BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Introduction
definitions hinge on an actor’s self-conscious decision to commit an abuse in order to
receive, or because she has already received, a bribe. In this sense, a bribe is constituted
by a corrupting intent. This is precisely how numerous laws define bribery. 18 When we
ask whether or not bribery was committed, therefore, we tend to frame this question in
terms of intent. In the case of Timagoras, the question becomes, “Did Timagoras intend
to abuse his power in order to receive dōra from the King?”
By focusing on the intent of the bribe, these definitions all implicitly answer the
very problem of intent: “What was Timagoras’ motivation in abusing his power? To win
dōra from the King.” Market-based approaches to bribery have been particularly popular
theoretical models, in this regard, precisely because they promise to predict the behavior
of political agents who, like Timagoras, are placed into a situation in which they must
represent the interests of their agent, here the Athenian people. Perhaps unsurprisingly
given that this model was developed by political economists, such predictions stem from
rational actor models of behavior. Why, then, did Timagoras take the King’s dōra? A
more specific answer would posit that the incentives—the dōra themselves—outweighed
the risks of any potential costs, such as death, loss of prestige, or, in Timagoras’ case,
prolonged illness. In gauging the intent of someone like Timagoras, the question is thus
framed in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, precisely as we asked earlier: “why, given the
high risk of death, did Timagoras take bribes?”
It should be noted that the most prominent factor in structuring an agent’s cost-
benefit analysis is usually taken to be the law itself; this is, in fact, a major reason why
market-based approaches feature so heavily in public policy debates today. To be sure,
18 See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) and, generally, “Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery
Law,” 92 Har. L. R. 451 [1978]; section 1 of the British Prevention of Corruption Act (1906).
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