The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling
The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling
The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling
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• Reverse Wedge. In a Reverse Wedge or ‘Vee’ formation, the tactical concerns of the commander are on<br />
control of the unit. It allows for good fields of fire to the flanks and rear, but severely restricts the forward fire<br />
arcs. This formation also allows a unit the ability to provide self-overwatch capabilities. (Not currently<br />
available to the TC in PE).<br />
• Diamond. If a unit is alone, tactically, or is in a halted state where a threat might come from any direction<br />
and require a perimeter-type defense in 360 degrees, then a good option for the unit commander would be<br />
the Diamond or ‘Coil’ formation. If a unit requires a movement formation to maintain security and good<br />
fields of fire, then another formation would probably be best. (Not currently available to a TC in PE)<br />
Movement as part of a Company. In general, the objectives you are given as a platoon reflect and support<br />
the greater objectives of the company as a whole. <strong>The</strong> other platoons will also be assigned similar objectives.<br />
While one platoon may be assigned to take a bridge, another may be guarding a convoy which needs to cross<br />
the bridge, while another may be holding a defensive position, and yet another attacking enemy positions as<br />
a feint, in order to draw off his forces. Each of these platoon objectives is essential to the success of the<br />
overall company mission, which, in this case, is to move a convoy safely over a bridge. Knowing where the<br />
rest of the company is supposed to be is of primary importance when engaging distant targets, so as to avoid<br />
accidentally firing on friendly troops. This is especially important when two or more of the platoons in a<br />
company have been given the same objective (usually approaching from different sides). Knowing the<br />
difference in appearance between friendly and enemy units is extremely important in this case.<br />
Another concept of movement within a larger formation, is that of an ‘overwatch’. When there is a<br />
requirement for a unit to safely advance into potentially hostile areas, there is also a need for mutual support<br />
from other units within the larger division. If two or more units have objectives in the same area, one unit<br />
will be able to cover the other as it advances and vice-versa. Each unit will move from one position of relative<br />
safety (such as a hull-down position from one hill to the crest of the next) along the line of the units advance<br />
while the second unit provides direct fire support. Once the first unit is able to traverse the area in question,<br />
it will set itself up in a viable position to cover the second units advance, and so on. A ‘leapfrog’ series of<br />
movements will develop with each unit moving safely under the guns of the other. This continuing sequence<br />
of movements will allow both units to cover more ground, with a higher safety factor, than if both had<br />
covered either alone or as one large force.<br />
Movement as part of a <strong>Tank</strong>-Infantry team. Infantry units are slower and weaker than armored units.<br />
This means that extra care must be taken to maintain contact with assisting infantry, provide them the<br />
benefit of full (and close) armor support, and avoid becoming separated. In open terrain, this means<br />
advancing in front of the infantry and using searching fire (firing at likely places where the enemy could be<br />
hiding) as needed. In close terrain, especially towns and villages, the infantry should precede the tanks to<br />
flush out enemy antitank teams. Mechanized infantry operations give commanders more tactical flexibility<br />
and mobility in various situations. Infantry that can disembark also allows them to perform as separate unit<br />
in cases where enemy infantry is dug in and would be difficult for armor alone to dispatch them. This type of<br />
force combination presents the opportunity for the half-track or other APC to provide its own direct fire<br />
support for its dismounted troops.