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BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Two<br />

historian’s focus on Thasos does underscore a crucial aspect of Athenian foreign policy<br />

throughout this period, one that Cimon brings out in proudly reporting that he enriched<br />

Athens from her enemies (plouti/zwn a)po\ tw=n polemi/wn th\n po/lin, Plut. Cim. 14.4).<br />

Athens’ archē, her power over her allies, was thus intimately bound up with the<br />

economic rewards of exerting that power. Yet so long as other allies were contributing<br />

men and ships to the cause, they, too, might expect economic rewards from the League. 13<br />

Once those allies began providing monetary payments, though, the nature of the<br />

payments effectively changed into a contract for protection by Athenian forces. 14<br />

Precisely because Athens continued to provide an increasingly greater share of the<br />

League’s navy, she deserved a greater share of the rewards from the League’s<br />

expeditions. This explains in part why Athenians assessed, collected, and administered<br />

the tribute; Athenian citizens colonized conquered territories; and Athens so frequently<br />

assumed control over local resources in subjecting a particular ally. 15 As Thucydides’<br />

account of the 50 years after the Persian Wars suggests, money equaled power and<br />

Athens’ power directly translated into more money.<br />

Lisa Kallet has persuasively illuminated the striking extent to which this equation<br />

of money and power infused Athenian political debates and policies throughout the fifth<br />

century; with more power, Athenian stratēgoi like Cimon could directly and indirectly<br />

13 At the League’s inception, the allies, too, would have anticipated tangible rewards from ravaging Persian<br />

territory. It was only after they stopped providing men and ships that the nature of the alliance shifted.<br />

Sealey (1966: 233-55). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993: 53-4).<br />

14 Cf. Thuc. 1.99. Kallet-Marx (1993: 65-7) is essential on this point, but it should be noted that cause and<br />

effect here are still somewhat murky. Doubtless some of the allies, disillusioned by the League’s<br />

expeditions—which, in benefiting Athens predominantly, already reflected her near hegemonic position—<br />

shifted to monetary payments as a pragmatic matter. In a sense, therefore, the switch to monetary<br />

payments could have both anticipated and responded to Athens’ changing relationship to the League.<br />

15 Like Thasos, Aegina was also forced to surrender her warships and mainland possessions in 458 (Thuc.<br />

1.108.4).<br />

88

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