BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six figure of thief we encountered in Chapter Three. By linking up these three shifts in this way, we thus find that shifting conceptions of the dōrodokos transformed, in turn, how the Athenians thought about the legal space in which he worked. One noteworthy feature of the above legal changes is that they introduced a stricter legal definition of dōrodokia, usually a clause to the effect of “against the public interest.” It was argued in the previous chapter that, although the Solonian law for the graphē dōrōn nowhere defined the crime of dōrodokia, it was later redefined with the inclusion of “to the harm of the dēmos or any citizen” (e0pi\ bla/bh| tou~ dh/mou h@ tino\j tw=n politw~n, Dem. 21.113). Similarly, the law for the graphē dekasmou specified that one was not allowed to “give money unto dōrodokia” (e)pi\ dwrodoki/a| xrh/mata didou/j, [Dem.] 46.26), and the nomos eisangeltikos prohibited public speakers from taking money and speaking “against the dēmos’ interests” (mh\ le/gh| ta\ a1rista tw| = dh/mw, Hyp. 4.8). In the case of the graphē dōrōn, this redefinition seems to have been intimately tied to expanding the scope of the procedure, but the same cannot be said for the other procedures. Why, then, the broader interest in more clearly defining what dōrodokia was? As a result of these stricter definitions in the law, litigants had a clearer guide in demonstrating when or if dōrodokia had occurred, namely, by showing whether or not the public (or some private) interest had been harmed. There was a symbolic reason, too, for framing this definition with respect to the dēmos’ interests. In committing dōrodokia, a citizen had either misjudged the greater good or was seeking to avoid being held accountable to that standard. This, it was thought, lay at the root of institutional breakdown in the late fifth century. By clarifying the legal definition of dōrodokia, the 287
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six Athenians reaffirmed which political domains should make those judgments in the first place: this specific norm was to be authorized by a jury court, not by the dōrodokos. As we will investigate in greater detail in the next chapter, one reason for including more precise definitions of dōrodokia at this time may have been to allow a jury—and, in an eisangelia, the dēmos—to reauthorize the precise communal norms which had been thought misjudged or evaded by the dōrodokos. Subsequent formal measures similarly reasserted the proper authority of a political body whose domain contained some political norm in the community. If a dōrodokos had misestimated what constituted harm to the dēmos, or if he had tried to use dōrodokia to escape judgment by the community, these later measures ensured that the community had another chance to pass judgment or to be the proper arbiters of what was and was not harmful to the dēmos. Here, though, it is crucial that so many of these measures were predicated on the threat posed by veritable networks of corruption, just like the ones we examined in Chapter Four. So, in one trial a certain Euxennipus claimed that he had been left off the citizen registry—and others had been illegally voted onto it—because of corruption involving a local official and his friends. 72 Whereas the graphē dōrōn originally had focused on the corruption of individual agents and only much later came to cover the individuals who corrupted entire political bodies, the networks of corruption envisioned by Euxenippus and others in the final decades of the democracy posed a new challenge. Both insiders and outsiders were potentially already corrupt and working in concert. In response, the Athenians continued to affirm a proper institutional structure, as they had done by giving 72 The speech for Euxitheus’ case was written by Demosthenes (Dem. 57) and is discussed most fully by Haussoullier (1979: 41-51), Whitehead (1986: esp. 293-301). For purported corruption involving the dēmarch Eubulides, see Dem. 57.26, 58-61. Eubulides’ father and corruption: Dem. 57.26, 60-1. 288
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six<br />
figure of thief we encountered in Chapter Three. By linking up these three shifts in this<br />
way, we thus find that shifting conceptions of the dōrodokos transformed, in turn, how<br />
the Athenians thought about the legal space in which he worked.<br />
One noteworthy feature of the above legal changes is that they introduced a<br />
stricter legal definition of dōrodokia, usually a clause to the effect of “against the public<br />
interest.” It was argued in the previous chapter that, although the Solonian law for the<br />
graphē dōrōn nowhere defined the crime of dōrodokia, it was later redefined with the<br />
inclusion of “to the harm of the dēmos or any citizen” (e0pi\ bla/bh| tou~ dh/mou h@ tino\j<br />
tw=n politw~n, Dem. 21.113). Similarly, the law for the graphē dekasmou specified that<br />
one was not allowed to “give money unto dōrodokia” (e)pi\ dwrodoki/a| xrh/mata<br />
didou/j, [Dem.] 46.26), and the nomos eisangeltikos prohibited public speakers from<br />
taking money and speaking “against the dēmos’ interests” (mh\ le/gh| ta\ a1rista tw| =<br />
dh/mw, Hyp. 4.8). In the case of the graphē dōrōn, this redefinition seems to have been<br />
intimately tied to expanding the scope of the procedure, but the same cannot be said for<br />
the other procedures. Why, then, the broader interest in more clearly defining what<br />
dōrodokia was?<br />
As a result of these stricter definitions in the law, litigants had a clearer guide in<br />
demonstrating when or if dōrodokia had occurred, namely, by showing whether or not<br />
the public (or some private) interest had been harmed. There was a symbolic reason, too,<br />
for framing this definition with respect to the dēmos’ interests. In committing dōrodokia,<br />
a citizen had either misjudged the greater good or was seeking to avoid being held<br />
accountable to that standard. This, it was thought, lay at the root of institutional<br />
breakdown in the late fifth century. By clarifying the legal definition of dōrodokia, the<br />
287