BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four
Significantly, therefore, the Athenians’ response to the suspected threat of stasis in the
340’s and 330’s focused on Athens’ laws, institutions, and political constitution as
embodiments of the democracy itself. 50 As we will see, it was this new symbolic
embodiment of the polis which was under attack by the dōrodokos.
In particular, more than ever before the Athenians weighed the monies of
dōrodokia against the currency of civic contributions and public honors. Certainly by the
middle of the fourth century, it had been well-established that financial contributions by
the wealthy were an essential part of the democracy: no longer did the city have an
empire of allied states contributing a tribute, and, as we saw above, the city’s financial
recovery in the 350’s and 340’s was predicated to a large extent on considerable elite
involvement. 51 Above and beyond mere financial importance, however, the good works
of elite citizens played a vital symbolic role within the polis as well. While Athens’ other
117-20), and most recently Sullivan (2003). A number of contemporary sources discuss the Areopagus’
role in the democracy: e.g. Isoc. 7 passim; Din. 1.5, 6, 9, 54-9, 62; Dem. 18.133-4; de Bruyn (1995: 155-
61) and, on legal attacks against the Areopagus, Sealey (1958: 72-3).
50 Indeed, that the laws, not the people, were sovereign was commonly pointed out in this period: cf.
Aeschin. 1.4-5, 3.6, 3.169; Dem. 21. 223-5, 23.73, 22.46, 24.5, 24.75-6, 24.118, 25.20-1, 57.56; Lyc. 1.3-4;
Din. 3.16; Hyp. 4.5. Hansen (1975: 48; 1990b: 239-42), Ostwald (1986: 497), Ober (1989: 299-304);
Lanni (forthcoming) reminds, however, that this was as much a rhetorical claim as a reality, that the law
was subordinated to judgments of the people in numerous ways. For the laws and the judicial system as the
democracy’s safeguard, see especially Aeschin. 3.6, 3.169, 3.196; Lyc. 1.3-4, fr. 70; Dem. 24.156, 24.216
with Allen (2000: 180-3). In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that, in two cases of attempted
overthrow of the democracy, the prosecutor claims that the defendant had simply broken the law, but that,
because the laws embodied the democracy, his action had infringed upon the constitution, as well: the two
cases involved Lycophron (Hyp. 1 fr. 4a.12, Lyc. fr. 70) and Diognides (Hyp. 3.3)
51 On this point, it is crucial that the allied contributions to the Second Athenian League were termed a
syntaxis (contribution) instead of phoros (tribute) precisely because the word phoros carried such pejorative
connotations from the fifth century: IG ii² 45.21-2; Harpocration s.v. su/ntacij; cf. Dreher (1995: 59-60).
More importantly, as IG ii² 123.11-12 indicates, the allied syntaxeis were to be controlled by the synedrion
of the League, not by the Athenian dēmos. Unlike with the tribute, the democracy’s administrative
expenses simply were not alleviated by the League’s contributions: Davies (1978: 224), Cargill (1981:
124-7), de Ste Croix (1981: 293), Dreher (1995: 79-80). For Athens’ general financial woes during the
fourth century, see especially de Ste Croix (1981: 607n.37). Concerning, specifically, the depletion of the
treasury after the Social War, Dem. 10.77 remarks that the city’s total post-war revenues were a mere 130
talents. Within ten years, however, this number was up to 400 talents (Dem. 10.37-9; Theopomp. FGrH
115 F 166). Accordingly, much of Eubulus’ policy at the time was directed at generating domestic
revenues through leasing the mines, maintaining foreign interests (especially in the Chersonese), and using
private monies in public works: on these fiscal policy changes, Cawkwell (1963) and recently Burke
(2002: esp. 171-5; 181-2).
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