Aircraft Hacking

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ADS-B Security ✈ None at all ✈ Attacks range from passive attacks (eavesdropping) to active attacks (message jamming, replaying, injection). ✈ Target selection » Public Data » Local data (SDR*) » Virtual Aircrafts * Software Defined Radio © 2013, n.runs Professionals - Security Research Team - April 2013 Hugo Teso
AcArS 101 ✈ Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System ✈ Digital datalink for transmission of messages between aircraft and ground stations ✈ Multiple data can be sent from the ground to the A/C * ✈ Used for passive “OS fingerprinting” and plotting targets * Aircraft © 2013, n.runs Professionals - Security Research Team - April 2013 Hugo Teso
Page 1 and 2: Aircraft Hacking Practical Aero Ser
Page 3 and 4: Agenda ✈ Part 1: The $PATH to the
Page 5 and 6: The Target In the beginning there w
Page 7 and 8: Today’s Answer © 2013, n.runs Pr
Page 9: ADS-B 101 ✈ Automatic Dependent S
Page 13 and 14: fMS 101 ✈ Flight Management Syste
Page 15 and 16: Aircraft Hardware and Software ✈
Page 17 and 18: © 2013, n.runs Professionals - Sec
Page 27 and 28: The lab A/C == Aircraft SDR == Soft
Page 29 and 30: fMS vulnerabilities ✈ Many differ
Page 31 and 32: Demo © 2013, n.runs Professionals
Page 33 and 34: SITA/ArInc ✈ Société Internatio
Page 35 and 36: Software Defined radio 101 ✈ A ra
Page 39 and 40: SIMOn ✈ Why SIMON? ✈ Multi-stag
Page 41 and 42: Conclusions © 2013, n.runs Profess
Page 43 and 44: eferences ✈ Aviation 101 » http:

Aircraft Hacking

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?