BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One
For each one of these services, there was a single output—an amount of tax or
grain, a naval ship, or a trained chorus—that was the product of enormous collaboration
among an entire network of people. The richest three members from each eisphora
symmory were responsible for providing the tax owed by the symmory as a whole; how
they collected reimbursement from the other members, however, is something of a
mystery. It is clear that there were considerable disagreements over the most equitable
distribution of contributions: in order to make the actual payment owed by the symmory,
therefore, there was doubtless interpersonal negotiation within the symmory—friends
helping each other out, signaling their own status within the group by the payment they
could contribute, etc. 77
Likewise, tax collectors, grain distributors, and liturgy performers could not have
performed their obligations single-handedly: they would have had to rely on friends to
ensure that all the necessary provisions were in order, that a certain amount of the tax
would be guaranteed to be collected, and so forth. 78 For all public contracts, as well as
for the trierarchy, there would have been the opportunity to recoup some losses and even
profit; in that case, we can readily imagine that the proceeds were redistributed among
friends who had been a part of the collaboration. 79
Each one of these areas of politics thus leveraged a different configuration of
social relationships, ranging from one or two immediate, close friends to more extensive
77 Of course, those in charge of a symmory might consequently force the other, less wealthy members of
the symmory to pay more—e.g. Dem. 18.104, Hyp. fr. 160—and this could cause tremendous problems at
wartime in trying to secure a fleet quickly. Cf. Dem. 4.36. On in-group distribution and remuneration, see
also Dem. 37.37, 50.9.
78 Wankel (1982: 46-7), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 102-6). That groups of people, not individuals,
might bid on amounts of grain is clear from Agyrrhios’ grain-tax law of 374/3: see SEG XXVI 72.31-3
with Stroud (1998: 65-6 ad 31-6), Osborne (2000: 173). Millett (1992: 69-71) notes that elites would
often borrow money from friends in order to pay a liturgy up-front.
79 For the redistribution of booty as prizes (aristeiae) or misthos, see Pritchett (1972: 1.85-92).
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