BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six fines for dōrodokia towards the end of the fifth century, bribe-takers could also be reintegrated into the polity. As the Athenians began to rethink what to do about the dōrodokos, they also began to rethink who he was in the first place. Chapter Two surveyed the rise of the so- called New Politicians in the second half of the fifth century: citizens whose political authority was based more on their rhetorical abilities than on family wealth or prestige. Individuals like Cleon and Hyperbolus acquired pre-eminent standing because they could persuade the masses through their command of rhetoric. Yet this new style of politics was not without its critics. In the Wasps and Knights Aristophanes decried how politicians like Cleon were effectively corrupting the political process, whether through outright persuasion or, more dangerously, through promises and services to the dēmos. And, indeed, as we saw in Chapter Two, in the second half of the fifth century the Athenians began to condemn giving as much as taking dōra illicitly. Aristophanes’ criticisms are emblematic of an acute anxiety attending the rise of the New Politicians, namely, that political institutions were changing, and not for the better. Contemporary critics of the democracy blamed the fickleness of the masses for unjust court decisions, like the execution of the Arginusae generals; poor collective decisions, like the Sicilian Expedition, which was thought fueled more by the Assembly’s desires than by any prudent deliberation; and unfair policies that disproportionately burdened elites, while the masses enjoyed the fruits of their labor. 45 In each case, the 45 For an overview of these concerns, see Chapters Two and Three. Courts: AP 34.1, Diod. 13.102.5. Assembly: Ober (1998: 104-20, esp. 114-18). The vulnerability of the dēmos to make poor collective decisions at the end of the fifth century is also borne out by the creation of a procedure for illegal proposals, or graphē paranomōn, and the distinction between public decrees (psēphismata) and laws (nomoi) which were forged through the complex process of nomothesia: Hansen (1974) on graphē paranomōn, Harrison (1955), MacDowell (1975), Rhodes (1985), Hansen (1999: 168-9) on nomothesia. Economy: Recall that, beginning in the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians began to levy the eisphora, or war-time tax on the elite: 275

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six deliberative process of collective institutions resulted in poor decisions, and within this context of general institutional failure, dōrodokia was increasingly suspected. In many respects, this was a new concern for the democracy. In the first half of the century, the threat of corruption of individual officials was chiefly mitigated by the large size of political bodies: boards of magistrates came in multiples of ten, juries numbered in the hundreds, and assemblies in the thousands, so the potential damage done by a single corrupt individual was limited. Yet, despite their apparently unassailable size, the growing importance of the jury courts and Assembly as arenas for acquiring political authority made them all the more vulnerable to corruption. Especially as the Peloponnesian War progressed and political outcomes worsened, it was here, in these larger political bodies, that critics like Aristophanes feared dōrodokia was taking root. We might relegate these fears to only a specific group of Athenians who were generally critical of what Athens’ polity had become, but it is striking how these new anxieties over democracy were attended (and often preceded) by legal expressions of a new concern about dōrodokia. In the second half of the century, the Athenians began to shift their focus in law from how a public official might be corrupted to how a single individual, like a Cleon, might corrupt an entire political body through persuasion and, it was suspected, dōrodokia. 46 Shifting from bribe-takers to bribe-givers, the legal image of the dōrodokos broadened to include essentially private individuals who came into contact cf. Thuc. 3.19.1, Lys. 21.3, Diod. 13.47.7, 13.52.5, 13.64.4 and generally Christ (2006: 156-62, esp. 161-2) on the increasing economic obligations of the elite during the fifth-century democracy. 46 Scholars commonly note the improbability that large groups of people, whether on juries or at an Assembly, were bribed: e.g. Staveley (1972: 113), Taylor (2007: 325, 329-30). Even despite this improbability, however, the Athenians readily assumed that large groups were, in fact, being bribed: cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.7; Thuc. 6. 13.1; Lys. 12.43-4, 29.12; Pl. Tht. 173d; Xen. Symp. 1.4; Isoc. 18.11; Dem. 18.149; AP 27.5. More importantly, by positing that bribery of large groups was infrequent in actuality, these scholars obfuscate the role this assumption played in the workings of the democracy: however unfounded, it shifted in part how the Athenians regulated dōrodokia. 276

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Six<br />

fines for dōrodokia towards the end of the fifth century, bribe-takers could also be<br />

reintegrated into the polity.<br />

As the Athenians began to rethink what to do about the dōrodokos, they also<br />

began to rethink who he was in the first place. Chapter Two surveyed the rise of the so-<br />

called New Politicians in the second half of the fifth century: citizens whose political<br />

authority was based more on their rhetorical abilities than on family wealth or prestige.<br />

Individuals like Cleon and Hyperbolus acquired pre-eminent standing because they could<br />

persuade the masses through their command of rhetoric. Yet this new style of politics<br />

was not without its critics. In the Wasps and Knights Aristophanes decried how<br />

politicians like Cleon were effectively corrupting the political process, whether through<br />

outright persuasion or, more dangerously, through promises and services to the dēmos.<br />

And, indeed, as we saw in Chapter Two, in the second half of the fifth century the<br />

Athenians began to condemn giving as much as taking dōra illicitly.<br />

Aristophanes’ criticisms are emblematic of an acute anxiety attending the rise of<br />

the New Politicians, namely, that political institutions were changing, and not for the<br />

better. Contemporary critics of the democracy blamed the fickleness of the masses for<br />

unjust court decisions, like the execution of the Arginusae generals; poor collective<br />

decisions, like the Sicilian Expedition, which was thought fueled more by the Assembly’s<br />

desires than by any prudent deliberation; and unfair policies that disproportionately<br />

burdened elites, while the masses enjoyed the fruits of their labor. 45 In each case, the<br />

45 For an overview of these concerns, see Chapters Two and Three. Courts: AP 34.1, Diod. 13.102.5.<br />

Assembly: Ober (1998: 104-20, esp. 114-18). The vulnerability of the dēmos to make poor collective<br />

decisions at the end of the fifth century is also borne out by the creation of a procedure for illegal proposals,<br />

or graphē paranomōn, and the distinction between public decrees (psēphismata) and laws (nomoi) which<br />

were forged through the complex process of nomothesia: Hansen (1974) on graphē paranomōn, Harrison<br />

(1955), MacDowell (1975), Rhodes (1985), Hansen (1999: 168-9) on nomothesia. Economy: Recall that,<br />

beginning in the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians began to levy the eisphora, or war-time tax on the elite:<br />

275

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