BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven Areopagites would have lent itself well towards legitimizing the people’s view that the Areopagus simply was not producing ‘democratic’ outcomes. As it turns out, the very process by which public officials would be held accountable seemed, itself, to be on trial. Concerns about judicial corruption seem to have surrounded Cimon’s trial from the outset. Cimon was not prosecuted according to the regular process of accountability (euthyna), in which the Areopagus or any willing citizen indicted a public official before the Areopagus. Instead, Cimon’s trial was hand-tailored to the occasion: essentially, a modified probolē process, in which the Assembly gave a preliminary hearing and non- binding verdict before the final hearing before the Areopagus. 42 As in a probolē process, the trial was initiated by a proposal approved at the Assembly, rather than by the Areopagus or by some willing citizen; moreover, unlike the probolē process, Cimon’s trial featured public prosecutors directly appointed by the people. 43 Although some of these procedural details might simply have been conflated in later accounts of the trial, it is possible that the people strategically employed a probolē-like process to ensure that Cimon would actually go to trial and, we might surmise, be convicted. 44 After all, Cimon normally should have been prosecuted by the Areopagus, whether on its own accord or 42 Probolē was normally employed for prosecuting someone who had deceived the dēmos. For Cimon’s trial, Carawan (1987: 202-5) assumes a straightforward probole was employed, yet the additional use of public prosecutors should not be understated. In this respect, it would be unsurprising to find that AP calls the process a euthyna (ta\j eu)qu/naj, AP 27.1), while Plutarch refers to it as a probolē (Per. 10.6): cf. Roberts (1982: 56). I can make no sense of Bauman’s (1990: 28-31) assumption that ‘aggravated bribery’, and hence treason, was the charge; the Athenians had no concept of ‘aggravated’ corruption, and treason is mentioned in none of our sources. On probolē generally, see Carawan (1987: 179-81), MacDowell (1990: 13-17); for Cimon’s trial, Roberts (1982: 55-7), Ostwald (1986: 40-2). 43 Initiated by the dēmos: Plut. Per. 10.5, Cim. 14.5. Pericles and nine other citizens were appointed to prosecute Cimon: Plut. Per. 10.6. Preliminary hearing in the Assembly: Plut. Per. 10.5, Cim. 14.3. 44 Given the lack of securely attested probolē trials prior to Cimon’s, and given the fourth-century preponderance of labeling as probolē the initiation of judicial proceedings by popular vote in the Assembly—e.g. Xen. Hell. 1.7.35; Isoc. 15.313-14; Dem. 21.1-2, 8-11; AP 43.5—it is uncertain to what extent the process and terminology recorded reflect contemporary fifth-century usage. Even so, my argument is concerned more with the use than with the specific mechanics of Cimon’s legal process; in this sense, the clear desire for the dēmos to initiate and control the proceedings is unquestionable. 317
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven after having assessed an indictment brought by any willing citizen. Likely, when it became clear that the Areopagus would not lodge an indictment, the people stepped in to ensure collectively that Cimon would be brought to trial by conducting all initial proceedings on their own, as in a probolē process. 45 The form of Cimon’s trial was thus highly unusual, designed as if the people were intent on ensuring that the ‘correct’ result (a conviction) would be reached. Of course, even despite this exceptional process, Cimon was acquitted by the Areopagus. As noted above, Ephialtes responded by prosecuting a number of members of the Areopagus most likely on a charge of dōrodokia, and these trials played a crucial mediating role between an unacceptable political outcome (Cimon’s acquittal) and subsequent political innovation (Ephialtes’ reforms). We know regrettably little about this series of trials, but our sources clearly understood them in tandem with Ephialtes’ legislative reforms: more than mere retributive measures, they were especially public ways of signaling the illegitimacy of accountability before the Areopagus. 46 Indeed, Plutarch records that Ephialtes had prosecuted those who had “done injustice to the dēmos” (tw=n to\n dh=mon a)dikou/ntwn, Plut. Per. 10.8), a phrase that resonates well with the then incipient slogan of dēmokratia. 47 If Cimon’s trial was, in a sense, ‘about’ control over the monies of empire, as we saw in Chapter Two, then Ephialtes’ subsequent prosecution of Areopagites hinged on who should have control over the judicial process. 45 Cf. Carawan (1987: 179). At least by the 420’s the Athenians were certainly concerned that euthynoi, like those in the Areopagus, might fail to prosecute an offender. So, IG ii² 127.18-20 records an explicit punishment for euthynoi who failed in this respect. Carawan (1987: 188) suggests that this was an archaic penalty. If he is correct, then this archaic law becomes early evidence of precisely the kind of abuse of authority I am positing was feared in Cimon’s trial. 46 Both are posited by Plutarch as reasons for Ephialtes’ murder: Plut. Per. 10.8; cf. AP 27.3-5. 47 Cf. Aesch. Supp. 398-400, 483-5. See especially Raaflaub (2007) on the central role of Ephialtes’ reforms in the emergence of dēmokratia during the 460’s. 318
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven<br />
after having assessed an indictment brought by any willing citizen. Likely, when it<br />
became clear that the Areopagus would not lodge an indictment, the people stepped in to<br />
ensure collectively that Cimon would be brought to trial by conducting all initial<br />
proceedings on their own, as in a probolē process. 45 The form of Cimon’s trial was thus<br />
highly unusual, designed as if the people were intent on ensuring that the ‘correct’ result<br />
(a conviction) would be reached.<br />
Of course, even despite this exceptional process, Cimon was acquitted by the<br />
Areopagus. As noted above, Ephialtes responded by prosecuting a number of members<br />
of the Areopagus most likely on a charge of dōrodokia, and these trials played a crucial<br />
mediating role between an unacceptable political outcome (Cimon’s acquittal) and<br />
subsequent political innovation (Ephialtes’ reforms). We know regrettably little about<br />
this series of trials, but our sources clearly understood them in tandem with Ephialtes’<br />
legislative reforms: more than mere retributive measures, they were especially public<br />
ways of signaling the illegitimacy of accountability before the Areopagus. 46 Indeed,<br />
Plutarch records that Ephialtes had prosecuted those who had “done injustice to the<br />
dēmos” (tw=n to\n dh=mon a)dikou/ntwn, Plut. Per. 10.8), a phrase that resonates well with<br />
the then incipient slogan of dēmokratia. 47 If Cimon’s trial was, in a sense, ‘about’ control<br />
over the monies of empire, as we saw in Chapter Two, then Ephialtes’ subsequent<br />
prosecution of Areopagites hinged on who should have control over the judicial process.<br />
45 Cf. Carawan (1987: 179). At least by the 420’s the Athenians were certainly concerned that euthynoi,<br />
like those in the Areopagus, might fail to prosecute an offender. So, IG ii² 127.18-20 records an explicit<br />
punishment for euthynoi who failed in this respect. Carawan (1987: 188) suggests that this was an archaic<br />
penalty. If he is correct, then this archaic law becomes early evidence of precisely the kind of abuse of<br />
authority I am positing was feared in Cimon’s trial.<br />
46 Both are posited by Plutarch as reasons for Ephialtes’ murder: Plut. Per. 10.8; cf. AP 27.3-5.<br />
47 Cf. Aesch. Supp. 398-400, 483-5. See especially Raaflaub (2007) on the central role of Ephialtes’<br />
reforms in the emergence of dēmokratia during the 460’s.<br />
318