BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One
form of behavior. It is, after all, a premise of relational models that ‘economic’ actions
really are about negotiating social relationships. Moreover, because we are focusing on
outcome, not intent, our relational model seeks to uncover why individuals might frame
an action as bribery, not necessarily why they might decide to pursue bribery as a course
of action. Indeed, if they do not think of their own actions as ‘bribery’, it is difficult to
understand in what sense they could be said to have ‘decided’ to takes bribes. One
significant shortcoming of rational actor models, I suggest, is that they simply presume
that individuals always frame the transaction as bribery. Undoubtedly this is true some of
the time, but, as was noted above, the prevalence of conflicting social frames suggests
that it is not true a significant amount of the time. In those cases, explaining the person’s
exact ‘intent’ is almost impossible; by contrast, explaining why somebody might be
inclined to frame the situation as bribery is almost always measurable. This is precisely
what we will seek to do in outlining a relational model of bribery in democratic Athens.
Bribery and Relational Work in Athenian Politics
In 480, the Athenian stratēgos Themistocles was in charge of the Athenian fleet
as it fought against the Persians. According to Herodotus, when the Greeks arrived at the
town of Artemisium in Euboea, they feared the size of the Persian fleet and wanted to
leave. The Euboeans tried to convince the Spartan leader Eurybiades to stay, but they
could not persuade him. They turned instead to Themistocles, offering him 30 talents of
silver should the Greeks stay and defend Euboea. With this money, Themistocles gave
five talents to Eurybiades, three to the Corinthian admiral Adimantus—purportedly more
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