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BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six<br />

with political institutions like assemblies, lawcourts, and executive boards. 47 Unlike<br />

public officials, who were regularly held accountable by the end of the fifth century,<br />

these private individuals could engage with the polity yet seemingly evade accountability.<br />

This section will trace how the legal and institutional changes from the end of the fifth<br />

century onward reflected a revised understanding of the dōrodokos. As we will see,<br />

focusing on both bribe-givers and bribe-takers, that is both outsiders and insiders at once,<br />

mirrored how the dōrodokos himself was conceived as simultaneously inside and outside<br />

the moral community of the dēmos. Institutional reform was thus articulated in response<br />

to the dōrodokos.<br />

In the previous section we saw how, by 411, the eisangelia procedure came to be<br />

used for a number of new offenses, including dōrodokia: specific kinds of dōrodokia,<br />

meaning specific kinds of dōrodokoi, were thus singled out for legal action. Crucially,<br />

some of these new dōrodokoi were not public officials. On the one hand, it is<br />

straightforward enough that the treason clause of the nomos eisangeltikos was expanded<br />

to include a provision against taking dōra (cf. dw=ra lamba/nh|, Lex. Cant. s.v.<br />

ei)saggeli/a). As discussed earlier, this clause would have been used primarily to<br />

prosecute stratēgoi or other top military officials who were elected to control whole<br />

armies, particularly as it was incorporated into a clause on the actions of stratēgoi. On<br />

the other hand, it is remarkable that the conduct of rhētores, who were not magistrates,<br />

was regulated in the same way: they were forbidden to “take money and speak against<br />

the interests of the Athenian people” (r(h/twr w2n mh\ le/gh| ta\ a1rista tw| = dh/mw| tw= |<br />

47 As Wallace (2006) rightly describes, one general feature of the Athenian democracy was that ‘private’<br />

conduct was defined as essentially anything that did not harm the community or another individual. I<br />

would add, moreover, that this specific demarcation of private and public was something that developed<br />

over time. This section outlines one crucial step in that development.<br />

277

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