BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Five but even how the norms governing dōrodokia should be defined. Positing such a legitimizing role for law helps explain the relationship between how dōrodokia was defined in law and how this definition shaped the ways in which litigants framed the offense. We can test the value of the above framework by turning the rich yet tangled story of what I argue is the first Athenian law concerning dōrodokia. As we will see, uncovering the text of this law implicates a number of discrete legislative acts throughout the democracy, including changes in the law’s substance, penalty and procedure. Only by outlining this diachronic change will we be in a position to understand why the law was drafted in the first place, and why it was drafted in the form that it was. After tracing the history of this one law, we will then turn, in the next chapter, to the remaining formal measures adopted during the democracy. The Original Law against dōrodokia: The first Athenian legislation on dōrodokia probably pre-dated the democracy by nearly a century. Although we have no direct evidence that such a law existed—no record of any sixth-century trials for dōrodokia, no ascription of any such law to an early lawgiver—a few scattered clues alert us to the probability that in 594 the Athenian lawgiver Solon drafted a law forbidding public officials, especially judges, from committing dōrodokia. The text of the law comes down to us from a speech of Demosthenes, who cites the law as evidence that his opponent had committed a grave 233

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Five offense in allegedly bribing the family of a recently deceased to claim that the man had been murdered by Demosthenes 37 : e0a/n tij 0Aqhnai/wn lamba/nh| para/ tinoj, h@ au0to\j didw| ~ e9te/rw|, h2 diafqei/rh| tina\j e0paggello/menoj, e0pi\ bla/bh| tou~ dh/mou h@ 38 tino\j tw=n politw~n tro/pw| h@ mhxanh~ | h| )ntiniou~n, a1timoj e1stw kai\ pai=dej kai\ ta\ e0kei/nou. If any Athenian should receive from another, or himself should give to the other, or should he corrupt a few men by freely making promises, to the harm of the people or one of the citizens in any way whatsoever, let him and his children and property be outlawed. (Dem. 21.113) 37 The law as we have it was not included in the speech first published by Demosthenes, but instead was inserted later by a scholiast who conjectured which law Demosthenes had read out to the jury on the occasion of his trial. As a result, doubts about the law’s authenticity have been echoed for at least a century: Drerup (1897: 304-5), for example, assumes on Pollux’ authority that the graphē dōrōn covered only taking bribes (Pollux 8.42). Pollux is contradicted by Lex. Seg. 237 s.v. dw/rwn grafh/, which claims that the procedure could be used for both giving and taking bribes. In any case, Pollux’ neat division of procedures for giving (dekasmou) and taking (dōrōn) bribes cannot be correct if [Dem.] 46.26— which includes both—refers to the graphē dekasmou. Cf. Glotz (1904: 502-3) with refutation by Hansen (1976: 88n.25). MacDowell (1990: 43-6) has compellingly argued in favor of the law’s authenticity. 38 h2: h2 i)di/a| Westermann; kai\ i)di/a|: Reiske; h2 dia\: Iurinus; kai\ dia\ S vulg. With the exception of this one phrase the text of the law is otherwise certain in the manuscripts that do not omit the law. The manuscript reading e)pi\ bla/bh| tou= dh/mou kai\ dia\ tino\j tw=n politw~n clearly has to be emended: why would giving or receiving dōra “through one of the citizens” have been a necessary condition in addition to harm to the dēmos? Iurinus’ emendation only creates an odd antithesis between giving/receiving bribes “to the harm of the dēmos” and “through one of the citizens.” Reiske ingeniously suggested that dia/ conceals i)di/a|, which Westermann further changed to h2 i)di/a| tino\j tw=n politw=n. Westermann’s reading has been standard for over a century but, as I argue here, the use of the word i)di/a| creates nonsensical Greek. On purely philological grounds, both Westermann’s and Reiske’s reading are untenable. If i)di/a| is taken as an adjective modifying bla/bh|, we would need a definite article before the adjective; and to take it as an adverb, as most scholars seem to do, significantly strains the sense of the words, for we would expect that it would then modify the offense as done ‘privately’, not that it would redundantly clarify that an individual’s harm was ‘in private’. On legal grounds, too, the word is problematic, for it is unclear why an offense explicitly marked out as part of the ‘private’ sphere—as i)di/oj regularly connotes: cf. Pl. Euth. 2a; Isoc. 11.28, 32, 35; AP 59.2-3, 67.1; Dem. 18.210, 24.192-3, [Dem.] 46.26—would actually be treated as a public offense punishable under a graphē: see especially Drerup (1897: 304), who accordingly thinks the law spurious. For precisely this reason, in fact, the unparalleled phrase grafa\j i)di/aj is often excised from the law against hybris, also cited in Demosthenes’ speech against Midias. For that law as well as for yet another law cited in the same speech (cf. i)di/aj decia\j, Dem. 21.52), MacDowell (1990: 268 ad Dem. 21.47) shrewdly posits that the word i)di/a| had originally been written next to these quoted laws in order to indicate that they were ‘separate’ from the rest of the speech; he posits that a later scribe incorporated the annotation into the text of each law, thus inadvertently creating textual difficulties. By the same process i)di/a| could have entered the general law against dōrodokia, as well. When combined with what came before, this addition would have created HIDIA, later misread as AIDIA or KIDIA and emended to KAIDIA, as per the manuscripts’ kai\ dia/. By excising i)di/a? |, Iurinus’emendation of kai\ to h@ is clearly correct, and we are left with a much more straightforward reading that neatly balances harm done to the dēmos and that done to individual citizens. 234

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Five<br />

but even how the norms governing dōrodokia should be defined. Positing such a<br />

legitimizing role for law helps explain the relationship between how dōrodokia was<br />

defined in law and how this definition shaped the ways in which litigants framed the<br />

offense.<br />

We can test the value of the above framework by turning the rich yet tangled story<br />

of what I argue is the first Athenian law concerning dōrodokia. As we will see,<br />

uncovering the text of this law implicates a number of discrete legislative acts throughout<br />

the democracy, including changes in the law’s substance, penalty and procedure. Only<br />

by outlining this diachronic change will we be in a position to understand why the law<br />

was drafted in the first place, and why it was drafted in the form that it was. After tracing<br />

the history of this one law, we will then turn, in the next chapter, to the remaining formal<br />

measures adopted during the democracy.<br />

The Original Law against dōrodokia:<br />

The first Athenian legislation on dōrodokia probably pre-dated the democracy by<br />

nearly a century. Although we have no direct evidence that such a law existed—no<br />

record of any sixth-century trials for dōrodokia, no ascription of any such law to an early<br />

lawgiver—a few scattered clues alert us to the probability that in 594 the Athenian<br />

lawgiver Solon drafted a law forbidding public officials, especially judges, from<br />

committing dōrodokia. The text of the law comes down to us from a speech of<br />

Demosthenes, who cites the law as evidence that his opponent had committed a grave<br />

233

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