BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven
unacceptable acquittal of Cimon was thus attributed to corruption generally, and probably
bribery specifically. 38 When Cimon left the city again on campaign, Ephialtes quickly
moved to change the procedures for accountability so that public officials would be held
accountable to the people: the fear of bribery enabled true democratic accountability at
Athens. 39
The backdrop for Cimon’s trial and the prosecutions it enjoined was one of class
conflict, according to our sources. The Areopagus Council and its predominantly elite
membership had increasingly been viewed as a source of elite conservatism; even if the
political body was not an instrument of class warfare, the rhetoric of pro- vs. anti-
democratic views was likely employed heavily. 40 In other words, precisely because it
was a dōrodokia suit, debate at the trial would have boiled down to what ‘democratic’
results should look like. 41 The Areopagus’ place within the democracy could have
consequently been deemed corrupt and undemocratic. A bribery trial like that of
Cimon—himself aligned with the more elite interests in the city—or those of the
handle external affairs while Pericles would be given control of the city. That this rumor even existed is a
good indication that at least some Athenians were concerned about the pair’s relationship.
38 Based on Plutarch’s wording of ‘doing injustice (adikountōn) to the people’, the only other plausible
legal process used was a public denunciation for ‘maladministration’ (graphē adikou): cf. AP 54.2. This
obscure process later came under the purview of the Council (AP 54.2) and is otherwise first attested in the
430’s when Pericles was prosecuted whether for bribery, embezzlement, or adikion (Plu. Per. 32.2). It is
unclear, however, what kind of financial crime beyond bribery could have been committed by the
Areopagites here.
39 Note how Aristotle suggests the same institutional change as a remedy for corruption among the Spartan
gerontes: Aristot. Pol. 1271a3-6. After Ephialtes’ reforms, the Areopagus no longer had the right to
initiate and conduct the euthynai of magistrates. Instead, each year ten members of the Council of 500
were designated as euthynoi in charge of lodging indictments as needed against public officials at the end
of their term. Cases of treason could still be heard by the Assembly, but Ephialtes surely transferred
jurisdiction over euthynai and all other cases of maladministration from the Areopagus to the Council of
500 and the newly created popular courts.
40 Cf. Wilamowitz (1893: 2.94). So, Plutarch records intonations of class conflict: Ephialtes was
“terrifying to the oligarchs [i.e. the elites] and inexorable in his pursuit of euthynai and prosecutions of
those who had done the dēmos injustice” (tw=n to\n dh=mon a)dikou/ntwn, Plut. Per. 10.8, cf. AP 25.4);
similar language is found in Aesch. Eum. 690-2.
41 I suggest that this pro- vs. anti-democratic rhetorical positioning could have been misread later and
assigned new meaning amid the patrios politeia debates of the late fifth century. Note how Plutarch frames
this as a debate between democracy and aristocracy, not oligarchy in particular: Plut. Cim. 15.2-3.
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