BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six
0Aqhnai/wn xrh/mata lamba/nwn, Hyp. 4.8). 48 Certainly the nomos eisangeltikos also
prohibited public speakers from making false promises to the Athenian people; what is
exceptional about the clause on dōrodokia is that it regulated the conduct of these private
individuals even before they entered the public sphere. 49 Any money or dōra they may
have taken for proposing a specific decree, say, became illicit the moment that their
decree was deemed against the interests of the dēmos. 50
To be sure, the inclusion of rhētores in the nomos eisangeltikos was but one of a
few different ways the Athenians began to formalize the role of public speakers in the
democracy during this period. 51 What these formal regulations reveal is that, as the
Athenians began to police the contact individuals had with political institutions, they did
so by refashioning regulations on the conduct of public officials. 52 So, around the same
time that the nomos eisangeltikos was formalized and expanded to include rhētores, a
number of its clauses were redrafted as separate laws applicable to private individuals
48
When Hyperides refers to this law later, he adds that rhētores were to be prosecuted for speaking against
the dēmos’ interests, afer taking money “and gifts from those acting against the dēmos,” (dwrea\j para\
tw=n ta)nanti/a pratto/ntwn tw| = dh/mw|, Hyp. 4.39). The additions does not substantively change the
meaning of the clause; accordingly, throughout this section I will refer only to the first part of the clause.
49
Cf. e)a/n tij to\n dh=mon u(posxo/menoj e)capath/sh|, Dem. 49.67. See also the clauses cited in
Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines (Dem. 20. 100, 135) with discussion at Hansen (1975: 13-14) and
Hesk (2000: 51-7). In 489, Miltiades was prosecuted most likely for deceiving the dēmos (cf. Hdt. 6.136):
Harrison (1971: 54), Hansen (1975: 69), MacDowell (1978: 179), Rhodes (1979: 105), Hesk (2000: 52).
The process may have been an eisangelia, as Hansen (1975: 69) argues, but cf. Rhodes (1979: 104-5) and
Hesk (2000: 51-2).
50
Recall that public speakers often received some kind of fee for proposing decrees or honors: see further
Chapter Two and Jackson (1919). Again, therefore, the question of dōrodokia was intimately connected to
the performance of these speakers, whether their actions benefited or harmed the community.
51
Two other measures included the graphē paranomōn procedure—under which a public speaker could be
prosecuted for proposing a decree against the city’s interests—and a special kind of dokimasia, or public
scrutiny, for those citizens who had spoken in a public assembly yet had not been qualified to do so.
Hansen (1974) is fundamental on the graphē paranomōn. I agree with his dating of the institution to the
last quarter of the fifth century (cf. Andoc. 1.17, 22). The locus classicus for the dokimasia rhētorōn is
Aeschines’ prosecution of Timarchus (Aeschines 1): see further Lipsius (1905-15: 2.278-82).
52
Although the dokimasia rhētōrōn came essentially after, not before, someone had acted in a ‘public’
capacity, its criteria for evaluating citizens were similar to that in a regular dokimasia. Aeschines 1.27-32
explains how public speakers could not have committed a military offense nor have been cruel to their
parents, among other things. Both of these criteria held for the scrutiny of magistrates, as well (cf. AP
55.3). Similarly, the graphē paranomōn established a legal standard for holding speakers accountable, just
like in a euthyna.
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