BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six continued to be suspected of dōrodokia; but, increasingly, so were individuals outside the public sphere blamed for bribing them. What began as a fear that individuals within a political body were making poor judgments about the community’s interests shifted to include the concern that individuals outside a political body were illicitly influencing the entire body in order to effect poor judgments about the community’s interests. Many of these poor judgments concerned the accountability of public officials and, towards the end of the century, the accountability of private citizens entering into the public sphere. As before, with this series of legal changes there continued to be divergent views on what to do with the dōrodokos: once the dēmos had passed its judgment on him, should he be expelled from or reintegrated into the community? Should his ‘insider’ or his ‘outsider’ status prevail? In the case of the graphē dekasmou, the Athenians displayed little tolerance for individuals who corrupted the judicial process; with an automatic death penalty, it expelled from the community forever those found guilty. 69 By contrast, no comparable penalty existed when non-magistrates were prosecuted under the graphē dōrōn: the only punishments for that procedure seem to have been the penalty of atimia qua disfranchisement or a tenfold fine (Aeschin. 3.232, Din. 2.16). It is all the more striking, therefore, that of the seven known prosecutions of ambassadors and public speakers suspected of dōrodokia in the fourth century not one used the graphē dōrōn process. Instead, all seven trials employed the eisangelia process, and every conviction resulted in the death penalty. 70 Our evidence is doubtless limited 69 Whether or not they were always prosecuted is another matter altogether. Isocrates decries how the politicians who corrupted (diafqei=rai) the most people the most obviously (fanerw/tata) were elected to the stratēgia (Isoc. 8.50). Similarly, Aeschines reports that it was common to hear accusations that people had bribed juries (Aeschin. 1.86), one reason behind the exceptional citizen registration process ordered by Demophilus’ decree in 346/5: see further below. 70 The cases were against Andocides, Epicrates, Eubulides, and Cratinus (392/1); Timagoras (367); Callistratus (361/0); Philocrates (343); and Euxenippus (330-24). Additionally, the stratēgoi Ergocles 285
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six and biased towards preserving only the most serious court cases. Nevertheless, in practice, if not in law, during the fourth century the Athenians apparently preferred to expel permanently, rather than to reintegrate, rhētores whose actions threatened to corrupt a political body via outright bribes or bad policy suggestions. 71 Framing this phenomenon in terms of insiders and outsiders might tell us why: it was exactly at this time that the dēmos was unwilling to tolerate any ‘outsider’-like behavior resembling the oligarchic Thirty. Better to expel that threat permanently than to reintegrate someone who truly wished to remain outside the moral community. In this respect, there are three concurrent trends that I think we can tie together in this series of legal innovations. First, the shift from bribe-taking to bribe-giving can be framed in terms of the expansion of the law’s scope from public officials to regular citizens interacting with the public sphere. Through dōrodokia regulations, which were modeled off of prior dōrodokia laws and which focused on how individuals could interface with the public sphere, the Athenians in fact expanded the domain of the ‘public’. But in that case, note how the bribe-givers who had formerly been ‘outside’ the public sphere now were ‘insiders’ just like the officials they corrupted. At the very fringe of this expanded public sphere, therefore, we find that the dōrodokos was not simply ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the community; he was somehow both at once, precisely like the (389) and Timotheus (356/5 or 355/4) were convicted probably of dōrodokia; Timotheus was nearly sentenced to death, but was fined instead. The sources for each are catalogued, respectively, in Hansen (1975: numbers 69-72, 82, 87, 109, 124). These trials are emblematic of a larger gravitation towards the eisangelia over the euthyna process when prosecuting public officials in the fourth century. Hansen (1975: 75-9). 71 Outside the Harpalus Affair, the only attested example of a fine for dōrodokia in the fourth century is for Timotheus’ eisangelia in 356/5, on a charge of treason and dōrodokia: Hansen (1975: number 101) collects the sources. Timotheus was prosecuted together with two other stratēgoi from that year: Iphicrates on a charge of treason and Menestheus for embezzlement, numbers 100 and 102 respectively in Hansen (1975); both were acquitted. Upon Timotheus’ conviction, the death penalty was originally proposed (Nep. Iph. 3.3), but a fine was eventually imposed instead (Isoc. 15.129, Din. 1.14, 3.17). Even here, though, the extraordinary sum of the fine—100 talents, reportedly—forced Timotheus into exile, in effect creating the same permanent expulsion as capital punishment (Plut. Mor. 605F). 286
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six<br />
continued to be suspected of dōrodokia; but, increasingly, so were individuals outside the<br />
public sphere blamed for bribing them. What began as a fear that individuals within a<br />
political body were making poor judgments about the community’s interests shifted to<br />
include the concern that individuals outside a political body were illicitly influencing the<br />
entire body in order to effect poor judgments about the community’s interests. Many of<br />
these poor judgments concerned the accountability of public officials and, towards the<br />
end of the century, the accountability of private citizens entering into the public sphere.<br />
As before, with this series of legal changes there continued to be divergent views<br />
on what to do with the dōrodokos: once the dēmos had passed its judgment on him,<br />
should he be expelled from or reintegrated into the community? Should his ‘insider’ or<br />
his ‘outsider’ status prevail? In the case of the graphē dekasmou, the Athenians<br />
displayed little tolerance for individuals who corrupted the judicial process; with an<br />
automatic death penalty, it expelled from the community forever those found guilty. 69 By<br />
contrast, no comparable penalty existed when non-magistrates were prosecuted under the<br />
graphē dōrōn: the only punishments for that procedure seem to have been the penalty of<br />
atimia qua disfranchisement or a tenfold fine (Aeschin. 3.232, Din. 2.16).<br />
It is all the more striking, therefore, that of the seven known prosecutions of<br />
ambassadors and public speakers suspected of dōrodokia in the fourth century not one<br />
used the graphē dōrōn process. Instead, all seven trials employed the eisangelia process,<br />
and every conviction resulted in the death penalty. 70 Our evidence is doubtless limited<br />
69 Whether or not they were always prosecuted is another matter altogether. Isocrates decries how the<br />
politicians who corrupted (diafqei=rai) the most people the most obviously (fanerw/tata) were elected to<br />
the stratēgia (Isoc. 8.50). Similarly, Aeschines reports that it was common to hear accusations that people<br />
had bribed juries (Aeschin. 1.86), one reason behind the exceptional citizen registration process ordered by<br />
Demophilus’ decree in 346/5: see further below.<br />
70 The cases were against Andocides, Epicrates, Eubulides, and Cratinus (392/1); Timagoras (367);<br />
Callistratus (361/0); Philocrates (343); and Euxenippus (330-24). Additionally, the stratēgoi Ergocles<br />
285