BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One<br />
sections that follow, with a relational approach we can directly obtain how and why<br />
normative assessments change across social contexts. 23<br />
Two caveats before moving on to how this relational approach can be applied to<br />
Athens. Perhaps the most controversial difference between my own approach and the<br />
standard view of bribery is that I am taking bribery to be a social frame for understanding<br />
actions, not a class of actions per se. In this sense I am defining bribery by its outcome<br />
(normative violation) rather than assuming its outcome by focusing on intent (corrupting<br />
payments). When I claim that a particular transaction was an instance of bribery, I am<br />
saying, merely, that one could construct a narrative of events such that A paid (or<br />
promised to pay) B to do C, and that either C or this payment (or both) constituted a<br />
violation of some norm. This is only a narrative frame. It does not establish any fact of<br />
the matter; I think, and doubtless most scholars would agree, that normally it is<br />
23 Although this will play little role in my analysis here, it should be noted that a third advantage to a<br />
relational approach to bribery is that it allows us to be more precise about the relationship between bribery<br />
and other forms of corrupt activity, specifically extortion and conflicts of interest. I do not focus on either<br />
extortion or conflict of interest largely because the former seems to have been rare at Athens—except under<br />
the Thirty, on which see Chapter Three—and the latter was simply a non-issue, as the Athenians were<br />
concerned not that officials might take gifts, but that they might take gifts from the wrong source: e.g. Plat.<br />
Leg. 955c8, Hyp. 4.24-5, pace Humphreys (1978b). Contemporary scholars frequently confess difficulty<br />
in distinguishing among these three concepts. When something is given to a politician, is it a ‘gift’<br />
(without any specific strings attached) that thereby creates a conflict of interest, or is it a ‘bribe’ (with<br />
specific strings attached)? When a bureaucrat must be given an inducement to do her job, is this bribery<br />
(meaning the bribe was voluntarily initiated on both sides) or extortion (meaning the payment was<br />
expected, not voluntarily given)?<br />
Our relational approach would point out that these distinctions stem from differences in framing:<br />
bribery (compensation), extortion (entitlement), and conflict of interest (gift) fundamentally differ in terms<br />
of perceived transaction context. Moreover, and this is the crucial advantage gleaned from our relational<br />
model, to the extent that differences in transaction context are shaped by the social relationship of the<br />
transactors, these differences stem, in part, from the patterns of social relationships that configure them.<br />
We simply would not expect a gift between relative strangers, just as we would not expect direct exchange<br />
between close friends. This is one reason why there is often a difference between how participants (who<br />
might be close friends) and observers understand a particular transaction. Finally, a relational model allows<br />
for shades of distinctions between these categories: surely there is a difference—different causes, different<br />
effects, and different meanings—between explicit extortion and when a citizen thinks a bureaucrat is<br />
extorting money, while the bureaucrat views the money as a bribe. Rather than having to call such a<br />
situation either bribery or extortion, a relational view helpfully explains how and why there might be<br />
different understandings of the events. With a relational approach, we can thus gain tremendous insight<br />
into when and where we might expect bribery, extortion, and conflicts of interest to arise.<br />
38