BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Conclusion
disfranchisement, or death—would be considered extreme and, one might imagine,
effective ways to hold officials accountable.
What makes the Athenian case a paradox, however, is that these anti-bribery
measures, though paradigmatic, appear to have been ineffective. Although Athenian
conceptions of what did or did not constitute bribery changed over the course of the
democracy, these laws apparently did nothing to change the common sentiment that
officials could take gifts so long as their actions did not harm the dēmos. As a result, the
number of public officials who took gifts seems to have been very high by Western
standards. Accurately measuring the incidence of bribery is impossible, of course, but we
have already found two different indications that this was so: both the enormous volume
of accusations of bribery and, as best as we can extrapolate from limited evidence, the
high rate of bribery trials as well. 2
Still more inexplicable, Athens actually flourished in the face of corruption.
Neither was the polis captured by rent-seeking politicians nor is there evidence that it was
really run by informal criminal networks. On the contrary, commonplace bribery seems
to have co-existed with strong institutions; in both theory and practice, the power of the
people was only augmented over time, as we have seen. Moreover, ineffective anti-
bribery legislation seems to have been perfectly consistent with Athenian democratic
values, as hallmarks of the democracy were forged through constant regulation of the
dōrodokos. How could this be? How was it that Athens flourished because of, not in
spite of, this inefficacy? 3
2 There are over 460 attested references to bribery in our non-fragmentary classical sources; similarly,
between 5-10% of major public officials were brought to trial for bribery: see the Introduction above.
3 It should be noted that the amount of bribery envisaged in Athens is considerably more than the minimal
amount advocated by political economists, who recognize that controlling bribery itself creates additional
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