BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One bribery seems an odd approach to take particularly for historical societies like ancient Athens. This chapter presents a different approach to how we should define and measure bribery, one that treats bribery not as a class of political actions, but as a political claim about actions. The first section will present an overview of this approach, examining how bribery, as a social frame, creates distinct normative patterns in every polity. The following section will apply this approach to the case of democratic Athens by focusing, in particular, on the language of bribery and the practice of politics. There it will be shown that the medium of bribery, the bribe, is emblematic of a host of different ways in which the Athenians leveraged social relationships in the practice of politics. In the third and last section, we will consider how the normative value of the bribe often shifts depending on whether one adopts the frame of an insider—someone part of the bribe relationship—or an outsider. In turn, public discourse on what did and did not constitute bribery was, itself, composed of numerous, competing accusations of bribery. Understanding how this public discourse was constructed will enable us, in the chapters to come, to measure how and why Athenian conceptions of bribery changed over the course of the democracy, and how bribery played an integral role in how the Athenians thought through their democracy. A Relational Approach to Bribery The relational approach adopted here begins with the simple claim that bribery entails both social relations and norms. First, bribery is never conducted in a social vacuum: there are always at least two participants linked by some kind of social tie, even 29

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One if that tie is as bare as an arms-length bureaucrat-citizen relationship. Second, and this is precisely the phenomenon captured by defining bribery as a kind of “illicit payment” or “abuse,” bribery implies a violation of some norm. The crucial distinction between the standard view and my own is how these two components—social relations and norms— are combined with each other to create the category ‘bribery’. On the standard view, the norms are taken to define the social relations involved in bribery. As noted earlier, once we define the categories of ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘power’, etc., we purportedly can determine the class of actions that constitute bribery. The social relations that pertain in these actions are thus wholly incidental, but they are also, themselves, determined by how we define the prevailing norms concerning ‘abuse’, ‘public’, etc. For an illicit payment to constitute bribery, in the sense that we want, it would necessarily entail some counterbalancing of ‘public’ and ‘private’. In other words, bribery would be possible only among those social relations that involve a ‘public’ individual. This may seem like an acceptable result, but note how quickly it can both under- determine and over-determine what scholars are actually trying to measure. Where a strong informal network holds considerable power in society, for example, even if it does not control the formal organs of government, within the network there may be no ‘public’ individuals, proper. Hence, the use of bribe-like payments within the network should not strictly be considered bribery under the standard definition. Conversely, it is not always an ‘abuse’ of power for a public official to receive some kind of gain in exchange for a favorable vote: again, vote-swapping, campaign financing, and lobbying by special 30

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter One<br />

if that tie is as bare as an arms-length bureaucrat-citizen relationship. Second, and this is<br />

precisely the phenomenon captured by defining bribery as a kind of “illicit payment” or<br />

“abuse,” bribery implies a violation of some norm. The crucial distinction between the<br />

standard view and my own is how these two components—social relations and norms—<br />

are combined with each other to create the category ‘bribery’.<br />

On the standard view, the norms are taken to define the social relations involved<br />

in bribery. As noted earlier, once we define the categories of ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘power’,<br />

etc., we purportedly can determine the class of actions that constitute bribery. The social<br />

relations that pertain in these actions are thus wholly incidental, but they are also,<br />

themselves, determined by how we define the prevailing norms concerning ‘abuse’,<br />

‘public’, etc. For an illicit payment to constitute bribery, in the sense that we want, it<br />

would necessarily entail some counterbalancing of ‘public’ and ‘private’. In other words,<br />

bribery would be possible only among those social relations that involve a ‘public’<br />

individual.<br />

This may seem like an acceptable result, but note how quickly it can both under-<br />

determine and over-determine what scholars are actually trying to measure. Where a<br />

strong informal network holds considerable power in society, for example, even if it does<br />

not control the formal organs of government, within the network there may be no ‘public’<br />

individuals, proper. Hence, the use of bribe-like payments within the network should not<br />

strictly be considered bribery under the standard definition. Conversely, it is not always<br />

an ‘abuse’ of power for a public official to receive some kind of gain in exchange for a<br />

favorable vote: again, vote-swapping, campaign financing, and lobbying by special<br />

30

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