BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One cash: how do you evaluate that scene normatively? Understanding the pair’s relationship—husband/wife, father/daughter, citizen/politician, store-owner/customer, to name but a few examples—is absolutely necessary. So, too, is understanding whether the cash represents a gift, payment, loan, kickback and so forth. Just as the social meaning of money hinges on the other two categories, the social meaning of a relationship or even of the transaction context can hinge on how much money is given, of what kind, to whom or from what source. 21 In the case of bribery, therefore, for different outcomes (i.e. when different obligations have been violated), for different social actors or for different relationships between them, the degree of illicitness varies. 22 This is a second crucial advantage to the standard view’s focus on what does and does not constitute bribery, an advantage that allows us to assess why there might be a normative distinction between, say, bribing an opponent in court to drop a lawsuit and bribing a bureaucrat to obtain a public contract. On the standard view, identical actions within two different normative contexts (e.g. two different countries) are very difficult to compare. Often scholars must resort to the blanket assumption that there are ‘different values’ involved, without clearly pinpointing what exactly motivates the change in normative value. By contrast, as we will see in the 21 Zelizer (1994: esp. 208-16) focuses on the social meaning of money and analyzes how people ‘earmark’ currencies with specific meaning, making the currencies non-fungible so that the specific content of discrete social ties can be maintained. Thus, an allowance is different from a gift, which is different still from payment for chores—all of which transactions can signal different aspects of a parent-child relationship. Note, though, how the amount of payment for chores, including whether or not such ‘payment’ is distinct from an allowance, can signal a distinctively parent-child relationship and not, say, that between employer and employee, as in the case of hiring someone to do the same chores. 22 Rigi (2004: 105-8) makes a similar point in isolating the various social variables—like relational distance, amount of trust, power dynamic between transactors—that influence how and when bribery occurs. 37

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One sections that follow, with a relational approach we can directly obtain how and why normative assessments change across social contexts. 23 Two caveats before moving on to how this relational approach can be applied to Athens. Perhaps the most controversial difference between my own approach and the standard view of bribery is that I am taking bribery to be a social frame for understanding actions, not a class of actions per se. In this sense I am defining bribery by its outcome (normative violation) rather than assuming its outcome by focusing on intent (corrupting payments). When I claim that a particular transaction was an instance of bribery, I am saying, merely, that one could construct a narrative of events such that A paid (or promised to pay) B to do C, and that either C or this payment (or both) constituted a violation of some norm. This is only a narrative frame. It does not establish any fact of the matter; I think, and doubtless most scholars would agree, that normally it is 23 Although this will play little role in my analysis here, it should be noted that a third advantage to a relational approach to bribery is that it allows us to be more precise about the relationship between bribery and other forms of corrupt activity, specifically extortion and conflicts of interest. I do not focus on either extortion or conflict of interest largely because the former seems to have been rare at Athens—except under the Thirty, on which see Chapter Three—and the latter was simply a non-issue, as the Athenians were concerned not that officials might take gifts, but that they might take gifts from the wrong source: e.g. Plat. Leg. 955c8, Hyp. 4.24-5, pace Humphreys (1978b). Contemporary scholars frequently confess difficulty in distinguishing among these three concepts. When something is given to a politician, is it a ‘gift’ (without any specific strings attached) that thereby creates a conflict of interest, or is it a ‘bribe’ (with specific strings attached)? When a bureaucrat must be given an inducement to do her job, is this bribery (meaning the bribe was voluntarily initiated on both sides) or extortion (meaning the payment was expected, not voluntarily given)? Our relational approach would point out that these distinctions stem from differences in framing: bribery (compensation), extortion (entitlement), and conflict of interest (gift) fundamentally differ in terms of perceived transaction context. Moreover, and this is the crucial advantage gleaned from our relational model, to the extent that differences in transaction context are shaped by the social relationship of the transactors, these differences stem, in part, from the patterns of social relationships that configure them. We simply would not expect a gift between relative strangers, just as we would not expect direct exchange between close friends. This is one reason why there is often a difference between how participants (who might be close friends) and observers understand a particular transaction. Finally, a relational model allows for shades of distinctions between these categories: surely there is a difference—different causes, different effects, and different meanings—between explicit extortion and when a citizen thinks a bureaucrat is extorting money, while the bureaucrat views the money as a bribe. Rather than having to call such a situation either bribery or extortion, a relational view helpfully explains how and why there might be different understandings of the events. With a relational approach, we can thus gain tremendous insight into when and where we might expect bribery, extortion, and conflicts of interest to arise. 38

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One<br />

cash: how do you evaluate that scene normatively? Understanding the pair’s<br />

relationship—husband/wife, father/daughter, citizen/politician, store-owner/customer, to<br />

name but a few examples—is absolutely necessary. So, too, is understanding whether the<br />

cash represents a gift, payment, loan, kickback and so forth. Just as the social meaning of<br />

money hinges on the other two categories, the social meaning of a relationship or even of<br />

the transaction context can hinge on how much money is given, of what kind, to whom or<br />

from what source. 21<br />

In the case of bribery, therefore, for different outcomes (i.e. when different<br />

obligations have been violated), for different social actors or for different relationships<br />

between them, the degree of illicitness varies. 22 This is a second crucial advantage to the<br />

standard view’s focus on what does and does not constitute bribery, an advantage that<br />

allows us to assess why there might be a normative distinction between, say, bribing an<br />

opponent in court to drop a lawsuit and bribing a bureaucrat to obtain a public contract.<br />

On the standard view, identical actions within two different normative contexts (e.g. two<br />

different countries) are very difficult to compare. Often scholars must resort to the<br />

blanket assumption that there are ‘different values’ involved, without clearly pinpointing<br />

what exactly motivates the change in normative value. By contrast, as we will see in the<br />

21 Zelizer (1994: esp. 208-16) focuses on the social meaning of money and analyzes how people ‘earmark’<br />

currencies with specific meaning, making the currencies non-fungible so that the specific content of<br />

discrete social ties can be maintained. Thus, an allowance is different from a gift, which is different still<br />

from payment for chores—all of which transactions can signal different aspects of a parent-child<br />

relationship. Note, though, how the amount of payment for chores, including whether or not such<br />

‘payment’ is distinct from an allowance, can signal a distinctively parent-child relationship and not, say,<br />

that between employer and employee, as in the case of hiring someone to do the same chores.<br />

22 Rigi (2004: 105-8) makes a similar point in isolating the various social variables—like relational<br />

distance, amount of trust, power dynamic between transactors—that influence how and when bribery<br />

occurs.<br />

37

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