BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One than the Persian King would have offered—and kept the rest for himself. So the Greeks remained at Artemisium. 25 The details of this story are bizarre and defy interpretation under the standard view. If we think of the thirty talents and subsequent payments as bribes given and received by rational actors, we are left with a few puzzling facts. First, if Eurybiades could be bribed by Themistocles for only five talents, why were the Euboeans unable to persuade him? Why did they not simply offer the Spartan general five—or thirty!— talents from the beginning? Second, if the Persian King would have paid Adimantus less than three talents to betray the fleet, then we would expect that three talents would have been the going price for treason in this case. So why would it have taken a full five talents to persuade Eurybiades? And third, why was Themistocles’ price so high? Why did he require 22 talents, when the others required only 3 or 5 talents? Why did the Euboeans not pay him, instead, a more modest bribe of, say, 20 talents, or even 15? In theory, if Eurybiades, Adimantus, and Themistocles were rational rent-seeking politicians, we would expect that their bribe-price would have been set at a market- clearing price just above whatever the Persian King would have paid. Anything below such a price would have been irrational for themselves because they could have always received more money from the King; anything above such a price, though, would have been irrational for the Euboeans, since theoretically they should always desire the lowest price possible. Neither the bribe prices nor the eventual series of payments seems ‘rational’ under the standard model. Thus, even if these details have little historicity, at 25 Hdt. 8.4.2-8.5.3; cf. Plut. Them. 7.5-6=Phanias fr. 24 Wehrli. 41

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One the very least we are hard-pressed to ascertain why Herodotus, or one of his sources, would have accepted, let alone passed on, the story at face value. 26 Understanding the significance of the events at Artemisium requires moving past the standard view. This section presents a case for how a relational approach can help. Two aspects of a relational approach to bribery lend themselves particularly well to the Athenian context. Because the Athenians had no word for ‘bribe’, the Athenian vocabulary of bribery focused on compensation and the violation of social norms. As we saw in the previous section, these were the two critical components in a relational model of bribery. Moreover, as has been underscored by much recent literature on gift exchange and economic activity in ancient Athens, gifts like those given to the Greek generals at Artemisium were consistently used to negotiate social relationships. 27 We have good reason to think, therefore, that the Athenians themselves understood bribery through the relationships that structured it. Both claims will be treated in this section as we investigate the vocabulary of bribery and the social contexts in which it could have appeared at Athens. The next section will examine how contested claims about bribery implicated broader public discussions about politics. 26 The historicity of the scene at Artemisium has been seriously questioned for a number of reasons, not least of which is the curious problem that, because the fleet was stationed at Artemisium explicitly in order to back up the Spartan land forces at nearby Thermopylae, it is odd that the Spartan leader Eurybiades would have wanted to leave. See further Cawkwell (1970: 41), Wallace (1974: 22-5), Podlecki (1975: 17-18), Frost (1980: 107-8 ad 7.6-7), Kurke (2002: 90). Cf. Plut. De Hdt. Mal.872BC. Doubts of historicity aside, many scholars paint Themistocles as a venal profiteer: see discussion, including ancient testimony, in Kurke (2002). Recently, Blösel (2001; 2005: 135-44), Baragwanath (2008: 292-4) and, less so, Fornara (1971: 66-74) have attempted to salvage Themistocles’ reputation as a cunning patriot. Blösel’s proposed scenario in which Herodotus uses Themistocles as a metaphor for Athens’ imperialism is possible—similarly, Cresci Marrone (1986), Balot (2001: 99-135 esp. 117-20)—but he goes too far in trying to model this scene off of, specifically, Pericles’ bribing of Pleistoanax: cf. Steinbock (2006). While I do not come down on either side of this issue, I would like to underscore that these normative assessments are all inherently political claims. 27 By ‘negotiate’ here and throughout I intend reference to some kind of relational work. Two social actors ‘negotiate’ a relationship in defining, redefining, adjusting, calibrating, or rejecting the obligations that inhere in their relationship. That is to say, they negotiate a social relationship in performing the work necessary to create, maintain or end it. 42

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One<br />

than the Persian King would have offered—and kept the rest for himself. So the Greeks<br />

remained at Artemisium. 25<br />

The details of this story are bizarre and defy interpretation under the standard<br />

view. If we think of the thirty talents and subsequent payments as bribes given and<br />

received by rational actors, we are left with a few puzzling facts. First, if Eurybiades<br />

could be bribed by Themistocles for only five talents, why were the Euboeans unable to<br />

persuade him? Why did they not simply offer the Spartan general five—or thirty!—<br />

talents from the beginning? Second, if the Persian King would have paid Adimantus less<br />

than three talents to betray the fleet, then we would expect that three talents would have<br />

been the going price for treason in this case. So why would it have taken a full five<br />

talents to persuade Eurybiades? And third, why was Themistocles’ price so high? Why<br />

did he require 22 talents, when the others required only 3 or 5 talents? Why did the<br />

Euboeans not pay him, instead, a more modest bribe of, say, 20 talents, or even 15?<br />

In theory, if Eurybiades, Adimantus, and Themistocles were rational rent-seeking<br />

politicians, we would expect that their bribe-price would have been set at a market-<br />

clearing price just above whatever the Persian King would have paid. Anything below<br />

such a price would have been irrational for themselves because they could have always<br />

received more money from the King; anything above such a price, though, would have<br />

been irrational for the Euboeans, since theoretically they should always desire the lowest<br />

price possible. Neither the bribe prices nor the eventual series of payments seems<br />

‘rational’ under the standard model. Thus, even if these details have little historicity, at<br />

25 Hdt. 8.4.2-8.5.3; cf. Plut. Them. 7.5-6=Phanias fr. 24 Wehrli.<br />

41

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