BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven In effect, those intermediary trials enabled Ephialtes to delegitimize the Areopagus’ acquittal of Cimon. Given the ideological tensions and concerns with bribery reported in our sources—and especially given how in Athenian bribery trials what constituted dōrodokia was, itself, under trial—we can plausibly conjecture that this anti-democratic bias would have come under fire when Ephialtes alleged that the Areopagites had ‘done injustice to the people’. On this reconstruction, Ephialtes’ prosecution of the Areopagites pitted two sides against each other: ‘acquit’, anti-democratic, and dōrodokia were lined up against ‘convict’, democratic and an ‘uncorrupt’ way of holding officials accountable (i.e. Ephialtes’ imminent reforms). 48 I propose that the series of dōrodokia trials was used, in part, to delegitimize the Areopagus’ method of accountability and to signal public support for a new way to secure legitimate political results (such as convictions at a bribery trial like Cimon’s). The very process by which public officials would be held accountable seemed, itself, to be on trial. It is surely significant, after all, that the unusual way in which Cimon was brought to trial—with public prosecutors conducting the case before a judicial body composed of the people—would subsequently form the backbone for public accountability after Ephialtes’ reforms. 49 Ephialtes transferred jurisdiction for trials of public officials from the Areopagus to the Council of 500 and the jury courts, the composition of both of which was at this time demonstrably more inclusive than that of the Areopagus Council. As such, the decisions made by each body straightforwardly manifested the norms of the 48 Cf. Raaflaub (2007: 139) on the terms of this debate. 49 In Cimon’s trial the people elected ten public prosecutors to conduct the trial before the Assembly and the Areopagus. After Ephialtes’ reforms, prosecutions at euthynai were conducted either by euthynoi, who were ten members chosen by lot from the Council, or by any willing citizen; depending on the offense, these trials would be held before either the Council or a jury court. 319
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven entire community, not just those of its elite citizens; for decisions that affected the entire polity, they were kurios. 50 By transferring to the Council of 500 and the jury courts the Areopagus’ prerogative to initiate and conduct proceedings for public officials, Ephialtes made it less likely that an elite official who had been publicly reputed to be corrupt would go untried or, worse, unpunished like Cimon. If we look between Cimon’s exceptional trial and Ephialtes’ subsequent reforms, therefore, we can begin to uncover a vital public debate over how to hold public officials accountable. I underscore that the Areopagites’ bribery trials likely played a crucial role in this debate. The same courtroom arguments concerning what should or should not be considered dōrodokia—that is, which modes of politics were and were not legitimate— shaped and were shaped by public debates found in deliberative institutions like the Assembly. The accusations of dōrodokia surrounding Cimon’s trial—the injustice done to the Athenian people or the prosecutor Pericles’ suspicious involvement with Cimon’s sister—certainly were ways of delegitimizing Cimon’s acquittal. Simultaneously, too, they signaled the illegitimacy of accountability before the Areopagus. In claiming that dōrodokia, or some kind of corruption, had occurred, these accusations implicitly called for a more ‘democratic’ approach, one which had been partly employed in Cimon’s trial and was soon instituted through Ephialtes’ reforms. This case-study is emblematic of what I see as a likely trend in how the Athenian democracy functioned, and so successfully at that. Our evidence for consistent connections between bribery and politics like the one proposed here, however, is very limited, and ultimately the value of this approach is perhaps more theoretical than 50 Cf. Taylor (2007). 320
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven<br />
entire community, not just those of its elite citizens; for decisions that affected the entire<br />
polity, they were kurios. 50 By transferring to the Council of 500 and the jury courts the<br />
Areopagus’ prerogative to initiate and conduct proceedings for public officials, Ephialtes<br />
made it less likely that an elite official who had been publicly reputed to be corrupt would<br />
go untried or, worse, unpunished like Cimon.<br />
If we look between Cimon’s exceptional trial and Ephialtes’ subsequent reforms,<br />
therefore, we can begin to uncover a vital public debate over how to hold public officials<br />
accountable. I underscore that the Areopagites’ bribery trials likely played a crucial role<br />
in this debate. The same courtroom arguments concerning what should or should not be<br />
considered dōrodokia—that is, which modes of politics were and were not legitimate—<br />
shaped and were shaped by public debates found in deliberative institutions like the<br />
Assembly. The accusations of dōrodokia surrounding Cimon’s trial—the injustice done<br />
to the Athenian people or the prosecutor Pericles’ suspicious involvement with Cimon’s<br />
sister—certainly were ways of delegitimizing Cimon’s acquittal. Simultaneously, too,<br />
they signaled the illegitimacy of accountability before the Areopagus. In claiming that<br />
dōrodokia, or some kind of corruption, had occurred, these accusations implicitly called<br />
for a more ‘democratic’ approach, one which had been partly employed in Cimon’s trial<br />
and was soon instituted through Ephialtes’ reforms.<br />
This case-study is emblematic of what I see as a likely trend in how the Athenian<br />
democracy functioned, and so successfully at that. Our evidence for consistent<br />
connections between bribery and politics like the one proposed here, however, is very<br />
limited, and ultimately the value of this approach is perhaps more theoretical than<br />
50 Cf. Taylor (2007).<br />
320