BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven
Areopagites would have lent itself well towards legitimizing the people’s view that the
Areopagus simply was not producing ‘democratic’ outcomes. As it turns out, the very
process by which public officials would be held accountable seemed, itself, to be on trial.
Concerns about judicial corruption seem to have surrounded Cimon’s trial from
the outset. Cimon was not prosecuted according to the regular process of accountability
(euthyna), in which the Areopagus or any willing citizen indicted a public official before
the Areopagus. Instead, Cimon’s trial was hand-tailored to the occasion: essentially, a
modified probolē process, in which the Assembly gave a preliminary hearing and non-
binding verdict before the final hearing before the Areopagus. 42 As in a probolē process,
the trial was initiated by a proposal approved at the Assembly, rather than by the
Areopagus or by some willing citizen; moreover, unlike the probolē process, Cimon’s
trial featured public prosecutors directly appointed by the people. 43 Although some of
these procedural details might simply have been conflated in later accounts of the trial, it
is possible that the people strategically employed a probolē-like process to ensure that
Cimon would actually go to trial and, we might surmise, be convicted. 44 After all, Cimon
normally should have been prosecuted by the Areopagus, whether on its own accord or
42 Probolē was normally employed for prosecuting someone who had deceived the dēmos. For Cimon’s
trial, Carawan (1987: 202-5) assumes a straightforward probole was employed, yet the additional use of
public prosecutors should not be understated. In this respect, it would be unsurprising to find that AP calls
the process a euthyna (ta\j eu)qu/naj, AP 27.1), while Plutarch refers to it as a probolē (Per. 10.6): cf.
Roberts (1982: 56). I can make no sense of Bauman’s (1990: 28-31) assumption that ‘aggravated
bribery’, and hence treason, was the charge; the Athenians had no concept of ‘aggravated’ corruption, and
treason is mentioned in none of our sources. On probolē generally, see Carawan (1987: 179-81),
MacDowell (1990: 13-17); for Cimon’s trial, Roberts (1982: 55-7), Ostwald (1986: 40-2).
43 Initiated by the dēmos: Plut. Per. 10.5, Cim. 14.5. Pericles and nine other citizens were appointed to
prosecute Cimon: Plut. Per. 10.6. Preliminary hearing in the Assembly: Plut. Per. 10.5, Cim. 14.3.
44 Given the lack of securely attested probolē trials prior to Cimon’s, and given the fourth-century
preponderance of labeling as probolē the initiation of judicial proceedings by popular vote in the
Assembly—e.g. Xen. Hell. 1.7.35; Isoc. 15.313-14; Dem. 21.1-2, 8-11; AP 43.5—it is uncertain to what
extent the process and terminology recorded reflect contemporary fifth-century usage. Even so, my
argument is concerned more with the use than with the specific mechanics of Cimon’s legal process; in this
sense, the clear desire for the dēmos to initiate and control the proceedings is unquestionable.
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