BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One
of reciprocal exchanges that define the dynamics of that local relationship. 15 Within this
frame, the transactors readily view their own actions as unproblematic or, at worst,
normatively ambiguous. Even when it is recognized that some kind of non-local ‘line’
has been crossed, this short-term violation is frequently justified on the grounds that it is
necessary or will bring a benefit in the long-term. 16
On the other hand, outsiders might frame the transaction as a bribe, that is, as
compensation constituting or resulting in a violation of broader societal norms—though
precisely which norms have been violated is often contested. On this view, too, the bribe
performs crucial relational work, but the proper field for that relational work is often
viewed as a bribe-taker’s relationship not to some bribe-giver, but to society as a whole. 17
For precisely this reason, public officials who take bribes are thought to have breached
some kind of public trust or to have transgressed the formal rules for office. 18
in bureaucratic contexts where bribery is expected. There, ‘bribe’ and service can be closely correlated as
direct exchange precisely because the local bureaucrat-citizen relationship being negotiated is an armslength
tie in which market norms (like direct compensation, not gifts) prevail. On the distinction between
market and social frames, see especially Heyman and Ariely (2004); as MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu
(2007) point out, however, an arms-length tie is nevertheless a relational distance that must be constantly
negotiated by two social transactors.
15 Ethnographic accounts of bribery are particularly helpful on this point, as they point to how the discourse
of friendship pervades how transactors frame the transaction: e.g. Ledeneva (1998: 59-66), Parry (2000:
33), Pardo (2004b: 40), Rigi (2004: 111), Sedlenieks (2004: 125), Smith (2007: 85-6).
16 American legislators frequently justify lobbyists and campaign contributions from special interest groups
on precisely these grounds as necessary, if ambiguous, means for them to stay in office; after all, they can
represent their constituents well only by remaining in office. Cf. Thompson (1995: 66). In examining US
federal laws on campaign financing, Lowenstein (2004) underscores the role corrupt intent plays both in
the law and in how people negotiate the giving and receiving of campaign contributions. I would reframe
his question of intent (is quid pro quo intended?) as a question of framing (according to the transactors, is it
quid pro quo or gift exchange?).
17 Alternatively, some set of non-universal norms might provide a competing frame. So a local high-school
athletic team might be let down if one of the teammates is bribed to throw the game, but we probably
would not say that a societal or universal norm had been transgressed. Schweitzer’s (2005) analysis of
bribery through the lens of particular vs. universal norms should thus be modified, as there is no
requirement that bribery be framed from the perspective of universal, societal norms. Often times, in fact,
which norms should be considered universal, which particular, is precisely the kind of political question
that is negotiated through practice.
18 This is, of course, where public-office and public-interest definitions of corruption derive their normative
force. For the relationship between corruption and the breach of trust, see especially Uslaner (2002, 2005),
Graeff (2005).
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