The Art Of Tank Warfare - Chris Keeling

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Optics. The quality of a tank’s optics affected not only how well the crew could see out of the vehicle, but
also the accuracy and usefulness of the rangefinder and optical targeting systems. Poor quality Soviet optics
reduced the overall accuracy of their tanks. American and British optics were better than the Soviets but
German glass quality, optical designs and workmanship were the best throughout the war, although they
occasionally suffered from complexity. The utility of an optical system in viewing and determining range
improved the speed and accuracy of the main gun, while its consistent alignment to the bore was critical to
hitting any target. Different methods of gauging range were used. The most common, however, was to
include a simple mil scale on the gunner’s reticule, enabling him to quickly estimate range by the size of the
target vehicle in the sight. As a general conversion, one mil is equal to one meter of width at 1,000 meters,
thus a four meter wide tank covering only two mils on the scale is at 2,000 meters range.
Communications. By the end of the Second World War, nearly every tank had a two-way radio set. At the
beginning of the war, only the German army had realized the need for two-way communications for all
vehicles. The Soviets learned late, and often suffered horrendous casualties due to a lack of communications.
Even the Sherman was initially equipped with a receiving set, in order to allow the platoon and company
commanders to send orders down. This problem was taken care of quickly, however, unlike the Soviet radio
problem, which lasted well into the war. All armies also produced special command, artillery, and
communication vehicles with multiple radios and versions with greater power. These were used to
communicate with higher command, call for and control artillery and airstrikes, and provide reconnaissance
information from far behind enemy lines.
Ammunition stowage. All tanks face the problem of ammunition stowage. Larger supplies for the main
gun means the tank needs to resupply less often, but also leads to a higher risk of crew death by explosion.
The need for ammunition to be readily available to the loader is offset by the need to stow it safely and
securely. Improper ammunition stowage often led to disaster. Sherman crews stored several loose rounds on
the floor of the turret basket. This led to the vehicle receiving the nickname “Ronson” from the British, after
a cigarette lighter which advertised that it always lit on the first try. It also led to the development of wet
stowage, whereby the ammunition was stored in a solution of water, antifreeze, and a rust inhibitor, which
reduced the likelihood of a fire reaching the ammunition before the crew could bail out.
Vulnerabilities. Every tank has its vulnerable points, and experienced tankers knew this and protected their
own, while taking advantage of the enemy’s. Shot traps, usually caused by an angled piece of armor
deflecting shot into a weaker piece of armor (normally from the turret into the superstructure roof) could be
taken advantage of at close range. Weak spots, such as where air exhaust or intakes passed through the armor
or welded joints where face-hardening was weakest, were favorite targets, as were the thinner sides and rear
areas of any tank, gun and vision ports, tracks and roadwheels, and the gap between the turret and the hull.
Additional armor, such as the one-inch plates welded onto many American Shermans and the Schuerzen
armor skirts on many later German tanks helped a great deal, especially against HEAT rounds. Field
modifications and improvised armor, such as boards, sandbags, and spare track sections were often added as
well. This measure of added protection sometimes caused additional problems due to the extra weight and
bulk. Some of the add-on armor welded to the Sherman hull and turret sides was even used as a targeting
aid by German tank crews who knew that the armor was weaker there, effectively negating its value.