The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling

AMERICAN TACTICS
American infantry tactics were of two major types. The
first was that of divided sections of each squad
providing covering fire for each other as they moved
from one piece of cover to another. By always posting
the BAR gunner with the supporting squad, it was
hoped that his firepower, combined with the
semiautomatic rifles (either M1 Garands or M1
carbines) of the rest of the squad would enable the
manoeuvring squad to move forward to a better
position. Although this technique was taught in
training, it was often replaced in combat by a technique
known as “marching fire,” in which all personnel
advanced and fired on the move, usually in the form of
a skirmish line rather than by squads. This proved to
be a superior tactic in open terrain or when advancing
down a slope. It required the close support of heavy
weapons to be a success.
Combined arms tactics were emphasised, including the
close co-ordination of artillery, infantry, and armor.
Artillery was to be used to neutralise enemy artillery,
including antitank guns, as well as their forward
observers and observation posts. The infantry were to
lead when an attack was going up against antitank
guns, crossing rivers, or in thick terrain and towns.
Tanks led in open terrain, and the need to fire into
every piece of cover that could be used to hide enemy
vehicles or antitank guns when in hostile terrain was
noted. Machineguns could often be used to drive
hidden enemy infantry or gun crews from their
positions. Smoke shells were often used to blind enemy
tanks so that American forces could manoeuvre around
to get a better shot, while avoiding the more powerful
German guns. Finally, the need for aggression by
armored forces was often accentuated by planners, who
often told tankers not to stop except to shoot, and to
move around stalled friendly units in order to attack
the flanks and rear of the enemy who was holding
them back.
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Fighting Principles
(General George S. Patton, Jr., 1944)
COMMAND
Leadership.
(1) Full Duty. Each, in his appropriate sphere, will
lead in person. Any commander who fails to obtain
his objective, and who is not dead or severely
wounded, has not done his full duty.
(2) Visits to the front. The Commanding General or
his Chief of Staff (never both at once) and one
member of the general staff sections, the signal,
medical, ordnance, engineer and quartermaster
sections should visit the front daily. . . . The function
of these staff officers is to observe, not to meddle . . .
your primary mission as a leader is to see with your
own eyes and to be seen by the troops.
Execution. In carrying out a mission, the
promulgation of the order represents not over 10% of
your responsibility. The remaining 90% consists of
assuring, by means of personal supervision on the
ground, by yourself and your staff, proper and
vigorous execution.
Rest Periods. Staff personnel, commissioned and
enlisted, who do not rest, do not last. . . . When the
need arises, everyone must work all the time, but these
emergencies are not frequent; unfatigued men last
longer and work better under high pressure.
Location of command posts. The farther forward the
CPs are located the less time is wasted in driving to
and from the front. . . .
COMBAT PROCEDURE.
Maps. We are too prone to believe that we acquire
merit solely through the study of maps in the safe
seclusion of a Command Post. . . .
Plans. Plans must be simple and flexible. . . They
should be made by the people who are going to
execute them. . . .
Reconnaissance. You can never have too much
reconnaissance. Use every means available before,
during and after battle. Reports must be facts, not
opinions; negative as well as positive. . . . information
is like eggs: the fresher the better.