The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling

The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling

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6. THE U.S. ARMY 85 American units, especially early in the war, could not match German units in troop and equipment quality or tactics. These differences became balanced as American forces gained more experience, and German forces were forced to use more new recruits while deploying their best troops on the Eastern Front. By the end of the war, American troops had a better level of experience in general, and a great deal more equipment. American infantry equipment and light vehicles were generally superior to their German equivalents, with some notable exceptions among machineguns and small arms, and American equipment was also more readily available. American tanks and other armored fighting vehicles lagged qualitatively behind their German counterparts until nearly the end of the war, with the American vehicles suffering not only with less powerful guns and thinner armor, but inferior manoeuvrability as well. The late introduction of more powerful vehicles, combined with the tremendous numerical output of US military vehicle production, redressed these deficiencies by the end of the war, albeit at a great cost in crews. At the beginning of the Second World War, the American army was the smallest of any of the major powers on both sides. It expanded over 4500% over the course of the war, finally becoming the second-largest force at the end of World War II. American tactical doctrine was still influenced initially by the lessons of the First World War, however, the late introduction of US forces into the war allowed for some time to introduce both new training techniques, tactics, and equipment. At the lower levels, leadership training was generally neglected throughout the war, leading to a weakness in junior officers, which lasted far beyond the end of World War II. The rapid rate of promotions due to the expansion of the force led to poor leadership and doctrine at all levels until mid-war.

86 The following tables of organization and equipment are fairly accurate for U.S. forces throughout the later part of the Second World War. Due to an excellent logistical system of replacements, parts and reinforcements, the industrial might of US industry provided materials in a timely manner and helped keep the deployed units at operational strength. • The American Tank Battalion was made up of one company of light tanks, organized into three five-tank platoons and a headquarters section of two tanks, and three companies of medium tanks, each organized into three five-tank platoons with a headquarters section of two tanks. The battalion headquarters company included two medium and three support tanks, as well as numerous jeeps, trucks, and halftracks, and could be supplemented by a reconnaissance platoon of six armored cars. • The American Tank Destroyer Battalion was made up of one reconnaissance company, organized into three platoons of two armored cars (one of which may be replaced by a platoon of light tanks) and several jeeps and a headquarters section of two halftracks and two jeeps. There were three tank destroyer companies, each organized into three platoons of four tank destroyers and two armored cars, with a headquarters section of two halftracks and two jeeps. The battalion headquarters platoon included two halftracks or armored cars and one jeep. • The American Mechanized Infantry Battalion was made up of three mechanized infantry companies, organized into three platoons of four halftracks (each carrying a squad of twelve men), a weapons platoon with four halftracks mounting 60mm mortars and machineguns, a headquarters section with two halftracks, two jeeps and several bazooka teams. This was supported by an antitank battery with one jeep and three halftracks towing three antitank guns, a headquarters platoon, and a combat support company with a heavy machinegun platoon, an 81mm mortar platoon, a reconnaissance platoon with four armored cars and a battery of three self-propelled howitzers. • The American Infantry Battalion was made up of three infantry companies, organized into three platoons of three squads of twelve men and a platoon headquarters jeep each, a headquarters section with two jeeps, and a weapons platoon with a machinegun section, a mortar section, and a platoon headquarters jeep. These units were further supported by an antitank battery made up of three or four towed antitank guns, trucks or halftracks, a combat support company with an 81mm mortar battery, a machinegun platoon, a heavy machinegun section, a bazooka section, and a headquarters platoon with two jeeps, and a headquarters platoon (for the battalion) with three or four jeeps and several bazooka teams.

6. THE U.S. ARMY<br />

85<br />

American units, especially early in the war, could not match German units in troop and equipment quality or<br />

tactics. <strong>The</strong>se differences became balanced as American forces gained more experience, and German forces were<br />

forced to use more new recruits while deploying their best troops on the Eastern Front. By the end of the war,<br />

American troops had a better level of experience in general, and a great deal more equipment. American<br />

infantry equipment and light vehicles were generally superior to their German equivalents, with some notable<br />

exceptions among machineguns and small arms, and American equipment was also more readily available.<br />

American tanks and other armored fighting vehicles lagged qualitatively behind their German counterparts<br />

until nearly the end of the war, with the American vehicles suffering not only with less powerful guns and<br />

thinner armor, but inferior manoeuvrability as well. <strong>The</strong> late introduction of more powerful vehicles, combined<br />

with the tremendous numerical output of US military vehicle production, redressed these deficiencies by the<br />

end of the war, albeit at a great cost in crews.<br />

At the beginning of the Second World War, the American army was the smallest of any of the major powers on<br />

both sides. It expanded over 4500% over the course of the war, finally becoming the second-largest force at the<br />

end of World War II. American tactical doctrine was still influenced initially by the lessons of the First World<br />

War, however, the late introduction of US forces into the war allowed for some time to introduce both new<br />

training techniques, tactics, and equipment. At the lower levels, leadership training was generally neglected<br />

throughout the war, leading to a weakness in junior officers, which lasted far beyond the end of World War II.<br />

<strong>The</strong> rapid rate of promotions due to the expansion of the force led to poor leadership and doctrine at all levels<br />

until mid-war.

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