.11<br />

was isolated in fecal samples from seven sparrows<br />

and unidentified birds. <strong>The</strong> study involved<br />

90 wild European birds (Müller et al., 1986).<br />

About 40% of trapped wild rodents and<br />

shrews carried <strong>Serratia</strong> strains in their gut without<br />

any visible sign of infection upon autopsy.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following animal species were found to carry<br />

<strong>Serratia</strong> spp.: 75/180, Apodemus sylvaticus; 7/23,<br />

Microtus arvalis; 3/11, Clethrionomys glareolus;<br />

1 /2, Micromys minutus; (rodents); 7/9, Sorex; and<br />

1 /3, Crocidura (shrews) (P. Giraud, F. Grimont,<br />

P.A.D. Grimont, unpublished observations). <strong>The</strong><br />

S. liquefaciens complex (S. liquefaciens, S. proteamaculans<br />

and S. grimesii) represented 73 to<br />

94% of all <strong>Serratia</strong> isolated from the gut of small<br />

mammals and from the soil and plants around<br />

traps (Table 1).<br />

<strong>Serratia</strong> in Humans<br />

<strong>The</strong> healthy human being does not often become<br />

infected by <strong>Serratia</strong>, whereas the hospitalized<br />

patient is frequently colonized or infected. At<br />

present, S. marcescens is the only known nosocomial<br />

species of <strong>Serratia</strong> (Table 1). S. liquefaciens<br />

and S. rubidaea are occasionally isolated from<br />

clinical specimens, but their pathogenic role is<br />

not established. <strong>The</strong> isolation of other <strong>Serratia</strong><br />

species is anecdotal (Farmer et al., 1985; Gill et<br />

al., 1981).<br />

Clinically, <strong>Serratia</strong> infections do not differ<br />

from infections by other opportunistic pathogens<br />

(von Graevenitz, 1977): respiratory tract infection<br />

and colonization of intubated patients (e.g.,<br />

Cabrera, 1969; von Graevenitz, 1980); urinary<br />

tract infection and colonization of patients with<br />

indwelling catheters (e.g., Maki et al., 1973); surgical<br />

wound infection or superinfection (e.g.,<br />

Cabrera, 1969); and septicemia in patients with<br />

intravenous catheterization or complicating a<br />

local infection (osteomyelitis, ocular or skin<br />

infections) (e.g., Altemeier et al., 1969). Meningitis,<br />

brain abscesses, and intraabdominal infections<br />

are more exceptional.<br />

<strong>The</strong> relationship between a <strong>Serratia</strong> strain and<br />

a patient may be in the form of an ephemeral<br />

association (in gut or throat, on hands or skin),<br />

a long-term colonization (in gut or urinary tract<br />

or on the skin), or a localized or generalized<br />

infection. <strong>The</strong> form of relationship might depend<br />

on the species or strain of <strong>Serratia</strong>, the entry<br />

route (ingestion, injection, catheter), an ecologic<br />

advantage (antibiotic treatment), or the patient’s<br />

physiologic status. Patient factors have been<br />

reviewed by von Graevenitz (1977). <strong>The</strong> localization<br />

of a hospital-acquired infection is often<br />

determined by the kind of instrumentation or<br />

intervention done (i.e., the entry route). <strong>The</strong><br />

same strain may cause a urinary infection in a<br />

urology ward, a bronchial colonization in an<br />

intensive care unit, and a wound infection in a<br />

surgery unit. Five epidemiological situation models<br />

can be described (adapted from Farmer et al.,<br />

1976):<br />

Model 1: “Endogenous,” nonepidemic infections.<br />

Sporadic cases of infection are observed<br />

that are associated with different <strong>Serratia</strong> strains.<br />

<strong>The</strong> strains are often susceptible to several antibiotics.<br />

<strong>The</strong> presence of a <strong>Serratia</strong> strain in feces<br />

is not a sufficient proof of the endogenous origin<br />

of the infection (<strong>Serratia</strong> are probably ingested<br />

daily with food). <strong>The</strong>re is no prevention mechanism<br />

in this epidemiological model.<br />

Model 2: Common source epidemics. A single<br />

strain (species, biotype, serotype) is found to<br />

colonize or infect several patients. Any type of<br />

<strong>Serratia</strong> can be involved, including pigmented<br />

biotypes of S. marcescens or environmental species<br />

(e.g., S. liquefaciens, S. grimesii, S. rubidaea).<br />

<strong>The</strong> strain is often susceptible to several antibiotics.<br />

An investigation can reveal a common<br />

infection source such as a breathing machine<br />

(the nebulizer and tubings should be sampled),<br />

a batch of perfusion or irrigation fluid, or an<br />

antiseptic solution. Identification of the source<br />

usually allows efficient control of the epidemic.<br />

Model 3: Patient-to-patient spread. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Serratia</strong><br />

strain involved is typically a multiresistant<br />

member of a nonpigmented biogroup of S.<br />

marcescens (biogroups A3, A4, A5/8, or TCT).<br />

No common source is found although several<br />

secondary sources are possible (sink or sponge<br />

in patients’ rooms, high rate of fecal carriage).<br />

Disinfection of inanimate sources often has no<br />

effect on the endemic state. In fact, the reservoir<br />

is usually the infected patient, and spread<br />

among patients occurs by transient carriage on<br />

the hands of nursing or medical staff. Handling<br />

of urinary catheters, wound drains, or tracheal<br />

tubes of infected (or colonized) patients contaminates<br />

the hands of personnel (Maki et al.,<br />

1973; Traub, 1972b). Hasty hand washing in an<br />

overbusy ward or in the course of an emergency<br />

(for example, (in an intensive care unit) allows<br />

the transmission of the strain to uninfected<br />

patients. <strong>The</strong>se patients are often immunocompromised,<br />

treated preventively with broad<br />

spectrum antibiotics and subjected to diverse<br />

instrumentation. <strong>The</strong> situation is typically<br />

endemic with epidemic peaks in periods of time<br />

when the ward is crowded. Transfer of infected<br />

or colonized patients from one ward to another<br />

or from one hospital to another often results in<br />

the spread of the outbreak to other wards or<br />

hospitals. Prevention of this epidemiological<br />

model is difficult (and in some countries, hopeless).<br />

Proper handwashing should be enforced.<br />

Some proposed solutions deal with ward/hospital<br />

management (e.g., smaller wards, higher<br />

nurse/patient ratio, separation of infected from

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