BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven colored staff that matched the color of a lintel on the doorway to the court where he would serve; this court also had a letter matching the acorn he was given (AP 64.4-65.2). Matching letters, randomization, colored lintels, colored wands and acorns: the purpose of most of these changes, according to Aristotle and numerous scholars since? To prevent corruption. 9 Some recent scholars have rightly questioned Aristotle’s judgment here, however, by claiming that it is unlikely that dōrodokia was the sole, or even primary, motivation for institutional change. 10 After all, it is difficult to imagine how, even in the late fifth century, a litigant could successfully rig the system by assembling and bribing enough jurors to secure a favorable outcome. Because jury panels were randomly assigned to courts at the beginning of each morning, a litigant would have had to bribe a critical mass of jurors in each panel to ensure the outcome of his trial. The only feasible way this could have happened—and recall that, despite the implausibility of judicial bribery, the Athenians strongly suspected that it did occur—was if the jurors, themselves, were banding together into groups. This was a concern not so much about bribery—money exchanged for votes—as about collusion; the relationship at issue was that between jurors, not between some outside bribe-giver and the jury. Indeed, the other offenses grouped together with the graphē dekasmou, like the prohibitions against conspiracy or 9 AP 64.2 (ticket-drawer chosen by lot to prevent mischief), 64.4 (drawing of acorns prevents packing of jury panels), 65.1 (colored sticks and lintels prevent juror from purposely going into the wrong jury court), 66.2 (men chosen by lot to work the water clock to prevent dishonest arrangements), cf. AP 66.1 (archons assigned to courts by lot to prevent prior knowledge of assignment). Cf. Eubulus fr. 74 K on the sale of jury allotments. AP is followed in the main by Staveley (1972: 61ff.), MacDowell (1973: 35-40), Rhodes (1981: ad loc), Todd (1993: 87). 10 Taylor (2007), Bers (2000). In particular, as Bers (2000) points out, if the sole purpose was to prevent corruption, the Athenians could have achieved that goal with a less complex, less timely process. For the allotment of magistrates, too, Whitehead (1986: 290) notes that AP’s attribution of the change to fears of corruption “may be open to doubt.” 299

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven forming a political faction to overthrow the democracy, point in the direction that a concerted group of political agents was helping to corrupt the judicial process. 11 On this view, as judicial outcomes like Anytus’ trial in 409 ran counter to the dēmos’ expectations, they were blamed on a kind of dōrodokia that signaled a problematic relationship to the community. As with other accusations of dōrodokia, I would add, what was troubling was the idea that single individuals could have relationships with such far-reaching influence; the media used to negotiate those relationships—whether drachmas, favors, or other—was thus incidental. The Athenians’ response was twofold: first, to atomize jurors so that they could not self-assemble into large voting blocks; and then to ritualize the allotment process through an increasingly complex series of steps in order to remind jurors of the very authority they held as dikasts. Note how the sortition process first broke up jurors by tribe, then by letter groups, precisely the two categories that previously would have been most easily exploited for collusion. Then, after atomizing jurors, the process transformed them from citizens into jurors. Like other rituals in the Athenian polis, civic and otherwise, one purpose of transforming the citizens into this civic category of jurors was to foster a new solidarity among participants qua dicasts, one thus drawn along public not private lines. 12 As more steps of the allotment procedure became randomized, they also became invested with greater social significance, creating greater separation between ordinary 11 See discussion above, Chapter Six. 12 Connor (1987) and Osborne (1994) on, respectively, religious and civic rituals in the democracy. Bers (2000) also underscores the ritual aspects of the sortition process, but ultimately claims that the process was meant to assuage non-jurors of the number and probity of jurors selected (2000: esp. 557-8). By contrast, I would point to the very real significance that the ritual could have for the participating jurors, themselves. A similar process of identity (trans)formation can be found in the swearing of the dicastic oath, on which see Chapter Six above. 300

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Seven<br />

colored staff that matched the color of a lintel on the doorway to the court where he<br />

would serve; this court also had a letter matching the acorn he was given (AP 64.4-65.2).<br />

Matching letters, randomization, colored lintels, colored wands and acorns: the purpose<br />

of most of these changes, according to Aristotle and numerous scholars since? To<br />

prevent corruption. 9<br />

Some recent scholars have rightly questioned Aristotle’s judgment here, however,<br />

by claiming that it is unlikely that dōrodokia was the sole, or even primary, motivation<br />

for institutional change. 10 After all, it is difficult to imagine how, even in the late fifth<br />

century, a litigant could successfully rig the system by assembling and bribing enough<br />

jurors to secure a favorable outcome. Because jury panels were randomly assigned to<br />

courts at the beginning of each morning, a litigant would have had to bribe a critical mass<br />

of jurors in each panel to ensure the outcome of his trial. The only feasible way this<br />

could have happened—and recall that, despite the implausibility of judicial bribery, the<br />

Athenians strongly suspected that it did occur—was if the jurors, themselves, were<br />

banding together into groups. This was a concern not so much about bribery—money<br />

exchanged for votes—as about collusion; the relationship at issue was that between<br />

jurors, not between some outside bribe-giver and the jury. Indeed, the other offenses<br />

grouped together with the graphē dekasmou, like the prohibitions against conspiracy or<br />

9 AP 64.2 (ticket-drawer chosen by lot to prevent mischief), 64.4 (drawing of acorns prevents packing of<br />

jury panels), 65.1 (colored sticks and lintels prevent juror from purposely going into the wrong jury court),<br />

66.2 (men chosen by lot to work the water clock to prevent dishonest arrangements), cf. AP 66.1 (archons<br />

assigned to courts by lot to prevent prior knowledge of assignment). Cf. Eubulus fr. 74 K on the sale of<br />

jury allotments. AP is followed in the main by Staveley (1972: 61ff.), MacDowell (1973: 35-40), Rhodes<br />

(1981: ad loc), Todd (1993: 87).<br />

10 Taylor (2007), Bers (2000). In particular, as Bers (2000) points out, if the sole purpose was to prevent<br />

corruption, the Athenians could have achieved that goal with a less complex, less timely process. For the<br />

allotment of magistrates, too, Whitehead (1986: 290) notes that AP’s attribution of the change to fears of<br />

corruption “may be open to doubt.”<br />

299

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