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BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Five<br />

think of these factors as endpoints on a sliding scale, then ultimately our goal here is to<br />

pinpoint the balance struck between them. At different points in time, and for different<br />

aspects of a given law, the balance will shift closer to one end or to the other; tracking<br />

these shifts for any given law will provide a framework for tracing the role of that law in<br />

society.<br />

In terms of defining an offense, Athenian laws were notorious for being<br />

substantively vague. 23 Moreover, there is little reason to think that legal definitions<br />

entailed considerable translation from common understandings of what an offense was.<br />

After all, there were no real legal professionals in Athens, so there was no institutional<br />

context by which a legal definition could be fixed, have precedent, and consequently be<br />

refined over time—traditionally the very processes by which ‘law’ becomes divorced<br />

from social realities. 24 Even when litigants referred to the legal definition of an offense,<br />

for example, they did so only informally, focusing on the spirit not the letter of the law. 25<br />

We can expect, then, that when dōrodokia was given legal expression, its definition<br />

closely matched prevailing ideas of what constituted dōrodokia.<br />

Inasmuch as Athenian litigants commonly cited legal definitions only<br />

informally—and only rarely tried to determine whether an offense in question matched its<br />

legal definition—we would expect that there would be relatively little correlation<br />

23<br />

Noted already in antiquity: AP 9.2, cf. AP 35.2; Arist. Rhet. 1.1354a27-30, b11-16, 1374a8; Pl. Polit.<br />

294a10-295a7.<br />

24<br />

Precisely because it was left to jury members to define, for themselves, which social norms applied to a<br />

particular case, rigorous legal definitions were unnecessary: see further Chapter Seven, cf. Carey (1994:<br />

178-9), Lanni (2006: 117-18). The divorcing of legal norms from social experience has been underscored<br />

in sociolegal scholarship on legal consciousness. To the extent that social actors are aware that their<br />

actions are constituted by legal norms in particular, they reframe their own experience of those actions: see<br />

especially Yngvesson (1989), Ewick and Silbey (1992, 2003), Silbey (1992: esp. 45-6).<br />

25<br />

Todd (2000a: 29-30) rightly points out that informal definition of the law, focusing on the broader<br />

meaning of a statute, not on the details of its wording, was common in Athenian courtrooms in large part<br />

because statutes were mere evidence (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1.15.2-12), not strict rules by which evidence was<br />

judged: cf. Harrison (1971: 134-5), Harris (1988: 367-70), Todd (1993: 58-60), Carey (1994: 178-9).<br />

226

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