BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One interest groups may be perfectly legal modes of conducting politics, even if to most observers such payments may look like bribes. What we find, then, is that by forcing actions into an already culturally determined framework, scholars have defined a pattern of actions that only imperfectly approximates the phenomenon they wish to study. It should be noted that the same problem will recur given any attempt to define bribery in apolitical terms: bribery is a political phenomenon, so we should expect that there are as many definitions of bribery as there are of polity. Accordingly, bribery qua a pattern of actions defies rigorous definition. I propose, instead, a relational approach to bribery in which the social relations, not the norms, assume a prior role in definition; in this way, we should think of bribery not as a distinct pattern of actions generated by specific cultural norms, but as a normative pattern generated by distinct social relations. 4 My approach follows on recent work by economic sociologists, who have sought to break down the orthodox divide between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ modes of behavior, traditionally considered to occupy separate spheres of action and hence to be predicated on different logics of action. 5 4 By ‘relational’ I intend to move past the concept of ‘embeddedness’, as classicists might recognize from the influential work of Polanyi (1968)—e.g. Finley (1977), von Reden (1995a), Kurke (1999)—and as underpins the work of recent economic sociologists like Granovetter (1985), Uzzi and Lancaster (2004). Embeddedness points towards how social relations shape economic activity. Yet these social relations are largely taken to be a flat structure within which ‘economic’, as distinct from ‘relational’, activity is carried out. On a relational view, within this structure the only work that occurs—the only meaning that is defined, contested, and negotiated—is relational work. In this sense, ‘economics’ does not occur within social relations—it is not simply “embedded” in them. Rather, economics is about social relations and is, in this sense, constitutive of them. For a helpful overview of the differences and similarities between a relational approach and Polanyi’s work on embeddedness, see Steiner (2009). 5 People have persistent fears over mixing money and relationships, as if the former are destructive or corruptive of the latter. Zelizer calls this fear “Hostile Worlds” and discusses it at length in Zelizer (2005b). In terms of ‘economic’ activity, this dichotomy had until recently amounted to scholars’ polarization of gifts and commodities—that is, inalienable goods exchanged between interdependent actors and alienable goods exchanged between independent actors, in Gregory’s (1982) influential formulation— which are, accordingly, exchanged according to different logics: see also Sahlins (1972: 277-314). As 31
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One Instead of claiming, like neo-classical economists, that economic behavior is not shaped in any significant way by social context or prevailing social norms, economic sociologists posit that economic actions are constitutive of social relations and the cultural meanings attached to them. 6 Production, distribution, and consumption, the traditional spheres of ‘economic’ activity, are always already relational activities, playing a valuable role in the relational work people perform every day. 7 In particular, Viviana Zelizer has developed a relational framework for analyzing economic activity, one that will lay the foundation for our investigation of bribery. Zelizer defines economic transactions by the presence of a transaction medium, called a ‘money’: “a representation of rights to goods and services, usually in the form of concrete tokens.” 8 Just as important as the transaction medium (the money given or received) are the transaction context and the social relation of the transactors. While the relations of the transactors can vary almost infinitely, Zelizer distinguishes among only three types of transaction contexts—gift, compensation, and entitlement—which Bourdieu (1977: 171-7) points out, however, transacting even in gifts requires misrecognition; ‘economic’ calculation can and does factor into how or what gifts are exchanged. See further discussion at Appadurai (1986: 13), Bloch and Parry (1989: 8-12). What economic sociologists like Zelizer have done, therefore, is to posit that the logic of the exchange is oriented around the social relations of the transaction, not necessarily the exchanged goods, themselves. 6 To be sure, recent literature in the New Institutional Economics and the contextualist camp of the New Economic Sociology has modified the neo-classical model tremendously: see the overview in Lambsdorff, Taube and Schramm (2005), with examples in della Porta and Vannuci (1999) and Warburton (2001) on networks and corruption. Still, the essential core of these models is assumed to be the traditional homo economicus rational actor. It is here, in dissolving a rational actor approach, that the alternative camp of economic sociologists makes its boldest and most stimulating claims. 7 See further Abolafia (1996), Tilly and Tilly (1998), Biggart and Delbridge (2004), Fourcade and Healy (2007). 8 Quote from Zelizer (2001: 9992). Zelizer (2001) provides a helpful overview of the sociology of money summarized here; see also Davis (1992), Zelizer (1994; 2005b), Zelizer and Tilly (2006). 32
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One<br />
interest groups may be perfectly legal modes of conducting politics, even if to most<br />
observers such payments may look like bribes.<br />
What we find, then, is that by forcing actions into an already culturally<br />
determined framework, scholars have defined a pattern of actions that only imperfectly<br />
approximates the phenomenon they wish to study. It should be noted that the same<br />
problem will recur given any attempt to define bribery in apolitical terms: bribery is a<br />
political phenomenon, so we should expect that there are as many definitions of bribery<br />
as there are of polity. Accordingly, bribery qua a pattern of actions defies rigorous<br />
definition.<br />
I propose, instead, a relational approach to bribery in which the social relations,<br />
not the norms, assume a prior role in definition; in this way, we should think of bribery<br />
not as a distinct pattern of actions generated by specific cultural norms, but as a<br />
normative pattern generated by distinct social relations. 4 My approach follows on recent<br />
work by economic sociologists, who have sought to break down the orthodox divide<br />
between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ modes of behavior, traditionally considered to occupy<br />
separate spheres of action and hence to be predicated on different logics of action. 5<br />
4 By ‘relational’ I intend to move past the concept of ‘embeddedness’, as classicists might recognize from<br />
the influential work of Polanyi (1968)—e.g. Finley (1977), von Reden (1995a), Kurke (1999)—and as<br />
underpins the work of recent economic sociologists like Granovetter (1985), Uzzi and Lancaster (2004).<br />
Embeddedness points towards how social relations shape economic activity. Yet these social relations are<br />
largely taken to be a flat structure within which ‘economic’, as distinct from ‘relational’, activity is carried<br />
out. On a relational view, within this structure the only work that occurs—the only meaning that is defined,<br />
contested, and negotiated—is relational work. In this sense, ‘economics’ does not occur within social<br />
relations—it is not simply “embedded” in them. Rather, economics is about social relations and is, in this<br />
sense, constitutive of them. For a helpful overview of the differences and similarities between a relational<br />
approach and Polanyi’s work on embeddedness, see Steiner (2009).<br />
5 People have persistent fears over mixing money and relationships, as if the former are destructive or<br />
corruptive of the latter. Zelizer calls this fear “Hostile Worlds” and discusses it at length in Zelizer<br />
(2005b). In terms of ‘economic’ activity, this dichotomy had until recently amounted to scholars’<br />
polarization of gifts and commodities—that is, inalienable goods exchanged between interdependent actors<br />
and alienable goods exchanged between independent actors, in Gregory’s (1982) influential formulation—<br />
which are, accordingly, exchanged according to different logics: see also Sahlins (1972: 277-314). As<br />
31